Under which circumstances the court can permit plaintiff to file a Replication?

 As stated supra, the petitioner has not raised any new plea and on the other hand, in order to controvert by giving proper reply qua the new facts stated in some of the paragraphs in the written statement by the first respondent, the petitioner sought leave to file replication. When the first respondent attempted to introduce new facts in the written statement, the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to controvert the said averments incorporated in the writ statement. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision in the case of Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal relied upon by the first respondent is not helpful to the case of the first respondent.

{Para 30}

31. Admittedly, the practice of filing replication/subsequent pleading is meant only for denying and/or clarifying the facts stated in the written statement. Fresh cause of action or fresh case is not brought up by filing replication. On a perusal of the replication filed by the petitioner, this Court finds that the averments set out in the replication are not contrary to the averments set out in the election petition and these are only explanatory to the plea advanced by the first respondent in the written statement. Therefore, in order to explain/clarify the plea of the first respondent and for fair trial of the election petition and also in the interest of justice, this Court is inclined to grant leave to the petitioner to file replication.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL

MC (El. Pet.) No. 119 of 2022 and El. Pet. No. 6 of 2022

Decided On: 14.03.2023

Nahakpam Indrajit Singh Vs. Sheikh Noorul Hassan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.V. Muralidaran, Actg. C.J.

Citation: MANU/MN/0055/2023.

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How to prove statements contained in power of attorney?

 It was then argued that the statement made by the notary public in the power of attorney regarding the articles of plaintiff-bank being contents of documents could be proved only by producing memorandum of articles. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Judicial Commissioner in Nar Bahadur Gurung v. Anil Krishna Bhattacharya, AIR 1970 Man 57. In this case, it was held that the statements contained in the powers of attorney have to be proved like any other statements. There is no quarrel so far as the principle of law is concerned. But, I have referred to these statements not for the purpose of using them as evidence to prove those facts but only to show the act of notarisation. Those statements do show that the notary public had satisfied himself about the authority of the executants of the power of attorney.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Suit No. 1290 of 1979

Decided On: 17.05.1982

Citibank N.A. Vs.  Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gian Chand Jain, J.

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Whether accused can be furnished with questions that may be asked U/S. 313 CrPC before filing written statement?

There is nothing under Sub-Section 5 of Section 313 Cr.P.C which prevents the accused to submit to file written statement even after being examined orally by the Court. As mentioned above the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C have been incorporated mainly to provide ample opportunity to the accused to explain himself and to prove his innocence in the light of the incriminating evidences which have been adduced against him during the examination of prosecution witnesses. This opportunity to explain himself is in addition to the right of the accused to adduce his own defence witness under Section 233 or Section 243 Cr.P.C as the case may be. The legislature by inserting Sub-section 5 to Section 313 Cr.P.C intended to facilitate furnishing of answers to the questions put by the Court to the accused even when the accused is not physically present in the Court by filing written statement. It is however, not restricted only to such cases where the accused is for any reason not able to present at the Court. There is nothing in the section or any other provision under the code which debars submission of written statement by an accused who is already present in the Court to face the questions of the Court. Therefore, this Court is of the view that if any accused desires to file a written statement to the questions put by the Court, he cannot be denied this right. As already mentioned above, under Section 243(1) of the Cr.P.C, the accused who is involved in a trial of warrant case instituted on police report can submit any written statement before the magistrate. Therefore, permitting an accused to submit his written statement even at the time of accused examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C cannot be said to be an alien concept.

36. Consequently, if an accused has a right to file a written statement at the time of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C as a corollary, it follows that the accused would have the right to be furnished with the questions in advance so that he can submit his written statement. It is only after the accused has been furnished with the questions of the Court that he can file his written statement. This Court is, accordingly, of the view that furnishing of questions prepared by the Court to the accused to enable the accused to file his written statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C should be normally allowed by the trial Court, unless, the Court is of the view that such request has been made to delay the trial or is vexatious and not warranted under the circumstances, as it is the discretion the Court.

37. In fact, the questions that are to be put by the Court are to be relevant to the issues involved in the trial and related to the incriminating materials and evidences already adduced against the accused and on record, and hence no prejudice can be said to be caused to anybody by disclosing the questions prepared by the Court to the accused in advance so that he can file his written statement.

38. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the learned Special Judge ought to have furnished copies of the questions prepared by the Court which were put to the accused so as to enable him to file his written statement in answer to the said questions.

39. In the present case, it has been noted that the accused Petitioner has been already examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C and as such he is already aware of the questions put to him by the Court. As such, he would be at liberty to file his written statement to the questions already put by the Court to him irrespective of the oral answers the accused has already given to the Court.

40. For the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that ordinarily, an accused is entitled to be furnished in advance, if he makes a request, of the questions to be put by the Court for the purpose of accused examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C and he can file his written statement in addition to any oral answers given before the Court which request can be declined by the Court if the same has been done to delay the trial or is vexatious or for such germane reasons.
In the High Court of Manipur at Imphal

(Before N. Kotiswar Singh, A.C.J)

Shri Langpoklakpam Kiranjit Singh,v.

The State of Manipur

Cril Petition No. 21 of 2017

Decided on November 7, 2017, 

Citation:2017 SCC OnLine Mani 118

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When application for condonation of delay in proceeding U/S 34 of Arbitration Act is liable to be rejected?

The sole question for consideration is as to whether the
appellant had been served with a copy of the awards after the same were
passed by the Arbitrator or not. It appears from the record that original copy
of the postal receipts and acknowledgement cards signed by the appellant
acknowledging receipt of the awards had been produced before the learned
District Judge. The observation of the learned District Judge in paragraph 11
of the impugned order, in this regard, is quoted below:
“11. During the course of hearing, the claimant/O.P.
has submitted original copies of postal receipts and
acknowledgement cards duly signed by the petitioner for
receiving the awards in connection with Judl. Misc. Cases
No. 115/2012/165/2013, 116/2012/166/2013 and
118/2012/168/2013. In Judl. Misc. Case No. 4
115/2012/165/2013, the award dated 20.11.2010 in
connection with RPR/2009-10/04/ST-5 dated 31.1.2009
was sent to the petitioner on 20.11.2010 by Registered
Post A/D bearing No. RLAD A 6571 and the same was
duly received on 4.12.2010. In Judl. Misc. Case
NO.116/2012/166/2013, the award dated 20.11.2010 in
connection with RPR/2009-10/01/ST-5 dated 31.1.2009
was sent to the petitioner on 20.11.2010 by registered
post A/D bearing No.RLAD A 6569 and the same duly
signed and received by the petitioner. In Judl. Misc.
Case No.118/2012/168/2013 the award dated
20/11/2010 in connection with RPR/2009-10/03/ST-5
dated 31/1/2009 was sent to the petitioner on
20.11.2010 by registered post A/D bearing No. RLAD A
6570 and the same was duly received on 7.12.2010. In
Judl. Misc. Case No.117/2012/167/2013, the award dated
9.12.2010 with reference to RPR/2009-10/24/ST-5 dated
5.2.2009 was sent to the petitioner on 12.12.2010 by
Speed Post with POD bearing No. EE-907305148IN. All
the awards were sent to the correct address of the
petitioner. A certified copy of the Dispatch Register
along with Receipt and POD(or A/D card ) for sending
speed post is also filed by the respondent/OP.”
[5] In view of the above, the fact that all the four awards were
sent to the appellant by registered post with A/D, the presumption is that it
had been served unless such presumption is rebutted by the appellant.
Before the learned District Judge, the appellant only denied to have received
the copy of the award in all the four cases and submitted that the signatures
appearing in the A/D cards are not his signatures. Except denying the above
fact, the appellant did not take any further step either by filing an application
to send the handwriting appearing in the acknowledgment card to an expert
for opinion or by adducing evidence to prove his stand that he had not been
served with the copy of the award. As a matter of fact, no rebuttal evidence
was adduced by the appellant against the presumption available under the
law except denial receipt of the award from the Arbitrator.
[6] In course of hearing of the appeals, the learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the matter may be remitted back to the learned
District Judge to give an opportunity to the appellant to get the signatures
verified by an expert. We are unable to accept such contention of the
learned counsel considering the fact that no such effort was made by the
appellant when the matter was pending before the learned District Judge
and several years have passed in the meantime. Apart from the above, we
also compared the signatures appearing in the A/D cards with the signatures 5
of the appellant in the Vakalatnama. To our bare eyes we did not find much
of difference. We, therefore, find no justification either to set aside the
impugned order refusing to condone the delay or remitting the matter back
to the learned District Judge for giving another opportunity to the appellant
to substantiate his stand.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL

 Arbitration Appeal(J2) No.1 of 2015
M/S Toijam Achouba Singh & Sons
 V
The Union of India

BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE L.K. MOHAPATRA
HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO


 Date of judgment :: 06.05.2016
Citation: AIR 2017 Manipur 8

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Whether application by father for visitation rights is maintainable under domestic violence Act?

As I have already indicated that Section 21 is amenable to
two interpretations as is being highlighted by the parties, in such event
only that interpretation which advanced the object of the provision can
be accepted. It is worthwhile to note that the Act was enacted to
prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society and keeping
in view that, several protection orders including the safety of the
aggrieved person and the ‘child’ have been contemplated to be
passed. Therefore, the cause of the safety of the aggrieved person or
the child is always warrants to be taken into account in interpreting the
provision. In such situation, if the interpretation given on behalf of the
wife-aggrieved party is accepted, it will render the provision incomplete
as in case where wife-aggrieved party seeks custody of the child, if the
child is in custody of the husband and an order of custody is passed in
favour of the aggrieved party, visitation right can be granted to the
husband. But, if custody lies with the wife–aggrieved party, then the
husband will have no remedy of visitation right if the interpretation as
contemplated by the wife-aggrieved party is given effect to and thereby
it can easily be said that interpretation given by the aggrieved party-wife
will never advance the cause of the child.
[15] On the other hand, if it is held that the husband, in
absence of any application for grant of custody, can maintain his
application for visitation right will advance the object of the provision as
in case of child being in custody of the husband, application for custody
can be filed by the wife wherein the husband can have a visitation right
if order is of custody of child passed in favour of the aggrieved party. In
other situation, when the custody of the child lies with the wife, there
would be no occasion for the wife for filing an application for custody as
it has happened in the instant case. In that situation, husband will have
remedy to have visitation right by filing application to that effect. Under
the circumstances, I do find that the appellate court was quite justified
in holding that even in absence of application for custody being there,
by the aggrieved party, application of visitation right in terms of the
proviso to Rule 21 can be maintained. Thus, I do not find any merit in
the Criminal Revision Petition No.16 of 2015. Hence, it is dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
CRIL.REVN. PETITION NO.16 OF 2015
Smt. Huidrom Ningol Maibam Ongbi
Omila Devi, 
V
Shri Inaobi Singh Maibam, 
BEFORE
 CHIEF JUSTICE R R PRASAD

Dated: 26.10.2016.
 Citation: 2017 CRLJ659

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What is basic concept of irregularity in proceeding?

In order to decide the above issue, it may be appropriate
for this court to examine as to what the words “proceedings” and
“regular” would mean. The word ‘proceeding’ is defined in the Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary “as doing a legal action or process, any act done by
the authority of a court of law.” In other words, as per the dictionary
meaning of the word ‘proceeding’, it is the course of procedure in an
action at law and an action, measure or step in a course of business or
conduct. The Criminal Procedure Code does not define the word
‘proceeding’ though the same is being used in the provisions of some
of the sections like Section 195 (1)(b), 116 (3) etc. of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Various High Courts have examined the word
‘proceeding’ with reference to the particular statute involved therein
and have expressed their views that the word ‘proceeding’ is not
purely a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it.
Necessarily the term indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial
business is conducted. A ‘proceeding’ may in some statutes mean an
action or that which initiates an action and in other enactments it may
also mean a step in an action. The expression ‘proceedings’ with
reference to a case, would mean taking of steps in connection with the
further progress of the case. When a case is listed for hearing and the
case is taken up by the court and an order is also made in the case, it
would be proceedings in the case.
 As per Webster’s New World Dictionary, the word
‘regular’ is defined as consistent or habitual in action; not changing;
uniform; conforming to a standard or to a generally accepted rule or
mode of conduct. As regards the word ‘regularity’ also, various High
Courts have examined it and expressed their views that the term
‘regularity’ is a well recognised term and well recognised ground of
judicial interference on an appeal or revision. The word ‘regular’ gives 
a constant course of conduct without any break or breach. It is
‘irregular’ when the procedure followed is in violation of the principles

of Natural Justice and fair play.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Cril. Revn. Petn. No. 8 of 2015
Shri K. Meghachandra Singh, 
 V
 Oinam (O) Itamani Devi,
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KH. NOBIN SINGH


Dated: 11-08-2015
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4332 Manipur

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When revision is not maintainable on ground of irregularity in proceedings?

The petitioner has challenged
only the proceedings on the ground of being irregular but the
petitioner is unable to show as to how the proceeding can be said to be
irregular when it has just commenced on the passing of the order dated
05-06-2015 issuing summons to him. The question of irregularity may
arise in a case where there is breach or break in the uniformity of the
actions or steps being taken by the Court. There is no question of such
breach or break in the proceeding of the case being Cril. Misc. Case No.
44 of 2015 because it is at its initial stage and in other words, it is just
the beginning of it.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Cril. Revn. Petn. No. 8 of 2015
Shri K. Meghachandra Singh, 
 V
 Oinam (O) Itamani Devi,
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KH. NOBIN SINGH


Dated: 11-08-2015
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4332 Manipur

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When FIR can be quashed for offence relating breaking of marriage engagement?

Here, in the instant case, it has never been the case of
the complainant that upon fraudulent or dishonest inducement
the complainant parted with money, rather, the simple case to
which the complainant came forth, is that settlement of marriage
on being broken, the accused promised to pay a sum of Rs.5
lakhs, which the accused did not pay and thereby it becomes a
pure case of breach of contract, if any, and hence, question of
attracting offence of cheating does not arise.
 Similarly, case of defamation is also not made out as
it has never been the case of the complainant that any imputation
was made against the complainant or her family members to
harm her reputation. Allegation what is there is that the accused
No.1 sent several messages on the mobile of son of the
complainant asking her to cancel the marriage, which allegation
does not have ingredients for constituting offence of defamation as
has been defined under Section 499. Similarly, nothing appears to
be there in the complaint to constitute an offence of criminal
intimidation as has been defined under Section 503 of the IPC, as
no such allegation is there to the effect that the accused did
threat either to the complainant or her family members with an
injury or to her reputation or property with intention to cause
alarm to the complainant or other or to cause that person to do 
any act which he is not likely bound to do so. Thus, there appears
to be no allegation whatsoever to the effect that the accused did
ever threat the complainant to injure her reputation and thereby
offence of criminal intimidation also does not get attracted. Under
the circumstances, the First Information Report warrants to be
quashed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
CRIL PETITION NO.20 OF 2015
Tekcham Romita Devi V State of Manipur 
BEFORE
 MR.JUSTICE RAKESH RANJAN PRASAD
Dated:6-4-2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)207 Manipur

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Whether Advocate can refuse to give No objection to his client if client wished to engage other Advocate?

The normal conduct of a client is that if he wishes to change
his counsel for some reason or the other, he should approach him for
return of the brief and to obtain “No Objection” from him. In case his
counsel returns the brief, it is well and good and if he refuses to return
the brief or refuses to give “No Objection”, the client may invoke the
provisions of Order 3 Rule 4 of the CPC to redress his grievances.
However, in the present case, the applicants have failed to that and
without determining the appointment of their earlier counsel, Shri Ng.
Kumar, Advocate, they had moved an application for deleting their
names from the array of parties in the writ petition through another
Advocate which is unfair and unreasonable on the part of the applicants.
The moment an Advocate is engaged, a client is expected to be fair and
reasonable to him and ought to give proper instructions accordingly. But
in any case and for whatever reasons, the applicants have expressed
their view that they don’t want Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate to continue as
their counsel and that a new Advocate be engaged in his place and 
since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said R.D. Saxena’s Case
(supra) has categorically observed that for whatever reason, if a client
does not want to continue the engagement of a particular Advocate, it
would be a professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the
profession that he would return the brief to the client and it is time to
hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative,
this court is of the view that this application is liable to be allowed. In
view of the above observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is the
duty of Shri Ng. Kumar, Advocate to give “No Objection” so that the
applicants could engage a new Advocate of their choice. If Shri Ng.
Kumar, Advocate is of the view that the action of the applicants being
unfair and unreasonable, has caused prejudice to his professional right
and privilege as a counsel, it is open to him to seek appropriate relief
and redress his grievance from an appropriate forum.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
M.C. (W.P. (C)) No. 147 of 2016
(Ref:- W.P. (C) No. 202 of 2015)

 Shri Ashem Shyamkesho Singh,  V  Thokchom Ranjan Meetei, 


B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KH. NOBIN SINGH

Date of Judgment & Order :: 08-07-2016

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Procedure to be followed by court in domestic violence case

It is clear that even though section 28(1) specifically provides that all proceedings under section 12 shall be governed by the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973, it is directory in nature and any departure from the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure will not vitiate a proceeding initiated under section 12. Therefore, this Court will hold that the Courts while dealing with proceedings under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 shall abide by the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 as far as possible. However, any departure from the provisions of Cr.P.C. will not have the effect of vitiating the proceeding in view of the fact that the statute itself specifically provides for the Court to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under section 12. Having heard the counsel for the parties and considered the materials on record, this Court is not able to discern any material irregularity or illegality in the proceedings before the Court below.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

Cril. Revision Petn. No. 7 of 2013

Decided On: 07.02.2014

Appellants: Shri Naorem Shamungou Singh
Vs.
Respondent: Smt. Moirangthem Guni Devi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N. Kotiswar Singh, J.

Citation: AIR2014 25, II(2014)DMC555 , 2014(2)GLT7,2014(3) Crimes 446 manipur

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