Supreme Court: High Courts Cannot Refuse To Follow SC Judgment On Ground Of Review/Reference Pending Against It; In Case Of Conflicting Judgments, Follow Earlier One

 We are seeing before us judgments and orders by High Courts not deciding cases on the ground that the leading judgment of this Court on this subject is either referred to a larger Bench or a review petition relating thereto is pending. We have also come across examples of High Courts refusing deference to judgments of this Court on the score that a later Coordinate Bench has doubted its correctness. In this regard, we lay down the position in law. We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open, unless specifically directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgment by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Limited v. Pranay Sethi,   MANU/SC/1366/2017 : (2017) 16 SCC 6805. The High Courts, of course, will do so with careful regard to the facts and circumstances of the case before it. {Para 35}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5707 of 2023

Decided On: 06.09.2023

Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. Vs. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.

Author: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Citation: 2023 INSC 804, MANU/SC/0988/2023.

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Whether Motor accident claim Tribunal has jurisdiction to review its own order?

I find that Sections 151 to 153 would not permit the Court to amend it's own order/judgment or cure any defect which would affect the merits of the case.

30. In view of the above, as there is a specific absence of a statutory provision providing for a review and since the power of review under Section 114 and Order XLVII have been excluded under Rules 275 and 276 defining the procedure and powers of the Tribunal, a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot review its judgment on its merits. To make it more clear, correcting a simple error or mistake or arithmetical calculations would be permitted under Sections 151/152/153. However, a mistake as like the one which has occurred in paragraph 22 of the judgment of the Tribunal in the case in hand, which would alter the decision of the Tribunal and which would require a re-argument and re-appreciation of evidence, would not be permissible.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 7589 of 2019

Decided On: 03.08.2019

 Meena and Ors. Vs.  The Manager, Bajaj Alliainz General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2276/2019.

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Whether successive applications for review of order is permissible?

 In law, there is no bar in filing applications for review successively if the same are otherwise maintainable in law. {Para 8}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7518-7519 of 2004.

Decided On: 22.11.2004

Jaya Chandra Mohapatra  Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Rayagada

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and S.B. Sinha, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

 Citation : (2005 )9SCC 123,MANU/SC/0992/2004

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What the court can not do while deciding review application?

 The provision of review is not to scrutinize the correctness of

the decision rendered rather to correct the error, if any,

which is visible on the face of the order / record without

going into as to whether there is a possibility of another

opinion different from the one expressed. {Para 15}

 NonReportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

PANCHAM LAL PANDEY Vs NEERAJ KUMAR MISHRA & ORS.

Author; PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Dated; February 15, 2023.

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What is distinction between Procedural review and substantive review?

We are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji MANU/SC/0433/1970 : AIR1970SC1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act. While the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Section 11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and not in Sub-section (3) of Section 11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held that no review lies on merits unless a status specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2355 of 1979

Decided On: 12.12.1980

 Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. and A.P. Sen, J.

Citation: 1980 (supp) SCC 420,MANU/SC/0308/1980

Author:A.P. Sen, J.

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Whether application for recall of order for procedural review is maintainable U/S 362 of CRPC?

This application for recall of the order was maintainable as it was an application seeking a procedural review, and not a substantive review to which Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would be attracted. [Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1980 (supp) SCC 420]. On the aspect of the difference between recall and review and when an order of recall can be passed reference can be made to Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 396.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Coram: SANJIV KHANNA; BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ. 

S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021;

 GANESH PATEL Vs UMAKANT RAJORIA

Dated: MARCH 07, 2022

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Whether court can review its own order passed in proceeding U/S 125 of CRPC?

  At the outset, this Court finds it pertinent to state that the embargo contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C., which prohibits the Court from altering or reviewing its judgement or final order disposing of the case, is inapplicable to an Order of maintenance passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Saving Clause contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. entails that the rigour of the provision is relaxed in two conditions, i.e. save as otherwise provided by (i) the Code of Criminal Procedure or (ii) any other law for the time being in force.

{Para 4}

5. In Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor and Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 172, the Supreme Court had observed that the legislature was aware that there were situations where altering or reviewing of criminal court judgement were contemplated in the Code itself or any other law for the time being in force. Noting that Section 125 Cr.P.C. was a social justice legislation, the Supreme Court held that a closer look at Section 125 Cr.P.C. itself indicated that the Court after passing judgment or final order in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. did not become functus officio, and that the Section itself contains express provisions wherein an Order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. could be cancelled or altered, and that this was noticeable from Sections 125(1), 125(5) and 127 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the legislative scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. clearly enumerates circumstances and incidents provided in the Code where the Court passing a judgement or final order disposing of the case can alter or review the same. The embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus, relaxed in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  IN THE MATTER OF:

  CRL. REV. P. 549/2018

 URVASHI AGGARWAL Vs  INDERPAUL AGGARWAL

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Whether the newly engaged Advocate of the party can argue on the points not argued or given up by the previous Advocate of the party or rejected by the court?

 A litigant has a right to be heard by a court. He has a right to

engage a lawyer, who will be heard on that party’s behalf. But no party has the right to keep changing lawyers and then having the new lawyers attempt to argue points not raised, given up or rejected. Certainly no lawyer is entitled to say to a court, “I am entitled to urge anything and everything, even points my client’s previous lawyer did not argue, or may have given up or which you negatived. I am entitled to do all this because I am now newly engaged and therefore it matters not a whit what my client’s previous lawyer, no matter how illustrious

or brilliant, said or did.” There is no such right. {Para 31}

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

REVIEW PETITION (L) NO. 5868 OF 2021

IN

COMM ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 434 OF 2021

Priyanka Communications (India) Pvt Ltd Vs Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd.

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Whether the party can file a review application on the ground that the court has not taken into consideration his written submission if his counsel has not relied on it?

 But before they filed this Review Petition, the Agarwals filed

an appeal. By the time of the Appeals, the Agarwals had changed

lawyers. They had now engaged M/s Pan India Legal Services LLP. Counsel instructed by Pan India Legal Services LLP in the appeal court sought to contend that I had failed to consider the Agarwals’ written submissions (filed at a much earlier date, on 15th December 2020) in my order of 12th March 2021. The Appeal Court disposed of the appeal by granting the Agarwals liberty to file a review.

9. It is actually correct that in my order of 12th March 2021 I did

not consider the Agarwals’ written submissions. I do not do so

because nobody asked me to. Nobody even told me they had been

filed. Nobody briefed for the Agarwals made any arguments on the written submissions. 

18. More disturbing is the implicit suggestion that Counsel’s

arguments are almost entirely worthless; and, by necessary extension, that Counsel are entirely redundant. If the attorney has filed something on record, Counsel must argue it, no matter how trifling or irrelevant. Further, it is then the job of the Court to engage in some sort of forensic archaeological excavation of these often mountainous records, and go through them document by document and page by page, to ferret out some sort of case in favour of a Review Petitioner, even if counsel have never argued every single line of what is pleaded.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

REVIEW PETITION (L) NO. 5868 OF 2021

IN

COMM ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 434 OF 2021

Priyanka Communications (India) Pvt Ltd Vs Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd.

CORAM : G.S.Patel, J.

DATED : 4th August 2021

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Questions and answers on law Part 25

 

Q 1:-  Whether application for review of order passed in review application is maintainable?

Ans: No as per O 47 R 9 of CPC.

Rule 9 Order XLVII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 "Bar of certain application"

No application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained.

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Whether court can review the consent order on the ground that it was entered when the President rule was in force in the state?

  The contention as urged on behalf of the State that an approval of the elected Government was required to be taken to the consent terms when the consent terms were executed on 10 December 2019 and filed before the Court on 12 December 2019 also cannot be accepted. There is no provision in the Constitution being pointed out on behalf of the State, which would require any ratification by the elected Government, of a decision taken by the President acting through the Governor during the subsistence of the President's Rule, after the President's rule is revoked. Such contention of Mr. Anturkar if accepted would do violence to the Constitutional scheme, as discussed above, and result into a chaotic situation bringing about uncertainty in the affairs of the State. This was never the intention of the Constitution makers in  having provisions of Article 356(1) of the Constitution and providing for conferring of powers on the Governor by the President of India during the President's rule. The Constitutional scheme does not make any provision for such ratification. Thus, Mr.Anturkar's contention that an approval of the appropriate Government was not taken when the consent terms were filed before this Court, so as to have a continuous authorization, deserves to be rejected.

{Para 54}

Bombay High Court

Manaj Tollway Private Limited vs The State Of Maharashtra ... on 5 March, 2021

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Whether Education officer can review his own order?

 We

find that the petitions deserve to be allowed on short

ground that by the impugned order, Respondent

Education Officer has set aside the order passed by the

earlier Education Officer. As such, the impugned order

revokes the approval granted by the earlier order passed

by the predecessor in the office of the Respondent

Education Officer. By now, it is settled principle of law

that unless the power of review is specifically or by

necessary implication provided, the authority cannot

review its own order. No doubt, if an order is obtained by

exercising fraud, it would stand vitiated. However, it is

not the case of the Respondent- Education Officer that

Petitioners have obtained their initial orders by

fraudulent means. If the earlier Education Officer had

granted approval to the Petitioners' appointment, may be

erroneously, the same cannot be made a ground to recall

the same and pass contrary order, unless a case of fraud,

misrepresentation or suppression is made out.

Particularly when most of the Petitioners have already

put in their services for 11 years, the impugned orders

would amount to penalising them for no fault on their

part.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.12234 OF 2016

Vikrant Prataprao Gaikwad  Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : S. S. SHINDE,

V. G. BISHT, JJ

DATE : 28th February 2020

JUDGMENT :- (S. S. SHINDE, J.)

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 316

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What remedies are available to the defendant if court passes an exparte decree against him?

 The proviso appended to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure postulates that when an ex parte decree has been passed against some of the defendants and it is necessary to set aside the entire decree, the Court is not powerless to do so. If an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was maintainable at the instance of the appellants, we fail to understand as to why a separate suit was required to be filed. When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant may have more than one remedies. He may file a suit contending that the decree was obtained fraudulently. He may file an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree. He may prefer an appeal from the ex parte judgment and decree. In a given case, he may also file a review application.

13. In Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Arcbana Kumar and Anr. MANU/SC/1079/2004 : AIR2005SC626 , this Court held:

26. When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant (apart from filing a review petition and a suit for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud) has two clear options, one, to file an appeal and another to file an application for setting aside the order in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. He can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously but in the event the appeal is dismissed as a result whereof the ex parte decree passed by the trial court merges with the order passed by the appellate court, having regard to Explanation appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 would not be maintainable. However, Explanation I appended to the said provision does not suggest that the converse is also true.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7316 of 2008 

Decided On: 16.12.2008

 Mahesh Yadav and Ors. Vs.  Rajeshwar Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/8463/2008,AIR 2009 SC 1064

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What remedy is available against consent decree to an aggrieved third party?

Still there could be one more situation, where the third party who was not the party to suit or the party to the compromise but had an interest in the subject matter of the compromise, is aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit. So what remedy would be available to him? It cannot be gainsaid that the decree based on the compromise between the parties under Order XXIII, Rule 3, if remains unchallenged would be a "consent decree" binding to the parties to suit. However, when the person aggrieved is third party who was neither a party to the suit nor a party to the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed by the Court in the suit, would not be bound by such decree. Such a decree could not be said to be a "consent decree" qua such third party, and therefore, neither the bar contained in Section 96(3) nor the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII would be application to him. Such an aggrieved party, with the leave of the Court can always file an appeal under Section 96(1) against the decree passed by the Court on the basis of the compromise, and can contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not have been recorded by the Court in view of Rule 1A(2) of Order XLIII of CPC. When the third party is vitally and adversely affected by the decree passed by the Court under Order XXIII, Rule 3 on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties to the suit on the subject matter or otherwise of the suit, he can certainly, with the leave of the appellate Court, prefer an appeal and can contest such a decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3. One of the grounds to contest the decree could be that such a compromise should or should not have been recorded by the Court.

31. At this juncture, the word "party" used in Sub-rule (1) and the word "appellant" used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1A of Order XLIII assume importance. The Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1A relates to the order passed against the 'party' to the suit, and the appeal filed by 'such party', whereas the Sub-Rule (2) of the said Rule 1A relates to the appeal filed by the 'appellant'. Such appellant may or may not be a party to the suit. The Sub-rule (2) is not confined to the appeal filed by the "party" to the suit. Hence, the third party, in the appeal against the decree passed in the suit under Rule 3 of Order XXIII can also contest such decree on the ground that such a compromise should not have been recorded.

32. In the opinion of the Court, such an aggrieved third party would also have an option to file an application for Review of the order recording the compromise or for Review of the decree based on the compromise between the parties to the suit, under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC, if the conditions precedent mentioned therein are satisfied. It has been held by the Supreme Court in case of Board of Control for Cricket, India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club, reported in MANU/SC/0019/2005 : AIR 2005 SC 592, that an application for Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence, or when there exists an error apparent on the face of record but also if the same is necessary on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order XLVII, Rule 1 are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or by an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking he doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit", which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no one. Therefore, it any person considers himself aggrieved by the order or decree passed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 may for sufficient reason apply for review of such decree or order under Order XLVII, Rule 1, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. When an application for review is granted, the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the rehearing as it thinks fit, as contemplated in Rule 8 of Order XLVII of CPC.

 If the aggrieved party was not the party to the suit, the remedy available to him to challenge the decree passed by the Court on the basis of compromise between the parties to the suit (consent decree), would be to file an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC, with the leave of the appellate Court, or to file a review application before the Court, which passed the decree, as may be permissible under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/Appeal from Order No. 33 of 2017,

Decided On: 28.08.2019

 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) Vs.  Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj 

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When court should not review an order on ground of discovery of new evidence?

 To appreciate the very contention raised by him, we have to import the legal requirements specifically spelt out under O. 47, R. 1, sub-rule (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. If a new discovery of evidence oral or otherwise is demonstrated, when the second appeal is sought to be admitted, I am firm in saying that such discovery of new evidence must contain (i) the relevancy of the same; and (ii) be such of a character that, if it had been given in the suit, it might possibly have altered the judgment. It must atleast be such as presumably to be believed and if so, it would be conclusive. The discovery afore-stated is not only a discovery of new and important materials or evidence; that would entitle a party to apply for, review, but the discovery of any new material or evidence and important matter must be one which was not within the knowledge of the party then the decree was made the person seeking a review should prove strictly the diligence as clearly spelt out in the above rule which he claims to have exercised and also that the matter or evidence which he wishes to have access to is, if not absolutely conclusive, at any rate, nearly conclusive. What has become more imperative is that a mere and bare assertion in the affidavit that the party could not trace the documents earlier or he was not in possession not in custody of said documents is not a ground at all to seek legal aid provided under the above rule. It is not the proper function of a review application to supplement the evidence or to make it serve the purpose of a merely introducing evidence which might possibly have had same effect upon the result.

9. Importing the above legal ratio to the grievances demonstrated before me, I am totally unable to identify any of the materials to show that the petitioner had acted with every due diligence all through the trial, having not been possessed with new materials now sought to be introduced. Even if it is admitted or allowed, it could not pose a conclusion of the trial or finality of the whole litigation between the parties herein. On the other hand, a new type of legal battle will be erupted, perhaps, in the pretext of the permission of the Court, which in my considered view, cannot at all be permitted. No material is available to show that in the long passage of time, the petitioner was not having the custody of the said document or the new fact, nor he was deprived of the said material.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Review C.M.P. No. 117 of 1994 in S.A. No. 839 of 1994

Decided On: 20.02.1996

Shanmugam Servai  Vs.  P. Periyakaruppan Servai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Arumugam, J.

Citation: AIR 1996 Mad 411

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Whether magistrate can review order passed U/S 125 of CRPC?

 In Section 125 Cr.P.C. uses the expression used is “as the Magistrate from time to time direct”. The use of expression ‘from time to time’ has purpose and meaning. It clearly contemplates that with regard to order passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate may have to exercise jurisdiction from time to time. Use of expression ‘from time to time’ in is

exercise of jurisdiction of Magistrate in a particular case. Advanced Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd edition defines ‘time to time’ as follows: -

“Time to time. As occasion arises”

25. The above Legislative Scheme indicates that Magistrate does not become functus officio after passing an order under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as and when occasion arises the Magistrate exercises the jurisdiction from time to time. By Section 125(5) Cr.P.C., Magistrate is expressly empowered to cancel an order passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. on fulfilment of certain conditions.

26. Section 127 Cr.P.C. also discloses the legislative intendment where the Magistrate is empowered to alter an order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Sub-Section (2) of Section 127 Cr.P.C. also empower the Magistrate to cancel or vary an order under Section 125. The Legislative Scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and 127 Cr.P.C. as noted above clearly enumerated the circumstances and incidents provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure where Court passing a judgment or

final order disposing the case can alter or review the same. The embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus, clearly relaxed in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as indicated above.

27. The submissions which have been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant were founded only on embargo of Section 362 and when embargo of Section 362 is expressly relaxed in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C., we are not persuaded to accept the submission of counsel for the appellant that the Family Court was not entitled to set aside and cancel its order dated 06.05.2017 in facts and circumstances of the present case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.286 OF 2020

SANJEEV KAPOOR  Vs  CHANDANA KAPOOR 

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated:19 -2-2020

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How to interpret any other sufficient reason while deciding review application?

The decision of the Allahabad High Court in Narain Das (supra) does not take into consideration the earlier decision of the Privy Council in the case of Chhajju Ram (supra) where the phrase "any other sufficient reason" was construed to be interpreted to mean a reason sufficient; on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. Such an interpretation excludes from the power of review conferred, consideration of other grounds of appeal which have not been decided by a former Bench or Judge as being immaterial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

RVW 318 of 2016 and CAN 10348 of 2016 in FA 178 of 2015

Decided On: 23.09.2019

 Sudipto Banerjee Vs.  Renuka Banerjee

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Biswanath Somadder and Arindam Mukherjee, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Cal 325

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Whether dismissal of application for condonation of delay in filing of review amounts to dismissal of review application?

 Having considered the submissions as to the maintainability of this Petition, we are of the view that an order of dismissal of the application for condonation of delay would be an order of dismissal passed in the Review Application. This has also been expressly held by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Chandrakant Govind Sutar (supra) at paragraphs 7 and 8 following the judgment of the Apex Court in Rani Choudhury (supra). An order of a Civil Court rejecting an application for review is not appealable as provided under Order XLVII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("C.P.C.").

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2765 of 2018

Decided On: 03.05.2019

 MSTC Limited  Vs.  Standard Chartered Bank

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.A. Sayed and Riyaz I. Chagla, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Bom 211

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Important provisions of Electricity Act, 2003.

135. Theft of electricity

136. Theft of electric lines and materials

137. Punishment for receiving stolen property.
138. Interference with meters or works of licensee.
139. Negligently breaking or damaging works.
140. Penalty for intentionally injuring works
150. Abetment.—(1) Whoever abets an offence punishable under this Act, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.

151. Cognizance of offences.—No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the Appropriate Government or Appropriate Commission or any of their officer authorised by them or a Chief Electrical Inspector or an Electrical Inspector or licensee or the generating company, as the case may be, for this purpose:

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Whether party can seek review of order on ground of change of Advocate?

In the case of M/s. Usha International Ltd. (supra) while relying upon the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rotary Club, Begusarai etc. (supra) the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the review application which was filed by a change of lawyer. The Hon'ble Division Bench reiterated its views expressed in Rotary Club, Begusarai etc. (supra) as under:

".........Recourse to review by change of lawyers is normally deprecated by Courts. The practice becomes all the more reprehensible when review is sought on grounds pertaining to the previous conduct of the case or other grounds of fact normally within the knowledge of the previous lawyer(s). To my mind a lawyer must be very reluctant to take up a brief of review unless he had appeared in the case, the order passed in which is the subject of review. In case for some reasons a change of lawyer is unavoidable, the newly engaged lawyer would owe it to himself and to the profession to have the statement of facts duly verified by the lawyer earlier conducting the case. In case a review is filed by a new lawyer a certificate ought to be appended to the review petition, preferably by the previous counsel, stating that the facts stated in the petition were correct or alternatively by the newly engaged lawyer testifying that he had got the facts stated in the review petition verified by the previous lawyer........"

12. In the review application what is important to be seen is that if an error has occurred because of mistake of the Court or for any other reason which is likely to cause injustice to a party, the same is required to be corrected.

13. This Court is of the considered opinion that this review application by a change of lawyer is liable to be rejected in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Usha International (Supra). 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

Civil Review No. 456 of 2018 in Miscellaneous Jurisdiction Case No. 1762 of 2017

Decided On: 30.04.2019

 Rishi Kesh Kumar  Vs.  Minakshi Kumari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J.

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