Whether it can be held that sisters are not in possession of joint family property only on ground they are residing in their matrimonial house?

Further, it is held that to apply these principles, the defendants had to establish that the plaintiffs have been excluded from the joint possession of the suit land twelve years prior to filing of the suit. Whereas, to prove such facts, D.Ws. 1 and 2 have deposed that from the year 1980, Huchchirappa was in possession of the suit land and after his death, his wife and children are in possession. These statements have been denied by the plaintiffs in the cross-examination. Exclusive possession has been claimed on the basis of allotment of suit land to the share of Huchchirappa. It was held that the defendants have failed to establish the partition and allotment of suit land to the share of Huchchirappa, as there was no convincing evidence to show that the plaintiffs were excluded from the joint possession of the suit land after 1980. Only because the plaintiffs are residing in their matrimonial house, it cannot be held that they were excluded from possession. Thus, the learned trial judge on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record has held that the defendants have failed to establish that the plaintiffs have been excluded from the joint possession of the suit land. As such, the suit of the plaintiffs is not barred under Article 110 of the Limitation Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Regular First Appeal No. 100108 of 2016 [PAR/POS]

Decided On: 09.01.2017

Durgavva and Ors. Vs. Annapoornavva and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ravi V. Malimath and K. Somashekar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 karnat 38

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Whether offence can be registered against brothers if they get property mutated in their names excluding sisters?

 In the present case, it is admitted that six brothers excluded seven sisters and got the land mutated in their name. It is also admitted that the present petitioners sold 1/6th portion of the land by registered sale deed. The peculiar facts in the present case are that the brothers from the very beginning knew that there were seven sisters also. No consent was taken from the respondent No. 2. She was never informed and surreptitiously the land was mutated in the names of all the six brothers. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them, their names were recorded as owner of 1/6th share, however, the fact remains that revenue records are not records of title. When Anandibai died in the year 2000, 1/13th share devolved upon respondent No. 2. Mere entry in the revenue record do not extinguish the right already accrued to respondent No. 2, therefore, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them and they were owner of 1/6th share is not acceptable. In the revenue proceedings, petitioner No. 2 was one of the party. She acted on behalf of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 before the Police Station, However, now the plea is taken independently by petitioner No. 1 that he was not party to the proceedings, and therefore, he had no knowledge about the revenue proceedings. In view of the aforesaid, the contents of the FIR shows that there was a dishonest intention on the part of all the six brothers. At this stage, no case is made out for quashment of the FIR and related proceedings using extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

M. Cri. C. No. 547 of 2016

Decided On: 21.09.2016

 Mukesh Nigam and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Coram:Alok Verma, J.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 620

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Whether mother and sister can seek relief under DV Act against son/brother and his wife?

In view of the above discussion and in view of the fact that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Kusum Lata Sharma's case has not been disturbed by the Supreme Court, we are inclined to read down the provisions of section 2(q) of the DV Act and to hold that the provisions of "respondent" in section 2(q) of the DV Act is not to be read in isolation but has to be read as a part of the scheme of the DV Act, and particularly along with the definitions of "aggrieved person", "domestic relationship" and "shared household" in clauses (a), (f) and (s) of section 2 of the DV Act. If so read, the complaint alleging acts of domestic violence is maintainable not only against an adult male person who is son or brother, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved complainant- mother or sister, but the complaint can also be filed against a relative of the son or brother including wife of the son / wife of the brother and sisters of the male respondent. In other words, in our view, the complaint against the daughter-in-law, daughters or sisters would be maintainable under the provisions of the DV Act, where they are co- respondent/s in a complaint against an adult male person, who is or has been in domestic relationship with the complainant and such co- respondent/s. It must, of course, be held that a complaint under the DV Act would not be maintainable against daughter-in-law, sister-in- law or sister of the complainant, if no complaint is filed against an adult male person of the family.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 300 of 2013

Decided On: 25.09.2014

 Kusum Narottam Harsora  Vs. Union of India

Coram:
M.S. Shah, C.J. and M.S. Sonak, J.

Citaion; 2015(7) ALLMR 104

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When unmarried brother and sisters of deceased are entitled to get compensation under motor vehicles Act?

In the present case, appellant nos. 3 and 4 were unmarried, they were living with the deceased alongwith their parents. It is not on record that the deceased was the sole bread earner of the family but we are of the opinion that dependency is not confined to material things. Brothers and sisters all unmarried living under the same roof not only have emotional attachment but emotional dependence also. Those who are unemployed expects something from their kith and kin to provide them things in material form though they may not be necessary for maintaining only their animal existence but useful for them to improve their quality of life. The contribution made by the deceased may include presents on festive occasions, eatable items, wearing apparels etc. In this way they are dependents of the deceased. In this factual background, we come to the conclusion that in the present case, appellant nos. 3 and 4 come within the category of legal representatives and they are entitled to be compensated. 
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 3857 of 2010 

Appellant :- Smt. Jai Kumari Devi & Others 
Respondent :- Smt. Pushpa Gupta & Another 

Hon'ble Krishna Murari,J. 
Hon'ble Pratyush Kumar,J. 

Citation;2016(1) ALLMR(JOURNAL)1ALLAHABAD

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