Uniformity in Succession, Clarity in Service: Key Takeaways from the Repealing & Amending Bill, 2025

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 Repealing & Amending Bill, 2025

Why this Bill matters

The Repealing and Amending Bill, 2025 (Bill No. 193 of 2025, as introduced in Lok Sabha) is a periodic “clean-up” measure: it repeals enactments that have ceased to be in force/are obsolete and corrects selected formal defects through limited amendments.​

Operationally, it (i) repeals enactments listed in the First Schedule, (ii) amends enactments listed in the Second Schedule, and (iii) carries a standard savings clause to protect past acts, accrued rights/liabilities, and pending proceedings from being disturbed by repeal.

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Whether person refusing to accept registered letter is deemed to have knowledge of its contents?

 Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee . Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed, with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1979

Decided On: 20.02.1981

 Harcharan Singh  Vs. Shivrani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai and A.N. Sen, JJ.

Citation: (1981) 2 SCC 535

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Whether prosecution for dishonour is cheque is maintainable if reminder notice is sent?

It is clear from Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that once notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing to the drawer of the cheque, the service of notice is deemed to have been effected. Then requirements under proviso (b) of Section 138 stands complied, if notice is sent in the prescribed manner. However, the drawer is at liberty to rebut this presumption.

15. This Court in catena of cases has held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with postal endorsement "refused" or "not available in the house" or "house locked" or "shop closed" or "addressee not in station", due service has to be presumed2. Though in process of interpretation right of an honest lender cannot be defeated as has happened in this case. From the perusal of relevant Sections it is clear that generally there is no bar under the N.I. Act to send a reminder notice to the drawer of the cheque and usually such notice cannot be construed as an admission of non-service of the first notice by the Appellant as has happened in this case.

16. Moreover the first notice sent by Appellant on 12-04-1991 was effective and notice was deemed to have been served on the first Respondent. Further, it is clear that the second notice has no relevance at all in this case at hand. Second notice could be construed as a reminder of Respondent's obligation to discharge his liability. As the complaint, was filed within the stipulated time contemplated under Clause (b) of Section 142 of the N.I. Act, therefore Section 138 r/w 142 of N.I. Act is attracted. In the view of the matter, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 455 of 2006

Decided On: 01.03.2017

 N. Parameswaran Unni Vs. G. Kannan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 441

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What is presumption if summons was sent by registered post?

Second proviso to Order 9 Rule 13 casts an embargo on the court that a decree passed ex-parte shall not be set aside merely on the ground that the has been an irregularity in the service of summons.

9. Order 5, proviso to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 19A of C.P.C. provides that where the summons are properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post with acknowledgement due, notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgement having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of the issue of the summons, the Court shall presume that notice is duly served. Further,Second 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in short 'Act) provides similar provision. The presumptions are rebuttable. It is always open to the defendants to rebut the presumption by leading convincing and cogent evidence.

10. It is nobody's case that the postal addresses of the defendants are not properly addressed and, therefore, the registered summons could not be served. It is also nobody's case that the registered summons are not pre-paid and not duly sent. In fact the registered summons, bearing receipt Nos. 875and 876 dated 24.4.1986, were issued is borne out from the record.

11. Once it is proved the summons were sent by registered post to a correct and given address, the defendants' own conduct becomes important. Before the Trial Court, the appellants were allowed to lead evidence in support of their contentions. An order to this effect was passed by the Trial Court on 11.1.1991. The premises in question is occupied by two defendants jointly - Hari Singh and Basant Singh. Hari Singh appeared and examined himself stating that he did not receive the registered letter. However, the defendant Basant Singh did not appear and no evidence whatsoever, on his behalf, has been led to rebut the presumption in regard to service of summons sent to him under registered post with acknowledgment due. His own conduct shows that the registered summons had been duly served on him. As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He has failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the Statute. This apart, it is inherently improbable that the registered summons were duly served on Basant Singh but not to Hari Singh when they occupied the tenanted premises jointly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6489 of 2002

Decided On: 03.10.2002

Basant Singh and Anr. Vs. Roman Catholic Mission

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Y.K. Sabharwal and H.K. Sema, JJ.

Citation:(2002) 7 SCC 531,AIR 2002 SC 3557

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When application for condonation of delay in proceeding U/S 34 of Arbitration Act is liable to be rejected?

The sole question for consideration is as to whether the
appellant had been served with a copy of the awards after the same were
passed by the Arbitrator or not. It appears from the record that original copy
of the postal receipts and acknowledgement cards signed by the appellant
acknowledging receipt of the awards had been produced before the learned
District Judge. The observation of the learned District Judge in paragraph 11
of the impugned order, in this regard, is quoted below:
“11. During the course of hearing, the claimant/O.P.
has submitted original copies of postal receipts and
acknowledgement cards duly signed by the petitioner for
receiving the awards in connection with Judl. Misc. Cases
No. 115/2012/165/2013, 116/2012/166/2013 and
118/2012/168/2013. In Judl. Misc. Case No. 4
115/2012/165/2013, the award dated 20.11.2010 in
connection with RPR/2009-10/04/ST-5 dated 31.1.2009
was sent to the petitioner on 20.11.2010 by Registered
Post A/D bearing No. RLAD A 6571 and the same was
duly received on 4.12.2010. In Judl. Misc. Case
NO.116/2012/166/2013, the award dated 20.11.2010 in
connection with RPR/2009-10/01/ST-5 dated 31.1.2009
was sent to the petitioner on 20.11.2010 by registered
post A/D bearing No.RLAD A 6569 and the same duly
signed and received by the petitioner. In Judl. Misc.
Case No.118/2012/168/2013 the award dated
20/11/2010 in connection with RPR/2009-10/03/ST-5
dated 31/1/2009 was sent to the petitioner on
20.11.2010 by registered post A/D bearing No. RLAD A
6570 and the same was duly received on 7.12.2010. In
Judl. Misc. Case No.117/2012/167/2013, the award dated
9.12.2010 with reference to RPR/2009-10/24/ST-5 dated
5.2.2009 was sent to the petitioner on 12.12.2010 by
Speed Post with POD bearing No. EE-907305148IN. All
the awards were sent to the correct address of the
petitioner. A certified copy of the Dispatch Register
along with Receipt and POD(or A/D card ) for sending
speed post is also filed by the respondent/OP.”
[5] In view of the above, the fact that all the four awards were
sent to the appellant by registered post with A/D, the presumption is that it
had been served unless such presumption is rebutted by the appellant.
Before the learned District Judge, the appellant only denied to have received
the copy of the award in all the four cases and submitted that the signatures
appearing in the A/D cards are not his signatures. Except denying the above
fact, the appellant did not take any further step either by filing an application
to send the handwriting appearing in the acknowledgment card to an expert
for opinion or by adducing evidence to prove his stand that he had not been
served with the copy of the award. As a matter of fact, no rebuttal evidence
was adduced by the appellant against the presumption available under the
law except denial receipt of the award from the Arbitrator.
[6] In course of hearing of the appeals, the learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the matter may be remitted back to the learned
District Judge to give an opportunity to the appellant to get the signatures
verified by an expert. We are unable to accept such contention of the
learned counsel considering the fact that no such effort was made by the
appellant when the matter was pending before the learned District Judge
and several years have passed in the meantime. Apart from the above, we
also compared the signatures appearing in the A/D cards with the signatures 5
of the appellant in the Vakalatnama. To our bare eyes we did not find much
of difference. We, therefore, find no justification either to set aside the
impugned order refusing to condone the delay or remitting the matter back
to the learned District Judge for giving another opportunity to the appellant
to substantiate his stand.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL

 Arbitration Appeal(J2) No.1 of 2015
M/S Toijam Achouba Singh & Sons
 V
The Union of India

BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE L.K. MOHAPATRA
HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO


 Date of judgment :: 06.05.2016
Citation: AIR 2017 Manipur 8

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Whether proper service of summons can be presumed even if summons were sent at wrong address?

It is abundantly clear from the reading of this rule that the summonses must be sent for service but in cast they are not served and they are returned, then alone the provisions of this rule are attracted. This Rule 20-A cannot be construed to mean that even if the summonses are sent in a wrong manner, or at a wrong address or to a wrong place and they are received back, service by registered post is permissible. This rule contemplates an attempt and a genuine attempt of the service of summons in the ordinary course. If service is not possible and the summonses are returned then of course mode of service of summons by registered post can be resorted to either in lieu of or in addition to the service under the ordinary course. The proviso added by Rajasthan State in Order 5, Rule 10, C.P.C. gives discretion to the court to send the summons to the defendant by registered post in addition to the mode of service laid down under Order 5, Rule 10. C. P. C. As noticed above on 19-10-70 summonses were ordered to be sent in ordinary course and service by registered post was also directed to be done in addition to it. But it transpired that the notices which were, sent in ordinary course were not properly done. The plaintiff furnished notices only in Hindi and they could not have been served on any person in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Thus there is a clear violation of Order 5, Rule 10, C.P.C.

Rajasthan High Court

Sitaram Ramavtar vs Lohiya Murlidhar Meghraj on 28 January, 1975

Equivalent citations: AIR 1975 Raj 121, 1975 WLN 201

Bench: J Jain

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How to appreciate evidence in Cheque dishonour case if there is difference in signature on acknowledgment receipt?

One more legal contention has been raised by Mr. Gupta, the learned advocate for the applicant, that no legal notice as contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was ever served upon the applicant and hence proceedings are vitiated. From the record it clearly transpires that notice, exhibit-i 1, dated April 26, 1992, was sent by registered post at the registered address of the applicant/accused in Criminal Case No. 1361 of 1992 whereas at exhibit-10 in Criminal Case No. 1562 of 1992. The notice was sent by registered post and the acknowledgment receipt duly signed is produced on record at exhibit-9 in Criminal Case No. 1361 of 1992 and at exhibit-9 in Criminal Case No. 1362 of 1992. Mr. Gupta disputes receipt of the notice saying that the acknowledgment does not bear the signature of the applicant. It is true that the signature on the acknowledgment receipt differs from the cheques in question. Here the question is not of the signature of the addressee but the question is whether it was received or reached at the address mentioned. The correctness of the address mentioned in the cause title of the notice as well as on the acknowledgment is not in dispute. Even the applicant has also written the same address in the cause title of the applications. Dispatch of notice by registered post is also not under challenge and, therefore, would be a relevant fact and the presumption that the notice/letter has reached and was delivered to the addressee can be raised under section 16 of the Indian Evidence Act. Since the address is correct and a letter posted in ordinary course reaches the addressee I have no hesitation in raising the presumption that the notices in question did reach the addressee and have been delivered to the addressee or any authorised person on his behalf and, therefore, this contention also does not find favour of the court. As regards practice and procedure for service of notice through post and if addressee endeavours to manage to have the notice returned with postal remarks "not available in the house", "house locked", "shop closed", the apex court in a recent decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiyalal [1996] 1 JT SC 609 has held it to be a valid service on respondent-addressee. In the light of this decision, the contention does not hold good as on the facts also the prosecution case is on a much sound footing and the notice shall be deemed to have been served and much significance cannot be attributed to difference in signature. A person consciously or unconsciously may put different signatures. In this case the applicant being conscious about anticipated litigation might have scribed different signature with dishonest and deliberate intention of defeating the provisions.

Gujarat High Court

Satish Jayantilal Shah vs State Of Gujarat on 11 March, 1996

Equivalent citations: 1999 95 CompCas 303 Guj, 1996 CriLJ 3099

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