What is Segmented custody as per bnss?

 "Segmented custody" (or staggered police custody) refers to a significant change in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Under Section 187 of the BNSS, the 15-day maximum police custody period no longer needs to be taken consecutively within the first 15 days of arrest. "Segmented custody" is Police custody which is broken into segments.

Instead, the police can now take custody in "whole or in parts" at any time within a larger window of the initial 40 or 60 days of the total 60/90 days investigation period. 

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Karnataka HC: As per S.187 of BNSS ,Police Custody Must Be Within First Forty Days For Offences Punishable Upto 10 Years Imprisonment

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

(i) A slight tweak in the new regime qua 187(3) of BNSS in juxtaposition to Section 167(2) of the earlier regime - the Cr.P.C. has not changed the purpose of the provision.

(ii) The phraseology of the words 'ten years or more' found in sub-clause (i) of Section 187(3) of the BNSS would mean, the minimum threshold punishment imposable on an offence under the BNS should be ten years.

(iii) The offence in the case at hand, does not bear a minimum threshold sentence of ten years, but is extendable or to an extent of ten years, which would mean, discretion available to the concerned Court to impose punishment up to ten years. Therefore, the minimum threshold is not ten years.

(iv) Completion of investigation in a punishment which is up to ten years is undoubtedly 60 days. Rest of the other offences, be it death, life imprisonment of ten years and more, would be 90 days.

(v) If the investigation is to complete within 60 days, the period of police custody would run from day one day forty of registration of the crime. If it is 90 days, it would run from day one to day 60, maximum period in both the cases is 15 days of police custody.

(vi) In the case at hand, the offence is punishable up to ten years, Therefore, the police custody is only from day one to day forty.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no warrant to interfere with the order passed by the concerned Court, the petitions deserve to be rejected and are accordingly, rejected.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 13459 of 2024 and Writ Petition No. 33526 of 2024 (GM - RES)

Decided On: 13.12.2024

State of Karnataka Vs. Kalandar Shafi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/4163/2024.

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Supreme Court upheld Karnataka High court judgment on police custody remand under S 187 of BNSS(Old S 167 of CRPC)

 The concerned Court itself came to the conclusion that police custody is not required and has dismissed the application(s) of the prosecution as well as the Complainant. We see no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 18063/2024

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 13-12-2024

in WP No. 33526/2024 (GM-RES) passed by the High Court of Karnataka  at Bengaluru]

HYDER ALI Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

Date : 08-01-2025 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

Read Karanataka HC Judgment here: Click here.

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Karnataka HC laid down the principles for grant of police custody under S 187 of BNSS(Old S 167 of CRPC)

 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

(i) A slight tweak in the new regime qua 187(3) of BNSS in juxtaposition to Section 167(2) of the earlier regime - the Cr.P.C. has not changed the purpose of the provision.

(ii) The phraseology of the words 'ten years or more' found in sub-clause (i) of Section 187(3) of the BNSS would mean, the minimum threshold punishment imposable on an offence under the BNS should be ten years.

(iii) The offence in the case at hand, does not bear a minimum threshold sentence of ten years, but is extendable or to an extent of ten years, which would mean, discretion available to the concerned Court to impose punishment up to ten years. Therefore, the minimum threshold is not ten years.

(iv) Completion of investigation in a punishment which is up to ten years is undoubtedly 60 days. Rest of the other offences, be it death, life imprisonment of ten years and more, would be 90 days.

(v) If the investigation is to complete within 60 days, the period of police custody would run from day one day forty of registration of the crime. If it is 90 days, it would run from day one to day 60, maximum period in both the cases is 15 days of police custody.

(vi) In the case at hand, the offence is punishable up to ten years, Therefore, the police custody is only from day one to day forty.

Summary of Judgment

The High Court of Karnataka addressed the issue of whether police custody could be extended beyond 40 days for accused Kalandar Shafi and others, charged with offenses under the BNS, which carry a maximum punishment of up to ten years. The State of Karnataka and the complainant argued for a 90-day investigation period, claiming the offenses warranted it. However, the court interpreted Section 187 of the BNSS, akin to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., to mean that only offenses with a minimum threshold punishment of ten years qualify for a 90-day period. Since the alleged offenses were punishable up to ten years, the court upheld the Magistrate's decision to deny extended police custody, affirming that the investigation should be completed within 60 days, with police custody permissible only within the first 40 days. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 13459 of 2024 and Writ Petition No. 33526 of 2024 (GM - RES)

Decided On: 13.12.2024

State of Karnataka Vs. Kalandar Shafi and Ors.

and

Hyder Ali Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/4163/2024.

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Supreme Court: Investigating Officers can not seek police custody remand of accused after competent Court has granted anticipatory bail

 The arguments advanced by learned senior counsel appearing for the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Gujarat as well as the High Court of Gujarat about the long-standing practice prevailing in the State, that the Investigating Officer(s) are given liberty to seek police custody remand of the accused after competent Court has granted anticipatory bail does not appeal to us for a moment. Such an interpretation does not appear to be in consonance with the unambiguous position of law. The provisions of anticipatory bail enumerated under Section 438 CrPC or the newly enacted Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023(hereinafter being referred to as ‘BNSS’), which has come into force with effect from 1st July, 2024, do not contemplate any such liberty to the Investigating Officer. However, the Court adjudicating an application for anticipatory bail may, in a given case, restrict the tenure of anticipatory bail in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Sushila Agarwal(supra) and may also impose suitable conditions in light thereof. However, it does not stand to reason that as a matter of course, the High Court or the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, while exercising anticipatory bail jurisdiction, grants pre-arrest bail to the accused and yet, invariably the Investigating Officer is given blanket liberty to keep the accused in custody for prolonged periods in a routine manner. This would virtually frustrate the very purpose and intent behind the grant of anticipatory bail to an accused. The relevant excerpts in this regard from the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sushila Agarwal(supra) are reproduced below for the sake of ready reference: -

“85.3. Section 438 CrPC does not compel or oblige courts to

impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing

of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police,

during investigation or inquiry, etc. While weighing and

considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the

court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the

person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of

investigation, or tampering with evidence (including

intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as

leaving the country), etc. The courts would be justified — and

ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437(3) CrPC [by

virtue of Section 438(2)]. The necessity to impose other

restrictive conditions, would have to be weighed on a case-bycase basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the

State or the investigating agency. Such special or other

restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases

warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine manner, in

all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of

anticipatory bail may be granted, if they are required in the

facts of any case or cases; however, such limiting conditions

may not be invariably imposed.

85.4-85.7.…..

85.8. It is open to the police or the investigating agency to

move the court concerned, which granted anticipatory bail,

in the first instance, for a direction under Section 439(2)

to arrest the accused, in the event of violation of any term,

such as absconding, non-cooperating during investigation,

evasion, intimidation or inducement to witnesses with a

view to influence outcome of the investigation or trial, etc.

The court, in this context, is the court which grants anticipatory

bail, in the first instance, according to prevailing authorities.”

 (emphasis supplied). {Para 55}

56. The ratio of the above judgment makes it clear that Section

438 CrPC does not compel or oblige courts to impose conditions

limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. The necessity to impose restrictive conditions other than those spelt out in Section 437(3) CrPC would have to be weighed on a case-by-case basis and depending upon the materials produced by the State or the Investigating Agency. Such special or other restrictive conditions may be imposed if the factual context of the case warrants but should not be imposed in a routine manner and the Court would have to act with circumspection depending on the particular facts of each case before endeavouring to impose such conditions.

57. This Court has time and again held that the discretion to

grant pre-arrest bail should be exercised with great degree of

circumspection. Reference in this regard may be made to P.

Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24.

58. Thus, the power to grant anticipatory bail is not to be

exercised in a routine manner and the Courts are expected to use

this provision with a great degree of circumspection. Once, a Court bearing in mind the strict parameters applicable to grant of anticipatory bail exercises such power, then in such a situation, giving a handle to the Investigating Officer to seek police custody remand of the accused, would virtually negate and frustrate the very purpose behind the order of anticipatory bail. Hence, we have no hesitation in holding that the practice prevalent in the State of Gujarat that the Courts while dealing with the anticipatory bail application routinely impose the restrictive condition whereby, the Investigating Officers are granted blanket permission to seek police custody remand of the accused, in whose favour the order of anticipatory bail is passed, is in direct contravention to the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sushila Agarwal(supra). The Division Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Sunilbhai Sudhirbhai Kothari(supra) does not hold good in law as the same runs contrary to the ratio of Sushila Agarwal(supra) and thus, the same stands impliedly overruled.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

INHERENT/CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONTEMPT PETITION(CIVIL) NO(S). OF 2024 (D. No. 1106 OF 2024) IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.) NO(S). 14489 OF 2023

TUSHARBHAI RAJNIKANTBHAI SHAH  Vs

KAMAL DAYANI & ORS. 

Dated: August 07, 2024.

Citation: 2024 INSC 588.

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Bombay HC: Order rejecting police custody remand is not interlocutory and revision is maintainable against said order

The learned Judge of this Court in R. Shakuntala, finally came to conclusion that an order rejecting application for remand of the accused to judicial custody is a final order and not an interlocutory order. This will be applicable with equal force to the refusal of request for police custody also. As such, the order passed by the Magistrate rejecting request for police custody cannot be treated as interlocutory order because the police cannot repeat and make applications again and again for police custody after the application for police custody had been rejected once and particularly in view of the limitation under Section 167 Cr.P.C. that the police custody may be granted only during first 15 days after the arrest or detention and not thereafter. If such application for police custody is rejected, that order becomes final and the Investigating Officer is permanently deprived of seeking police custody of that accused for the purpose o further investigation, discovery, etc. even though the offence may be very serious.

By granting bail and refusing police custody of the accused, who were not in police custody even for a day, the learned Magistrate practically prohibited the investigating agency from making proper investigation to the case which, in fact, required in-depth investigation and which could not be possible without the police custody. Therefore, while the order refusing the police custody could be challenged under revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, the order granting bail could be cancelled by the superior courts, including the Sessions Court, by virtue of the powers under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 2785 of 2009 and Criminal Application No. 425 of 2010

Decided On: 22.07.2010

Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2011 Cri L J 515, MANU/MH/0806/2010.

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Supreme Court: Criminal revision is not maintainable against order of police custody remand

Section 167 Cr.P.C. empowers a Judicial Magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in the custody of police. Section 209 Cr.P.C. confers power upon a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody until the case has been committed to the Court of Sessions and also until the conclusion of the trial. Section 309 Cr.P.C. confers power upon a Court to remand all accused to custody after taking cognizance of an offence or during commencement of trial when it finds it necessary to adjourn the enquiry or trial. The order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings of the trial itself nor it can have any effect on the ultimate decision of the case. If an order of remand is found to be illegal, it cannot result in acquittal of the accused or in termination of proceedings. A remand order cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner. Therefore, applying the test laid down in Madhu Limaye's case (supra), it cannot be categorised even as an "intermediate order". The order is, therefore, a pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by Sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C., a revision against the said order is not maintainable. The High Court, therefore, erred in entertaining the revision against the order dated 6.11.2001 of the Metropolitan Magistrate granting police custody of the accused Joy Immaculate for one day. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 575-576 of 2004 

Decided On: 05.05.2004

State Rep. by Inspector of Police and Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Rajendra Babu, C.J., A.R. Lakshmanan and G.P. Mathur, JJ.

Authored By : G.P. Mathur, A.R. Lakshmanan

Citation: AIR 2004 SC 2282,MANU/SC/0448/2004.

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Whether the court can grant remainder days of police custody remand of accused if police could not interrogate him previously if he was admitted in hospital?

7.1. It is true that in the case of Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra), this Court observed that there cannot be any police custody beyond 15 days from the date of arrest. In our opinion, the view taken by this Court in the case of Anupam J. Kulkarni (supra) requires re-consideration. When we put a very pertinent question to Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent-Accused that in a given case it may happen that the learned trial/Special Court refuses to grant the police custody erroneously which as such was prayed within 15 days and/or immediately on the date of arrest and thereafter the order passed by the trial/Special Court is challenged by the investigating agency before the higher Court, namely, Sessions Court or the High Court and the higher Court reverses the decision of the learned Magistrate refusing to grant the police custody and by that time the period of 15 days is over, what would be position? The learned Senior Counsel is not in a position to answer the court query.

8. Be that as it may, the facts in the present case are very glaring. Despite the fact that on 16.04.2021, the learned Special Judge allowed police custody of the Respondent-Accused for seven days i.e., up to 22.04.2021, the Respondent-Accused got himself admitted in the hospital during the period of police custody, i.e., on 18.04.2021 and obtained interim bail on 21.04.2021 which came to be extended till 08.12.2021 when his interim bail came to be cancelled by the learned Special Judge by observing that the Accused has misused the liberty shown to him and during the interim bail he has not cooperated with the investigating agency. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that initial order of grant of seven days police custody attained finality. However, due to the aforesaid reasons of having got the Accused himself hospitalised on 18.04.2021 and thereafter obtaining the interim bail on 21.04.2021, the CBI could not interrogate the Accused in the police custody though having a valid order in its favour. Thus, the Respondent-Accused has successfully avoided the full operation of the order of police custody granted by the learned Special Judge. No Accused can be permitted to play with the investigation and/or the court's process. No Accused can be permitted to frustrate the judicial process by his conduct. It cannot be disputed that the right of custodial interrogation/investigation is also a very important right in favour of the investigating agency to unearth the truth, which the Accused has purposely and successfully tried to frustrate. Therefore, by not permitting the CBI to have the police custody interrogation for the remainder period of seven days, it will be giving a premium to an Accused who has been successful in frustrating the judicial process.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2023

Decided On: 10.04.2023

Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Vikas Mishra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0342/2023,2023/INSC/345

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Whether magistrate can remand accused to custody even though investigating officer has not produced case diary?

 However, the submission made by the applicants that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in granting remand and ordering detention of the applicants from the beginning, as at no time the extracts of the case diary regarding investigation were submitted before the Magistrate, deserves to be accepted. The Magistrate before passing the order of detention or remand has to get himself satisfied regarding adequacy of grounds for the said purpose. This cannot be from what is stated in the application i.e. whether the investigation is complete or certain accused are to be arrested. He has to get himself satisfied from the case diary which is required to be maintained under section 172(1) by the Investigating Officer. It is obligatory upon every Investigating Officer to maintain the said diary which contains various details regarding the progress of the investigation. It is a chart or graph of the investigation which is carried out by the said officer as day to day progress of the investigation is required to be recorded in it. The said extract of the diary must be produced before the Magistrate when any remand or detention of the accused is claimed. The Magistrate must look into the same and get himself satisfied regarding adequacy of the grounds and pass necessary order. Without the extracts of the said diary of investigation or case papers, it is not possible for the Magistrate to find out the adequacy of grounds and to get himself satisfied. The Magistrate must indicate, however succinctly it may be, his satisfaction for detention or remand of the accused. Since the order passed by the learned Magistrate is having the effect of taking away the liberty of a person, which is a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen under the Constitution of India, it must be scrupulously followed.

8. The learned advocate for the applicants cited MANU/GH/0013/1963, R. K. Nabachandra Singh v. Manipur Administration. It dealt with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Same provision is to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as Section 167 (with some modifications). It is observed - (at page 312 (of Cri LJ)

"...... if the police do not transmit to the Court a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case, to satisfy the Magistrate that there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, and that a remand is absolutely necessary for the purpose of investigation, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct the detention of the arrested person."

Similarly, in MANU/AP/0154/1955 : AIR 1957 AP 561, In re B. J. Reddi the Division Bench considered the effect of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It came to be observed as follows : at page 1065 (of Cri LJ)

"It is manifest that the provision relating to the transmission of a copy of the entries in the diary prescribed in S. 172 is mandatory and therefore imperative that every one of the officers answering the description in the section should send along with the remand report a copy of the case-diary which he is bound to keep under S. 172, Criminal Procedure Code. The object of enacting this section is that the entries in the diary afford to the Magistrate information upon which he can decide whether or not the detention of the accused person in custody should be authorised and also to enable him to form an opinion as to whether any further detention is necessary.

In the absence of the entries referred to in that section, it is difficult for the Magistrate to decide whether either the detention was authorised or the further detention is necessary. By not complying with the first requirement, the investigating officer render that part of the section which requires the transmission of entries in the case diary otiose. It is really astounding that a Police Officer should offer the explanation that it is not usual to send copies of case-diary in spite of an obligation cast on them by the section.

We are unable to understand how the Magistrate are able to act on the remand reports without the entries. These are very relevant in considering whether a further remand should be granted or not. We hope that the Magistrate acting under S. 167 would insist upon the mandatory provisions of the section being complied with."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT NAGPUR

Criminal Revision Application No. 61 of 1993

Decided On: 17.06.1993

Shrawan Waman Nade  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.S. Patankar, J.

Citations: 1994 (2) BomCR 668, 1994 CriLJ 780, 1994 (1) MhLj 220,MANU/MH/0144/1993

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Delhi HC: First 15 days of PCR has to be counted from the date of first remand and not from the date of arrest.

The point is really quite simple. Sub-section (1) of S. 167 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 requires that a person arrested must be produced before Magistrate within twenty four hours. Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to authorise, from time to time the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days 'in the whole'. It is plain that those fifteen days begin to run immediately after the accused is produced before the Magistrate in accordance with sub-section (1). Therefore they are, and have to be the 'first' fifteen days after day of arrest.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Criminal Revn. No. 74 of 1982 

Decided On: 16.03.1982

State (Delhi Administration) Vs.  Ravinder Kumar Bhatnagar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.P.S. Chawla, J.

 Citations: 21 (1982) DLT 442, 1982 (3) DRJ 205

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Supreme Court: Accused can be remanded to police custody from Judicial custody within 15 days from the date of first remand on sufficient ground

We have considered the submissions of learned Counsel on both sides. That a person held in judicial custody could, if circumstances justify, be transferred to police custody or vice versa within a period of 15 days referred to in Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - which by virtue of Section 20 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, is to be read as 60 days in this case cannot be disputed. There must, of course, be sufficient grounds for such a change of custody. In the present case, having regard to the nature of offence and the stage of the investigations it cannot be said that grounds for such custody do not exist.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petn. (Cri.) No. 203 of 1992

Decided On: 28.07.1992

Kosanapu Ramreddy  Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.N. Venkatachaliah, P.B. Sawant and N.P. Singh, JJ.

 Citations: AIR 1994 SC 1447, 1994 CriLJ 2121

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FIR For Facebook post : Karnataka HC Orders enquiry Against Magistrate Who Remanded Accused In Violation Of SC Guidelines

There is yet another important aspect which

requires consideration namely, the order passed by the

learned Magistrate granting police custody. To a specific

query made by this Court during the course of hearing to

the learned advocate for petitioner, whether registration

of FIR No.91/2019 and the grant of anticipatory bail by

the learned Sessions Judge was brought to the notice of

learned Magistrate, it was asserted by Shri.Aruna Shyam,

that the same was brought to the notice of learned

Magistrate. This submission was not disputed by the

prosecution. In Arnesh Kumar’s case, Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India has issued directions to ensure that the

Police Officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily

and Magistrates do not authorize detention casually and

mechanically. The said directions read as follows:

“11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure

that police officers do not arrest the accused

unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention

casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we

have observed above, we give the following directions:

11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its

police officers not to automatically arrest when a case

under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy

themselves about the necessity for arrest under the

parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41

CrPC;

11.2. All police officers be provided with a check

list containing specified sub-clause under section

41(1)(b)(ii);

11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list

duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which

necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the

accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

11.4. The Magistrate while authorizing detention of

the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the

police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording

its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be

forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the

date of the institution of the case with a copy to the

Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent

of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in

writing;

11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-

A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from

the date of institution of the case, which may be

extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district

for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

11.7. Failure to comply with the directions

aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers

concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also

be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be

instituted before the High Court having territorial

jurisdiction.

11.8. Authorising detention without recording

reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned

shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate

High Court.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

27. It was incumbent upon the learned Magistrate

to carefully scrutinize the papers and bestow his

attention to the submissions of the learned Advocate for

the petitioner before granting police custody. A special

care was required in the instant case because petitioner

was granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions

Judge, who is superior to him in hierarchy. It is

unfortunate that despite binding directions by the Apex

Court in various judgments including Arnesh Kumar, the

learned Magistrate has granted police custody. By this

act of the learned Magistrate, petitioner remained in

police custody in spite of an anticipatory bail order in his

favour. This is a serious matter and requires correction.

Further, the directions contained in paragraph No.11.8 of

Arnesh Kumar require initiation of departmental enquiry.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2019

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S. DINESH KUMAR

CRIMINAL PETITION No.4306 OF 2019

SRI. JAIKANTH S  SEKAR K Vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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What is importance of remand report while remanding accused to PCR or MCR?

 The contention raised by the counsel that the remand reports are lacking in material particulars is also without merit. I have gone through the remand reports. Necessary details are available in the remand reports. A remand report is for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate to satisfy himself of the necessity to remand the accused. A particular remand report has significance only for the period during which the accused is remanded, unless the same is relied on for the remand of the accused for subsequent period also. A remand report need not contain all the details which are available in the First Information Statement and the other materials collected during investigation. The remand report need only contain sufficient materials to arrive at the conclusion that detention of the accused is necessary or the continued detention of the accused is necessary. In other words, a remand report is not a substitute for the material papers to be supplied on appearance of the accused. An accused is not entitled to contend that he is entitled to be released on bail on the ground that all the materials collected during the investigation are not reproduced in the remand report.

There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. requiring the Police Officer to submit a "remand report". But under Section 167 Cr.P.C. it is imperative that the Police Officer should send along with the accused a copy of the entries in the Police diary which he is bound to maintain under section 172Cr.P.C. Usually copies of the entries in the Police diary are not separately sent to the Magistrate. A gist of the above entries in the Police diary alone is incorporated by the Police Officer in the remand report or in the remand extension report. The purpose of filing such reports and the purpose of incorporation of the diary entries in such reports is to enable the Magistrate to decide whether he should authorize the detention or further detention of the accused to Police or judicial custody, as the case may be, or to release the accused. Bearing in

mind the purpose and significance of the remand report and the Constitutional rights of the arrestee, the accused has a right to get a certified copy of such remand report."

Kerala High Court

SUNNY JOSEPH,vs STATE on 8 August, 2011

Bail Appl..No. 5786 of 2011()

Read full judgment here:click here

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Whether Revision is maintainable against order of grant of police custody remand?

Criminal – Criminal procedure code – Sections 160, 167, 397 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections

302, 363 - Revision petition in relation to interlocutory order – Maintainality of – Murder – Grant of

police remand to accused for one day by Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 167 CrPC –

Subsequent Grant of judicial custody – Challenged by accused by filing criminal revision under

Section 397 – Allowed by High Court – Validity – Order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings

of the trial itself nor it can have any effect on the ultimate decision of the case - If an order of remand

is found to be illegal, it cannot result in acquittal of the accused or in termination of proceedings - A

remand order cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner – Hence order was a

pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by Sub-section (2) of Section 397

Cr.P.C., a revision against the said order was not maintainable – Held that High Court erred in

entertaining the revision against the order the Metropolitan Magistrate granting police custody of the

accused

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 575-576 of 2004 

Decided On: 05.05.2004

 State Rep. by Inspector of Police  Vs.  N.M.T. Joy Immaculate

Hon'ble Judges: S. Rajendra Babu, C.J., AR. Lakshmanan and G.P. Mathur, JJ.

Equivalent Citation: AIR2004SC2282, 2004(2)ALD(Cri)95, 2004CriLJ2515, 2004(3)CTC138, (2004)3GLR2174, 2004(5)SCALE330, (2004)5SCC729

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Supreme Court: Magistrate should apply his mind prior to remanding accused to PCR OR MCR

The purpose of remand as postulated under Section 167 is that investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. It enables the Magistrate to see that the remand is really necessary. This requires the investigating agency to send the case diary along with the remand report so that the Magistrate can appreciate the factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a warrant for police remand or justification for judicial remand or there is no need for any remand at all. It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind and not to pass an order of remand automatically or in a mechanical manner. It is apt to note that in Madhu Limaye (supra), it has been stated that once it is shown that the arrests made by the police officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to establish that at the stage of remand, the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant matters.

Supreme Court of India

Manubhai Ratilal Patel ... vs State Of Gujarat & Ors. on 28 September, 2012

Author: D Misra

Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, Dipak Misra

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