Supreme Court: In Agreement To Sell Property Under Joint Ownership, Onus Is On Plaintiff To Secure Consent Of All Co-Owners

 In view of the above, we hold that Defendant No. 1

lacked the authority to bind Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 in

the agreement to sell dated 06.06.1993. The General

Power of Attorney did not confer upon him the power

to sell the property on behalf of his sisters at the time

of the agreement, having been impliedly revoked by

the partition deed. The agreement was, therefore,

incomplete and unenforceable against Defendant

Nos. 6 to 8, who collectively held a majority share in

the property. The plaintiffs' knowledge of the

necessity of obtaining the sisters' consent, coupled

with their failure to secure such consent, renders the

agreement ineffective against Defendant Nos. 6 to 8.

Consequently, the agreement cannot be specifically

enforced against them, and the plaintiffs cannot

claim any right over their shares in the property

based on the said agreement.{Para 18}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.613 OF 2017

JANARDAN DAS & ORS. Vs  DURGA PRASAD

AGARWALLA & ORS. 

Citation: 2024 INSC 778.

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Whether Elder Sister can Exercise right of Guardianship Over Younger Sister without Court's Order?

There is no legal right of an elder sister to

exercise guardianship over her sister except when

there is an order from a Court of competent

jurisdiction.

In such circumstances, we do not think the

writ petition seeking relief in the nature of Habeas

Corpus was a proper proceeding for the grievance of

the petitioner. The petitioner shall be at liberty to

apply before the appropriate Court seeking

Guardianship, if the facts so warrant.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 14633/2023

RITA DWIVEDI Vs THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR

Date : 12-02-2024 This petition was called on for hearing today.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following order: 

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Can brothers exclude their sisters from joint family property on the ground that dowry was paid at the time of their sisters' marriage?

The evidence on record shows that the joint family property was purported to be exclusively usurped by the brothers to exclude the sisters. Merely because one of the sisters deposed in favour of the brothers does not mean that the issue of family arrangement or oral partition was duly proved. There is no evidence about providing a sufficient dowry to the daughters of the house. However, even if it is assumed that some dowry was provided to the daughters, that does not mean that the daughters cease to have any right in the family property. The rights of the daughters could not have been extinguished in the manner in which they have been attempted to be extinguished by the brothers, post the father's demise. 

{Para 86}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Second Appeal No. 89 of 2005

Decided On: 16.03.2023

Terezinha Martins David Vs. Miguel Guarda Rosario Martins and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1005/2023,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 20.

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Whether sister of deceased employee is entitled to get family pension?

In my opinion, since the respondent­sister had gone to
the Court with a suit for  claiming declaration and consequent
pensionary benefits after the death of her brother Sheikh Sardar, it
was wholly unnecessary to go into the question whether appellant
Hoorbanoo was given Talak or was his wife, who was divorced or
not.  The reason is that under the Pension Rules, the respondentplaintiff
Shabnoorbee is not entitled to the pensionary benefits
after the death of her brother, who was working as Safai Kamgar
in Municipal Council, Buldana.  It cannot be disputed that grant of

benefits   of   pension   to   a   Government   servant   or   his   family
members would be clearly governed by the Pension Rules.   It is
true   that   the   pension   may   be   a   property   as   contended   by
Ms Sapkal but then the entitlement thereof due to the death of
deceased employee would be governed by the statutory Pension
Rules   framed   by   the   Government   and   not   by   the   rules   of
succession under the personal law.  The reason is that the property
namely; the pension is given by the Government and is not a
matter of property coming in the hands of the legal heirs from
their ancesters or the source contemplated by the personal law of
parties.     It   is   clearly   the   prerogative   and   the   right   of   the
Government to define and regulate as to whom and to what extent
the property namely; the pension should be given after death of its
employee.  Therefore, in my opinion, award of pension after death
of   an   employee   would   not   be   governed   by   the   personal   laws
namely; Mohammedan Law or Hindu Law or as the case may be.
It   is   a   different   matter   that   as   a   beneficial   legislation   the
Government may extend the benefits to the persons like sister of
the deceased employee but then that is within the domain of the
Government and the Legislature and not within the scope of the
judicial review.   It is, therefore, clear from the above discussion

that even if the respondent­Shabnoorbee is sister or assuming the
legal heir of deceased Sheikh Sardar, she would not be entitled to
pension after his death in the light of the Rule 116 (16) (b) of the
Pension Rules which reads thus:
“116. Family Pension 1964:
(1) to (15)…..
(16) For the purpose of this rule­
(a) …..
(b) “Family”,   in   relation   to   a   Government   servant
means­ (i) wife in the case of a male Government servant, or
husband in the case of a female Government servant.
(ii) a   judicially   separated   wife   or   husband,   such
separation not being granted on the ground of adultery and
the   person   surviving   was   not   held   guilty   of   committing
adultery ;
(iii) son who has not attained the age of twenty one years
and unmarried daughter who has not attained the age of
twenty four years, including such son and daughter adopted
legally before retirement.”
9. The above rules are relevant and would determine the
entitlement of the person after death of the employee concerned.
In that view of the matter, I think the question framed by me is the
only relevant question which is required to be answered in the
negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.447/2002
Hoorbanoo wd/o Sk. Sardar,V  Shabnoorbee w/o Sk. Rashid,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:­ A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :­ 30.03.2016
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 204

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Whether offence can be registered against brothers if they get property mutated in their names excluding sisters?

 In the present case, it is admitted that six brothers excluded seven sisters and got the land mutated in their name. It is also admitted that the present petitioners sold 1/6th portion of the land by registered sale deed. The peculiar facts in the present case are that the brothers from the very beginning knew that there were seven sisters also. No consent was taken from the respondent No. 2. She was never informed and surreptitiously the land was mutated in the names of all the six brothers. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them, their names were recorded as owner of 1/6th share, however, the fact remains that revenue records are not records of title. When Anandibai died in the year 2000, 1/13th share devolved upon respondent No. 2. Mere entry in the revenue record do not extinguish the right already accrued to respondent No. 2, therefore, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioners that the land was sold by them and they were owner of 1/6th share is not acceptable. In the revenue proceedings, petitioner No. 2 was one of the party. She acted on behalf of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 before the Police Station, However, now the plea is taken independently by petitioner No. 1 that he was not party to the proceedings, and therefore, he had no knowledge about the revenue proceedings. In view of the aforesaid, the contents of the FIR shows that there was a dishonest intention on the part of all the six brothers. At this stage, no case is made out for quashment of the FIR and related proceedings using extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

M. Cri. C. No. 547 of 2016

Decided On: 21.09.2016

 Mukesh Nigam and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Coram:Alok Verma, J.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 620

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Whether sister of husband can be denied right in property of her father on ground of right of wife to get shared household as per DV Act?

Of course, an order under Section 19(1)(f) is permissible only on

satisfaction that domestic violence had taken place. In this case, even

according to the first respondent, she left her matrimonial home as early

as in the year 1998 and filed the petition under Section 12 of the D.V.

Act only in the year 2009. In this case, the revision petitioner is the

sister of the third respondent and she along with the third respondent

inherited the properties of their parents on their death. It is to obtain

her share that the aforementioned partition suit was filed and pursuant

to the decree it was partitioned in between the revision petitioner and


the third respondent in tune with Ext.D1 decree, referred as such in the

order in M.C.No.38 of 2009. The impugned orders would reveal that

pursuant to the preliminary decree a partition was effected and a final

decree was also passed by a competent Civil Court.                  In such

circumstances, on the strength of a decree of a competent Civil Court

and the partition the revision petitioner became entitled to enjoy her

share in the said property. There is nothing on record before the court

to suggest that the house in question was partiable and, even otherwise

essentially, the question whether a property scheduled in a suit for

partition is partiable or not is not a matter to be considered in a collateral

proceedings and that too, in a criminal proceedings. When the court of

competent jurisdiction passed a preliminary decree permitting the parties

to the suit to effect partition amicably after declaring the share and

thereafter passed a final decree the partition and the decree cannot be

set at naught in a criminal proceedings. Respondents 1 and 2 cannot be

heard to contend that they were not aware about the suit for partition

and also regarding the passing of a preliminary decree in the said suit for

partition and in fact, the preliminary decree was produced in the

proceedings in M.C.No.38 of 2009 and the order thereon was passed

taking into account the same. In such circumstances, respondents 1 and

2 cannot be heard to say that they were not aware that in terms of the


preliminary decree a partition might take place adverse to their interest

based on an amicable settlement between the revision petitioner and the

third respondent and that the order in M.C.No.38 of 2009 also restricted

their right to reside only in the share alloted to the third respondent.

Certainly, in the light of the settled position of law an endeavour to

challenge the partition and decree would not have been made by

respondents 1 and 2 in a collateral proceedings and at any time, it could

not have been accepted in a criminal proceedings.      Section 19(1)(f) of

the D.V. Act provides for issuing directions to the `respondent', which

term has been defined under Section 2(q) of D.V. Act, to secure same

level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by

her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the

circumstances so require. Considering the right which is available under

Section 17 and especially, taking into account the circumstances it

cannot be said that respondents 1 and 2 could insist for direction to

continue residence in the shared household itself ignoring the judgment

and decree passed by competent Civil Court whilst the first respondent

could only insist for protection of her right guaranteed under Section 17

of D.V. Act taking note of the provisions under Section 19(1)(f) of the

said Act. A combined reading of Section 17(2) and Sections 19(1)(f) and

19(6) of the D.V.Act would reveal that while giving utmost care and


protection to an aggrieved party especially, in respect of protection

orders, the D.V. Act does not intend to defeat or deny the rights of

others available in respect of a shared household lest the provisions

under Sections 19(1)(f) and 19(6) would not have been incorporated to

ensure protection of right to reside available under Section 17(1), of the

D.V. Act. A close scrutiny of the common order of the learned Magistrate

would reveal that even while dismissing the Miscellaneous Petitions the

learned Magistrate has specifically found that the first respondent herein

would have the right to demand alternate accommodation (Is it not

alternative accommodation?) from the third respondent herein taking

into account the fact that her right to reside in the shared household was

made impossible due to the execution of the partition deed.           This

certainly is the right and protection available in such circumstances, in

terms of Sections 19(1)(f) and 19(6) of the D.V. Act.         This position

makes the impugned common judgment all the more, unsustainable.

The first respondent was residing separately from her husband since

1998 and thereafter she did not stay with him in the shared household

and she along with the second respondent is residing at Ernakulam. All

these circumstances would indicate that it is a fit case for the first

respondent to work out her claim for alternate accommodation

(alternative accommodation) as against the third respondent, in



accordance with law.   
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                        PRESENT:

                  MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR

          THURSDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF JULY 2015

                            Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 102 of 2014 ()
                          
         MARY JACOB (MARY KURIAKOSE) Vs  ELIZABETH JACOB, 



                         Dated 2nd July, 2015

                            

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