Showing posts with label Dowry prohibition Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dowry prohibition Act. Show all posts

Monday, 23 November 2020

Whether there is the limitation for claiming property by wife entrusted to husband?

 The question involved in the above reference is that,

when there is a change in circumstances between the spouses,

especially when there is a dissolution of marriage and substantial

time had elapsed, whether the trust created between them would

be extinguished.

6. It is settled law when the wife entrusts with the husband any property belonging to her, a trust is created and the husband is bound to return the same to his wife. If the same is not returned, the wife has a right to demand the same by filing a suit or as in the present case, file an application before the Family Court or take other necessary steps under the relevant statutes in force. When S.10 of the Limitation Act indicates that there is no limitation for initiating any such action, in the absence of any other statute providing for a limitation, the trustee cannot take a contention that he shall not return the trust property on account of any period of limitation. The question posed is, when the relationship between the parties gets deranged and results in divorce, whether the trust gets extinguished and the divorced wife would be entitled to invoke S.10 of the Limitation Act and file a suit at her will and pleasure at any point in time. 

9. As per S.6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, when a

statutory trust is created in respect of dowry, the principle

aforestated shall apply.

10. In the case of ornaments which are given in the form of

dowry, definitely, a statutory trust is created. Even otherwise, if

the ornaments owned by the wife do not form part of the dowry

and if there is an entrustment of gold ornaments by the wife to

the husband or his parents, a trust gets created, in which event,

the trustee or trustees, as the case may be, are liable to return

the same and there is no limitation for claiming the same by the

wife/divorced wife.

In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are in full

agreement with the law laid down in Chacko's case (supra) and

we uphold the view expressed in Bindu K.P.'s case (supra). 


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE

 MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS

and

 MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.


Mat.Appeal.No.358 OF 2019


SHEELA.K.K., Vs  N.G.SURESH,


Author: Shaffique, J.

Dated:  24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2020

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Thursday, 19 December 2019

Supreme Court: Seeking Financial Assistance Can Constitute Demand For Dowry

 Mr. Raval relied on decision of this Court in the case of Appasaheb &
Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721, in this judgment it was
observed:
“11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the
word “dowry” any property or valuable security
should be given or agreed to be given either directly
or indirectly at or before or any time after the
marriage and in connection with the marriage of the
said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of
property or valuable security must have some
connection with the marriage of the parties and a
correlation between the giving or taking of property
or valuable security with the marriage of the parties
is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be
strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well-known
social custom or practice in India. It is well-settled
principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is

passed with reference to a particular trade, business
or transaction and words are used which everybody
conversant with that trade, business or transaction
knows or understands to have a particular meaning
in it, then the words are to be construed as having
that particular meaning.(See Union of India v.
Garware Nylons Ltd. (1996) 10 SCC 413 and
Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. v. Union of India
(1997) 2 SCC 664.) A demand for money on account
of some financial stringency or for meeting some
urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure
cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said
word is normally understood. The evidence adduced
by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any
demand for “dowry” as defined in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants
as what was allegedly asked for was some money
for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing
manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section
304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established,
the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained.”
7. But the view of the Court reflected in that judgment that seeking
financial assistance would not per se constitute demand for dowry has been
rejected by a later judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the
case of Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 477. Upon
considering the case of Appasaheb (supra) and certain other authorities, it
was held in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra):-
“20. Given that the statute with which we are
dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and commonsense
interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to
be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment

in Appasaheb case followed by the judgment of Vipin
Jaiswal do not state the law correctly. We, therefore,
declare that any money or property or valuable
security demanded by any of the persons mentioned
in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or
before or at any time after the marriage which is
reasonably connected to the death of a married
woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in
relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given
case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”
(Non-Reportable)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1850 OF 2010

Jatinder Kumar  Vs.  State of Haryana 

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Dated:Dated: December 17, 2019
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Saturday, 17 August 2019

Leading Judgment on dowry death

 In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [MANU/SC/0296/2000 : (2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 SCC (Cri.) 935] where this Court considered the term "soon before". The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)

15. ... 'Soon before' is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term 'soon before' is not synonymous with the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression 'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon before death' if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.

Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.

22. In another recent judgment in Sher Singh v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0022/2015 : 2015 (1) SCALE 250, this Court said:

We are aware that the word 'soon' finds place in Section 304B; but we would prefer to interpret its use not in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily indicating that the demand for dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but should be the continuing cause for the death Under Section 304B or the suicide Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Once the presence of these concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution, even by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is replaced by an assumption of guilt of the accused, thereupon transferring the heavy burden of proof upon him and requiring him to produce evidence dislodging his guilt, beyond reasonable doubt. (at page 262)

23. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman Under Section 304B.

24. At this stage, it is important to notice a recent judgment of this Court in Dinesh v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0364/2014 : 2014 (5) SCALE 641 in which the law was stated thus:

The expression "soon before" is a relative term as held by this Court, which is required to be considered under the specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time of allotment. It can be said that the term "soon before" is synonyms with the term "immediately before". The determination of the period which can come within term "soon before" is left to be determined by courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (at page 646)

25. We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. "Soon before" is not synonymous with "immediately before".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2321 of 2009

Decided On: 26.02.2015

 Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur, Rohinton Fali Nariman and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.


Citation: AIR 2015 SC 1359
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Wednesday, 3 July 2019

Whether prosecution for offence U/S 498A of IPC can be quashed if complaint was filed long after divorce?

 We find much substance in the submission made by Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants-accused. Even in the FIR dated 18.8.2015, the complainant-wife has stated that her divorce had taken place about four years back. It is not possible to accept the contention made by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of complainant-wife that she made the statement in ignorance of Sharia law. She is a Headmistress and must be credited with due knowledge of her meritorious status. In view of her own averment that she was divorced four years ago, we are of the view that the prosecution is not sustainable Under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

6. Section 498A1 of the Indian Penal Code opens with the words " Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman...." Therefore, where the complainant approaches with a case that there has been a divorce long back i.e. four years ago before filing of the FIR, Section 498A of Indian Penal Code in terms would not be attracted. We accordingly consider it appropriate to quash the prosecution against all the Accused persons Under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Crl. A. No. 1048 of 2018 

Decided On: 21.08.2018

 Mohammad Miyan  Vs.  The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.


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Tuesday, 5 March 2019

Whether a person can be added as an accused U/S 319 of CRPC for any offence?

Under Section 319 Cr.P.C., a person can be added as an
accused invoking the provisions not only for the same offence for
which the accused is tried but for “any offence”; but that offence
shall be such that in respect of which all the accused could be
tried together. It is to be seen whether the appellants could be
summoned for the offence under Section 498A IPC and under
Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The statement of PW-
1 both in the complaint and in his evidence before the court is
very general stating that he had given sufficient dowry to Shilpa
according to his status and that the groom side were not satisfied
with the dowry and that they used to demand dowry each and
every time. Insofar as the demand of dowry and the dowry

harassment, there are no particulars given as to the time of
demand and what was the nature of demand. The averments in
the complaint and the evidence is vague and no specific demand
is attributed to any of the appellants. In such circumstances,
there is no justification for summoning the appellants even under
Section 498A IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act. It is also pertinent to point out that upon
completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer felt that no
offence under Sections 498A, 304-B IPC and under Sections 3
and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is made out. Charge sheet
was filed for the offence punishable only under Section 302 IPC
against Chanchal @ Babita. As held in the Constitution Bench
judgment in Hardeep Singh, for summoning an accused under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. it requires much stronger evidence than
mere probability of his complicity which is lacking in the present
case. The trial court and the High Court, in our considered view,
has not examined the matter in the light of the well-settled
principles and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 395 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 4626 of 2017)

SUNIL KUMAR GUPTA Vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:February 27, 2019
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Thursday, 4 May 2017

How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in case of misappropriation of streedhan property?

When the legislature in its wisdom has given such
a right by amending Section 181 (4) of the Code in the year 1978 the
judicial authority cannot deprive a citizen of India such advantage
acquired by law on the ground that it may be misused.
Section 181(4) of the Code runs thus:
“Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of
trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is
the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” (emphasis supplied
by me)
This Court wants to emphasize on the word ‘or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person’. It is true that as per
claim of the de facto complainant the dowry was paid at Siliguri and as perFIR when the victim opposite party was driven out from her matrimonial
abode she claimed her ‘Stridhan’ articles including her certificates but
those were not given to her and as such this Court is satisfied that there is
prima facie case under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is the admitted position that at present this opposite party wife is
residing at her father’s house at Lilua, Howrah. Thus, if the articles are to
be returned after the conclusion of the trial the venue of such return must
be either the court at Howrah or the residence of the de facto complainant,
the victim of this case. Thus, this Court is satisfied that interest of justice
demands that in this scenario the protection must be given to the deserted
lady by applying Section 181 (4) of the Code. The legislature in its wisdom
amended that sub-section and if such advantage has been given to the wife
or the de facto complainant why should the court will take out that
advantage from her mouth. Her entitlement as per law should not be taken
out in the disguise that such sub-section may be used just to oppress her
counterpart.
Thus, in view of the discussion so long made this court is satisfied
that there is enough of material to go for trial even against the petitioners.
This court is also satisfied that in view of Section 181 (4) of the Cr.P.C, the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah has perfect jurisdiction over the case.Thus, this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 is answered in the negative and dismissed accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
Present :  Justice Indrajit Chatterjee
C.R.R. 1529 of 2014
Ashok Kumar Marda & Ors.
V
State of West Bengal & Anr.

Judgment on : 06.10.2016.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 73

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Sunday, 13 November 2016

When offence under dowry prohibition Act is not made out?


Dowry Prohibition Act
Section-6 - Must be return - Within three months – Who received or have
dominion over it.
There are no specific allegations that the dowry articles were entrusted
to the accused persons (in laws except husband) and that they have not returned
the dowry amount and the articles. Equally, there are no allegations that those
dowry articles were kept in the house of the accused persons. They were
separately living away from the couple in other district.
If the dowry amount or articles of married woman was placed in the
custody of his husband or in-laws, they would be deemed to be trustees of the
same. The person receiving dowry articles or the person who is dominion over
the same, as per Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, is bound to return the
same within three months after the date of marriage to the woman in
connection with whose marriage it is given. If he does not do so, he will be
guilty of a dowry offence under this Section. The section further lays down that
even after his conviction he must return the dowry to the woman within the
time stipulated in the order.
Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about the time of
wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that such a property was
thereby entrusted and put under the dominion of the parents-in- law of the bride
or other close relations so as to attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act. As noticed earlier, after marriage, the husband and wife 
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of „stridhana
articles‟ given to the bride, one has to take into consideration the common
practice that these articles are sent along with the bride to her matrimonial
house. It is a matter of common knowledge that these articles are kept by the
woman in connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her
in her matrimonial house when the accused persons have been residing
separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the dowry was given to them
and that they were duty bound to return the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and
circumstances of the case and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the
complaint do not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act against the accused persons and there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding against them
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
Versus
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
Dated;January 19, 2016

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Saturday, 14 May 2016

When prosecution for criminal misappropriation of stridhan is not tenable against IN-LAWS?

Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about
the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that
such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion
of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to
attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As
noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of
‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into
consideration the common practice that these articles are sent
along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of
common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in
connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in
her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been
residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the
dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return
the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case
and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do
not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that
appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the
offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding
under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the
criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the
dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view,
continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is
not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
Versus
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC309
Dated;January 19, 2016


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Wednesday, 3 February 2016

Whether amount spent by parents of bride towards clothes and marriage expenses will fall within term 'Dowry'?

Moreover though evidence on record proves that
some amount was spent by parents of Anita towards purchase of
clothes and marriage expenses, said expenses in view of Section
Section (3) (2) (b) of the Dowry Prohibition Act do not fall within
term “dowry”. As per said proviso, the presents that are made
by and on behalf of the bride or any person related to bride,
which are of customary nature and value thereof is not
excessive, having regard to the financial status of the person by
whom or on whose behalf presents are given do not fall within
the prohibited demand of “dowry”. Thus, the customary presents, the value of which is not excessive, they do not fall within the definition of term “dowry”.
Here in the case the amount which is alleged to be spent by
P.W.1 for marriage of his daughter Anita, cannot be called as of
excessive nature, having regard to the financial status of the
parties. As the said amount is spent by him for purchase of
clothes of Anita and her husband, then it has to be held that
those presents are of customary nature. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.689 OF 1993
The State of Maharashtra
 V/s.
Anil Narayan Pawar, 
CORAM : SMT. V. K. TAHILRAMANI &
 DR. SHALINI PHANSALKAR-JOSHI, JJ.
DATE : 2nd JULY, 2015.
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)4597
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Wednesday, 20 January 2016

When prosecution against relatives of Husband can be quashed under Dowry prohibition Act?

Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about
the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that
such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion
of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to
attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As
noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of
‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into
consideration the common practice that these articles are sent
along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of
common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in
connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in
her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been
residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the
dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return
the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case
and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do
not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that
appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the
offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding
under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the
criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the
dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view,
continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is
not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
V
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
Dated;January 19, 2016
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Monday, 4 January 2016

Whether Husband can seek divorce against wife if wife had filed false case against husband and his family members?

In my view, the order passed by the lower appellate Court
is totally erroneous and contrary to law laid down by the Supreme
Court and this Court holding that if the wife had filed a false case
against the husband and his family members in which the appellant
husband and his family members are acquitted, it amounted to cruelty
and the husband on the said ground was entitled to seek divorce. The
impugned order passed by the lower appellate Court thus deserves to
be set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 634 OF 2013

Shri Mangesh Balkrushna Bhoir  Vs Sau. Leena Mangesh Bhoir 

 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON : 23rd DECEMBER, 2015.
Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)364 Bom

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Sunday, 26 July 2015

Whether money given at the time of engagement amounts to dowry?

In my humble opinion, the bare reading of
Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 indicates
that if parties have agreed to enter into the marriage
on the future date, they shall be known as “parties to
a marriage” for the reason that any item or valuable
security given or agreed to be given either before the
marriage or at the time of marriage or after the
marriage shall be “dowry”.
It is nowhere denied by the defendant either in
this petition or in the application moved under Order
7 Rule 11 CPC that Rs. 2 lakhs were not given to him
by way of bank draft by the plaintiff/respondent,
herein to purchase the car so that car may be used by
them after the marriage. It is also not denied that
marriage was fixed between the parties to be
solemnized on 20.11.2003. Therefore, in my humble
opinion, parties to the plaint are parties to a marriage. 9
Since, as per the contents of the plaint, Rs. 2
lakhs were given by one of the parties to the marriage
i.e. the plaintiff in favour of another party to the
marriage i.e. defendant, therefore, for the recovery of
the amount, suit under Section 7, Explanation (c) of
the Family Courts Act is very well maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
WRIT PETITION (M/S) No. 1277 of 2005

Uma Shanker Sharma  Vs  Principal Judge, Family Court, Rudrapur


Hon’ble Alok Singh, J. R
Citation; AIR 2015(NOC) 855 UTR

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Tuesday, 7 July 2015

How to ascertain jurisdiction of court in offence under S 498A and Dowry prohibition Act?

 The petitioner No.1 has also challenged issuance of
process on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Court
of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur contending that the
allegations, taken at their face value, would show that all the acts
necessary to prosecute the offences of cruelty and demand of
dowry had taken place at Bhopal and not at Nagpur. Learned
counsel for the respondent No.2, however, disagrees. Placing his
reliance upon the case of Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of
Bihar and another, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1674, he submits
that when the allegations are read in their entirety, an inference
would arise that the offences of cruelty as well as illegal demand of
dowry have been continuously committed not only at Bhopal, but
also at Nagpur.
16. Upon perusal of the complaint and also the depositions
of two witnesses, I find that there is a substance in the argument of
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 and no merit in the
argument of the petitioner No.1. An amount of Rs.25,000/,
which
was a part of demand of dowry, has been alleged to be paid at

Nagpur and, therefore, demand of dowry can be, prima facie, seen
to have been partly fulfilled at Nagpur. The respondent No.2 had
been compelled to leave her matrimonial house, as alleged by her,
because of afore stated cruel treatment and live at her parental
house at Nagpur. This act has been seen in the case of Sunita
Kumari as an act which made the offence of cruelty as continuing
one. Besides, there are other allegations of continuation of cruelty
even at Nagpur. Therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that
Nagpur Court has lost its territorial jurisdiction over the matter.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION No.272 OF 2014
 Shri Shridhar Bandaru,
V
State of Maharashtra,


CORAM: S.B. SHUKRE, J.
DATE : 19 th JANUARY, 2015 .
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(CRI)2161
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Tuesday, 17 February 2015

Whether bride's parents can be prosecuted for giving of dowry on the basis of statement made in complaint?


Q: When giving or taking dowry is an offence under The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, can
the (complainant’s parents) bride’s parents be prosecuted basing on the statement made in the
complaint or their161 Cr.P.C. statements?
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Sunday, 15 February 2015

Whether accused can be acquitted on ground that no demand for dowry was made before marriage?



The accused have taken the defense that the PWs. have also
stated in their statements that no demand for dowry was
made before marriage and that the marriage was concluded
by the consent of the two parties.
They also took the
defense that no prior police complaint of dowry demand was
made by the family of the deceased. However, in light of the
decision of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nikku
Ram & Ors. (supra) and the social evil of dowry that is
prevalent in the Indian society, this defense does not hold
water. The demand for dowry can be made at any time and
not necessarily before marriage.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2146 OF 2009
BHIM SINGH & ANR.

V
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

Dated;February 11, 2015
Read original judgment here; click here
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.:
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Sunday, 8 April 2012

Meaning of word "Dowry" as appearing in dowry Prohibition act

Demand of valueables should be in connection with marriage to amount to dowry. Customary gifts are not covered under the term dowry.
Supreme Court of India
Ashok Kumar vs State Of Haryana on 8 July, 2010

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Swatanter Kumar
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1489 OF 2004

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