Showing posts with label subsequent event. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subsequent event. Show all posts

Sunday, 19 April 2026

Supreme Court: Whether an appellate court can dismiss an appeal solely on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit of the respondent without considering the entire material on record, including the trial court record?

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having

perused the documentary material on record, we are of the view

that the writ petition did not warrant dismissal solely on the

ground that the original plaintiffs failed to file any rejoinder to the defendants’ affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023. In our view, all relevant material that was brought on record by both the parties ought to have been examined while deciding the writ petition. The affidavit in reply dated 12th April 2023 could have been considered as additional material in opposing the claim for eviction on theground of bonafide need. Dismissal of the writ petition solely on the ground of non-traverse has, in our view, vitiated the impugned judgment. {Para 6}.

18. In the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001)

2 SCC 604], this Court held that the landlord should not be

penalised for the slowness of the legal system and the crucial

date for deciding the facts of the requirement of the landlord is

the date of his application for eviction. It is also observed that

the process of litigation cannot be made the basis for denying

the landlord relief unless the litigation at least reaches the final

stages. However, it is further added that subsequent events

may, in some situations, be considered to have overshadowed

the genuineness of the landlords’ needs but only if they are of

such nature and dimension as to completely eclipse such need

and make it lose the significance altogether.”

In the light of above discussion, the High Court failed to consider whether the subsequent event as urged by the defendants had material bearing on the right claimed by the plaintiffs. It has to be borne in mind that the Trial Court had passed a decree for eviction on the basis of the evidence on record which was reversed by the Appellate Court. It was, therefore, necessary for the High Court to have taken into consideration the entire material available on record including the affidavit dated 12th April 2023. Thus, by failing to do so, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it while deciding the challenge to the reversal of the decree for eviction. We, therefore, find that the order passed by the High Court deserves interference.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

MARIA MARTINS  Vs NOEL ZUZARTE AND OTHERS 

Author: ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.
Citation: 2026 INSC 376
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Saturday, 8 February 2025

Bombay HC: Whether the court can grant maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC to wife after her divorce if she fails to incorporate this fact by amending her application?

Since there was no dispute about divorce and it was a ground available for maintenance under Section 125 Explanation (b), the learned Magistrate could have considered these subsequent developments. Explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh (supra) and recorded the finding in para 9 that on account of the Explanation quoted above, a woman who has been divorced by her husband on account of a decree passed by the Family Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, continues to enjoy the status of a wife for the limited purpose of claiming maintenance allowance from her ex-husband. {Para 7}


8. There is no dispute on the law that such a right of divorcee exists till she remarries. There is no such averment that the respondent/wife was remarried. In view of the facts of the case and admitted position, the Court is of the view that the rule of pleading would not strictly apply in such cases. Therefore, the subsequent development of divorce has been correctly considered by the learned Revisional Court. Though the respondent/wife failed to establish that she was refused and neglected to maintain, the subsequent facts of divorce gave her a new ground which may be considered during the pendency of the application and the learned Magistrate ought to have considered it. The learned Revisional Court has corrected the errors of law of the Magistrate. However, the learned Revisional Court erred in granting the maintenance from 21.11.2005. If the right of the wife was accrued under Explanation (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code after the divorce and she was not entitled to the maintenance on the ground available under Section 125(1), she would not be entitled to the maintenance from the date of the desertion or filing the petition. Except this error, the judgment and order of the learned Revisional Court is legal, proper and correct. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 250 of 2008

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Kishor Fulchand Pawar Vs. Nanda

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Mehare, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/6101/2024,2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3115,2024:BHC-AUG:23068

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Sunday, 10 November 2024

Whether motor accident claim tribunal can grant amount under the head of consortium if said person has died after filing of claim petition?

By applying the dictum as laid down in Smt. Somwati's case (supra) both the parents of the deceased Balbir Singh are held entitled to a filial consortium of Rs. 40,000/- each. The submission advanced by counsel for the insurance company that since parents of the deceased have already expired as such the amount under the head of loss of consortium cannot be awarded is found to be misconceived and not well founded. Upon the death of Balbir Singh in a motor vehicle accident that took place on 30.10.2000, not only the widow and minor children but even the parents had filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh. Claim of the parents for grant of filial consortium as such had crystallised at the time of the accident itself i.e. on 30.10.2000 when they had lost their son Balbir Singh in the accident. Such claim which already stood crystallised on the date of the accident cannot be negated by the subsequent death of the parents themselves. {Para 20}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

FAO-3756-2002(O&M)

Decided On: 18.01.2021

Paramjit Kaur and Ors. Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/0025/2021.

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Supreme Court: Claims and legal liabilities crystallize at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto ought not to ordinarily affect pending proceedings.

 ANALYSIS

I. Deduction for Personal Expenses

10. We have thoughtfully considered the rival submissions. It cannot be disputed that at the time of death, there in fact were four dependents of the deceased and not three. The subsequent death of the deceased's dependent mother ought not to be a reason for reduction of motor accident compensation. Claims and legal liabilities crystallize at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto ought not to ordinarily affect pending proceedings. Just like how Appellant-claimants cannot rely upon subsequent increases in minimum wages, the Respondent-insurer too cannot seek benefit of the subsequent death of a dependent during the pendency of legal proceedings. Similarly, any concession in law made in this regard by either counsel would not bind the parties, as it is legally settled that advocates cannot throw-away legal rights or enter into arrangements contrary to law.1Director of Elementary Education v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo,   MANU/SC/1329/2019 : (2019) 10 SCC 674, p. 11.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 19-20 of 2021.

Decided On: 05.01.2021

Kirti and Ors. Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant, S. Abdul Nazeer and N.V. Ramana, JJ.

Authored By : Surya Kant, N.V. Ramana

Author: Surya Kant, J.

Citation: AIR 2021 SC 353,MANU / SC / 0004 / 2021,[ 2021 ] 1 SCR 989,( 2021 ) 2 SCC 166.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court: Preserving the existing standard of living of a deceased's family is a fundamental endeavour of motor accident compensation law.

II. Assessment of monthly income

12. Second, although it is correct that the claimants have been unable to produce any document evidencing Vinod's income, nor have they established his employment as a teacher; but that doesn't justify adoption of the lowest-tier of minimum wage while computing his income. From the statement of witnesses, documentary evidence-on-record and circumstances of the accident, it is apparent that Vinod was comparatively more educationally qualified and skilled. Further, he maintained a reasonable standard of living for his family as evidenced by his use of a motorcycle for commuting. Preserving the existing standard of living of a deceased's family is a fundamental endeavour of motor accident compensation law.3R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal (2019) 14 SCC 1, p. 9.Thus, at the very least, the minimum wage of Rs. 6197 as applicable to skilled workers during April 2014 in the State of Haryana ought to be applied in his case.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 19-20 of 2021.

Decided On: 05.01.2021

Kirti and Ors. Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant, S. Abdul Nazeer and N.V. Ramana, JJ.

Authored By : Surya Kant, N.V. Ramana

Author: Surya Kant, J.

Citation: AIR 2021 SC 353,MANU / SC / 0004 / 2021,[ 2021 ] 1 SCR 989,( 2021 ) 2 SCC 166.

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Monday, 14 December 2020

Whether the right of the landlord to get rent accrued during the pendency of the first suit will be barred by res judicata if the landlord fails to claim said rent by amending plaint?

 (g) Rent and Recurring Cause of Action:


48. The Corporation and the Firm maintain that the Owner's claim has been barred by res judicata. I reckon what applies, if ever, here is Order 2, Rule 2 of CPC. And the provision reads:


2. Suit to include the whole claim.--(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish and portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.


(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.--Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.


(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.--A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.


49. The illustration exemplifies what amounts to relinquishment of part of claim. A lets a house to B at a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200. The rent for the whole of the years 1905, 1906 and 1907 is due and unpaid. A sues B in 1908 only for the rent due for 1906. He shall not afterwards sue B for the rent due for 1905 or 1907.


50. That is, the suit was in 1908. A's cause of action got crystalised on the date of his filing the suit. His right was to recover the rent arrears accumulated by then--for 1905, 1906, and 1907. The cause for his action was the B's default. The default was up to the date of his going to the Court, until the end of 1907. In the illustration, by the time A filed the suit, the rent for 1906 and 1907 was also due. Yet A did not seek to recover what he had been entitled to by then. The rent for 1906 and 1907, I may stress, was not the rent accumulated pending the suit.


51. In other words, A's suit in 1908 must have included the whole claim which A was entitled to make by then. But A sued for the rent of only 1906. In that suit, as A did not seek the rent for 1905 and 1907, it amounted to his relinquishing that portion of the claim. Law treats that as an intentional relinquishment. So, he shall not afterwards sue for that relinquished or omitted portion. The reckoning point, I must say, is the date of suit filing.


52. Looked from another angle, in the illustration, we may note that the suit was filed in 1908, but the rent for that year was not included because it was not due by then. That means a future arrear cannot provide cause of action. What should happen to the rent of 1908?


53. We cannot presume that a suit gets decided there and then. It runs its course; in the meanwhile, many years may pass. Let us assume that the case in the illustration took six years to conclude, after running its course through appellate and revisional channels. So it ended in 1914. If we accept the Corporation's argument, then every year or at least intermittently the owner should have amended his pleadings and kept adding the rent for the years passing by until the suit ended. This method adopted, the court fee gets paid whenever there is an amendment and, eventually, the arrears adding up, even the pecuniary jurisdiction may change. So halfway through the trial Court should abandon the case and transmit it to another court. A chimerical concept of procedural law. On the contrary, once the cause of action crystallizes and issues are struck, the parties go to the trial on that basis. Thus, for adjudicatory purposes, the cause of action stands frozen.


54. True, subsequent events may affect the suit outcome. For that, either party to the suit should bring to the court's notice those later developments. For that even the amended Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC provides. Otherwise, the court itself, in the interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, may take note of those developments. But law does not compel a person to invariably bring on record all the later developments through amendment. If the later developments provide an independent cause of action, the party's right to a fresh legal remedy remains intact. This proposition applies with more rigour if the cause of action is recurring.


55. Indeed, default in rent remittance provides recurring cause of action. Every successive default provides an independent cause of action. Later developments may affect that cause of action if they are duly brought on record; otherwise, they provide further independent cause of action. Even the doctrine of lis pendens does not defeat the suitor's independent right to sue. It is only a matter of prudence and convenience that all the related facts are brought under one umbrella of adjudication. More particularly, if the cause of action is recurring, each instance of recurrence provides an independent cause of action. Here, the first suit--RCS No. 754 of 1977--concerns the rent from 1.4.1973 to 30.4.1977. The second suit--RCS No. 149 of 1998--concerns the later period.


56. I, therefore, conclude that the Owners have not lost their right to sue the Corporation and the Firm merely because the default occurred when another suit was pending. Pithily put, if there is no completed cause of action, there is no right for the party to sue. If the completed cause of action has many aspects or facets, but the party sues only on a few, the rest remain relinquished or abandoned. But on a completed cause of action if a party sues and pending those proceedings, there is, temporally speaking, recurrence of the same cause of action, it provides an independent cause of action. All these rights to sue are subject to one obvious limitation: The Statute of Limitation.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 561 of 2018 and 562 of 2016 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2005 in Regular Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 K.B. Lahoti and Company and Ors. Vs. Champalal Vithuram Jajoo and Ors.

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Sunday, 15 November 2020

Whether the court can mould relief in revision proceeding considering the subsequent event?

What is urged is that only an appeal is a continuation of a suit while revision is not. There cannot be any demur to the legal proposition as such. However, I am of the view that where the right to sustain the application is no longer available to Murugan Bus Service, different considerations will arise irrespective of the fact that the jurisdiction that is exercised is appellate jurisdiction or revisional. In other words, if the lis is kept pending, that would enough for the court to interfere. If it were some other matter perhaps, one may not very much worry in exercising revisional jurisdiction. But here as I have stated above, the right to sustain the application on certain stated qualifications having disappeared, can it be said that because of this High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction and because it concerns itself under S. 115 C.P.C. with the jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal or lower authority, it should shut its eves? I do not think so. The power of revision is a limited one, in comparison to the appellate power. Barring that there is no point in saying that under revisional powers, the subsequent events cannot be taken note of. Such an extreme argument will render the revisional power absolutely nugatory. In shankar v. Krishnaji MANU/SC/0456/1969 : [1970]1SCR322 , it has been categorically held that the power under S. 115 C.P.C is a valuable power which is exercised by the High Court as a superior Court. Therefore the right to sustain the application must survive at any stage of the order. In fact, Alagirirswami J. (as he then was) in a ruling reported in Abdul Rahiman v. Abdulla (1967) 80 MLW 54, which comes under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, took note of an even that took place during the revisional stage and granted the relief. this exactly is the purport of the ruling in P.Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, MANU/SC/0415/1975 : [1975]3SCR958 . that case also related to A.P.Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the court, said as follows ( at p.1410) -


"We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and prosperity vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the hand-maid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inapt the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation ponds, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the fight or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. the later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into S. 10(3)(iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact.


Therefore, if a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the court, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inapt the decretal remdey. I should think that equity and justice demand my taking note of these events especially when by reason of these events, the original grantee Murugan Bus Service loses all the qualification to the a transport operator.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS


C.R.P. No. 1535 of 1980


Decided On: 17.09.1982


 A.M.V. Jayaraman Vs.  Murugan Bus Service and Ors.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Mohan, J.

Citations: AIR 1983 Mad 210,MANU/TN/0377/1983,1982SCCONLINE Mad 138

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When revisional court can take note of subsequent event?

 It is true that the Court can take notice of subsequent events. These cases are where the court finds that because of altered circumstances like devolution of interest it is necessary to shorten litigation. Where the original relief has become inappropriate by subsequent events, the Court can take notice of such changes. If the court finds that the judgment of the Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy the court also takes notice of such event. If the property which is the subject matter of suit is no longer available the Court will take notice of such event. The court takes notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1036 of 1967

Decided On: 12.09.1972

Laxmi & Co. Vs. Anant R. Deshpande and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ.

Citations: 1973 AIR 171, 1973 SCR (2) 172,MANU/SC/0513/1972,(1973) 1SCC 37

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Friday, 13 November 2020

Whether the court can remand the case in civil revision if the subsequent event is brought on record by amendment?

 Indeed, the court can allow the parties to amend the pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. Those amendments must be necessary for the court to determine the questions in controversy between the parties. This liberal provision underwent an amendment in 2002. So the earlier Maharashtra-specific State Amendment of 1983, I reckon, now may not stand in the way. Then, with the Central Amendment, the limitation on amending the pleadings is this: there should be no amendment once the trial has commenced. But there is an exception: if the court concludes that despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. And that includes the subsequent developments.


23. For the court to appreciate the later developments, they should be brought on record through amendment. Once the pleadings are amended, the later developments become part of the record. Then, based on the gravity, the appellate court or even the revisional court may remand the matter.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 497 of 2016

Decided On: 06.09.2019


Rukminibai Motiram Kshirsagar  Vs.  Manoramabai Mallikarjun Bagale

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Sunday, 13 October 2019

Whether subsequent event in eviction suit on ground of bonafide need can be brought on record by way of affidavit?

The facts sought to be brought on record do not, in fact, create a fresh cause of action but support the existing cause of action on the basis of which the original eviction petition has been filed. In rent control matters, where the leave to defend has been granted and the matter is pending, it is common for facts to arise during the pendency of the petition, which may strengthen the already filed eviction petition in favour of the Landlord. Such facts cannot be relegated to fresh eviction petitions, leading to multiplicity of proceedings. So long as there is adequate notice of the facts sought to be pleaded in the amendment, subsequent events and facts ought to be permitted to be brought on record. In Gurcharan Singh (supra), a similar situation had arisen wherein the Landlord had fallen ill during the pendency of the petition and this fact was permitted to be added. The Court observed:

"24. This was a subsequent development. It is true that the landlord could have amended eviction petition to plead his ill-health also as a ground for eviction of the tenant but the fact remains that these were developments during the pendency of the eviction proceedings of which the tenants had full notice.

.............................

27. There can be no doubt that in cases of ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the developments that may have taken place till the time of passing of order of ejectment in order to mould the relief. It is also true that cases of illness must be proved by best evidence. The subsequent developments should, however, relate to the requirement of the landlord. It is another thing as to how the subsequent developments should be pleaded and/or proved. As I stated earlier the petition for ejectment can always be amended but failure to amend the petition does not mean that the subsequent events cannot be considered. Rules of natural justice require that the tenant should have full notice about it and should have time and opportunity to rebut it. In the present case, much before the evidence of the tenant commenced, the illness of the landlord was brought to the notice of the court as well as of the tenant and that is why the landlord was allowed to be examined on commission. The landlord even deposed about it in his testimony and this was never challenged in cross-examination. Thus, no prejudice has been caused to the tenant by non-amendment of the ejectment application. In fact, when the evidence of the landlord was being recorded and he was deposing about his illness because of heart attack, no objection was taken on behalf of the tenant to the recording of such evidence. Nor was the fact of illness challenged, as stated earlier."

8. Recently, this Court has considered a similar situation in Bhagwan Dass v. Usha Tyagi [CM (M) 1229/2019, decided on 23rd August, 2019] wherein subsequent facts were permitted to be brought on record by means of an affidavit. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CM (M) 1376/2019

Decided On: 18.09.2019

 Kashi Ram Vs.  Anita Garg

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prathiba M. Singh, J.

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Tuesday, 10 September 2019

Whether decree granted in favour of landlord should be set aside on ground of subsequent event?

 The courts below have appreciated the evidence and
concluded on facts that the owners have an expanded family, and their
needs are genuine. It is impermissible for this Court to disturb those
findings of facts in its revisional jurisdiction. The owners, besides
denying these allegations, have contended that all these developments
were said to have taken place when the appeal was pending. But the
tenants did not bring them to that court’s notice. The issue of the
locked rooms had been concurrently rejected by the courts below.
According to them, these pleas are part of the tenants’ delaying
techniques.
62. The alleged later developments, I must note, have not been,
first, properly brought on record—at an appropriate time. Second, at
this stage they cannot be considered; third, there is no clinching
evidence to establish these allegations.
(f) Two of the Owners’ Family Getting Employment:
63. Indeed, the tenants have made heavy weather of this issue.

Indeed, two of the many children in the owners’ family secured
employment. They are many other children, either unemployed or
doing petty businesses. Let us not forget the owners initiated the
eviction proceedings in 1986—over thirty years ago. In this period
someone may be born, brought, and employed. And the one who was
getting educated then, may get employed, and retired. And the one
who was employed then may retire and die away, too.
64. In Dickensian diction, innumerable children may have been
born into the cause; innumerable young people may have married into
it; innumerable old people may have died out of it. The little of the
plaintiffs may have been promised a new toy cycle when the case is
settled, but may have grown up pending the case, possessed a real cycle,
ridden it through his life, and ridden away into the other world. A case
can be perennial but not the life, nor its needs. As it were, courts have
time machines, for cases remain constant decades on end. But not the
clients or causes.
65. True, two of the many children have secured employment.
But that is hardly surprising in three decades and three years. That has
not taken away the owners’ need completely. That development has not
eclipsed their need, so to say.
Suppression of Facts:
66. The tenants have contended that two of the owners’ children
got employment, perhaps, pending the appeal. It was not brought to

the Appellate Court’s notice. It is suppression. At least, the tenants
assert so.
67. S. P. Chengalraya Naidu is the oft-quoted judgment on fraud
and its ramification in the judicial arena. It invokes Chief Justice
Edward Coke’s aphoristic assertion that “Fraud avoids all judicial acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal”. It reiterates that a judgment or decree
obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the
eyes of the law.
68. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant,
according to the Supreme Court[15], disqualifies such litigant from
obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the
Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense
that had it not been suppressed it would have affected the merits of the
case. It must be a matter material for the consideration of the Court,
whatever view the Court may have taken.
69. The owners have a counter allegation: the tenants have
business at another place, too. But they suppressed that fact.
70. At any rate, I see no plea taken in the CA about the
suppression of a material fact: two of the children getting employment.
But it was argued. I reckon among the many children of the owners,
two getting employment in thirty years hardly affects their case
prospects. Nor does it amount to a material suppression.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.497 OF 2016

Smt. Rukminibai Motiram Kshirsagar v/s.  Smt. Manoramabai Mallikarjun Bagale

CORAM : DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.

PRONOUNCED ON: 6th September 2019
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Saturday, 24 August 2019

Whether bonafide need of landlord should subsist till passing of eviction decree?

If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Registration Act. If the landlord is able to show his n requirement when the action is commenced and the requirement continued till the date of the decree of the Trial Court and thereafter during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the tenant should be able to show that the subsequent events disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is tenant against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take note of subsequent events. When a statutory right of appeal is conferred against the decree or the order and once in exercise of the right an appeal is preferred the decree or order ceases to be final. What the definition of 'tenant' excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a court or hierarchy of courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by Trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred the appeal being a continuation of suit, landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the court shut its eyes and evict the tenant ? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry.
Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly.
This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) where Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Court observed as under :
We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognisance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed.
In order to fully evaluate the law laid down in the aforementioned extracted passage it is worthwhile to give the background of facts in which it was made. The appellant landlord in that case was the owner of a large building which was leased out in separate portions to several tenants. One of such tenants was the respondent. The landlord wanted to start a business in automobile spares and claimed eviction of the respondent under the Rent Restriction Act being Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The petition was resisted and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The appeal of the landlord failed. But in revision the High Court chose to remand the case to the appellate authority and the appellate authority in turn remitted the case to the Trial Court for fresh disposal in accordance with certain directions. The landlord preferred a revision petition against the order of remand by the first appellate court. The High Court dismissed the action of the landlord taking cognisance of a subsequent event namely that the landlord acquired possession of a reasonable suitable non-residential building in the same town. In appeal to this Court it was seriously contended that it was improper for the High Court to take into consideration the subsequent events and this contention was negatived inter alia on the ground in the passage extracted above.

Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events.
He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Taramal's case must be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh Act. Therefore, the High Court was in error in declining to take this subsequent event which was admittedly put forth in the plaint itself into consideration.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1108 of 1976.

Decided On: 28.04.1981

 Hasmat Rai  Vs. Raghunath Prasad

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
D.A. Desai, R.S. Pathak and E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.
Citation: (1981)3 SCC 103,AIR 1981 SC 1711.
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Wednesday, 26 December 2018

Whether court should consider subsequent event in favour of landlord to grant him eviction decree on ground of bonafide need?

 We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bonafides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.

 Acquisition of accommodation during pendency of lis by landlord may satisfy his additional needs of growing family and merely because such needs have not been pleaded in the eviction proceedings initially started, they could not be ignored. A review of the authorities cited, requires that all subsequent events should be noted and not only those, which favour a tenant. Therefore, the need of landlord's son in this case, who is 66 years old, too would qualify for being considered as a subsequent event, just as the death of his parents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Writ Petition No. 799 of 2016

Decided On: 08.03.2018

 Gurudas Yeshwant Pednekar Vs. Sharada and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Nutan D. Sardessai, J.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 605
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Sunday, 25 February 2018

Whether eviction decree on ground of bonafide need can be denied to landlord if his son has settled at some different place?

The deposition of respondent No. 2 was taken into consideration and the fact that he had done his Engineering Course from Thapar Institute of Engineering & Technology, Patiala and also done his PG Diploma and Business Management Course in the year 2003 from the Birla Institute of Management and Technology, Greater Noida. It was noticed that he was doing field job of the bank in corporate branch and he had no promotion prospects. Merely because he was settled at Panchkula, which was also admitted by his mother, the bona fide requirement as such could not be ruled out. Reliance was placed upon the judgment in 'Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd.' MANU/SC/0665/1998 : 1998 (8) SCC 119, Maganlal Vs. Nanasaheb MANU/SC/8168/2008 : 2009 (1) RCR (Rent) 16 and 'Dattatraya Laxman Kamble Vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & another MANU/SC/0301/1999 : 1999 (1) RCR (Rent) 508 for the said proposition and keeping in view the tenant cannot dictate the terms to the landlord, the eviction was duly ordered on that ground.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Civil Revision No. 2476 of 2015 (O&M)

Decided On: 21.03.2017

 Kishan Singh Rahi and Ors. Vs. Hans Raj Kaushal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.
Citation: 2017(2) RCR (Rent) 357.
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When court should direct eviction of tenant on ground of bonafide need of landlord?


"The ejectment has been done by both the Courts below on the ground that the property is required for the sons of the landlord. Counsel has tried to demonstrate that on an earlier occasion some property has been sold by the landlord and, therefore, bona fide requirement is not made out. However, it is not disputed that the sale took place in 2006 whereas the petition was filed in the year 2010. The requirement of the landlord can keep on changing with times and therefore the said argument cannot be given much weight.
 Similarly, the shop which was allegedly sold was in the year 2006 and, therefore, if the landlord was in need of some money and sold part of his property, it would not be a ground to disbelieve his bona fide requirement. 
It is not expected that the son would sit idle and not do any other business and would wait for the result of the proceedings which has taken six years at the initial stage itself. It is settled principle that the date of institution is to be seen and merely because during the pendency, his son had started doing business, would not as such be a ground to deny the benefit of the need which was the requirement at that point of time and which can still be utilized as such and can be put into motion.

5. The Supreme Court while dilating on the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlord in Sarla Ahuja's case (supra) held that the requirement of landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide and the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the assumption that requirement is not bona fide. 

It has also been held that a pragmatic approach is to be taken and the crucial date of litigation when the suit for eviction was filed although subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the reliefs have to be kept in mind but the fact remains that the person who had started litigation cannot be expected to sit idle during the said period. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

C.R. No. 1630 of 2017 (O&M)

Decided On: 24.03.2017

Arun Kumar Vs. Gurcharan Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: 2017(2) RCR(Rent) 37
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Friday, 28 July 2017

Whether court should allow amendment of plaint to bring on record subsequent event?

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, a ground on which the suit for eviction was not initially instituted, but if that ground being a ground for eviction under the Act and being available to the landlord during the suit, can be allowed to be taken by the landlord during the pendency of the suit and the landlord can legally ask the Court to allow amendment of the plaint taking into account the subsequent event after the institution of the suit and can legally press into service for the relief of eviction of the tenant on that ground (which is one of the grounds for eviction under the Act). As already stated above, such amendments on such grounds (of course being available under the Act) being based on subsequent event should be allowed in a suit for eviction against the tenant just to shorten the litigation, to preserve the rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice. Reference may be made to the case of Sachchidanand v. Heeranand, MANU/BH/0066/1983 : AIR 1983 Pat 276:1983 BBCJ (HC) 168).
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

Civil Revn. No. 1128 of 1983

Decided On: 09.11.1983

Annapurna Agrawal and Ors.
Vs.
Jitendra Kumar Sinha and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ashwini Kumar Sinha , J.
Citation: AIR 1984 Patna 215
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Sunday, 7 August 2016

When court can refuse to execute decree?

 The position of law is well settled that ordinarily the executing Court is not entitled to go behind the decree and is not entitled to consider subsequent events to deny the decree-holder the right to execute the decree. But there are certain well recognised exceptions to this rule; one of them is that when the decree is a nullity or the decree-holder has lost the right to execute the decree on account of a subsequent change in law or some subsequent development then the executing Court can take note of change in the situation and can refuse to execute the decree on that basis.
Orissa High Court
Smt. Radhi Dei And Ors. vs Lalit Bihari Mohanty on 3 August, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR 1991 Ori 36

Bench: D Mohapatra
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Friday, 3 June 2016

How to prove subsequent event pleaded in appeal or revision?

The contention of the appellant's learned Counsel is that the subsequent events pleaded would require to be proved as otherwise it would amount to granting a decree on pleadings alone without more and without evidence to prove the alleged subsequent factual events. It is urged that the High Court accepted the averments themselves as their own proof and proceeded straightway to reverse the decree of dismissal and to grant possession for the first time in revision.
 The submissions of learned Counsel are only partly correct. While it is true that a distinction must be made between pleading and proof, the further submissions that these must necessarily be in two successive sequential stages need not always be so and particularly when dealing with pleas of subsequent events in appeals and revisions. If the allegations of facts made in support of such a plea are denied then alone the question of their proof in an appropriate way arises. If those allegations of facts are admitted, there is no need to prove what is admitted or must be deemed to be admitted. There can be admissions by non-traverse. The High Court proceeded to accept the allegations as proved presumably in view of the fact that appellant's learned Counsel did not even appear, let alone challenge the allegations. But there might also be cases in which, having regard to the nature of the circumstances, the Court may insist upon proof independently of such admission by non-traverse.
When subsequent events are pleaded in the course of an appeal or proceedings of revision, the Court may, having regard to the nature of the allegations of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence to be adduced by means of affidavits as envisaged in Rule 1 of Order 19, C.P.C. The Court may also treat any affidavit filed in support of the pleadings itself as one under the said provision and call upon the opposite side to traverse it. The Court, if it finds that having regard to the nature of the allegations, it is necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral cross-examination, may have recourse to that procedure. It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. All these depend upon the factual and situational differences characterising a particular case and the nature of the plea raised. There can be no hard and fast rule governing the matter. The procedure is not to be burdened with technicalities.
Supreme Court of India
Ramesh Kumar vs Kesho Ram on 30 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: AIR 1992 SC 700, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 623
Bench: M Venkatachaliah, N Kasliwal
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Tuesday, 18 August 2015

When appellate court can take note of subsequent event which will have fundamental impact on relief claimed?

 It was further contended by defendant Nos. 1 to 6
that even on the date of execution of Agreement of
Sale their mother was very much alive and, therefore
in the absence of execution of Agreement of Sale by
all the seven co-sharers of the suit schedule
property the suit for specific performance does not
lie. The learned counsel for the defendants placed
reliance on the decisions of Andhra Pradesh High
Court and this Court in the cases of Kommisetti
Venkatasubbayya v. Karamestti Venkateswarlu 
 A.I.R. 1971 AP 279 and
Lourdu Mari David & Ors. v. Louis Chinnaya
Arogiaswamy & Ors. (1996) 5 SCC 589 in support of their claim.
20. Further, they placed reliance upon the case of
this Court in Rameshwar & Ors. v. Jot Ram & Anr. 
(1976) 1 SCC 194Page 11
In the said authority it has been held as follows:
“9…First, its bearing on the right of
action, second, on the nature of the
relief and third, on its impotence to
create or destroy substantive rights.
Where the nature of the relief, as
originally sought, has become obsolete or
unserviceable or a new form of relief will
be more efficacious on account of
developments subsequent to the suit or
even during the appellate stage, it is but
fair that the relief is moulded, varied or
reshaped in the light of updated facts.
Patterson illustrates this position. It is
important that the party claiming the
relief or change of relief must have the
same right from which either the first or
the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent
events in the course of the case cannot be
constitutive of substantive rights
enforceable in that very litigation except
in a narrow category (later spelt out) but
may influence the equitable jurisdiction
to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights
have already vested in a party, they
cannot be nullified or negated by
subsequent events save where there is a
change in the law and it is made
applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar
Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri
falls in this category. Courts of justice
may, when the compelling equities of a
case oblige them, shape reliefs — cannot
deny rights — to make them justly relevant
in the updated circumstances. Where the
relief is discretionary, courts may
exercise this jurisdiction to avoid
injustice. Likewise, where the right to
the remedy depends, under the statute
itself, on the presence or absence of
certain basic facts at the time the relief
is to be ultimately granted, the Court,
even in appeal, can take note of such
supervening facts with fundamental
impact…”

 (Emphasis supplied)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7835 OF 2014
(Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 24653 OF 2012)
PEMMADA PRABHAKAR & ORS
Vs.
YOUNGMEN’S VYSYA ASSOCIATION & ORS. …
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Citation;(2015)5 SCC355
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Saturday, 21 March 2015

Landmark judgment when court can mould relief taking in to consideration subsequent events


 Considering the aforementioned changed  circumstances,  the  High  Court
    taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief  in  the  appeal
    under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the  same  has  been
    challenged  by  the  appellants  before  us.  In  ordinary   course   of
    litigation, the rights of parties are crystallized on the date the  suit
    is instituted and only  the  same  set  of  facts  must  be  considered.
    However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal
    under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is  not  precluded  from
    taking note of  developments  subsequent  to  the  commencement  of  the
    litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed
    by a party or one the entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking  note
    of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This  rule  is  one  of
    ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson vs.
    State of Alabama[11] followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad  Shukul  vs  Keshwar
    Lal Choudhury[12]. The aforementioned  cases  were  recognized  by  this
    Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor and General  Traders[13]
    wherein he stated that:

  “…If a fact, arising after the  lis  has  come  to  court  and  has  a
      fundamental impact It is basic to our  processual  jurisprudence  that
      the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the  date  a  suitor
      institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the  principle  that
      procedure is the  handmaid  and  not  the  mistress  of  the  judicial
      process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has  a
      fundamental impact on the right to relief or the  manner  of  moulding
      it, is brought diligently to the notice of  the  tribunal,  it  cannot
      blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render  inept  the
      decretal remedy. Equity justifies  bending  the  rules  of  procedure,
      where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with  a  view  to
      promote substantial justice — subject, of course, to  the  absence  of
      other  disentitling  factors  or  just  circumstances.  Nor   can   we
      contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
      to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends,  the  power
      exists, absent other special circumstances repelling  resort  to  that
      course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are  legion,  even  as
      situations for applications of this  equitable  rule  are  myriad.  We
      affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed  by
      the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in  accord
      with the current realities, the Court can, and  in  many  cases  must,
      take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to  the
      institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness  to  both
      sides are scrupulously obeyed.”

The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena  of  decisions.
This  Court  by  placing  reliance  on  the  Pasupuleti  Venkateswarlu  Case
(supra), held in  Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram[14] that:

  “6. The  normal  rule  is  that  in  any  litigation  the  rights  and
      obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at  the
      commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever
      subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on  the
      entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear  on  the
      moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a
      ‘cautious cognizance’ of  the subsequent changes of fact  and  law  to
      mould the relief.”

This was further followed in Lekh Raj vs. Muni Lal &  Ors.[15].  This  Court
in Sheshambal (dead) through LRs vs. Chelur Corporation  Chelur  Building  &
Ors.[16]  while discussing the issue  of  taking  cognizance  of  subsequent
events held that:
  “19. To the same effect is the decision of this Court  in  Om  Prakash
      Gupta case where the Court declared that although the ordinary rule of
      civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on  the
      date of the institution of the suit yet the court has power  to  mould
      the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied:  (SCC
      p. 263, para 11)
  “11. … (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has,  by  reason  of
      subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted;


      (ii)  that  taking  note  of  such   subsequent   event   or   changed
      circumstances would shorten litigation  and  enable  complete  justice
      being done to the parties; and


      (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court
      promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural  law  so  that
      the opposite party is not taken by surprise.”

This Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and Ors. vs. Narasinghro  Krishnaji  Kulkarni
and Ors.[17], a matter regarding the  elections  in  a  registered  society,
held that the courts can mould relief accordingly taking note of  subsequent
events. Furthermore, in  Beg  Raj  Singh  vs.   State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  &
Ors.[18] while deciding on the issue of  renewal  of  a  mining  lease  held
that:
 “….A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet  be  denied
      relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e.  the
      events  between  the  commencement  of  litigation  and  the  date  of
      decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have
      been rendered redundant by lapse of time or  may  have  been  rendered
      incapable of being granted by  change  in  law.  There  may  be  other
      circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner  any
      relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the
      petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the  date
      of judgment.”

Even this Court while exercising its powers under Article 136 can take  note
of subsequent events (See: Bihar State  Financial  Corporation  &  Ors.  vs.
Chemicot India (P) Ltd. & Ors.[19],  Parents  Association  of  Students  vs.
M.A. Khan & Anr.[20],   State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors.  vs.  Mahindra  &
Mahindra Ltd.[21] )
35. Thus, when the relief otherwise awardable on the  date  of  commencement
    of  the  suit  would  become  inappropriate  in  view  of  the   changed
    circumstances, the courts may mould the relief in  accordance  with  the
    changed circumstances for shortening the litigation or  to  do  complete
    justice.
  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.4887     OF  2014
                  
Gaiv Dinshaw Irani  Vs. Tehmtan Irani & Ors.
                               
Citation;AIR 2014 SC 2326


Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.


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