Showing posts with label retrospective. Show all posts
Showing posts with label retrospective. Show all posts

Saturday, 26 July 2025

Supreme Court Sets Aside Sentence Under Amended POCSO Provision : Constitutional Bar Against Retrospective Imposition Of Harsher Penalty Is Absolute

 The submission advanced on behalf of the appellant is that

the incident occurred on 20.05.2019. While the conviction is

under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the Protection Of Children

From Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019, which came

into force on 16.08.2019, enhanced the minimum sentence

to 20 years and redefined "imprisonment for life" to mean

imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life. It is the

appellant’s contention that the sentencing court erred in

applying the amended provisions retrospectively, as the

incident in question took place prior to the amendment.{Para 6}


8. Section 6 of the POCSO Act, prior to the 2019 amendment,

read as under:

“6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual

assault – Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual

assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for

a term which shall not be less than ten years but which

may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable

to fine.”

9. This Court, having found no merit in the challenge to

conviction, had confined its notice to the question of

sentencing. However, we find merit in the appellant’s

submission that since the offence was committed on

20.05.2019, the amended provision of Section 6 of the

POCSO Act, which came into force on 16.08.2019, could not

have been applied to his case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…..………….OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 13834 of 2024)

SATAURAM MANDAVI  Vs  THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ANR.

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Dated: July 25, 2025.

Citation: 2025 INSC 892

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Sunday, 5 March 2023

Under which circumstances Circulars issued by IRDAI have retrospective effect?

(ix) It has been argued that the instructions in the

circular dated 12th October 2022 come into

force prospectively. This argument must also be

rejected. The IRDAI has been prompted to

issue the directions in the circular for the sole

reason that it was observed by the regulatory

authority that various insurers were repudiating

the claims on the pretext of the so called

‘exclusions’ in the policy document and hence

the regulatory authority was compelled to issue

the said directions. Thus, it stands to reason

that the directions have been issued to rectify

the arbitrary refusal of claims. Hence, the same

obviously applies to past refusals on the grounds

as mentioned in the circular.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2839 OF 2021

Rita Kirit Joshi Vs NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY,

CORAM : G.S.Patel & Neela Gokhale, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 1st March 2023

JUDGMENT ( Per Neela Gokhale J) :-

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 12.

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Saturday, 24 December 2022

Supreme Court: Section 17A of Prevention of Corruption Act Not Retrospective; Not Applicable To FIRs Before 2018 Amendment

 It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute

is prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication

made to have retrospective operation. There is a presumption

against retrospectivity. An express provision should ordinarily be

made to make a statute retrospective. The presumption against

retrospectivity may also be rebutted by necessary implication as

held by this Court in Akram Ansari vs. Chief Election Officer

reported in (2008) 2 SCC 95, which has been referred to and relied

upon by the Kerala High Court in its judgment in K.R. Ramesh vs.

Central Bureau of Investigation and Another reported in 2020 SCC

Online Kerala 2529. The device of a legal fiction can also be used

to introduce retrospective operation. Generally, it is considered

that every statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie

prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made

retrospective. {Para 7}

8. In T.N. Bettaswamaiah vs. State of Karnataka being W.P.

No.29176/2019 (GM-RES), decided on 20.12.2019, which is reported reported in MANU/KA/9503/2019, the Karnataka High Court referred to the judgment of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602, and rightly held :

“21. … But in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors.

vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4

SCC 602 it is held that a statute which not

only changes the procedure but also creates

new rights and liabilities shall be

construed to be prospective in operation

unless otherwise provided either expressly

or by necessary implication. A careful

reading of both Section 17A as also Section

19 do not contain any express provision to

show that they are retrospective in nature

nor it is so discernable by implication.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1647 OF 2021

STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs TEJMAL CHOUDHARY 

Author: INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

Dated: December 16, 2021.
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Sunday, 28 August 2022

Whether the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act is prospective or retrospective in operation?

 B. Whether the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act is prospective or retrospective in operation?

45. We do not subscribe to the aforesaid reasoning provided by the High Court for the simple reason that after the 2018 amendment, specific performance, which stood as a discretionary remedy, is not codified as an enforceable right which is not dependent anymore on equitable principles expounded by judges, rather it is founded on satisfaction of the requisite ingredients as provided under the Specific Relief Act. For determination of whether a substituted law is procedural or substantive, reference to the nature of the parent enactment may not be material. Instead, it is the nature of the amendments which determine whether they are in the realm of procedural or substantive law.

48. In any case, the amendment carried out in 2018 was enacted to further bolster adherence to the sanctity of contracts. This approach was radical and created new rights and obligations which did not exist prior to such an amendment. Section 10, after amendment, reads as under:

10. Specific performance in respect of contracts.—The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16.

49. This provision, which remained in the realm of the Courts’ discretion, was converted into a mandatory provision, prescribing a power the Courts had to exercise when the ingredients were fulfilled. This was a significant step in the growth of commercial law as the sanctity of contracts was reinforced with parties having to comply with contracts and thereby reducing efficient breaches.

50. Under the preamended Specific Relief Act, one of the major considerations for grant of specific performance was the adequacy of damages under Section 14(1)(a). However, this consideration has now been completely done away with, in order to provide better compensation to the aggrieved party in the form of specific performance.

51. Having come to the conclusion that the 2018 amendment was not a mere procedural enactment, rather it had substantive principles built into its working, this Court cannot hold that such amendments would apply retrospectively.

53. From the aforesaid decision, it is clear that when a substantive law is brought about by amendment, there is no assumption that the same ought to be given retrospective effect. Rather, there is a requirement for the legislature to expressly clarify whether the aforesaid amendments ought to be retrospective or not.

56. In view of the above discussion, we do not have any hesitation in holding that the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act is prospective and cannot apply to those transactions that took place prior to its coming into force.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5822 OF 2022  

Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. Vs Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Coram: N.V. RAMANA; CJI., KRISHNA MURARI; J., HIMA KOHLI; J. 

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Dated: AUGUST 25, 2022
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Saturday, 23 July 2022

Whether Commercial Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018 is retrospective?

 It cannot be said that there is any lack of clarity or ambiguity in the phrasing of Section 19 of the Amending Act which categorically states that the provisions of the Amending Act will apply to cases relating to commercial disputes filed on or after the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. 03.05.2018. Furthermore, interpreting the Amending Act to be retrospective in nature will affect the substantive rights of the parties who have already filed their suits in ordinary Civil Courts before the Amending Act was enforced. {Para 27}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  TR.P.(C.) 47/2021& C.M. No. 19833/2022 

SATYANARAIN KHANDELWAL Vs PREM ARORA  

 CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD 

Author: SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J

Date of decision: 18thJULY, 2022
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Sunday, 24 October 2021

Whether Municipal Corporation can recover property tax with retrospective effect?

 Section 2(44) of the Act of 1949 defines "official year" thus : "2(44) "official year or year" means the year commencing on the first day of April."

{Para 7}

8. The law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Solapur Municipal Corporation and approved by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli and further re-iterated in Kalyan Municipal Council is applicable on all fours in the light of the statutory provision contained in Rule 20(1)(e) and definition of the expression "official year" occurring in Section 2(44). Any amendment in the assessment book by inserting or altering an entry in respect of any building erected, re-erected, altered, added to or reconstructed in whole or in part of the assessment book shall be and can only be effective during the currency of official year. The expression "official year" defined under Section 2(44) of the Act of 1949 read with Rule 20(1)(e) indicates without doubt the legal position that the property tax being tax for the official year must be levied only during the official year. In view thereof, it was not open for the Commissioner to amend or alter assessment entry of petitioner's property with retrospective effect. In other words, the demand of property tax raised for the period from 1-4-1985 to 31-3-1990 vide demand notices dated 8-1-1991 cannot be justified and to that extent the notices as well as the demand bills have to be modified.

9. We, accordingly, partly allow the writ petition and partially quash the special notices dated 8-1-1991 (Annexures "D" and "E") and bills dated 12-12-1991 (Annexures "G" and "H") to the extent demand of property tax has been raised with retrospective effect for the period from 20-5-1985 till 31-3-1990. The respondents may, accordingly, issue fresh demand of property taxes as per the aforesaid observations.

Bombay High Court
Satish Dattatray Shivalkar vs Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal ... on 6 February, 2002
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Saturday, 16 October 2021

Whether Municipal Corporation can recover retrospective property tax by amending assessment list?

 'Subbappa's case, (E)', appears to be an authority for the proposition that alterations made in an assessment list under Section 81(3) have limited retrospective operation i.e. the liability for a rate under an assessment list which is finalised and authenticated during the course of an official year arises in case of inadvertent omissions as from the date 011 which the assessment list is brought into operation and in cases where there has been new construction or alteration of a building during the course of the year from the date on which the building became liable to tax.

But 'Subbappa's case', (E), in our judgment, is no authority for the proposition that a more extensive retrospective operation to an assessment list is intended to be given so as to enable a Municipality to alter the assessment list of previous years. In other words, the assessment list for each year comes to an end on the expiry of the official year and a fresh assessment list comes into existence as from the 1st date of the official year, and the assessment list of the previous year cannot be amended so as to impose fresh liability after the close of the official year.

Bombay High Court
The Chalisgaon Borough ... vs Multanchand Fulchand Sancheti on 24 November, 1955
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Sunday, 3 May 2020

Whether S 14 of specific relief Act as amended in the year 2018 applies to pending suit?

 Taking up for consideration the third question involved in the present case, the 2018 Amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963 came into force from October 1, 2018. The suit was undoubtedly filed prior to the commencement of operation of the Amendment Act. However, a question arises as to the relevant date for ascertaining the applicability of the amendment - the date of filing of the suit or the date of passing of the decree. In the event the date of filing of the suit was the relevant date, the 2018 Amendment would not be applicable to the present case.

99. However, the language of Section 14 of the 1963 Act indicates that the relevant date would be the date of passing of the decree, since Section 14(1) commences with the phrase, "The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced ....."

100. The question of enforcement comes only on the date of passing of the decree and not the institution of the suit. If the date of filing of the suit was the relevant date, the language of Section 14(1) would be something akin to: "no suit can be filed for specific performance of the following contracts ...."

101. Hence, the relevant date is the date of passing of the decree. As such, the 2018 Amendment becomes applicable to the present lis, since the amendment came into force during pendency of the suit.

102. Hence, the 2018 Amendment to the 1963 Act is applicable to the present case and the third issue is decided in the affirmative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.O. No. 863 of 2019

Decided On: 17.04.2019

 Church of North India  Vs.  Ashoke Biswas

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

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Wednesday, 8 January 2020

Supreme Court reiterates that S 148 of NI Act is retrospective in nature

 Learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court dated
30.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1160 of 2019 (G.J.
Raja vs. Tejraj Surana). This Court in the above case
was considering provisions of Section 143A of the
N.I. Act which was inserted by the same Amendment Act
20 of 2018 by which Section 148 of the N.I. Act has
been inserted. This Court took the view that Section
143A is prospective in nature and confined to cases
where offences were committed after the introduction
of Section 143A i.e. after 01.09.2018. In paragraph
22 of the judgment following has been held:
“22. In our view, the applicability of
Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be
held to be prospective in nature and
confined to cases where offences were
committed after the introduction of Section
143A, in order to force an accused to pay
such interim compensation.”
15. The judgment of this Court which was delivered in
the case of the present appellants i.e. Criminal
Appeal Nos.917-944 of 2019 (Surinder Singh Deswal @
Col. S.S. Deswal and others vs. Virender Gandhi) (in

which one of us M.R.Shah, J was also a member) was
also cited before the Bench deciding the case of G.J.
Raja. This Court in its judgment dated 29.05.2019 has
rejected the submission of the appellants that
Section 148 of N.I. Act shall not be made applicable
retrospectively. This Court held that considering the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in
Section 148 of the N.I. Act, on purposive
interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as
amended, shall be applicable in respect of the
appeals against the order of conviction and sentence
for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act,
even in a case where the criminal complaints for the
offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed
prior to amendment Act No.20/2018 i.e. prior to
01.09.2018.
16. The Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case has noticed
the judgment of this Court in the appellants’ case
i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s case and has opined that
the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’s
case was on Section 148 of the N.I. Act which is a
stage after conviction of the accused and

distinguishable from the stage in which the interim
compensation was awarded under Section 143A of the
N.I.Act. When the Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s
case(supra) itself has considered and distinguished
the judgment of this Court in appellants’ own case
i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s, reliance by the learned
counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this
Court in G.J. Raja’s case is misplaced. It is useful
to refer to paragraph 23 of the judgment in G.J.
Raja’s case which is to the following effect:
“23. We must, however, advert to a
decision of this Court in Surinder Singh
SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act
which was also introduced by the same
Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from 01.09.2018
was held by this Court to be retrospective
in operation. As against Section 143A of
the Act which applies at the trial stage
that is even before the pronouncement of
guilt or order of conviction, Section 148
of the Act applies at the appellate stage
where the Accused is already found guilty
of the offence Under Section 138 of the
Act. It may be stated that there is no
provision in Section 148 of the Act which
is similar to Sub-Section (5) of Section
143A of the Act. However, as a matter of
fact, no such provision akin to Sub-section
(5) of Section 143A was required as
Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which
apply post-conviction, are adequate to take
care of such requirements. In that sense
said Section 148 depends upon the existing

machinery and principles already in
existence and does not create any fresh
disability of the nature similar to that
created by Section 143A of the Act.
Therefore, the decision of this Court in
Surinder Singh Deswal (2007) 13 SCC 492
stands on a different footing.”
In view of the above, the judgment of this Court in
the case of G.J. Raja does not help the appellants.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1936-1963 OF 2019

SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL Vs  VIRENDER GANDHI & ANR. 

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Dated:January 08, 2020.
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Friday, 20 September 2019

Latest Supreme Court and Bombay HC Judgments

Whether Adultery Judgment passed by Supreme Court will operate retrospectively?

Hon'ble Apex Court in Maj. Genl. A.S Gauraya v. S.N Thakur (supra) has held that law laid down by the Supreme Court applies to all pending proceedings even with retrospective effect.
8. There is no dispute about the decision of the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions. In view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court holding Section 497 of Indian Penal Code is not an offence, the punishment awarded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhiwapur in Summary Criminal Case No. 41/2010 is liable to be quashed and set aside. Hence, following order.

In the High Court of Bombay
(Before M.G Giratkar, J.)

Rupesh  Haribhau Mundle, v. Shri Charandas  Fulchand Chandanbawane

Criminal Revision Application No. 2 of 2018
Decided on December 14, 2018
Citation:2018 SCC OnLine Bom 6292
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Thursday, 1 August 2019

Supreme Court: Section 143A of Negotiable Instruments Act on Interim Compensation is not retrospective

In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences were committed after the introduction of Section 143A, in order to force an Accused to pay such interim compensation.

23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi MANU/SC/0793/2019 : (2019) 8 SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act which was also introduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from 01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be retrospective in operation. As against Section 143A of the Act which applies at the trial stage that is even before the pronouncement of guilt or order of conviction, Section 148 of the Act applies at the appellate stage where the Accused is already found guilty of the offence Under Section 138 of the Act. It may be stated that there is no provision in Section 148 of the Act which is similar to Sub-Section (5) of Section 143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact, no such provision akin to Sub-section (5) of Section 143A was required as Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction, are adequate to take care of such requirements. In that sense said Section 148 depends upon the existing machinery and principles already in existence and does not create any fresh disability of the nature similar to that created by Section 143A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal MANU/SC/8202/2007 : (2007) 13 SCC 492 stands on a different footing.

24. In the ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence Under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book. Consequently, the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court are required to be set aside. The money deposited by the Appellant, pursuant to the interim direction passed by this Court, shall be returned to the Appellant along with interest accrued thereon within two weeks from the date of this order.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 
Decided On: 30.07.2019

 G.J. Raja Vs. Tejraj Surana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3817,2019(5) MHLJ 761
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Saturday, 13 April 2019

Whether Negotiable instruments (amendment) Act 2018 has retrospective effect?

See Negotiable Instrument amendment Act 2018: Click here

Therefore, it has to be held that Section 143-A of the Act cast a substantive
obligation upon the accused and thereby effect the substantive right of the
accused. Since the Amendment Act has not made the provision applicable
retrospectively, specifically, to pending cases, hence, it cannot be applied
retrospectively, to pending cases; which arose from the default of the
accused which has taken place before coming into force of this provision.
It permits the Appellate Court to
order the convict to deposit only 20% of the fine or compensation, leaving
the remaining amount to be paid beyond a period of 90 days; or not to be
paid even till conclusion of the appeal.
In view of the above discussion, it is quite clear that the
procedure of recovery of fine or compensation from a convict-appellant of
pending appeal already existed in CR.P.C; before advent of the provision as
contained in Section 148 of the Act. Hence, no new aspect of coercive
recovery of fine or compensation from the appellant is being created
through this amended provision. On the contrary, this provision provides

more breathing space to the convict/appellant; as compared to the other
procedures of recovery, as contemplated under Sections 421 and 424 of
Cr.P.C, which is for more onerous in terms of time limit and the
consequences. Since the provisions for recovery of fine or compensation
from the appellant/convict already existed in the existing procedure relating
to the recovery, therefore, the provision introduced vide Section 148 of the
Act; which relates only to recovery of amount partly, as interim measure,
has to be treated purely procedural only, which is otherwise also beneficial
for the appellant as compared to the pre-existing provisions. Hence it has to
be held that provision of Section 148 of the Act shall govern all the appeals

pending on date of enforcement of this provision or filed thereafter.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRR No.9872-2018(O&M)
Date of decision:04.04.2019

M/s Ginni Garments Vs M/s Sethi Garments 

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajbir Sehrawat

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Sunday, 23 December 2018

Whether burden of proof is on insurance company to prove breach of policy clearly?

Mr. Chapalgaonkar relied on the judgment in the case of Premlata Shukla (supra). Though the proceedings before the Tribunal are summary in nature and strict rules of evidence are not applicable, it is well settled that once it is established that the vehicle involved in the accident was duly insured with the Insurance Company, the burden is on the Insurance Company to show that they are not liable to indemnify the insured on account of breach of policy. The breach of policy must be clearly made out.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

First Appeal No. 1397 of 2015

Decided On: 16.08.2018

 Shriram General Insurance Company Limited  Vs.  Rekha and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Dhavale, J.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 527
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Sunday, 19 March 2017

Whether standard rent will be payable from date of filing of application for grant of standard rent?


However, it is to be noted that the direction to pay standard rent has been given from the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of the landlady. The standard rent has been directed to be paid from 1-3-2008 till filing of the suit. This finding has again been confirmed by the appellate Court. It is, however, to be noted that the landlady had sought determination of standard rent by filing an application in that regard alongwith the suit for eviction. The suit in question was filed in October 2010 and in the application for fixation of standard rent, a prayer was made to fix the same from 1-11-2010 onwards. When an application is moved for fixing standard rent under Section 8(1) of the said Act, on such standard rent being fixed, it would be ideal for the same to be directed to be paid from the date of the application. The reason for the landlady to seek determination of standard rent is because she found the same to be on a lower side. She therefore sought the same to be fixed by moving an application under Section 8(1) of the said Act. There could not have been a direction to pay the same retrospectively. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand Kastoorchand v. Samirmal Jaini and another MANU/NA/0060/1952 : 1953 NLJ 294. It has been held by the Division Bench that once fair rent is determined, the same would have prospective operation and such fair rent can be directed to be paid from the date such application is moved.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
Writ Petition No. 211 of 2015
Decided On: 30.06.2016

 Zainab Bee Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharwade

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:A.S. Chandurkar, J.
Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ 374
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Sunday, 15 January 2017

Whether Child Care Leave Has To Be Applied For In Advance?

By the very nature of things, Child Care Leave has to be applied
for in advance and due permission accorded. The right is valuable because
female employee gets full salary for the period of Child Care Leave. Child
Care Leave cannot be applied for to act retrospectively and therefore, there is
nothing wrong in the Department holding that ex post facto permission cannot
be granted.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CWP No.26951 of 2016
Date of decision:22.12.2016
Shashi Bala

V
State of Haryana and others

CORAM:- MR. JUSTICE RAJIV NARAIN RAINA
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Sunday, 4 December 2016

S 311-A of CRPC is not retrospective,it is prospective in nature?

After referring to Section 5 of the Identification of
Prisoners Act, 1980 in Ram Babu Misra’s case, this Court
suggested that a suitable legislation be made along its lines to
provide for investiture of Magistrates with powers to issue
directions to any person including an accused person to give
specimen signatures and handwriting. Accordingly, a new Section
311-A was inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code. Section
311-A Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
“Section 311A. Power of Magistrate to order person to give specimen
signatures or handwriting.-If a Magistrate of the first class is satisfied
that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under this
Code, it is expedient to direct any person, including an accused
person, to give specimen signatures or handwriting, he may make an
order to that effect and in that case the person to whom the order
relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place
specified in such order and shall give his specimen signatures or
handwriting:
Provided that no order shall be made under this section unless the
person has at some time been arrested in connection with such
investigation or proceeding.”
The said amendment is prospective in nature and not
retrospective.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 224 OF 2012
SUKH RAM 
V
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Citation: 2016 CRLJ 4146 SC
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Sunday, 20 November 2016

What is presumption of future continuance?

 The survey records of 1892, 1895, 1904 and 1909 disclose that the ancestors of the plaintiffs held some of the frontier plots of Dubha Mal. The High Court was, therefore, asked to draw the inference that their ancestors held those plots during 1845 to 1863 when the Taufir lands accreted. The question is whether such an inference should be drawn. Now, if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed hi Illustration (d) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised both in India, see Anangamanjari Chowdh-rani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani MANU/PR/0033/1887 and England, see Bristow v. Cormican (1878) L.R. 3 A.C. 64 Deo v.Young (1845) 8 Q.B. 63115 E.R. 798 The broad observation in Manmatha Nath Haldar v. Girish Chandra Roy(1934) 38 C.W.N. 763 and Hemendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jnanendra Prasanna Bhaduri (1935) 40 C.W.N. 115 that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances. 
 Citation : AIR 1966 SC 605
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 435 to 437 of 1959
Decided On: 08.09.1965
Ambika Prasad Thakur and Ors.
Vs.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh and Ors.
Coram:
J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao and R.S. Bachawat, JJ.


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Saturday, 27 August 2016

What is distinction between substantive and procedural law?


Mr. Dada, argued that the amendment to Section 36
affects the substantive right of an award-debtor and hence it must
take prospective effect. He refers to the decision of the Apex Court
in Thirumala Chemicals Ltd. V/s. Union of India and Ors. reported in
(2011) 6 SCC page 739 to support his submission. In that decision,
the question considered was, whether the Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (“FEMA”
for short) was right in dismissing an appeal preferred under Section
19(1) of FEMA by applying the first proviso to Section 52(2) and
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (“FERA” for short) holding
that, it had no power to condone the delay beyond 90 days. Although

the cause of action had arisen when FERA was in force, show cause
notices and impugned notices were issued, when FEMA was imposed
and appeals were also preferred under Section 19(1) of FEMA. The
Apex Court, in that decision considered, the distinction between
substantive and procedural law at paras-23 to 27. The same reads as
under :-
“23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that
creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities.
Right conferred on a party to prefer an appeal against
an order is a substantive right conferred by a statute
which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in
law, unless modified expressly or by necessary
implication. Procedural laws establishes a mechanism
for determining those rights and liabilities and a
machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a
substantive right always act prospectively. It is trite
law that every statute is prospective unless it is
expressly or by necessary implication made to have
retrospective operation.
24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but
the procedure for filing the appeal including the
period of limitation cannot be called a substantive
right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim any
vested right claiming that he should be governed by
the old provision pertaining to period of limitation.
Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that
it will apply even to acts or transactions under the
repealed Act.
25. Law on the subject has also been elaborately
dealt with by this Court in various decisions and
reference may be made to a few of those decisions.
This Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhry, reported in AIR 1957 SC 540, New India
Insurance Co. Ltd v. Shanti Misra,reported in (1975)

2 SCC page 840, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (1994) 4 SCC page 602,
Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State
of Bihar, reported in (1999) 8 SCC page 16 and
Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, reported in (2001) 8
SCC page 24, has elaborately discussed the scope and
ambit of an amending legislation and its
retrospectivity and held that every litigant has a
vested right in substantive law but no such right exists
in procedural law. This Court has held that the law
relating to forum and limitation is procedural in
nature whereas law relating to right of appeal even
though remedial is substantive in nature.
26. Therefore, unless the language used plainly
manifests in express terms or by necessary implication
a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is
to be construed as prospective, a statute merely
procedural is to be construed as retrospective and a
statute which while procedural in its character, affects
vested rights adversely is to be construed as
prospective.
27. Rights of appeal conferred under Section 19(1) of
FEMA is therefore a substantive right. The procedure
for filing an appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 19
as also the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 19
conferring power on the Tribunal to condone delay in
filing the appeal if sufficient cause is shown, are
procedural rights.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

CHAMBER SUMMONS NO.1530 OF 2015
IN
EXECUTION APPLICATION (L) NO.2481 OF 2015
IN
ARBITRAL AWARD DATED 22ND JUNE, 2015

In the matter between :
M/s Rendezvous Sports World 
Vs.
The Board of Control for Cricket 
in India

Coram : Smt. R.P. SondurBaldota, J.
Date : 14th June, 2016.

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Sunday, 24 July 2016

Whether vested right can be taken away?

 It is trite that a vested right cannot be taken away except by a law
which is expressly made retrospective and must stand the scrutiny of law.
The Board or the State of Uttar Pradesh did not invalidate degrees awarded
by the Vishwavidyalyas in the past during the period the Vishwavidyalya
was recognized and degrees granted were given equivalence. The
recognition was withdrawn in the year 2009.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : July 21, 2016
W.P.(C) 7284/2015
ARUN TOMAR 
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR ..
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOGW.P.(C) 
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

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Wednesday, 19 August 2015

Whether law of limitation will apply retrospectively?

 This judgment was strongly relied upon by Shri A.K.
Sanghi for the proposition that the law in force on the date of
the institution of an appeal, irrespective of the date of accrual of
the cause of action for filing an appeal, will govern the period of
limitation. Ordinarily, this may well be the case. As has been
noticed above, periods of limitation being procedural in nature
would apply retrospectively.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4367 OF 2004
M.P. STEEL CORPORATION …APPELLANT

VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
EXCISE ...RESPONDENT
Citation;(2015)7 SCC58
R.F. Nariman, J.
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