Showing posts with label testamentary disposition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label testamentary disposition. Show all posts

Thursday, 18 June 2020

Supreme Court: Bar On Transfer/Assignment Of Agricultural Land To Non-Agriculturist is Applicable To Testamentary Disposition Also

The questions that arose for consideration and
the circumstances in which the matters were referred to it were set out by
the Division Bench as under:-.
“We are called upon to decide as to whether Section 63 of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands, Act, 1948
(for short ‘the Bombay Tenancy Act’) debars an
agriculturist from parting with his agricultural land to a
non-agriculturist through a “Will” so also, whether Section
43(1) of the Tenancy Act restricts transfer of any land or
interest purchased by the tenant under Sections 17B, 32,
32F. 321. 320, 32U, 33(1) or 88E or sold to any person
under Section 32P or 64 of the Tenancy Act through the
execution of a Will by way of testamentary disposition.
Learned Single Judges of this Court have taken a
consistent view that such transfer of property through
testamentary disposition would not violate Section 43 or
63 of the Tenancy Act.

31. If the provisions referred to in Section 43 of the Act and allied
provisions are considered in light of the settled principles extracted earlier,
it emerges that the primary concern of those provisions is to see that the
legislative scheme of granting protection to persons from disadvantaged
categories and conferring the right of purchase upon them, and thereby
ensure direct relationship of a tiller with the land. The provisions, though
lay down a norm which may not be fully consistent with the principles of
Indian Succession Act, are principally designed to attain and sub-serve the

purpose of protecting the holdings in the hands of disadvantaged
categories. The prohibition against transfers of holding without the
previous sanction of the concerned authorities, is to be seen in that light as
furthering the cause of legislation. Even if by the process of construction,
the expression “assignment” is construed to include testamentary
disposition, in keeping with the settled principles, the incidental
encroachment cannot render the said provisions invalid. In pith and
substance, the legislation and the concerned provisions are completely
within the competence of the State Legislature and by placing the
construction upon the expression “assignment” to include testamentary
disposition, no transgression will ensue.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2573 OF 2020

VINODCHANDRA SAKARLAL KAPADIA Vs  STATE OF GUJARAT 

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Dated:June 15, 2020.
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Sunday, 12 January 2020

Whether property received by son from father by way of gift or will is self acquired property or ancestral property?

The controversy arises, however, on the question as to what kind of interest a son would take in the self-acquired property of his father which he receives by way of gift or testamentary bequest from him, vis-a-vis his own male issue. Does it remain self-acquired property in his hands also, untrammeled by the rights of his sons and grandsons or does it become ancestral property in his hands, though not obtained by descent, in which his male issue become co-owners with him?......

11. In view of the settled law that a Mitakshara father has right of disposition over his self-acquired property to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants, it is in our opinion not possible to hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must necessarily, and under all circumstances, rank as ancestral property in the hands of the donee in which his sons would acquire co-ordinate interest...

16. Still further, it was held that the father's gifts are exempt from partition. The reason for this distinction is that the theory of equal ownership between the father and the son in the ancestral property is not applicable to the father's gifts at all. The Court held as under:

12. ...But when the father obtains the grandfather's property by way of gift, he receives it not because he is a son or has any legal right to such property but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which he could have bestowed on any other person as well. The interest which he takes in such property must depend upon the will of the grantor. A good deal of confusion, we think, has arisen by not keeping this distinction in mind. To find out whether a property is or is not ancestral in the hands of a particular person, not merely the relationship between the original and the present holder but the mode of transmission also must be looked to; and the property can ordinarily be reckoned as ancestral only if the present holder has got it by virtue of his being a son or descendant of the original owner. The Mitakshara, we think, is fairly clear on this point. It has placed the father's gifts under a separate category altogether and in more places than one has declared them exempt from partition. 

Our conclusion, therefore, is that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7528 of 2019 

Decided On: 23.09.2019

Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel  Vs. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 4822
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Tuesday, 19 February 2019

Whether Widow is liable to pay court fees in partition suit filed against her brother in law?

 A petition for probate of a Will is neither a petition in relation to any 'property dispute' nor does it 'arise out of or concern a matrimonial matter.'

c) A petition for probate of a Will is never a petition in relation to any dispute concerning any property but is in relation to the validity or otherwise of a Will. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Mrs. Vijaya Gurshaney and Anr., MANU/SC/0632/2003 : A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3669, which Deshmukh J. referred to in his judgment of 4/6/2007 clearly brings to light the aforementioned view, wherein it was held that a testamentary Court is only concerned with finding out whether or not the testator executed the testamentary instrument of his free will and grant of a probate or Letters of Administration does not confer title to property.

d) As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, Mr. Ravi Kadam, on behalf of the state, testamentary cases do not arise out of matrimonial matters but rather arise out of 'death'.

C) Furthermore it is pertinent to differentiate between matrimonial matters and matrimonial relationship as the two terms are not synonymous and hence the term 'matrimonial matters' arising in the Notification of 23/3/2000 cannot be replaced by 'matrimonial relationship' so as to bring a petition filed by a widow for probate of her deceased husband's Will, within the ambit of the Notification.

D) Lastly, the words 'property dispute arising out of or concerning matrimonial matters' should be given their plain and simple meaning, that is, a dispute arising between parties to a marriage, (attention may be brought to the reference made by Deshmukh. J. to the Family Courts Act sub-section (1) section 7 to elucidate the meaning of the term 'matrimonial matters') and should therefore exclude testamentary petitions wherein not only is there an absence of a dispute, other than in cases when somebody files a caveat, it is not a matter between two parties to a marriage."

14. Learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, in the matter in hand, has contended that since the husband of plaintiff No. 4 has passed away, her claim for partition and separate possession can be considered to be a matrimonial dispute since she would not have been required to litigate if her husband would have been alive or would have apportioned his share to her before his death. This contention finds an answer in the conclusions of the learned Division Bench in the Girish Case (supra) in paragraph Nos. 26(B) (d), (C) and (D). It is concluded that even testamentary cases with regard to the death of the husband would not come within the meaning of 'matrimonial dispute'.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1210 of 2016

Decided On: 15.01.2018

Kailash Satyanarayan Khandal Vs. Vijaykumar Satnarayan Khandal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 737
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Sunday, 29 April 2018

Whether father can execute will in respect of ancestral property which he received in partition?

 It is clearly emerging factual and legal position in the matter that there had been partition among father and three sons in 1978 whereunder each of them received one fourth share in the inherited coparcenary property and that in 1990, the father under a registered will, had bequeathed his one fourth separate share received in partition, to only two sons. The third son though being alive, had not received anything under the bequest. Father of the plaintiff died in 1991. Thereafter, the properties bequeathed were being enjoyed by the two sons as their independent properties. That enjoyment had never been questioned by the third son. The Maharashtra amendment to Hindu Succession Act had been effective since 1994 and amendment to section 6 to Hindu Succession Act had been made effective from 2005. Disposition of the property by the father of the plaintiff, as such, obviously has been before 20th day of December, 2004. On partition, the property had become separate property of father and as such, he had an absolute right to deal with the same and which he did by executing a registered will, which appears to have been acted upon. Coparcenary nature of the property had ceased to continue upon partition of the properties among the partitioning members of the coparcenary, since 1978. It is not the case that any male member had been born after 1978 to deceased father in order to lay claim to any share in the property. Father admittedly had executed will of his partitioned separate share in 1990 and in 1991, he has expired. Disposition of suit property among coparceners then had taken place before Maharashtra Amendment of 1994 to Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Even if it is assumed that amendment to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, is retroactive, the legislature has already made its intention clear that disposition of properties made before 20th December, 2004 would remain unaffected.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 440 of 2015

Decided On: 22.03.2017

 Leelavati Baburao Chaudhari Vs. Pitambar Shridhar Attarde and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.P. Deshmukh, J.
Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 469
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Tuesday, 26 December 2017

Whether it is permissible to create life interest in property in favour of Hindu woman?


 An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.

42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of Plaintiff No. 2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall Under Section 14(1) of the Act but it squarely falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case (supra) would apply.

43. A fortiori, Plaintiff No. 2-late Mrs. Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death Under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First, the testator-Mr. Dewan being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.

45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act.

46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" Under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls Under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.

47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.

48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wife's death would go to testator's nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wife's right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest Under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" Under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 21784 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 32044/2016)

Decided On: 12.12.2017

Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 1
Print Page

Sunday, 3 December 2017

Whether father can effect of partition of ancestral property by executing will after commencement of Hindu succession amendment Act 2005?

Whether the execution of Will before 20th day of December, 2004 was sufficient, to make a Will come within the purview of the expression "disposition" under the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, especially when the testator was alive on the crucial date?

27. Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as follows:

"Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall:

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;

(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;

(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004."
28. A careful look at Section 6(1) would show that by the amendment brought forth by Central Act No. 39/2005, the daughter of a coparcener in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law was made a coparcener by birth, in the same manner as the son and was vested with the same rights and obligations in respect of the coparcenary property, as a son would have. But the proviso to sub-section (1) makes it clear that nothing therein would affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20.12.2004.

29. Two expressions appearing in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 are of significance. They are (1) disposition and (2) alienation. These two expressions are followed by a rider to the effect that any partition or testamentary disposition is also included within the purview of these two expressions.

30. While we would have no difficulty in understanding the purport of the expression "alienation", there is some difficulty in expounding the meaning of the expression "disposition". This difficulty is compounded by the inclusion of "testamentary disposition", within the meaning of the expression "disposition". Normally one would understand the expression "testamentary disposition" to mean the execution of a testamentary instrument, the bequest under which is to take effect in future, while alienation takes place in praesenti. Therefore the confusion or difficulty posed by the proviso to Section 6(1) is as to whether it includes testamentary disposition that has come into effect due the death of the testator before the crucial date or bequest which has not yet come into effect, due to the testator being alive as on the crucial date.

31. The question as to whether, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 will have retrospective effect or not, has been answered by the Supreme Court in Prakash v. Phulavati MANU/SC/1241/2015 : (2016)2 SCC 36. The Supreme Court held therein that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters were born. The Supreme Court further held that disposition or alienation including partition, which may have taken place before 20.12.2004 as per the law applicable prior to the said date, will remain unaffected.

32. In Prakash, the Supreme Court considered some of its earlier decisions in which a tricky question similar to the one arising in the present case came up for consideration. For instance, in S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy MANU/SC/0788/1991 : (1991)3 SCC 647, a preliminary decree for partition was passed in favour of a son against his father. But before a final decree could be passed, an amendment was introduced by the State of Andhra Pradesh under Hindu Succession (A.P. Amendment) Act, 1986, allowing a share to the unmarried daughters. Therefore, a question arose as to whether the share allotted to the son under the preliminary decree would undergo a change or not. The Court upheld the right of the unmarried daughters on the ground that the rights of the son had not crystallized. But the Supreme Court pointed out in Prakash that the decision in S. Sai Reddy did not arise out of a case where the shares of the parties stood already crystallized by operation of law. Moreover, the A.P. amendment Act did not include under Section 29-A, a provision similar to the proviso to Section 6(1), introduced by the 2005 Central Amendment. Clause (iv) of Section 29A merely covered, marriage or partition effected before the commencement of the A.P. Amendment Act, 1986. There was no inclusion of "testamentary disposition" under the exclusion clause, in the A.P. Amendment Act.

33. Heavy reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent/defendant on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pavitri Devi v. Darbari Singh MANU/SC/0577/1993 : (1993)4 SCC 392, in support of his contention that the expression 'testamentary disposition' includes the mere execution of a Will. In the said case before the Supreme Court, what was in question was only a gift deed and not a Will. Therefore the expression "testamentary disposition" appearing in Section 30(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had no application to the case before the Supreme Court. But nevertheless, the Supreme Court referred to the expression "testamentary disposition" appearing in Section 30 (1) and went into the scope and ambit of the said expression in paragraph 3. Paragraph-3 of the said decision reads as follows:

"Webster in Comprehensive' Dictionary in international edition at page 1298, stated the meaning of the word 'testamentary' thus: (i) derived from, bequeathed by, or set forth in a will; (ii) appointed or provided by, or done in accordance with, a will; (iii) pertaining to a will, or to the administration or settlement of a will, testamental. In the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, reprint edition 1987 at P. 1271 testamentary instrument was defined to mean a "testamentary instrument" is one which declares the present will of the maker as to the disposal of his property after death, without attempting to declare or create any rights therein prior to such event. Black's Law Dictionary [6th Ed. 1991] defines "testamentary disposition" at page 1475 thus -"the passing of property to another upon the death of the owner. A disposition of property by way of a gift, Will or deed which is not to take effect unless the grantor dies or until that event." Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act provides disposition by a gift which takes effect even during the lifetime of the donor and effective as soon as it is registered and normally given possession of the property therein. Section 30 of the Act is merely declaratory of the law not only as it stood before the Act, but as it now stands modified by the provisions of the Act. It declares that any Hindu may dispose of by a will or other testamentary disposition his property or interest in coparcenary which is capable of being so disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other law for the time being in force applicable to the Hindus. Its explanation is really material. The testamentary disposition, therefore, would mean disposition of the property which would take effect after the death, instead of co-intestine on the execution of the document. A testamentary disposition is generally effected by a will or by a codicil which means an instrument made in relation to a will extending, altering or adding to its disposition arid is to be deemed to form part of the will. Will as defined in Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 means legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desired to carry into effect after his demise. It limits alienation intra vivos. While the gift being a disposition in presenting, it becomes effective on due execution and registration and generally delivery of the possession. Section 30 makes it clear that testamentary disposition under the Act would be dealt with in accordance with the Indian Succession Act. Section 55 and Schedule 3 of the said Act prescribe procedure effecting succession amongst Hindus by testamentary succession by will or codicil. Section 30 employs non-obstinate clause and excludes from the operation of pre-existing or any other law applicable to coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara law and introduced fiction in its explanation and empowers the Hindu male or female to dispose of his or her interest by a will or any other testamentary disposition known to law-which would be effective after the demise. It would, therefore, be difficult to envisage that disposition by gift partakes the character of testamentary succession under Section 30 of the Act.
34. Though the Supreme Court, in Pavitri Devi, expounded the meaning of the expression 'testamentary disposition' and gave it a meaning, we do not think that we can take the decision in Pavitri Devi as an authoritative pronouncement on the issue now before us, for two reasons. They are:

"(a) As we have pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the Supreme Court was concerned in Pavitri Devi with a gift deed and not a Will. A gift is actually a transfer of property, while a Will is not. Therefore, the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in Pavitri Devi to the expression "testamentary disposition" is actually out of context and did not arise out of the lis before the Supreme Court. Hence, the decision in Pavitri Devi cannot be taken to be the last word on the interpretation of the expression found in the proviso to Section 6(1).

(b) By its very nature, a testamentary disposition is one which does not take effect and which does not become final, unless and until the testator dies. It is not only the bequest under Will, which is subject to various uncertainties, dependent upon the life and wish of the testator, but even the right of the testator to bequeath particular property may undergo change before he dies. Take for instance a case where the testator begets a child after the execution of Will. If his undivided share in the joint family property had been the subject matter of the Will, his own share may undergo a change with the birth of a son after the execution of the Will. In peculiar cases it may even happen with the birth of a sibling to the testator. Therefore, a testamentary disposition can never be an actual disposition in the true sense of the term, since its coming into effect as well as the extent to which it takes effect, are always subject to the uncertainties of time and mind, apart from birth and death. As pointed out by the Supreme court in Mathai Samuel v. Eapen {MANU/SC/0996/2012 : (2012) 13 SCC 80}, a Will is merely a legal declaration of the testator's intention and its essential characteristic is its ambulatoriness and revocability."

35. Unfortunately, the word 'disposition' itself emerged from the English language and law and hence the manner in which law dictionaries have expounded the term, is in tune more with linguistics than with law. This is perhaps why the Supreme court pointed out in Goli Eswariah v. Commissioner of Gift Tax {MANU/SC/0258/1970 : AIR 1970 SC 1722} that the word 'disposition' is not a term of law, having a precise meaning and that its meaning has to be gathered from the context in which it is used.

36. Black's Law Dictionary defines "disposition" to mean "the fact of transferring something to another's care or possession especially by deed or will; the relinquishing of property". The same dictionary defines "testamentary disposition" to mean "a disposition to take effect upon the death of the person making it, who retains substantially entire control of the property until death". P. Ramanatha Aiyar's the Law Lexicon (3rd Edition 2012) deals with the definition of the word "disposition" in a variety of circumstances. One of the several connotations given in the Law Lexicon is as follow:

"The word disposition in relation to property means disposition made by deed or will and also disposition made by or under a decree or under order of a Court as the qualifying phrase used in Section 21(2), viz., including any transfer in execution of a decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or authority (Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra - MANU/SC/0200/1985 : AIR 1986 SC 414).
37. The right of a Hindu to dispose of his property by will or other testamentary disposition is recognised by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act. It is that in Section 30, the expression "testamentary disposition" is used. A careful look at the manner in which Section 30 is worded would show two things, viz., - a) that a testamentary disposition could be either by way of will or otherwise; and b) that what is sought to be done through will or other testamentary disposition is considered by Section 30 to be a "disposal".

38. Interestingly the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word, whenever used as a noun in the branch of law, to mean "the distribution or transfer of property or money to someone especially by bequest". The origin and etymology of the word 'disposition', as indicated in Merriam Webster Dictionary shows that the word evolved in the 14th century from the Latin word 'Dispositio' and from the word 'disponere'. Though no disposition or disposal or distribution of property takes place at the time of execution of the Will, the word disposition has come to be associated even with testamentary instruments.

39. But the Proviso to section 6(1) does not merely use the expression 'testamentary disposition'. It starts with the word 'disposition', then proceeds to include 'testamentary disposition' within its ambit and then qualifies it with the words "which had taken place". Therefore, we think that the proviso to Section 6(1) has to be split into 3 parts-

"(i) the first part containing the words "disposition or alienation"

(ii) the second part containing the words "including any partition or testamentary disposition" and

(iii) the third part containing the words "which had taken place before 20-12-2004."

40. Therefore, if a case is to be brought within the purview of the proviso to section 6(1), especially in relation to a Will, 2 things are to be proved namely (i) that there was a valid Will and (ii) that the disposition under the Will had taken place before the date specified. The disposition under Will would take place only when the testator dies and not otherwise. This is not only due to the very nature of testamentary disposition but also due to the fact that during the period between the date of execution of the Will and the date of death of the testator, many things may happen, even beyond the control of the testator, that would make the bequest invalid, wholly or partially. Therefore, the expression 'testamentary disposition' appearing in the proviso to section 6(1) should be understood to mean only a Will which had taken come into effect before 20-12-2004. The words "which had taken place" should be understood to mean "which had taken effect".

41. There is one clue available in Section 6 itself, for anyone to come to the same conclusion as we have. It is in sub-section (5) and the Explanation following the same. Sub-section (5) of section 6 and the Explanation following the same, read as follow:

"(5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a Court."

42. While the proviso under sub-section (1) of section 6 excludes from the operation of sub-section (1), any alienation or disposition, including any partition or testamentary disposition that has taken place before the appointed day, sub-section (5) excludes from the operation of section 6 in entirety, a partition made by a registered deed repartition effected by a decree of court. It is important to note that the proviso to sub-section (1) is confined in its applicability to sub-section (1). In contrast, the prescription contained in sub-section (5) and the Explanation there under, are applicable to the entirety of section 6.

43. The prescription contained in sub-section (5) and the Explanation following the same, give a clear indication to the fact that the law makers did not want parties to plead oral partition effected before the appointed day, for the purpose of defeating the right created by the Amendment Act. An oral partition or a Memorandum recording past partition, had always been accepted by courts, subject to proof. But the Explanation to section 6, makes it clear that unless a partition had been effected by a registered deed or by a decree of court, the benefit of subsection (5) may not be available.

44. It is needless to point out that in a partition, mutual transfers take place in presenti. Even then, the benefit of sub-section (5) will not be available unless the partition had been effected by a registered deed or a decree of court. Therefore, the intention of the law makers is very clear to the effect that no one should be allowed to create documents, after the advent of the Amendment Act of 2005, to defeat the rights conferred by the amendment. In order to prevent the creation of ante dated documents, the Amendment ensures that even reliance upon such documents is impermissible. In such circumstances, if the expression "testamentary disposition" is taken to mean the mere execution of a Will, the rights conferred by section 6 can be easily defeated by parties by setting up a Will, which is not required to be compulsorily registered.

45. Therefore, we are of the considered view that in cases where the testator was alive as on 20-12-2004, the Will, even if any executed by him genuinely before the said date, would not make it a case of "testamentary disposition which had taken place", so as to make the case fall under the proviso and to take it out of the application of section 6(1). In other words, a case will fall under the proviso to section 6(1), only if 2 things had taken place before 20-12-2004 namely (i) execution of a Will and (ii) the death of the testator. The execution of the Will before 20-12-2004 alone is not sufficient to take a case out of the operation of section 6(1), as no disposition under the Will would have taken place, if the testator was alive. As pointed by the Supreme court in S. Rathinam v. Mariappan {MANU/SC/7732/2007 : AIR 2007 SC 2134}, a Will of a man is the aggregate of his testamentary intentions manifested in writing and is not a transfer.


46. Today there can be no dispute any longer about the proposition that to fall under the category of "a disposition that had taken place", a partition should have become final and conclusive and that even a preliminary decree for partition would not suffice. This is in view of at least 3 decisions of the Supreme court namely (1) S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy MANU/SC/0788/1991: (1991) 3 SCC 647 (2) Prema v. Nanje Gowda MANU/SC/0607/2011 : (2011) 6 SCC 462 and (3) Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi MANU/SC/1216/2011 : (2011) 9 SCC 788. If a preliminary decree for partition itself cannot bring a case within the ambit of the proviso to section 6(1) or within the ambit of section 6(5), on account of the same not becoming final and conclusive, we do not know how the mere execution of a Will, without the death of the testator before the appointed day, can make the case come within the purview either of the proviso to section 6(1) or of section 6(5). Hence, we answer point No. 2 in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, since the father of the parties hereto died (unfortunately for the respondent and fortunately for the appellant) after 20-12-2004.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD 

Appeal Suit No. 349 of 2016

Decided On: 27.04.2017

R. Seethamma Vs. M. Thimma Reddy

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V. Ramasubramanian and Anis, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 HYD125
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Sunday, 5 March 2017

Whether court can grant probate which is at variance with terms of will?

It is now settled law that the Probate Court is a Court of conscience and the duty of the Probate Court is only to adjudicate whether the Will in question was the last Will and testament of the deceased, whether the same was duly executed and attested, whether the same was executed without being vitiated by force, fraud, undue influence, etc. and whether the testator had the required mental capacity to execute the Will. Apart from those questions, a Probate Court cannot go into the question of title of the testator nor can the Court grant a probate which is at variance with the terms of the Will.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
R.V.W. 2116 of 2005 in F.A. No. 311 of 1988
Decided On: 21.04.2006
 Uma Addhya
Vs.
Biren Mondal
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:B. Bhattacharya and P.N. Sinha, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2006 Cal 200
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Sunday, 26 February 2017

Whether court can grant interlocutory relief in respect of property of deceased prior to grant of probate?

Now, it has been emphasized on behalf of the Appellant that the words "all matters connected therewith" in Section 266, have a broad connotation and that Section 268 emphasizes that the proceedings before the District Judge in relation to the grant of probate and Letters of Administration will be regulated so far as the circumstances of the case permit by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is contended that the power to grant interim orders is a necessary adjunct of the power of a civil court. The ambit of the words "all matters connected therewith" has to be construed in relation to the grant of probate and letters of administration. Such a proceeding does not concern itself with title or even the existence of the property but only determines whether the will was executed by the testator of his own free will.
That being the ambit of the proceeding, the words " connected therewith" cannot transform the probate proceeding into one in which issues alien to the grant of probate are to be decided. That would be impermissible. The contents of the broad general language inSections 266 and 268 must be read in the context of the specific provisions which are made inSection 269. The Legislature in sub-section (1) of Section 269 made a specific provision to the effect that until probate of the will of a deceased person is granted or an administrator of his estate is constituted, the District Judge (i) is authorised and required to interfere for the protection of such property at the instance of any person claiming to be interested therein; and (ii) in all other cases where the Judge considers that the property incurs any risk of loss or damage to do so. For that purpose, the District Judge is empowered to appoint an officer to take and keep possession of the property. While recognising and conferring such a power expressly on the District Judge, the Legislature nonetheless mandated in sub-section (2) that this section shall not apply when the deceased is a Hindu, Mohammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person, nor shall it apply to any part of the property of an Indian Christian, who has died intestate. When Section 268 emphasizes that "save as hereinafter otherwise provided", the proceedings before the District Judge shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 so far as the circumstances of the case permit, it is not open to the District Judge to exercise a power contrary to the legislative intent and mandate of Section 269. Until probate of the Will is granted of a deceased person or an administrator is constituted, the statute has recognized the power of the District Judge for the protection of the property (at the behest of a person claiming to be interested) and in all other cases (where the Judge considers that the property incurs a risk of loss or damage). But, just as this power is specifically conferred upon the District Judge, sub-section (2) precludes the exercise of the power when the deceased belongs to one of the categories specified in sub-section (2). If the provisions of Sections 266 and 268were broad enough to bring within their purview, powers of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 269, there was no necessity to incorporate a provision in the nature of sub-section (1) of Section 269. As a rule of interpretation, the Court will not ascribe or attribute the use of a surplusage to the Legislature. But, even if an alternate construction is possible - one that recognizes that sub-section (1) of Section 269 only makes implicit a power which is exercisable under Sections 266 and 268 - the effect of sub-section (2) is to  preclude the exercise of that power in the case of one of the excepted categories. It would not be permissible, in the face of the specific provision of sub-section (2) of Section 269 to read into the provisions ofSections 266 and 268 a general power to grant interlocutory relief even prior to the grant of probate in respect of the property which is alleged to form part of the estate of the deceased. This construction is fortified by the principle that the testamentary Court in proceedings for probate is only concerned with the question as to whether the Will of the deceased is genuine and that it has been made voluntarily. The probate Court is not concerned with questions relating to the property itself. Though an assiduous attempt was made on behalf of the Appellant to rely upon the provisions of the Act, to which a reference has been made earlier, the Court in this case is essentially concerned with the powers of the testamentary Court when it exercises its jurisdiction in a petition for the grant of probate. In view of the express provision which is contained in Section 269(2), there can be no recourse to the exercise of the inherent powers of the Civil Court.
Bombay High Court
Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande Alias ... vs Vithalrao Hande & Ors on 29 March, 2011
Bench: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Anoop V.Mohta
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How to prove that will was executed due to undue influence?

 Mr. Kapadia is, of course, correct in saying that generalized allegations of 'undue influence' sans particulars are of no use. They are to be pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision. (Bishnudeo Narain & Anr. v Seogeni Rai & Ors., MANU/SC/0059/1951 : AIR 1951 SC 280; Afsar Shaikh & Anr. v Soleman Bibi & Ors., MANU/SC/0001/1975 : AIR 1976 SC 163.) What we have in this case is a generalized allegation that because Dossa assisted Babubhai therefore it necessarily follows that he exerted undue influence in the making of the will. It has been well-settled for over a century that to constitute undue influence in testamentary law, the testator must be compelled to act against his wishes. It is not enough to show that there was mere influence. There must be undue influence, such that the testator did that which he did not intend or could not reasonably be expected to have intended. (Wingrove v Wingrove,1885 XI PD 81; Hall v Hall, 1868 I XXXI P&D Vict LR 481) Closeness in relations, providing assistance and, within a family, being supportive are not evidence of 'undue influence'. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Testamentary Suit No. 46 of 2008 in Testamentary Petition No. 105 of 2008
Decided On: 20.01.2015
 Yatin Gordhandas Dossa
Vs.
 Supriya Shailesh Patel
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:G.S. Patel, J.
Citation:2015 (5) Mh.L.J. 587
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Saturday, 25 February 2017

Whether valid will can be dislodged on ground that particular heir was excluded?

Every testamentary disposition disrupts the natural line of succession.1 Wills, by their very nature, usually result in the reduction or deprivation of the share of a natural heir; were it otherwise, no will would be necessary. The exclusion, therefore, of a particular heir or even of a large number of heirs is not ipso facto a suspicious circumstance sufficient to dislodge an otherwise valid will,2 or make it 'unnatural'.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Testamentary Suit No. 89 of 1999 in Testamentary Petition No. 1205 of 1998
Decided On: 05.02.2015
 Madhuri Pukharaj Baldota
Vs.
 Omkarlal Daulatram Banwat and Ors.
Coram:G.S. Patel, J.
Citation:2015 (4)Mh.L.J.327.
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Tuesday, 25 October 2016

Whether wife can be treated as maid servant considering statement made in will?

In the case of caveat by
respondent Malati, the Division Bench noted the citations in
the Will propounded by the appellant showing Malati to be
only a maid servant but on the basis of totality of facts and

circumstances it rightly came to the conclusion that a person
by merely making a contrary statement in the Will cannot
change a real relationship if it actually existed and hence at
least arguable case in favour of claim of Malati as regards her
relation with the testator has been established and hence she
deserves to be permitted to contest the probate proceeding.
The Court, at the same time made it clear that whether Malati
is really a lawful widow of the testator or not cannot be
conclusively adjudicated in the probate proceedings and
therefore, only a prima facie view was possible to decide
whether her caveat should be discharged or not.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.473 of 2009
Saroj Agarwalla (Dead) Thr. LR
Abhishek Agrawalla 
Versus
Yasheel Jain 
Dated:October 24, 2016
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Sunday, 14 August 2016

Whether interest in tenancy can be transferred by way of will?

The principal question that arises for consideration in these two appeals, preferred against the judgments of the High Court of Bombay, is whether tenancy rights under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') can be devised by a will. Ancillary thereto arises the question whether the words 'assign' and 'transfer' in Section 15 of the Act include 'bequest'. 
From a plain reading of Section 5(11)(c)(i) it is obvious that the legislative prescription is first to give protection to members of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death. The basis for such prescription seems to be that when a tenant is in occupation of premises the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him. Therefore, when the tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the family who were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs as well the tenancy was originally taken by the tenant. It is for this avowed object, the legislature has, irrespective of the fact whether such members are 'heirs' in the strict sense of the term or not, given them the first priority to be treated as tenants. It is only when such members of the family are not there, the 'heirs' will be entitled to be treated as tenants as decided, in default of agreement, by the court. In other words, all the heirs are liable to be excluded if any other member of the family was staying with the tenant at the time of his death. When Section 15, which prohibits sub-letting, assignment or transfer, is read in juxtaposition with Section 5(11)(c)(i)it is patently clear that the legislature intends that in case no member of the family as referred to in the first part of the clause is there the 'heir', who under the ordinary mode of succession would necessarily be a relation of the deceased, should be treated as a tenant of the premises subject, however, to the decision by the court in default of agreement. The words "as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court" as appearing in Section 5(11)(c)(i) are not without significance. These words in our view have been incorporated to meet a situation where there are more than one heirs. In such an eventuality the landlord may or may not agree to one or the other of them being recognised as a 'tenant'. In case of such disagreement the court has to decide who is to be treated as 'tenant'. Therefore, if 'heir' is to include a legatee of the will then the above-quoted words cannot be applied in case of a tenant who leaves behind more than one legatee for in that case the wishes of the testator can get supplanted, on the landlord's unwillingness to respect the same, by the ultimate decision of the court. In other words, in case of a testamentary disposition, where the wish or will of the deceased has got to be respected a decision by the court will not arise and that would necessarily mean that the words quoted above will be rendered nugatory. What we want to emphasise is it is not the heirship but the nature of claim that is determinative. In our considered view the legislature could not have intended to confer such a right on the testamentary heir. Otherwise, the right of the landlord to recover possession will stand excluded even though the original party (the tenant) with whom the landlord had contracted is dead. Besides, a statutory tenancy is personal to the tenant. In certain contingencies as contemplated in Section 5(11)(c)(i) certain heirs are unable to succeed to such a tenancy. To this extent, a departure is made from the general law.
15. The matter may be viewed from another angle also. If the word 'heir' is to be interpreted to include a 'legatee' even a stranger may have to be inducted as a tenant for there is no embargo upon a stranger being a legatee.
The contention of Mr Sorabjee that 'heir' under a will may be confined to only members of the family cannot be accepted for there is no scope for giving such a restrictive meaning to that word in the context in which it appears in the Act as earlier noticed, unlike in other Rent Acts.
16. Coming now to the meaning of the words 'assign' or 'transfer' as appearing in Section 15 we find that 'transfer' has been qualified by the words 'in any other manner' and we see no reason why it should be restricted to mean only transfer inter vivos. As has been rightly pointed out by the High Court in the impugned judgment the Transfer of Property Act limits its operation to transfer inter vivos and, therefore, the meaning of the word 'transfer' as contained therein cannot be brought in aid for the purpose of the Act. On the contrary, the wide amplitude of the words 'in any other manner' clearly envisages that the word 'transfer' has been used therein in a generic sense so as to include transfer by testament also.

Supreme Court of India
Vasant Pratap Pandit vs Dr Anant Trimbak Sabnis on 12 April, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994 SCC (3) 481, JT 1994 (3) 267
Author: M M.K.
Bench: Mukherjee M.K. (J)
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Friday, 31 May 2013

Whether court can pass order of injunction during pendency of probate proceeding?

 We may in this connection consider the powers & the jurisdiction of a probate court for safeguarding the interest of all concerned, & particularly to protect the properties which are the subject matter of the testamentary disposition. We have noticed already the provisions contained in Sections 247 & 269, Succession Act. Even where the exercise of the powers given to the probate court under Section 247, Succession Act, cannot obviate the difficulties or protect the properties, the powers of that court are wide enough to issue temporary orders restraining other persons from interfering with the properties which are the subject-matter of testamentary disposition. As indicated in Nirod Barani Debi v. Chamatkarini Debi', 19 C. W. N. 205 though for certain purpose, a probate proceeding is not a suit in which there is a property in dispute, as contemplated under Order XXXIX, Rule 1, Civil P. C., the only question in controversy being as to who is to represent the estate of a deceased person, & there being no question of title involved in those proceedings, the court of probate is not thereby wholly incompetent to grant a temporary injunction even in extreme cases; such order of injunction is to be issued only in aid of & in furtherance of the purpose for which a grant is made by a probate court. It is, therefore, open to the probate court not only to appoint an administrator pendente lite, but also to issue an order of injunction, temporary in character, pending the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. If such powers are exercised in probate cases by a probate court, there is no reasonable chance of any property being dissipated, pending the actual grant of a probate or the appointment of an administrator. As observed in 'Nirodbarani v. Chamatkarini (supra)'
"In cases where it is brought to the notice of the probate court that a party in possession is about to deal with the movable properties unless injunction is granted, appointment even of an administrator pendente lite may become fruitless. The Court under such circumstances, has ample authority, either under statutory powers or in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, to make a temporary order, so as not to defeat the ultimate order which the court is competent to make."
In our view, the proper application which ought to have been made in the present case was an application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite, & if necessary, to pray for the issue of a temporary injunction on the decree-holders concerned, pending the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. In a case of this description, the probate court will not grant the application as a matter of course. The Court of probate would appoint an administrator pendente lite in all cases where the necessity of the appointment is made out. 

Calcutta High Court
Atula Bala Dasi And Ors. vs Nirupama Devi And Anr. on 27 February, 1951
Equivalent citations: AIR 1951 Cal 561

Bench: R Mookerjee, Guha

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Monday, 25 February 2013

Whether court can restrain a person by injunction from making will?

No Court has the power to make an order, that too an interim order, restraining an individual from exercising his right to execute a Will and thereby regulate succession on his death. A direction to a party to maintain status quo in regard to a property does not therefore bar him from making a testamentary disposition in regard to such property. By making a Will, the testator neither changes title nor possession in regard to a property nor alters the nature or situation of the property nor removes or adds anything to the property. In short the testator, by making a Will does not alter the existing state of things in regard to the property. It follows therefore that making of a Will in regard to a property does not violate an order of status quo in regard to such property, and consequently, the testamentary disposition is neither void nor voidable.

Karnataka High Court
N. Ramaiah vs Nagaraj S. And Another on 13 March, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR 2001 Kant 395, ILR 2001 KAR 3466, 2001 (4) KarLJ 12

Bench: R Raveendran, B Sangalad

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