Considering the aforementioned changed circumstances, the High Court
taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal
under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been
challenged by the appellants before us. In ordinary course of
litigation, the rights of parties are crystallized on the date the suit
is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered.
However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal
under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from
taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the
litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed
by a party or one the entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking note
of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of
ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson vs.
State of Alabama[11] followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs Keshwar
Lal Choudhury[12]. The aforementioned cases were recognized by this
Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor and General Traders[13]
wherein he stated that:
“…If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that
the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor
institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that
procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial
process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a
fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding
it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot
blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the
decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure,
where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to
promote substantial justice — subject, of course, to the absence of
other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we
contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts
to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power
exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that
course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as
situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We
affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by
the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord
with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must,
take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the
institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both
sides are scrupulously obeyed.”
The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena of decisions.
This Court by placing reliance on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Case
(supra), held in Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram[14] that:
“6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and
obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the
commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever
subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the
entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the
moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a
‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to
mould the relief.”
This was further followed in Lekh Raj vs. Muni Lal & Ors.[15]. This Court
in Sheshambal (dead) through LRs vs. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building &
Ors.[16] while discussing the issue of taking cognizance of subsequent
events held that:
“19. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Om Prakash
Gupta case where the Court declared that although the ordinary rule of
civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the
date of the institution of the suit yet the court has power to mould
the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied: (SCC
p. 263, para 11)
“11. … (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of
subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted;
(ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed
circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice
being done to the parties; and
(iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court
promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that
the opposite party is not taken by surprise.”
This Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and Ors. vs. Narasinghro Krishnaji Kulkarni
and Ors.[17], a matter regarding the elections in a registered society,
held that the courts can mould relief accordingly taking note of subsequent
events. Furthermore, in Beg Raj Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors.[18] while deciding on the issue of renewal of a mining lease held
that:
“….A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied
relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the
events between the commencement of litigation and the date of
decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have
been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered
incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other
circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any
relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the
petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date
of judgment.”
Even this Court while exercising its powers under Article 136 can take note
of subsequent events (See: Bihar State Financial Corporation & Ors. vs.
Chemicot India (P) Ltd. & Ors.[19], Parents Association of Students vs.
M.A. Khan & Anr.[20], State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Mahindra &
Mahindra Ltd.[21] )
35. Thus, when the relief otherwise awardable on the date of commencement
of the suit would become inappropriate in view of the changed
circumstances, the courts may mould the relief in accordance with the
changed circumstances for shortening the litigation or to do complete
justice.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4887 OF 2014
Gaiv Dinshaw Irani Vs. Tehmtan Irani & Ors.
Citation;AIR 2014 SC 2326
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.