Showing posts with label venue of arbitration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label venue of arbitration. Show all posts

Friday, 4 July 2025

Supreme Court Clarifies Jurisdiction in Cross-Border Arbitration: The Disortho v. Meril Landmark Ruling

 The Supreme Court of India recently delivered a significant judgment in Disortho S.A.S. v. Meril Life Sciences Private Limited,2025 INSC 352,ARBITRATION PETITION NO.48 OF 2023,dated: MARCH 18, 2025that provides crucial clarity on determining jurisdiction in international commercial arbitration when contractual clauses conflict. This March 2025 ruling, authored by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, addresses one of the most complex issues in cross-border dispute resolution: which courts have the authority to appoint arbitrators when parties have chosen different laws and venues for their agreement.

The Contractual Dilemma

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Sunday, 29 October 2023

If several annexures/attachments of contract are prepared at different points of time, the latter in point of time would normally prevail over the earlier

 Another parallel principle that is equally relevant is that where the contract has several annexures/attachments, prepared at different points of time, unless a contrary intention is apparent, the latter in point of time would normally prevail over the earlier in point of time."{Para 32}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Application No. 250 of 2021

Decided On: 14.09.2023

Parekh Plastichem Distributors LLP Vs. Simplex Infrastructure Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Firdosh P. Pooniwalla, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/3701/2023,2023/BHC-OS/9920.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Written, stamped or typed additions in the contract when inconsistent with the printed terms, would normally prevail over the printed terms"

  That leaves me to consider one more argument advanced by the Applicant. It is the case of the Applicant that the purchase orders contained an Annexure, in which against the title "Other Terms", it is stated that jurisdiction would be subject to Mumbai High Court. It is the submission of the Applicant that, because of this Clause, this Court would have jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act to appoint an Arbitrator. In the context of this submission, the Applicant has referred to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. K. Abraham & Co. (Supra) and in particular to Paragraph No. 10 thereof, which reads as under:-


"10. If a contract consists of a printed form with cyclostyled amendments, typed additions and deletions and handwritten corrections, an endeavour shall be made to give effect to all the provisions. However, in the event of apparent or irreconcilable inconsistency, the following rules of construction will normally apply :


(i) The cyclostyled amendments will prevail over the printed terms;


(ii) The type-written additions will prevail over the printed terms and cyclostyled amendments;


(iii) Hand written corrections will prevail over the printed terms, cyclostyled amendments and typed written additions.


The above rules have evolved from the well known maxim of construction that "written, stamped or typed additions, when inconsistent with the printed terms, would normally prevail over the printed terms" and proceeds on the assumption that the printed form contained the original terms, and changes thereto were incorporated by the cyclostyled amendments, followed by changes by type-written additions and lastly the hand written additions. The logical explanation for such assumption is this: The printed form contains standardized terms to suit all contracts and situations. It is not drafted with reference to the special features of a specific contract. When such a standard form is used with reference to a specific contract, it becomes necessary to modify the standard/general terms by making additions/alterations/deletions, to provide for the special features of that contract. This is done either by way of an attachment of an annexure to the standard printed form, incorporating the changes, or by carrying out the required additions/alterations/deletions in the standard form itself. Such additions/alterations/deletions are done by typing/stamping/hand. We may refer to the following oft-quoted enunciation of the legal position by Lord Ellenborough in Robertson v. French MANU/ENRP/0600/1803 : [1803-13] All ER Rep.350 with reference to printed form of contract with hand- written additions :


....... that the words super added in writing are entitled, nevertheless, if there should be any reasonable doubt on the sense and meaning of the whole, to have a greater effect attributed to them than to the printed words, inasmuch as the written words are the immediate language and terms selected by the parties themselves for the expression of their meaning and the printed words are a general formula adapted equally to their case and that of all other contracting parties on similar occasions and subjects".


Another parallel principle that is equally relevant is that where the contract has several annexures/attachments, prepared at different points of time, unless a contrary intention is apparent, the latter in point of time would normally prevail over the earlier in point of time."{Para 32}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Application No. 250 of 2021

Decided On: 14.09.2023

Parekh Plastichem Distributors LLP Vs. Simplex Infrastructure Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Firdosh P. Pooniwalla, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/3701/2023,2023/BHC-OS/9920.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Sunday, 5 January 2020

Supreme Court: Venue of Arbitration will be seat of Arbitration in absence of contrary intention of parties

 It will thus be seen that wherever there is an express designation of a
“venue”, and no designation of any alternative place as the “seat”,
combined with a supranational body of rules governing the arbitration,
and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion is
that the stated venue is actually the juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding.{Para 63}

On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it may be concluded that
whenever there is the designation of a place of arbitration in an arbitration
clause as being the “venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the
expression “arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the
“venue” is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid
expression does not include just one or more individual or particular
hearing, but the arbitration proceedings as a whole, including the
making of an award at that place. This language has to be contrasted
with language such as “tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts
or the parties” where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things being equal,
that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of arbitral proceedings, but
only a convenient place of meeting. Further, the fact that the arbitral  proceedings “shall be held” at a particular venue would also indicate
that the parties intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular
place, signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral proceedings.
This, coupled with there being no other significant contrary
indicia that the stated venue is merely a “venue” and not the “seat” of
the arbitral proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a
clause designates a “seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an International
context, if a supranational body of rules is to govern the arbitration,
this would further be an indicia that “the venue”, so stated, would
be the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In a national context, this
would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996 as applying to the
“stated venue”, which then becomes the “seat” for the purposes of arbitration.{Para 84}

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9307 OF 2019

BGS SGS SOMA JV  Vs  NHPC LTD.

Dated:December 10, 2019
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Sunday, 24 February 2019

Whether Venue of arbitration can change intention of parties to vest jurisdiction in courts of specific region?

A perusal of the above rule shows that the place or venue "shall be India" i.e. any place in India could be the seat. However, for convenience the venue where arbitration was to be held was the office of the CAI. While the Rules and the By-laws of the CAI are applicable for the purpose of appointing of the tribunal, for holding of the proceedings and other procedural matters, the contract clearly expresses the intention of the parties to vest exclusive jurisdiction in Delhi Courts, for any issues arising out of the arbitration proceedings or the award. This clause brooks no ambiguity or vagueness. Thus, unlike a court jurisdiction clause, the parties clearly vested the Courts in Delhi with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. The venue cannot change the intention of the parties to vest the Courts in Delhi with exclusive jurisdiction.
Delhi High Court
Spentex Industries Ltd. vs Louis Dreyfus Commodities India ... on 22 February, 2019
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Wednesday, 25 July 2018

Whether venue of arbitration will be changed if evidence is recorded somewhere else?

Be that as it may, a question that also arises for consideration of this Court is whether recording of evidence of any witness at the place or venue outside the agreed venue would amount to change of venue under any part of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act or not. It is not in dispute that on 14th June 2016, this Court passed order in Arbitration Petition (L) No. 7 of 2016 based on the consent minutes of order tendered by the parties. In paragraph 3 of the consent minutes of order, it was provided that the said agreements shall be governed by the laws of India. The seat and venue of the arbitration shall be Mumbai. The Courts at Mumbai shall have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the arbitration. Based on Clause 3 of the consent minutes of the order dated 14th June 2016, it is strongly contended by the respondents that the recording of evidence in Singapore on Commission even if appointed by this Court would amount to change of venue of the arbitral proceedings which would be contrary to the venue agreed by both the parties in the consent minutes of order dated 14th June 2016.In my view, Mr. Kapadia, learned senior counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that as and when such evidence would be tendered by the petitioners of their witness whose evidence is recorded on commission, if allowed by this Court, before the learned arbitrator in Mumbai, at that stage, the evidence would be tendered in Mumbai and may be considered by the learned arbitrator. 


In my view, there would be thus no change of agreed venue even if evidence of witness is recorded on commission not in Mumbai but in Singapore. A commission if appointed, for recording evidence of witness of the petitioners would be an agent of the Court for the purpose of recording of evidence in Singapore which process would not change the agreed venue. If the argument of the learned senior counsel for the respondents that recording of evidence on commission in Singapore would amount to change the venue without consent of the parties is accepted, the arbitral tribunal will not be able to meet at any place though considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property. Acceptance of such argument would be in clear violation of Section 20 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition No. 332 of 2018

Decided On: 08.06.2018

Stemcor (S.E.A.) Pte Limited Vs. Mideast Integrated Steels Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.D. Dhanuka, J.

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Tuesday, 19 December 2017

Whether parties can exclude jurisdiction of any court by arbitration agreement?

Supreme Court in the case of Indus Mobile has indeed laid down as a matter of law that any agreement between the parties as to the seat of arbitration is in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. This exclusive jurisdiction cause would then oust the jurisdiction of any other court having concurrent jurisdiction. Further, such exclusive jurisdiction clause would forbid Section 42 having any play for the purpose of determination of jurisdiction of the Court. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Associated Contractors MANU/SC/0793/2014 : (2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 32, where the agreement between the parties restricted jurisdiction to only one particular court out of courts having concurrent jurisdiction, that court alone would have jurisdiction, since neither Section 31(4) nor Section 42 contains a non obstante clause wiping out a contrary agreement between the parties. In other words, if there is a contrary agreement between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on one particular court, it is that court and that court alone which will entertain any challenge to an arbitral award. There is no difficulty thus far. The difficulty arises when we come to consider whether or not there is indeed a seat of arbitration fixed or agreed between the parties in the present case. It is important to note that a seat of arbitration, as observed by the Supreme Court in case of Indus Mobile, is a place chosen by or on behalf of the parties; it is designated either in the arbitration agreement or in the terms of the reference or reflected in the minutes of proceedings or in some other way as "place or seat of arbitration". As far as the agreement between the parties in the present case is concerned, there is indeed no place of arbitration chosen. If at all, the agreement points to a seat outside Mumbai inasmuch as the jurisdiction to arbitrate, under the agreement, is conferred on the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation for the cities of Kalyan & Dombivli, whose seat is indisputably beyond the city of Mumbai. Mr. Chinoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, however, submits that in the face of this agreement, when this Court was approached under Section 11 of the Act, an independent arbitrator was chosen. It is submitted that this Arbitrator held the proceedings of the reference in Mumbai, with the concurrence of the parties and also declared his award in Mumbai. Learned Counsel submits that there being nothing contrary either in the agreement or in the minutes of proceedings or otherwise, the very fact that the meetings in the arbitration reference were held, and the award was made, in Mumbai, fixes the seat of arbitration in Mumbai. I am afraid that is not a correct way of ascertaining the seat of arbitration. The seat of arbitration, in the context of fixation of jurisdiction of the curial Court, is not the same as the venue where the arbitral forum held its sittings or the place where it made its award. In fact, there is a well known distinction between the venue of arbitration and seat of arbitration. Even if the parties by their contract designate any place as the seat of arbitration, the arbitral forum is free to hold sittings at any place other than the seat of arbitration. For that matter, all sittings can be held and even an award can be made, at a location outside the place of seat of arbitration. In the face of this distinction, the simple fact of conduct of arbitration reference or making of an award at a particular place, in this case, Mumbai, is neither here nor there. In the present case, the seat of arbitration having not been designated either in the contract between the parties or in the terms of the reference or in the minutes of proceedings or otherwise, the city of Mumbai cannot be termed as the seat of arbitration, going by the sheer conduct of meetings in the reference there. Even there, as a matter of fact, it is not disputed that some of the meetings in the arbitration references were actually held in Thane, within the jurisdiction of the District Court at Thane, though even that fact, on the reasoning discussed above, is hardly relevant.

5. In the premises, the combined effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Indus Mobile and Associated Contractors (supra), does not imply ouster of jurisdiction of the District Court at Thane. As noted above, it is not in dispute that the cause of action did arise in Thane and application/s under Part-I was/were infact made before the Court at Thane prior to the present arbitration petitions. The District Court at Thane, accordingly, has curial jurisdiction over the award within the meaning of Section 42 read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. It is the only Court to exercise jurisdiction in any challenge to the arbitral award, and not this Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition No. 372 of 2016, Notice of Motion (L) No. 1302 of 2016, Miscellaneous Application No. 193 of 2016 and Arbitration Petition No. 373 of 2016

Decided On: 05.07.2017

 Municipal Corporation for the city of Kalyan & Dombivli
Vs. Rudranee Infrastructure Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Gupte, J.
Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 753
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