Showing posts with label procedural law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label procedural law. Show all posts

Saturday, 31 May 2025

The Dual Nature of India's Constitution: A Comprehensive Analysis of its Substantive and Procedural Dimensions

 The Constitution of India stands as one of the world's most comprehensive constitutional documents, embodying a unique characteristic that sets it apart from many other legal instruments. Unlike traditional legal frameworks that fall distinctly into either substantive or procedural categories, India's Constitution transcends this binary classification, functioning simultaneously as both substantive and procedural law. This dual nature makes it a remarkable legal document that not only defines rights and duties but also establishes the mechanisms for their enforcement and protection.

Conceptual Framework: Understanding the Legal Distinction

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Sunday, 1 April 2018

Whether Procedural laws should be construed like a penal provision?

This case reminds us of the apt observations  made by the learned Judge of this Court, Vivian Bose J., in Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr., AIR 1955 SC 425. His Lordship, speaking for the Bench, in his distinctive style of writing with subtle power of expression reminded the Courts as to how the code of procedure should be construed in the context of rights of the parties to the lis, which affects their lives and properties. His Lordship reminded that procedural laws should not be construed like a penal provision to punish the parities as far as possible. The following is the classic passage, which is always followed for doing substantial justice to the parties to the lis:
“A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends:
not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that  proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.”
                                                               REPORTABLE
Supreme Court of India
Prahlad Shankarrao Tajale vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 March, 2018
Author: A M Sapre
Citation:AIR 2018 1313

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Sunday, 11 February 2018

What is scope and ambit of power of revision U/S 34(4) of Maharashtra Rent Control Act?

 In the result, therefore, our answer to question No. 2 referred for our consideration is as under:-

A revision application under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is not maintainable in respect of a procedural order passed under the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit arising out of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, if such order does not affect the rights of parties under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act or any other substantive law. While an order to be revisable need not necessarily be an order for possession or fixation or recovery of rent, nevertheless, the order sought to be revised must directly affect the substantive rights and liabilities of parties under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act or any other substantive law, but not merely rights under a procedural law like the Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Act.
84. For an order to be revisable under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the order must affect the very existence of the suit or the foundation of the party's case in their pleadings and not merely a procedural order, not affecting the substantive rights of parties, though such procedural order may ultimately affect the strength or weakness of the case of the aggrieved litigant which is to be finally determined at the trial while passing the decree in the suit or final order in the proceeding.

85. Following are instances of revisable orders.

(i) an order refusing leave to amend the plaint or written statement, where the proposed amendment is for assertion of rights or liabilities under the Rent Act or any other substantive law

(ii) an order rejecting an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of the CPC

(iii) an order allowing or rejecting an application for a declaration that the suit has abated

(iv) an order refusing to extend the time for filing a written statement

(v) an order for deleting an issue pertaining to rights or liabilities under the Rent Act, or any other substantive law

This list is illustrative and not exhaustive.

86. Following are instances of orders which would not be revisable orders:-

(i) an order granting leave to amend plaint or written statement

(ii) an order granting extension of time to file written statement

(iii) an order raising additional issue

(iv) an order made for production of documents or discovery or inspection.

(v) an order directing a plaintiff/defendant to furnish better and further particulars

(vi) an order issuing or refusing to issue a commission for examination of witnesses

(vii) an order issuing or refusing to issue summons for additional witness or document

(viii) an order condoning delay in filing documents, after the first date of hearing.

(ix) an order of costs to one of the parties for its default

(x) an order granting or refusing an adjournment

(xi) an order allowing an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of CPC

This list is also illustrative and not exhaustive.

87. As regards question No. 1 about scope and ambit of power of revision under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, our answer is that after the revisional Court is satisfied about maintainability of the revision application, the revisional Court will consider whether the impugned order is according to law. However, "according to law" refers to the order as a whole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall order, which must be according to law, which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to mistake of law. Hence, mere breach of, or non-conformity with, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Act or similar other procedural laws, will not be a ground for interfering with the impugned order of the trial Court. The revisional powers are intended to be exercised with a view to subserve and not to defeat the ends of justice. As a general rule where substantial justice has been done by order of the lower Court, the revisional Court will not interfere with it notwithstanding the fact that the reasons for the order are not correct or the order is improper or irregular. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 9562, 8029 and 907 of 2010

Decided On: 21.01.2013

Bhartiben Shah Vs. Smt. Gracy Thomas and Others


Hon'ble Judges/Coram: 

M.S. Shah, C.J., R.V. More & N.M. Jamdar, JJ.

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Whether substantive rights are right created by statute or any other law or it may relate to procedural law?

Moreover the expression "substantive rights" used in the authorities I have considered must be understood in the lexical sense. It ought not necessarily to be construed as a right created by statute or any other law. In other words, to be revisable it is not necessary that the order must relate to a provision of substantive law. Even if it relates to a procedural law it would be revisable if it affected substantively the rights of a party.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 4 of 2004

Decided On: 05.05.2004

Pacific Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. East India Hotels Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.J. Vazifdar, J.

Citation: 2004(40 ALLMR 330
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Sunday, 12 November 2017

What is exception to rule that amendment in limitation Act are retrospective in nature?

It is settled law that periods of limitation are procedural in nature and would ordinarily be applied retrospectively. This, however, is subject to a rider. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840, this Court held:

5. On the plain language of Sections 110-A and 110-F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective.

46. In answering a question which arose Under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court held:

7..."(1) Time for the purpose of filing the application Under Section 110-A did not start running before the constitution of the tribunal. Time had started running for the filing of the suit but before it had expired the forum was changed. And for the purpose of the changed forum, time could not be deemed to have started running before a remedy of going to the new forum is made available.

(2) Even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of the commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish a vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation.

47. This statement of the law was referred to with approval in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. MANU/SC/0475/1991 : (1991) 4 SCC 333 as follows:

7. It is true that the Appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the Appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the Appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act--subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra [MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266]. The husband of the Respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the Respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal Under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation. The Respondent filed the application in July, 1967. It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the Respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the Respondent in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso to Section 110-A(3).
Both these judgments were referred to and followed in Union of India v. Harnam Singh MANU/SC/0216/1993 : (1993) 2 SCC 162, see paragraph 12.

48. The aforesaid principle is also contained in Section 30(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

30. Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,-

(a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, may be instituted within a period of [seven years] next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier:

49. The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision.

50. This aspect of the matter is brought out rather well in Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/SC/0427/2011 : (2011) 6 SCC 739 as follows:

22. Law is well settled that the manner in which the appeal has to be filed, its form and the period within which the same has to be filed are matters of procedure, while the right conferred on a party to file an appeal is a substantive right. The question is, while dealing with a belated appeal Under Section 19(2) of FEMA, the application for condonation of delay has to be dealt with under the first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 52 of FERA or under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of FEMA. For answering that question it is necessary to examine the law on the point.
Substantive and procedural law

23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities. Right conferred on a party to prefer an appeal against an order is a substantive right conferred by a statute which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in law, unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a substantive right always acts prospectively. It is trite law that every statute is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation.

24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but the procedure for filing the appeal including the period of limitation cannot be called a substantive right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim any vested right claiming that he should be governed by the old provision pertaining to period of limitation. Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that it will apply even to acts or transactions under the repealed Act.

25. Law on the subject has also been elaborately dealt with by this Court in various decisions and reference may be made to a few of those decisions. This Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [MANU/SC/0008/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 540], New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840], Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [MANU/SC/0526/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087], Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar [MANU/SC/0643/1999 : (1999) 8 SCC 16] and Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar [MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24], has elaborately discussed the scope and ambit of an amending legislation and its retrospectivity and held that every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. This Court has held that the law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature whereas law relating to right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4367 of 2004

Decided On: 23.04.2015

M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.
Citation:(2015) 7 SCC 58
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Sunday, 1 January 2017

Whether parties to an arbitration agreement are free to decide both procedural and substantive law?

However, the authors in Comparative International Commercial
Arbitration32 go a step further in that, apart from procedure, they say that party
autonomy permits parties to have their choice of substantive law as well. It is
said:
“All modern arbitration laws recognise party autonomy, that is,
parties are free to determine the substantive law or rules applicable
to the merits of the dispute to be resolved by arbitration. Party
autonomy provides contracting parties with a mechanism of avoiding the
application of an unfavourable or inappropriate law to an international
dispute. This choice is and should be binding on the arbitration tribunal.
This is also confirmed in most arbitration rules.” [Emphasis supplied by
us].
31 Chapter 6. Conduct of the Proceedings in Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides,
et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Sixth Edition), (© Kluwer Law
International; Oxford University Press 2015) pp. 353 – 414, paragraph 6.07
32 Chapter 17 Determination of Applicable Law in Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A.
Mistelis, et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (© Kluwer Law
International; Kluwer Law International 2003) pp. 411 – 437, paragraph 17-8
C.A. Nos.2562 of 2006 etc.
Page 25 of 2940. Be that as it may, the legal position as we understand it is that the parties to
an arbitration agreement have the autonomy to decide not only on the procedural
law to be followed but also the substantive law. The choice of jurisdiction is left
to the contracting parties.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2562 OF 2006
M/S. CENTROTRADE MINERALS & METAL INC. 
VS.
HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.
Dated:December 15, 2016
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC228
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Sunday, 27 November 2016

When court should not allow application for setting aside of abatement of suit?

 It is no doubt true that a code of procedure “is
designed to facilitate justice and further its ends and it is
not a penal enactment for punishment and penalty and
not a thing designed to trip people up”. Procedural laws
are no doubt devised and enacted for the purposes of
advancing justice. Procedural laws, however, are also
laws and are enacted to be obeyed and
implemented. The laws of procedure by themselves
do not create any impediment or obstruction in the
matter of doing justice to the parties. On the other
hand, the main purpose and object of enacting
procedural laws is to see that justice is done to the
parties. In the absence of procedural laws regulating
procedure as to dealing with any dispute between
the parties, the cause of justice suffers and justice
will be in a state of confusion and quandary.
Difficulties arise when parties are at default in
complying with the laws of procedure. As procedure
is aptly described to be the hand-maid of justice, the
court may in appropriate cases ignore or excuse a
 mere irregularity in the observance of the procedural
law in the larger interest of justice. It is, however,
always to be borne in mind that procedural laws are
as valid as any other law and are enacted to be
observed and have not been enacted merely to be
brushed aside by the Court. Justice means justice to
the parties in any particular case and justice
according to law. If procedural laws are properly

observed, as they should be observed, no problem
arises for the court for considering whether any lapse in
the observance of the procedural law needs to be
excused or overlooked. As I have already observed
depending on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case in the larger interests of administration of
justice the Court may and the Court in fact does,
excuse or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach
in the observance of any procedural law for doing real
and substantial justice to the parties and the Court
passes proper orders which will serve the interests of
justice best.
13. Excuse of lapses in compliance with the laws
of procedure, as a matter of course, with the avowed
object of doing substantial justice to the parties may
in many cases lead to miscarriage of justice.
14. Civil Procedure Code requires that in the event of
death of a particular party, heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased have to be brought on
record within a particular period, provided the cause of
action survives. If the legal representatives are not
brought on record within the stipulated period,
certain consequences follow and the action abates
either wholly or partially depending on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case. The Code further
provides that an application may be made for setting
aside the abatement within a stipulated period. It is now
well settled that an abatement can be set aside at
any time even beyond the period prescribed for
making an application for setting aside the
 abatement, if sufficient cause is shown explaining
 the delay in the making of the application. If,
irrespective of the provisions of the Code and the
merits of the case, abatements are to be set aside as
a matter of course merely on the ground that

abatement is only a consequence of noncompliance
of law of procedure and substantial
justice is denied to the parties, the result may really
amount to a denial of justice and in an indefinite
prolongation of a litigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. I believe this powerfully articulated passage to be squarely
applicable to this case. I cannot in law turn a blind eye to the law
relating to abatement. What is it that is expected of the Applicants?
At a minimum, I believe the law requires the Applicants to explain
the delay. It is not just any explanation that will do. The explanation
must be one that is cogent, persuasive and tenable. As we have
seen, the statements in the Affidavit in Support of the Chamber
Summons provide no sort of explanation at all, apart from stating in
the most general terms that the Applicants were ‘unaware’ of the
proceedings in this Court. That they were aware of the proceedings
between the same parties in other courts is accepted. The so-called
explanation seems to me to be most unlikely in the normal course of
conduct; it postulates that the Petitioner kept the Applicants
abreast of the litigations in other courts but for some reason
completely shut them out of all knowledge of the present
proceedings. Why and how that might have been is left to our
speculation. On so diaphanous a thread am I asked to allow this
application. In short, what the Applicants say is that it matters not a
whit what the law says; it matters perhaps even less that their
affidavit contains no explanation as required by law; I must, for the
mere asking, allow their application. I cannot.

13. Would an order putting the Applicants to terms suffice?
After all, in several cases, our courts, including the Supreme Court,
have condoned delayed and set aside abatement by putting parties
to terms. I do not believe there is any rigid formula in such cases. It
also cannot be that in every single case, irrespective of conduct or
the want of any explanation, a party can simply agree to pay costs
and thus evade the consequences of his own negligence or
indolence, or both. Costs are imposed to compensate the other side
for the trouble and expense they have suffered. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION
CHAMBER SUMMONS NO. 50 OF 2015
IN
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 17 OF 2011
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 402 OF 2004
Smt. Hema Achyut Shah & Ors
V
Princess Ujawala Raje 
CORAM: G.S. PATEL, J
DATED: 12th June 2015
Citation:2016(6) ALLMR403
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Saturday, 27 August 2016

What is distinction between substantive and procedural law?


Mr. Dada, argued that the amendment to Section 36
affects the substantive right of an award-debtor and hence it must
take prospective effect. He refers to the decision of the Apex Court
in Thirumala Chemicals Ltd. V/s. Union of India and Ors. reported in
(2011) 6 SCC page 739 to support his submission. In that decision,
the question considered was, whether the Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (“FEMA”
for short) was right in dismissing an appeal preferred under Section
19(1) of FEMA by applying the first proviso to Section 52(2) and
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (“FERA” for short) holding
that, it had no power to condone the delay beyond 90 days. Although

the cause of action had arisen when FERA was in force, show cause
notices and impugned notices were issued, when FEMA was imposed
and appeals were also preferred under Section 19(1) of FEMA. The
Apex Court, in that decision considered, the distinction between
substantive and procedural law at paras-23 to 27. The same reads as
under :-
“23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that
creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities.
Right conferred on a party to prefer an appeal against
an order is a substantive right conferred by a statute
which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in
law, unless modified expressly or by necessary
implication. Procedural laws establishes a mechanism
for determining those rights and liabilities and a
machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a
substantive right always act prospectively. It is trite
law that every statute is prospective unless it is
expressly or by necessary implication made to have
retrospective operation.
24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but
the procedure for filing the appeal including the
period of limitation cannot be called a substantive
right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim any
vested right claiming that he should be governed by
the old provision pertaining to period of limitation.
Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that
it will apply even to acts or transactions under the
repealed Act.
25. Law on the subject has also been elaborately
dealt with by this Court in various decisions and
reference may be made to a few of those decisions.
This Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhry, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540, New India
Insurance Co. Ltd v. Shanti Misra,reported in (1975)

2 SCC page 840, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (1994) 4 SCC page 602,
Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State
of Bihar, reported in (1999) 8 SCC page 16 and
Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, reported in (2001) 8
SCC page 24, has elaborately discussed the scope and
ambit of an amending legislation and its
retrospectivity and held that every litigant has a
vested right in substantive law but no such right exists
in procedural law. This Court has held that the law
relating to forum and limitation is procedural in
nature whereas law relating to right of appeal even
though remedial is substantive in nature.
26. Therefore, unless the language used plainly
manifests in express terms or by necessary implication
a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is
to be construed as prospective, a statute merely
procedural is to be construed as retrospective and a
statute which while procedural in its character, affects
vested rights adversely is to be construed as
prospective.
27. Rights of appeal conferred under Section 19(1) of
FEMA is therefore a substantive right. The procedure
for filing an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 19
as also the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 19
conferring power on the Tribunal to condone delay in
filing the appeal if sufficient cause is shown, are
procedural rights.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

CHAMBER SUMMONS NO.1530 OF 2015
IN
EXECUTION APPLICATION (L) NO.2481 OF 2015
IN
ARBITRAL AWARD DATED 22ND JUNE, 2015

In the matter between :
M/s Rendezvous Sports World 
Vs.
The Board of Control for Cricket 
in India

Coram : Smt. R.P. SondurBaldota, J.
Date : 14th June, 2016.

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Wednesday, 20 January 2016

Golden rules for interpretation of procedural law

Blyth (1966 (1) All E.R. 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See Shreenath and Anr. v.
Rajesh and Ors. (AIR 1998 SC 1827) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.
It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words - "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non- extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions.
The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Mr. Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab Vs. Mr. Kumar & Ors [2005] Insc 652 (18 November 2005)
ARIJIT PASAYAT & R.V. RAVEENDRAN 
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15807 of 2004) With Civil Appeal No.6918 of 2005 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16523/2004)
Citation: AIR2006SC396, 2006(1)BomCR57, 2006(1)MhLj178 SC,2006(1)MhLj178,
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Whether procedural law will prevail over substantive law?

 The key word for determination of question involved is underlined, i.e., "name of any party improperly joined". The word improperly, in my view, is wide enough to include the name of a defendant who was no more when suit was filed. Learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, fairly admitted that defendant No.2 died even before filing of the suit. If plaintiff was not aware about his death and impleaded him as defendant No.2, it can be said that he was improperly impleaded. Apart from this, no prejudice is caused to petitioner by the impugned order. Thus, I am unable to hold that the Court below has committed any error in permitting the deletion of the name of said defendant under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC. It cannot be forgotten that the procedural law is made for smooth functioning. It is not made to strangulate the litigants on hyper technical grounds. This Court has considered this aspect in a recent judgment reported in 2014(3) M.P.L.J. 612 (Dataram Singh & others Vs. Brindawan Singh and others) and opined as under:-
"In the opinion of this Court, the court below has taken a view to advance the cause of justice and did not permit itself to be strangulated by hyper- technicalities. This is settled in law that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The Apex Court in AIR 1955 SC 425 (Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah) opined that A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is "procedure", something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against. The Apex Court in (1975 (1) SCC 774 (Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar) opined that the mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. In (1976) 1 SCC 719 (State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari), the Apex Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. In (1984) 3 SCC 46 (Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India) the Apex Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. In (2005) 4 SCC 480 (Kailash vs. Nanhku and others) the Apex Court held that the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice."

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Smt. Rama Agrawal vs Smt. Mithlesh Agrawal on 29 June, 2015
BENCH AT GWALIOR
JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL.
Writ Petition No. 3596/15
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Sunday, 31 March 2013

When change in law will operate retrospectively?

Reference may also be made upon the decision of this Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 915 where the legal position was stated in the following words: "4. The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369, 372). In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Ramesh Kumar Soni Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh on 26 February, 2013
[Criminal Appeal No. 353 of 2013 arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No.5663 of 2011]

T.S. THAKUR, J.
Citation:(2013) 14 SCC 696
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Tuesday, 23 October 2012

What are exceptions to rule that suit or appeal will not be dismissed for non compliance of procedural requirement?


 Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a hand-maiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well recognized exceptions to this principle are :- i) where the Statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non-compliance.
ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court.
v) in case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant;

Supreme Court of India
Uday Shankar Triyar vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh & Anr on 10 November, 2005
Bench: R Pal, . A Lakshmanan, R V Raveendran

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