Showing posts with label registration of offence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label registration of offence. Show all posts

Monday, 9 February 2026

Important articles and judgments on police investigation U/S 156 of CRPC {S 175(3 ) of BNSS }

 

1) Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications


35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/03/supreme-court-how-bnss-modernizes.html

2) Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

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Tuesday, 25 March 2025

From Judicial Interpretation to Statutory Law: Section 156 CrPC and S 175 of BNSS, 2023

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020), has analyzed the procedural changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in relation to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This judgment highlights the legislative codification of judicial safeguards aimed at preventing misuse of the powers vested in Magistrates for ordering investigations.

Key Changes in Section 175 of BNSS

Section 175 of BNSS corresponds to Section 156 CrPC but introduces significant procedural modifications:

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Section 156(3) of CR.P.C vs. Section 175(3) of B.N.S.S : A Comparative Analysis of Procedural Changes

The new interpretation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), specifically Section 175(3), which replaces Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), introduces significant procedural changes that will affect its practical application. These changes aim to enhance judicial scrutiny, reduce misuse, and increase accountability in the process of ordering investigations. Below is an explanation of how these changes will impact the working of Section 156 in practice:

Key Changes and Their Practical Implications

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Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications

 However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS"). {Para 28}


29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with Sub-section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any Magistrate, before ordering investigation Under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:


a. Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4) of the BNSS;


b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and


c. Consider the submissions made by the police officer.


30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:


a. Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to the Accused public servant; and


b. Considering the assertions made by the Accused public servant as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged incident.


31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:


a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application Under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate Under Section 175(3).


b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.


c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions Under Section 175(3).


32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in   MANU/SC/0344/2015 : 2015:INSC:239 : (2015) 6 SCC 287, this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant must necessarily make applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the Accused by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). 

28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees.

29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power Under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.


30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.


31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition Under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application Under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [  MANU/SC/1166/2013 : 2013:INSC:748 : (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.


(Emphasis supplied)


33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka reported in   MANU/SC/0214/2022 : 2022:INSC:209 : (2022) 5 SCC 639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:


24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.


25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that, applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons.


26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, there have to be applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law.


(Emphasis supplied)


34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.


35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: It is not necessary to conduct preliminary inquiry as per Lalita kumari's Judgment if cognizable offence is made out against accused

 The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. {Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: 'Lalita Kumari' Judgment Doesn't Create Absolute Rule That Preliminary Enquiry Is Necessary In Every Case Before FIR

Conclusion/Directions


120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:


120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory Under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.


120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.


120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.


[Emphasis supplied]


12. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information clearly discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute Rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence.


13. In the present case, the allegations against the Appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The Appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the course of investigation and trial. The Appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum.


14. Further, this Court cannot issue a blanket direction restraining the registration of FIRs against the Appellant or mandating a preliminary inquiry in all future cases involving him. Such a direction would not only be contrary to the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure but would also amount to judicial overreach. As rightly observed by the High Court, courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions or introduce additional procedural safeguards that are not contemplated by law. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1313 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.03.2025

Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: Vikram Nath, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 350,MANU/SC/0346/2025.

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Saturday, 8 June 2024

Kerala HC: Whether the Bail Court has jurisdiction to pass orders restraining the Police from arresting accused without passing interim bail orders?

The third referred issue in B.A. No. 4421/2022 (which is the 4th issue mentioned supra) is as to whether the Bail Court has jurisdiction to pass orders restraining the Police from arresting the accused without passing interim bail orders as per Sec.438(1) of the Cr.P.C. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in para 52, more particularly, para 52.14, of Sushila Agarwal v. State (NCT, Delhi) & Anr. [MANU/SC/1538/2019 : (2020) 5 SCC 1, p.86] and paras 40 & 41 of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [MANU/SC/0215/1980 : (1980) 2 SCC 565, pp. 590-591], it is not right and legally correct for an Anticipatory Bail Court to pass orders or interim orders restraining the arrest of the accused or directing not to arrest the accused, etc. However, as categorically held in para 42 of Gurbaksh Singh's case supra [MANU/SC/0215/1980 : (1980) 2 SCC 565, p.591] and various other decisions, the Anticipatory Bail Court, in appropriate cases, will have the discretionary power to issue interim bail order/ad-interim bail order if the Court is convinced that it is so warranted, pending consideration of the main bail application. But, while considering passing of such interim bail orders, the Court should ensure strict conformity with the requirements of Sec.438. The last referred issue in B.A. No. 4421/2022 will also, thus, stand answered.

{Para 109}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. Nos. 4421 and 4983 of 2022

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Anu Mathew Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Alexander Thomas and C.S. Sudha, JJ.

Author: Alexander Thomas, J.

Citation:  MANU/KE/0926/2023.

Read full Judgment here:  Click here.

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Kerala HC: Whether the court should grant anticipatory bail to a accused who has absconded abroad after registration of offence?

So, if in a case it is established and the Court is convinced that the accused/bail applicant had absconded from India and had gone abroad, after fully knowing about the registration of a non-bailable offence against him and thereafter, he files a bail application under Sec.438 of the Cr.P.C. while he is still abroad, then it may not be proper exercise of discretion to grant bail in such a case. This is not to say that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a bail application under Sec.438, merely because the accused/applicant is abroad at the time of filing of the application. We are answering this factual premised issue only in the context of the issue as to whether it would be right and proper exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. So also, if such an accused had absconded from India and had gone abroad knowing fully well about the registration of a crime in respect of a non bailable offence, then thereafter, though he may technically have the locus standi to maintain a pre-arrest bail plea, but if as a matter of fact, the Court is convinced that he has absconded and fled away from the law enforcement agencies, etc., then it may not be right and proper exercise of jurisdiction to grant interim bail to such an accused who is abroad. {Para 107}

108. In this regard, the Courts may examine whether the accused was already abroad at the time of registration of crime. Even if the accused had gone abroad after registration of the crime, it may be ascertained whether he had bonafide gone abroad in view of his employment or professional compulsions, etc. General relevant facts should be ascertained by the Court, before reaching factual conclusions, as above.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. Nos. 4421 and 4983 of 2022

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Anu Mathew Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Alexander Thomas and C.S. Sudha, JJ.

Author: Alexander Thomas, J.

Citation:  MANU/KE/0926/2023.

Read full Judgment here:  Click here.

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Sunday, 31 December 2023

Whether police can register offence U/S 31 of Domestic violence Act if respondent fails to pay maintenance amount in breach of protection order?

The "economic abuse" has been explained in clause (iv) of Explanation I of Section 3 of the Act wherein deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessary is an expression of "domestic violence".{Para 16}

 The amount of maintenance awarded by the Magistrate is an amount which an aggrieved person requires to meet necessities of life and for survival. Such amount is not limited to household. It includes maintenance as well. Therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate granting maintenance is an affirmative order of protection in relation to domestic violence as defined in Section 3 of the Act. For such violation, the penalty is provided in Section 31 of the Act. {Para 16}

21. In the result this Court holds as follows:-

Section 31 of the DV Act is a key provision and heartbeat of the DV Act to regulate the violator of protection order passed under Section 18 of the DV Act. The question as to whether the law enforcing authority has jurisdiction to register the Criminal Case under Section 31 of the Act for non-payment of maintenance allowance which is deemed to be breach of protection order under Section 18 of the Act, is answered affirmatively and the law enforcing authority has jurisdiction to register the case and proceed in accordance with law for every breach of order without any legal bar for the reason that each breach of order amounts to a continuing offence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 15704 of 2018, Crl. M.P. (MD) Nos. 6953 and 6954 of 2018

Decided On: 06.03.2023

S. Amalraj Vs. State and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Ramakrishanan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/4321/2023.

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Sunday, 27 November 2022

Whether the police can register an offence against a child nine year old in respect of accident?

 Central Government Act

Section 83 in The Indian Penal Code

83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

 Misconception or ignorance of law is not an excuse, much less, for a police officer and in the peculiar facts, more so, having regard to the fact that the child was only 9 years of age. This action of the police i.e. of registration of FIR, has resulted in traumatizing a 9 year old boy. Despite Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code, the police have proceeded to register the FIR as against the petitioner’s son, a minor aged 9 years, at the behest of the respondent No.3. The action reflects complete non-application of mind by the concerned officer whilst registering the offence. {Para 15}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3062 OF 2022; 

`AK’ Vs State of Maharashtra

Coram: REVATI MOHITE DERE; J., S. M. MODAK, J.

Dated: 20th OCTOBER 2022
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Tuesday, 8 December 2020

Whether Magistrate can direct police to register FIR for an offence punishable under the Mines Act U/S 156 of CRPC?


After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder vis-à-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, and the law laid down by this Court in the cases referred to hereinabove and for the reasons stated hereinabove, our conclusions are as under:


i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers Under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar Under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;


ii) the bar Under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;


iii) for commission of the offence under the Indian Penal Code, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and


iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.


v) in a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per Sub-section 1 of Section 23A, considering Sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any Rule made thereunder so compounded. However, the bar Under Sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the Indian Penal Code, such as, Sections 379 and 414 Indian Penal Code and the same shall be proceeded with further.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 824-825 of 2020 

Decided On: 03.12.2020

Jayant  Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and M.R. Shah, JJ.


Citation: MANU/SC/0912/2020

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Sunday, 21 June 2020

Whether prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act can be quashed if no preliminary inquiry was conducted prior to registration of offence?

The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry being necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon the facts of each case. There is no set format or manner in which a preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The objective of the same is only to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint. That is the test laid down in Lalita Kumari.

33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the information collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of the Accused Officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant information was available with the informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed against the Accused even without conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on the basis of the credible information received by him. It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this Court reported as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein, this Court held inter alia that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused and also where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari is not required to be mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal collection of information disclosing a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019  and Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 

Decided On: 06.12.2019

 The State of Telangana  Vs.  Managipet

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

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Friday, 11 May 2018

Whether it is necessary to hear accused prior to registration of offence U/S 340 of CRPC?

In the process of formation of opinion, the learned Judge if thinks that some more documents which are referred to by the parties are required then he may call and rely on the same to initiate inquiry under section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure by the Court. To initiate criminal inquiry against someone is a serious matter and therefore, the Court while forming opinion has to consider the relevant documents or the evidence carefully. Generally decision taking often invites disapproval from the losing party. Forming of opinion is making up mind. Therefore the learned Judge needs to be candid in making up mind. The best source for forming opinion is verification of facts and for the purpose of verification, the true and correct facts should be placed before the Judge. In the process of forming opinion in the inquiry the procedural power to call the witness, to bring the documents revealing the true facts, vests with him. Thus section 311 of Code of Criminal Procedure is helpful not only in the trial but also even in any inquiry or any other proceedings under the Code to get true facts on record. Before registering the complaint by the Magistrate under section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure hearing the person against whom prosecution is likely to be instituted is not contemplated. A respondent who will face inquiry has every right to know and is to be heard in the proceeding once the complaint is registered and the proceedings are conducted under section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure, but not at the stage of making of mind by the Judge whether to refer the matter for registering the complaint to the Magistrate under section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of this, I rely on the judgment of Pritish (supra) passed by Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Pritish (supra) has observed as under:
"14. Section 341 of the Code confers a power on the party on whose application the court has decided or not decided to make a complaint, as well as the party against whom it is decided to make such complaint, to file an appeal to the court to which the former court is subordinate. But the mere fact that such an appeal is provided, it is not a premise for concluding that the court is under a legal obligation to afford an opportunity (to the persons against whom the complaint would be made) to be heard prior to making the complaint. There are other provisions in the Code for reaching conclusions whether a person should be arrayed as accused in criminal proceedings or not, but in most of those proceedings there is no legal obligation cast on the court or the authorities concerned, to afford an opportunity of hearing to the would be accused...."
13. In the present case, the learned Judge has rightly not heard the respondent against whom the application is made under section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the order dated 16.02.2017 rejecting the review of order dated 11.01.2017 cannot be faulted with.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Writ Petition (S.T.) No. 4899 of 2017
Decided On: 17.04.2017

 Union of India and Ors. Vs. Haresh Virumal Milani
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Sunday, 9 April 2017

Whether accused can be remanded in police custody prior to registration of offence?

 As per the provisions quoted above, custody of the accused can be after a report. In the instant case, accused petitioner seems to have remained in custody for almost six days even prior to the report. After his arrest on 11.3.2016, he was produced for taking remand by the police on 12.3.2016 before the learned Magistrate. Initially, remand was given for two days followed by other order of remand for 14 days on 14.3.2016. The arrest as well as initial order of remand were without registration of an FIR. In our opinion, initial two orders for remand prior to registration of FIR are hit by section 167 Cr.P.C.. The first question is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioner.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)
DB Civil Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) Nos. 120 and 121/2016
Decided On: 26.05.2016

 Rahul Pareek  Vs.  State of Rajasthan and Ors.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.N. Bhandari and J.K. Ranka, JJ.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 721 Raj
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Thursday, 23 March 2017

Whether offence can be registered against brothers if they get property mutated in their names excluding sisters?

 In the present case, it is admitted that six brothers excluded seven sisters and got the land mutated in their name. It is also admitted that the present petitioners sold 1/6th portion of the land by registered sale deed. The peculiar facts in the present case are that the brothers from the very beginning knew that there were seven sisters also. No consent was taken from the respondent No. 2. She was never informed and surreptitiously the land was mutated in the names of all the six brothers. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them, their names were recorded as owner of 1/6th share, however, the fact remains that revenue records are not records of title. When Anandibai died in the year 2000, 1/13th share devolved upon respondent No. 2. Mere entry in the revenue record do not extinguish the right already accrued to respondent No. 2, therefore, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them and they were owner of 1/6th share is not acceptable. In the revenue proceedings, petitioner No. 2 was one of the party. She acted on behalf of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 before the Police Station, However, now the plea is taken independently by petitioner No. 1 that he was not party to the proceedings, and therefore, he had no knowledge about the revenue proceedings. In view of the aforesaid, the contents of the FIR shows that there was a dishonest intention on the part of all the six brothers. At this stage, no case is made out for quashment of the FIR and related proceedings using extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)
M. Cri. C. No. 547 of 2016
Decided On: 21.09.2016

 Mukesh Nigam and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.
Coram:Alok Verma, J.
Citation: 2017 CRLJ 620
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Sunday, 9 October 2016

Guidelines regarding registration of FIR

As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, the following directions are issued:
i A petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for a direction to register an FIR on the complaint of the petitioner circumventing the time table prescribed by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari-IV and V is not maintainable.

ii This Court directs all the Station House Officers in the State of Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Puducherry to receive any complaint relating to the commission of cognizable offence by a common man and if the Station House Officer wants to conduct a preliminary enquiry, he shall immediately issue a CSR receipt (in case of Tamil Nadu) or issue a separate receipt (in case of Union Territory of Puducherry) to the complainant and after making the necessary entries in the Station General Diary, as directed by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari-IV and V, conduct preliminary enquiry.  In Lalita Kumari-IV, the Supreme Court has directed that after conducting preliminary enquiry, if the police come to the conclusion that no FIR need be registered, a duty is cast upon the police to furnish a copy of the closure report to the complainant.  After getting the closure report, it is open to the complainant to file a petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or private complaint under Section 190 read with Section 200 Cr.P.C. disclosing the facts and persuading the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence.  Such a petition/private complaint should disclose the closure report of the police. After taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate can also order police investigation under Section 202, Cr.P.C. to a limited extent. The closure report cannot be subject to judicial review under Section 482, Cr.P.C.

iii If the Station House Officer refuses to receive the complaint, the complainant shall send the complaint together with a covering letter to the Superintendent of Police/Deputy Commissioner of Police by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due under Section 154(3), Cr.P.C. 

iv If there is inaction on the part of the Station House Officer and the Superintendent of Police, the complainant is at liberty to move the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
v The complaint shall be given to the Magistrate either in Tamil or in English in the form of a representation in first person addressed directly to the Magistrate.

vi The complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit as mandated by the Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava.

vii On receipt of the complaint, the Magistrate shall  pass orders thereon within 15 days, either issuing directions or dismissing the petition.

viii If the Magistrate decides to order police investigation, he should pass a judicial order to that effect in the record sheet.

ix A copy of the order, together with original complaint and copy of the affidavit, shall be forwarded by the Magistrate to the jurisdictional police officer for investigation.

x If the police officer does not register FIR within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the Magistrate's order, the Magistrate shall initiate prosecution against him under Section 21 read with Section 44 of the District Police Act before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be.  

xi If no FIR is registered by the police within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order of the Magistrate under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., the complainant can approach this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C.

xii If the police fail to complete the preliminary enquiry within six weeks as mandated by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari-V, the complainant can approach this Court under Article 144 read with Section 482, Cr.P.C.

xiii The aforesaid petition under Article 144 read with Section 482, Cr.P.C. must be accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the complainant with satisfactory materials to show that the police have not completed the preliminary enquiry within six weeks, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari-V.  In such a petition, this Court will not read the complaint, but, issue directions to the police to register an FIR on the complaint for the very failure of the police to follow the mandates of Lalita Kumari-IV and V.  The Registry of this Court shall not number the petition filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. seeking a direction to register an FIR unless it is accompanied by an affidavit containing the above details.

xiv In suitable cases, this Court shall also direct disciplinary action to be taken against the police officer for the violation of the mandates of Lalita Kumari - IV and V.

xv If the police officer fails to register the FIR pursuant to the directions of this Court, he will be liable for contempt of Court, besides facing disciplinary action.


xvi The aggrieved party can also approach the local Legal Services Authority and the Authority shall take immediate steps to ensure that an FIR is registered or CSR receipt issued to the complainant. 

xvii Every police station shall have a board giving the name and telephone number of the local Legal Services Authority.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated: 27.09.2016
CORAM:
MR. JUSTICE P.N. PRAKASH

Crl.O.P. Nos.19197, 19198, 19343 and 19359 to 19363 of 2016

Sugesan Transport Pvt. Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner of Police



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Monday, 30 May 2016

Whether an employee can be dismissed from service on ground that offence is registered against him?

In the present case after a show cause notice was given to the petitioner and his reply was received, the Gram Panchayat passed a resolution resolving to dismiss the petitioner from services. There was no reasonable opportunity granted to the petitioner to justify his defence before dismissing him from service. There was no opportunity to putforth his explanation before said action was taken. Though provisions of Section 61(1) empower the Gram Panchayat to dismiss any servant, said power cannot be exercised in a manner that gives a go bye to the principles of natural justice. There is no power with the Gram Panchayat to dismiss a servant merely on the ground that an offence has been registered against him. Mere registration of an offence in these facts by itself cannot be treated as a reason for dispensing with holding of an enquiry whatsoever especially when the services of a servant were sought to be dismissed. In State of UP and another Vs. Ram Vinayak (2010) 15 SCC 305, an Assistant Engineer in the Irrigation Department was appointed on ad hoc basis and his services were subsequently regularized. Thereafter an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered against him. The State Government terminated his services on the ground that same were not required. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the termination of services was sought to be justified on the ground that he was found unsuitable in view of a criminal case being registered against him. It was held that same was not termination simplicitor and in absence of any opportunity of being heard, the order of termination was in violation of principles of natural justice. Said order was accordingly set aside.
Bombay High Court
Ashok Govindrao Sardar (Water ... vs The Chief Executive Officer, Z.P. ... on 29 January, 2016
Bench: A.S. Chandurkar
WRIT PETITION NO.2395 OF 2015

Citation:2016(2) ALLMR 413
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Friday, 29 April 2016

Whether offence can be registered against public servant U/S 156 of CRPC without sanction for prosecution?

At this juncture, it may be mentioned that the crime registered against the petitioners does not include sections referred to in the Explanation to Sub section (1) of 197 of the Code. The grievance voiced by the respondent no.2 in the application and the offences registered against the petitioners relate to the acts performed by the petitioners in the discharge of their official duty and are reasonably connected with their official duties and would therefore attract the bar of section 197 of the Code. The decisions relied upon by the respondent are therefore distinguishable and are not applicable to the facts of the case.
32. In the case of Anil Kumar, the Apex Court after considering the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of State of U.P. vs. Parasnath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372 and in Subramanium Swami vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64, has held that the word "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. The Apex Court has held that the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under section 156 (3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. In the instant case undisputedly, there is no such sanction order hence, the learned Magistrate was not justified in issuing order under Section 156(3) of the Code.
Bombay High Court
Pandharinath Narrayan Patil And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 30 March, 2015
CORAM : RANJIT MORE & SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI,JJ.
Citation;2016 CRLJ146
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Bombay High court Guidelines for exercise of power U/S 156 of CRPC

It is thus well settled that the law neither prescribes any particular format for application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. nor contemplates verbatim reproduction of the factual allegations or all the ingredients of the alleged offence. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the application undersection 156 (3) Cr.P.C should contain facts disclosing cognizable offence and further that the police has failed to exercise powers under section 154 Cr.P.C despite intimation, whereupon the magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can order investigation of the crime.
 It is thus well settled that the powers under section 156(3) of the Code cannot be exercised mechanically but are required to be exercised judiciously. The magistrate is not required to embark upon an in-depth roving enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations, nonetheless, he has to arrive at a conclusion that the application discloses necessary ingredients of the offence for which investigation is intended to be ordered. Furthermore, the reasons for arriving at such conclusion should be clearly reflected in the order.
Bombay High Court
Pandharinath Narrayan Patil And ... vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 30 March, 2015
Bench: Ranjit More
Citation;2016 CRLJ146 Bom
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Saturday, 23 April 2016

Whether accused is entitled to hearing prior to registration of offence against him?


29. Section 154 of the Code places an unequivocal duty upon the police officer in charge of a police station to register FIR upon receipt of the information that a cognizable offence has been committed. It hardly gives any discretion to the said police officer. The genesis of this provision in our country in this regard is that he must register the FIR and proceed with the investigation forthwith. While the position of law cannot be dispelled in view of the three Judge Bench Judgment of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi [AIR 1964 SC 221], a limited discretion is vested in the investigating officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry pre-registration of a FIR as there is absence of any specific prohibition in the Code, express or implied. The subsequent judgments of this Court have clearly stated the proposition that such discretion hardly exists. In fact the view taken is that he is duty bound to register an FIR. Then the question that arises is whether a suspect is entitled to any pre-registration hearing or any such right is vested in the suspect.
30. The rule of audi alteram partem is subject to exceptions. Such exceptions may be provided by law or by such necessary implications where no other interpretation is possible. Thus rule of natural justice has an application, both under the civil and criminal jurisprudence. The laws like detention and others, specifically provide for post-detention hearing and it is a settled principle of law that application of this doctrine can be excluded by exercise of legislative powers which shall withstand judicial scrutiny. The purpose of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code is to effectively execute administration of the criminal justice system and protect society from perpetrators of crime. It has a twin purpose; firstly to adequately punish the offender in accordance with law and secondly to ensure prevention of crime. On examination, the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for any right of hearing at the time of registration of the First Information Report. As already noticed, the registration forthwith of a cognizable offence is the statutory duty of a police officer in charge of the police station. The very purpose of fair and just investigation shall stand frustrated if pre- registration hearing is required to be granted to a suspect. It is not that the liberty of an individual is being taken away or is being adversely affected, except by the due process of law. Where the Officer In-charge of a police station is informed of a heinous or cognizable offence, it will completely destroy the purpose of proper and fair investigation if the suspect is required to be granted a hearing at that stage and is not subjected to custody in accordance with law. There would be the pre- dominant possibility of a suspect escaping the process of law. The entire scheme of the Code unambiguously supports the theory of exclusion of audi alteram partem pre-registration of an FIR. Upon registration of an FIR, a person is entitled to take recourse to the various provisions of bail and anticipatory bail to claim his liberty in accordance with law. It cannot be said to be a violation of the principles of natural justice for two different reasons. Firstly, the Code does not provide for any such right at that stage. Secondly, the absence of such a provision clearly demonstrates the legislative intent to the contrary and thus necessarily implies exclusion of hearing at that stage. This Court in the case of Union of India v. W.N. Chadha (1993) Suppl. (4) SCC 260 clearly spelled out this principle in paragraph 98 of the judgment that reads as under:
“98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation lifeless, absurd and self- defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary.”
31. In the case of Samaj Parivartan Samuday v. State of Karnataka (2012) 7 SCC 407, a three-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the right of hearing to a person termed as ‘suspect’ or ‘likely offender’ in the report of the CEC observed that there was no right of hearing. Though the suspects were already interveners in the writ petition, they were heard. Stating the law in regard to the right of hearing, the Court held as under :
“50. There is no provision in CrPC where an investigating agency must provide a hearing to the affected party before registering an FIR or even before carrying on investigation prior to registration of case against the suspect. CBI, as already noticed, may even conduct pre-registration inquiry for which notice is not contemplated under the provisions of the Code, the Police Manual or even as per the precedents laid down by this Court. It is only in those cases where the Court directs initiation of investigation by a specialised agency or transfer investigation to such agency from another agency that the Court may, in its discretion, grant hearing to the suspect or affected parties. However, that also is not an absolute rule of law and is primarily a matter in the judicial discretion of the Court. This question is of no relevance to the present case as we have already heard the interveners."
Reportable
 Supreme Court of India

Anju Chaudhary vs State Of U.P.& Anr on 13 December, 2012
Bench: Swatanter Kumar, Madan B. Lokur
Citation;2014ALLMR(Cri)5226,2013CriLJ776,(2013)6SCC384,  
Criminal Appeal No. 2039 of 2012 (Arising out of 
SLP (Crl) No. 9475 of 2008)
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