Showing posts with label O 15A of CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label O 15A of CPC. Show all posts

Tuesday, 21 March 2023

Whether the court can direct tenant to pay enhanced rent during pendency of eviction proceeding as per O 15-A of CPC?

 There is no gainsaying that an order under Order 39 Rule 10 CPC and/or Order XV-A CPC is rendered as an interim measure to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff/owner. This ‘order as an interim measure’ is to be carefully passed and the provisions loosely interpreted to safeguard the interest of a party that claims ownership over a property and assails unauthorized occupation of the same. In light of the very nature of relief contemplated under the above provisions, there is no reason to deprive a plaintiff of fair protection of his interest during pendency of the trial just because the trial is near its end or because there is dispute as to whether the property was tenanted as one or three/four. {Para 11}

12. In the present case, the appellant has placed on record certain registered lease deeds, to show that rentals upto Rs.145/- are being charged from tenants in the vicinity of the property in question. In the application filed, though the appellant had sought use/occupation charges @ Rs.12 lacs per month, during the course of submissions before the Trial Court, the demand was statedly restricted to Rs.8 lacs per month. Despite considering the scope of Order XV-A CPC, the Trial Court restricted its decision to direct payment only to ‘admitted’ rate of rent. The same does not find favour with this Court.

14. Considering the aforesaid and the material on record, this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if the respondent/defendant is directed to deposit before the Trial Court arrears @ Rs.2 lacs per month since the date of filing of the suit till its pendency.

 Neutral Citation Number : 2023:DHC:1893

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ FAO 7/2023 & CM APPL. 1225/2023

SMT. SWARAN MAKKAR Vs M/S DAYAL CHAND KISHORI LAL

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

Pronounced on : 16.03.2023

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Tuesday, 30 March 2021

Whether court can grant interim compensation as per O 15A of CPC(Maharashtra amendment) without ascertaining the agreed rate of rent between the parties?

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would make it manifest that for application of the Order XV-A, it must be a suit by a lessor or a licensor against a lessee or a licensee. In the present case, the respondents did not approach the trial Court with a case that they are lessors. They did not state the rate of rent agreed between the parties. They did not assert that the tenancy of the petitioner was attorned in their favour. They are the purchasers of the house property and as such the earlier existing tenancy would stand attorned if the appropriate communication is made to the tenant. The case of the respondents is that the petitioner has encroached over one of the room and had occupied another room by consent of the previous owner. The provision of Order XV-A would come into play only when there is prima facie evidence to show that the rent or licence fees was agreed between the parties and a particular sum could be charged as a liability. 

12. These observations of the trial Court would show that the trial Court was unmindful to the pleadings of the parties. The respondents/plaintiffs were not praying that the defendant shall be directed to deposit Rs. 36,000/- towards arrears of rent. What they prayed was that amount of compensation and damages for use and occupation of the premises shall be directed to be deposited. It was necessary for the trial Court to first determine, prima facie, whether there exists relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and then to determine quantum of rent agreed between them. Without undertaking such exercise, the trial Court proceeded to assume that amount of Rs. 36,000/- is due from the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the impugned order is so harsh that it practically amounts to granting of peremptory decree although impliedly. I am of the opinion that the impugned order is perverse, arbitrary and untenable.

 Bombay High Court

Radheshyam vs Tuljaprasad And Ors. on 17 October, 2006
Equivalent citations: AIR 2007 Bom 83

Bench: V Kingaonkar
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Saturday, 6 March 2021

Questions and answers on law part 20

Q 1:-  What is transit bail and when court should grant it?

Ans:- A transit bail is a bail granted by a Court not having jurisdiction over the place where offence was committed.

The purpose of transit anticipatory bail is to grant bail to a person till the time he/she reaches the appropriate Court so that in case the police wants to effect the arrest, the person will be released on bail. However, such bail is given at the condition that the accused has to cooperate in the investigation throughout the ongoing investigative process.

Q. 2:- Whether court can grant interim compensation as per O 15A of CPC(Maharashtra amendment) if eviction suit is filed against gratuitous licensee?

Ans: In case reported in AIR 2007 Bombay 83 Radheshyam v\s Tuljaprasad Honble Bombay High court has taken a view that the the provisions of order 15 A of C.P.C. would come into play only when there is prima facie evidence to show that the rent or licence fees was agreed between the parties.

In case of gratuitous licensee, there is no any fixed amount payable. Therefore no question of grant of interim compensation..

Q 3:-  Whether court should send order of cancellation of registered will to sub registrar?

Ans:- S 31 of specific relief Act,

(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.


(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.
Hence As will is registered, court should send it to sub-registrar.


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Sunday, 7 February 2021

Whether court can direct the licensee to pay maintenance charges to the licensor in application U/O 15A of CPC in eviction suit?

The only question to be considered is whether the maintenance charges could have been directed to be paid under Over XV-A of the Code as prayed for by the defendants.

From the aforesaid averments it is clear that the plaintiff has admitted that it is liable to pay maintenance charges of Rs.25,000/- per month during the period of Leave and Licence agreement. As stated above the said agreement specifically refers to various amenities provided by the licensor and with a view to enable the licensee to enjoy the same the plaintiff is required to pay Rs.25,000/- per month.

10. The provisions of Section 7(14) of the said Act define the term "standard rent". The standard rent in the present case has not been determined under Section 8 of the said Act. However reading of both the agreements on the basis of which the plaintiff has been inducted as a licensee indicates that besides the amount of licence fees, it is also liable to pay maintenance charges and failure to pay maintenance charges gives a cause of action to the licensor to terminate the licence.

 In Puspa Sen Gupta vs. Susma Ghose (1990) 2 SCC 651 while considering the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the question whether the tenant was liable to pay amount of Rs.8/- per month towards electricity besides Rs.32/- as rent, it was observed that the expression "rent" was not defined under relevant Act. However on reading the entire Act, the word "rent" would also include payment in respect of amenities or services provided by the landlord under the term of tenancy. It was observed that considering various provisions a tenancy would carry with it amenities to be provided or services to be maintained by the landlord and hence the amount of rent would include the amount of electricity charges. Drawing support from the aforesaid observations it can be said in the facts of the present case that the plaintiff was liable to pay maintenance charges besides license fees. This has infact been admitted by the plaintiff in its written statement to the counter-claim. In that view of the matter the trial Court was not justified in refusing to direct the plaintiff to pay Rs.25,000/- per month towards maintenance charges. The impugned order therefore is liable to be modified accordingly.

 Bombay High Court

Daksha  Jyotindra Patel And Vs Big V. Telecom Pvt. Ltd. Nagpur ... on 8 November, 2019
Bench: A.S. Chandurkar
  WRIT PETITION NO.3553 OF 2019



CORAM : A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.

 Judgment pronounced on : November 08, 2019 

Citation: 2020(6) MHLJ 313

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Monday, 6 April 2020

Whether appellate court can strike off the defence of tenant if he fails to deposit rent as directed by court as per O 15A of CPC?

As far as maintainability of the application is concerned, in my
view, Order 15A
of the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked at the
appellate stage also in view of the provisions of Section 107(2) of the Code
of Civil Procedure. In any case, the appellate Court can exercise jurisdiction
under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in such situation for the
ends of justice.
The learned District Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in him by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to strike off the
defence of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 7007 OF 2016

Santosh @ Ambadas Jayendra Vs   M/s. Khemka Automobiles,

CORAM : Z.A.HAQ, J.
DATED : DECEMBER 20, 2017.
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Sunday, 15 March 2020

Whether court can grant maintenance charges along with license fees as per O 15A of CPC?

From the aforesaid averments it is clear that the plaintiff has
admitted that it is liable to pay maintenance charges of Rs.25,000/- per
month during the period of Leave and Licence agreement. As stated above
the said agreement specifically refers to various amenities provided by the
licensor and with a view to enable the licensee to enjoy the same the plaintiff
is required to pay Rs.25,000/- per month.
10. The provisions of Section 7(14) of the said Act define the term
“standard rent”. The standard rent in the present case has not been
determined under Section 8 of the said Act. However reading of both the
agreements on the basis of which the plaintiff has been inducted as a
licensee indicates that besides the amount of licence fees, it is also liable to
pay maintenance charges and failure to pay maintenance charges gives a
cause of action to the licensor to terminate the licence.

In Puspa Sen Gupta vs. Susma Ghose (1990) 2 SCC 651 while
considering the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and
the question whether the tenant was liable to pay amount of Rs.8/- per
month towards electricity besides Rs.32/- as rent, it was observed that the
expression “rent” was not defined under relevant Act. However on reading
the entire Act, the word “rent” would also include payment in respect of
amenities or services provided by the landlord under the term of tenancy. It
was observed that considering various provisions a tenancy would carry with
it amenities to be provided or services to be maintained by the landlord and
hence the amount of rent would include the amount of electricity charges.
Drawing support from the aforesaid observations it can be said in the facts of
the present case that the plaintiff was liable to pay maintenance charges
besides license fees. This has in fact been admitted by the plaintiff in its
written statement to the counter-claim. In that view of the matter the trial
Court was not justified in refusing to direct the plaintiff to pay Rs.25,000/-
per month towards maintenance charges. The impugned order therefore is
liable to be modified accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.3553 OF 2019

 Daksha Jyotindra Patel Vs   Big V. Telecom Pvt. Ltd.


CORAM : A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.

Judgment pronounced on : November 08, 2019
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Monday, 4 November 2019

Bombay HC: Application U/O XV-A of CPC can be entertained in suit even if suit in not on the ground of arrears of rent

The petitioner seeks eviction of the respondent under the provisions of
Section 16 (1)(g) and (n) of the said Act. If during the pendency of the suit the rent

in question is not being deposited, the plaintiff in a suit for eviction of the
defendant either with or without arrears of rent can take resort to the provisions of
Order XV A of the Code. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 4253/2019

Dr.Vinod Rajeshwarrao Bhat  Vs Jawaharlal s/o Janardhan Chaturwedi @ Chhotu Pandit,

CORAM : A.S.CHANDURKAR, J.
DATED : 03.10.2019
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Thursday, 31 October 2019

Whether landlord can execute order of grant of interim rent even though defence of tenant is struck off?

 The impugned order was passed by the Court under Order 15-A of the Code of Civil Procedure directing the defendant to pay rent and deposit arrears. No fault can be found with such a direction. In this case, the defendant failed to obey the order and failed to deposit the arrears. The consequence of such failure is given in the same Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. The Rule says that if such order is not obeyed, the defence shall be struck out. The learned Counsel for the applicant/plaintiff contended that striking out of defence is a mode of enforcement while execution by attachment is mode of satisfaction. In 1999 (1) SCC 405, Smt. Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh, it is observed as follows:

6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the other. Sentencing a person to jail is a 'mode of enforcement'. It is not a 'mode of satisfaction' of the liability. The liability can be satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has refused to discharge. Be it also realized that a person ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he fails to pay monthly allowance 'without sufficient cause' to comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a person who 'without reasonable cause' refuses to comply with the order of the Court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears.
6. Therefore, even though the remedy by way of striking out of defence is available, that does not deprive the plaintiff to resort to mode of satisfaction. Ordinarily, therefore, an order can be executed for satisfaction. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Civil Rev. Appln. No. 1193 of 1999

Decided On: 13.03.2007

Gwaldas Shivkisanji Lakhotia Vs. Bapurao Arjunji Bandabuche
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Whether interim order can be executed after suit or appeal has come to an end?

Still, however, it has to be seen whether any interim order in any suit or appeal can be executed after the suit or appeal has come to an end. The law is well settled that when main lis comes to an end, all interim orders merge into that final order. Once, those interim orders merge into that final order, the interim order cannot be executed. To my mind, the interim orders do not survive once the main lis is decided by Court and no more remains executable. Here, the suit itself is dismissed hence none of the orders passed in the suit could be said to have" survived. This order, therefore, to my mind is not executable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Civil Rev. Appln. No. 1193 of 1999

Decided On: 13.03.2007

Gwaldas Shivkisanji Lakhotia Vs. Bapurao Arjunji Bandabuche

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
C.L. Pangarkar, J.

Citation: 2007(4) MHLJ 698,2007(3) ALLMR 544
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Sunday, 12 August 2018

Whether court can direct occupant to deposit damages if it is not proved that he is tenant?

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would make it manifest that for application of the Order XV-A, it must be a suit by a lessor or a licensor against a lessee or a licensee. In the present case, the respondents did not approach the trial Court with a case that they are lessors. They did not state the rate of rent agreed between the parties. They did not assert that the tenancy of the petitioner was attorned in their favour. They are the purchasers of the house property and as such the earlier existing tenancy would stand attorned if the appropriate communication is made to the tenant. The case of the respondents is that the petitioner has encroached over one of the room and had occupied another room by consent of the previous owner. The provision of Order XV-A would come into play only when there is prima facie evidence to show that the rent or licence fees was agreed between the parties and a particular sum could be charged as a liability. The next significant aspect is that the learned trial Court further passed order of striking off the defence of the petitioner on account of non-compliance of the impugned order. For this purpose, Sub-rule (2) of Order XV-A is required to be considered. It is conspicuous that before passing order for striking off the defence, the Court shall serve notice on the defendant or his Advocate to show cause as to why the defence should not be struck off, and the Court shall consider any such cause shown in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved from the order striking off the defence. Thus, the legislature has offered second opportunity to the defendant before striking off the defence and has afforded right of hearing. Such a person can show cause as to why the order could not be complied with and in that case, after application of judicial mind, the Court has discretion to relieve such a person from such an order of striking off the defence. Needless to say, the striking off the defence is not automatic only because of non depositing of the amount as directed by the Court. The defence cannot be so lightly struck off as has been done in the present case.

These observations of the trial Court would show that the trial Court was unmindful to the pleadings of the parties. The respondents/plaintiffs were not praying that the defendant shall be directed to deposit Rs. 36,000/- towards arrears of rent. What they prayed was that amount of compensation and damages for use and occupation of the premises shall be directed to be deposited. It was necessary for the trial Court to first determine, prima facie, whether there exists relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and then to determine quantum of rent agreed between them. Without undertaking such exercise, the trial Court proceeded to assume that amount of Rs. 36,000/- is due from the petitioner. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 100 of 2006

Decided On: 17.10.2006

Radheshyam  Vs. Tuljaprasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: 
V.R. Kingaonkar, J.

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Sunday, 29 July 2018

Whether appeal is maintainable against order passed by court for compensation under order 15A of CPC?

Considering the fact that the order dated 28.2.2002 was passed by the trial court in exercise of powers under Order 15A and the provisions relating to appeal against the orders passed by the Courts in terms of the provisions of CPC, it is apparent that the orders passed under 15A are not appealable. Being so, the petitioners are justified in contending that the appellate bench of the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal against the order dated 28.2.2002. On that count itself, the petition is bound to succeed and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 7516 of 2002

Decided On: 21.02.2003

 Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Thakorbhai Ranchhodji Desai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Citation: 2003(3) MHLJ 617
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Thursday, 29 March 2018

Whether landlord can be denied rent from tenant if documents of title of property of tenant is laying with landlord as security?

In reply to both these applications, it is stated by the Defendants that the papers relating to the residential properties of the Defendants at 12, Malikpur, Model Town-I, Delhi-110009 are in the possession of the Plaintiff and that it is a sufficient security. It is only contended that the Plaintiff cannot be granted relief "based upon a disputed rent and a liability which has not been admitted by the Defendants".

15. As already observed, the word 'rent' in Order XVA CPC is not limited to the 'admitted' rent. In any event, it also envisages the Court determining an 'amount' payable towards either rent or future mesne profits. In the present case, after the termination of the tenancy, the Defendants continue to occupy the commercial property. The property, in which where they are running a restaurant, is located in a busy market area. The Defendants have not countered the documents placed on record by the Plaintiff to show that the current market rent for commercial property of a similar size in the area is more than Rs. 3 lakhs per month. The mere fact that the Plaintiff may have the title documents of the residential property of the Defendants cannot be said to constitute sufficient security for the purposes of Order XVA CPC. The object of this provision is to provide the landlord with some 'amount' for use and occupation of the property by the Defendant during the pendency of the litigation. Keeping these factors in view, the Court is of the opinion that pending the final decision in the suit, the Defendants should deposit towards use and occupation charges/falling within the meaning of the expression 'such amount' in Order XVA CPC, a sum of Rs. 1 lakh per month.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 1698 of 2011

Decided On: 03.12.2013

 Prem Lata Vs. Raghubir Rai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Muralidhar, J.
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Whether unauthorised occupant is liable to deposit use and occupation charges during pendency of eviction proceeding?

As already observed, the word 'rent' in Order XVA CPC is not limited to the 'admitted' rent. In any event, it also envisages the Court determining an 'amount' payable towards either rent or future mesne profits. In the present case, after the termination of the tenancy, the Defendants continue to occupy the commercial property. The property, in which where they are running a restaurant, is located in a busy market area. The Defendants have not countered the documents placed on record by the Plaintiff to show that the current market rent for commercial property of a similar size in the area is more than Rs. 3 lakhs per month. The mere fact that the Plaintiff may have the title documents of the residential property of the Defendants cannot be said to constitute sufficient security for the purposes of Order XVA CPC. The object of this provision is to provide the landlord with some 'amount' for use and occupation of the property by the Defendant during the pendency of the litigation. Keeping these factors in view, the Court is of the opinion that pending the final decision in the suit, the Defendants should deposit towards use and occupation charges/falling within the meaning of the expression 'such amount' in Order XVA CPC, a sum of Rs. 1 lakh per month.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 1698 of 2011

Decided On: 03.12.2013

 Prem Lata Vs. Raghubir Rai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Muralidhar, J.
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Procedure to be followed by court if tenant fails to deposit rent in accordance with order passed by U/ 15A of CPC

Sub-rule (1) of Order 15-A as amended applies to a suit by a lessor against a lessee or a licensor against a licensee for eviction with or without the arrears of rent or licence fee and future mesne profits. In such a suit, the Court is empowered to direct the defendant to deposit such amount as the Court may direct on account of arrears upto the date of the Order and thereafter to continue to deposit in each succeeding month the rent or licensee fee claimed in the suit as the Court may direct. Sub-rule (1) provides that the defendant shall unless otherwise directed continue to deposit such amount till the decision of the suit. The legislature was clearly conscious of the necessity of requiring the tenant or, as the case may be, a licensee to deposit such an amount as the Court may direct towards arrears payable on account of his occupation and to protect the interest of the landlord by requiring that future deposits of the amount of rent or the licence fee must also be made. In the absence of such a provision, the landlord would have to suffer the hardship of awaiting a final decision of the suit for eviction before any amount would be recovered. This was obviated by conferring upon the Court, the power to pass an appropriate interim order. Even in the absence of such a provision, the hardship which was liable to be suffered by the landlord has been sought to be obviated by the decision of this Court in Sangeeta Prints (supra) by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 39, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code. Having regard to the salutary object underlying the provisions, the proviso to sub-rule (1) envisages certain consequence emanating from a non-compliance of the order of deposit. The proviso stipulates that in the event of a default in making deposit as decided, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off the defence. Undoubtedly, before striking off the defence, sub-rule (2) provides that a notice has to be issued to the defendant to show cause and the cause, if any, shown has to be considered in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved of a peremptory order striking off the defence. Sub-rule (2) in turn indicates that unless the Court is of the view that there are valid circumstances as to why the defendant should be relieved of an order striking off his defence, ordinarily the defence would be liable to be struck off upon a failure of compliance with an order of deposit. In these circumstances, there can be no gainsaying the fact that an order passed under sub-rule (1) is an order of moment and is liable to seriously effect the rights of the parties. A defendant who does not comply with the order of deposit, cannot be relieved of the striking off of his defence unless he shows sufficient cause. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that an order under sub-rule (1) of Order 15-A is merely a procedural order and is not subject to a revision under sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. In the present case, a revision is maintainable. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1079 of 2003

Decided On: 08.09.2003

 Colaba Central Co-operative Consumer Wholesale and Retail Stores Ltd. alias Sahakar Bhandar
Vs.
 Kusumben Kantilal Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.
Citation: 2003(4)ALLMR304; 2004(1)BomCR547
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Whether revision is maintainable against order of striking off defence in default of payment of rent?

Even in the absence of such a provision, the hardship which was liable to be suffered by the landlord has been sought to be obviated by the decision of this Court in Sangeeta Prints (supra) by taking recourse to the provisions of Order 39, Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code. Having regard to the salutary object underlying the provisions, the proviso to sub-rule (1) envisages certain consequence emanating from a non-compliance of the order of deposit. The proviso stipulates that in the event of a default in making deposit as decided, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off the defence. Undoubtedly, before striking off the defence, sub-rule (2) provides that a notice has to be issued to the defendant to show cause and the cause, if any, shown has to be considered in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved of a peremptory order striking off the defence. Sub-rule (2) in turn indicates that unless the Court is of the view that there are valid circumstances as to why the defendant should be relieved of an order striking off his defence, ordinarily the defence would be liable to be struck off upon a failure of compliance with an order of deposit. In these circumstances, there can be no gainsaying the fact that an order passed under sub-rule (1) is an order of moment and is liable to seriously effect the rights of the parties. A defendant who does not comply with the order of deposit, cannot be relieved of the striking off of his defence unless he shows sufficient cause. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that an order under sub-rule (1) of Order 15-A is merely a procedural order and is not subject to a revision under sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. In the present case, a revision is maintainable. There is hence no necessity for this Court to go into the challenge urged on behalf of the petitioner on the merits of the order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1079 of 2003

Decided On: 08.09.2003

 Colaba Central Co-operative Consumer Wholesale and Retail Stores Ltd. alias Sahakar Bhandar
Vs.
 Kusumben Kantilal Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.
Citation: 2003(4)ALLMR304; 2004(1)BomCR547
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Whether court can direct tenant to deposit arrears of rent in eviction suit?

It may also be mentioned that another Single Judge in the case of Sangeeta Prints vs. Hemal Prints, MANU/MH/0398/1985 : 1985 Mh. L.J. 413 has noted the introduction of Order XV-A in the Code of Civil Procedure and its applicability to suits filed by landlords against the tenants. In the said case however the question was whether the said rule would apply to a suit between licensee and licensor by virtue of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. The Learned Judge after considering the provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act and other provisions came to the conclusion that there was no reason as to why the provision of Order XV-A could not be made applicable to a suit between the licensor and licensee since provisions of Code of Civil Procedure apply to suits under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. In that case the Court took act of the provision under section 151 and Order XXXIX, rule 10. Another Judgment referred is the Judgment in the case of Jaihind Vidyalaya, Nagpur vs. Ghanshyam Girdharilal Khinchi, MANU/MH/0299/1989 : AIR 1989 Bom. 99, where the Court observed as under :-

The plain reading of Order XV-A shows that the Court has powers to direct the tenant to deposit arrears of rent irrespective of the fact whether the Suit is mainly for eviction or for arrears of rent. In either of these categories, the Court can use its discretion.
It may be pointed out that in the said case what was sought to be argued was that the Court could direct the deposit of arrears only when the suit is for eviction with the other reliefs of arrears of rent and or mesne profits and that such relief could never be given by the Court if the main relief of the suit is only for eviction. On the plain reading of Order XV-A the Court negatived the contention. Thus considering the provisions of Rent Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the provisions of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, there is no doubt that the Small Cause Court or any other Court constituted under the Rent Act to hear the evictions matter is empowered under provision of Order XV-A to call on the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and recovering rent during the pendency of the proceedings. No doubt, it is the Court which will direct the tenant to deposit such amount as the Court may prima facie come to the conclusion that requires to be deposited. The power is therefore in the Court in its discretion to fix the quantum which has to be deposited.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Rev. Appln. No. 866 of 1991

Decided On: 12.07.1996

 Shantaram Janu Raut Vs. Smt. Claradas Lourds

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
F.I. Rebello, J.

Citation: 1998 (1) Mh.L.J. 639
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Whether licensee can be directed to deposit licence fee during eviction proceeding?

This decision was expressly overruled by the Division Bench which held that the court had such a power under Section 151, Civil P.C. The Division Bench observed that in many cases landlords depend for their livelihood upon the income from the properties. It would be a hardship in the circumstances if the landlord has the misfortune of having to file suits against his tenants who cannot be ordered to pay any amount on account of their use and occupation of their premises while the landlord is required to meet his responsibilities and liabilities. The process of the court over which neither the landlord nor the tenant defendant has any control cannot be allowed to be abused and work to the detriment of a person. If it is capable of resulting in harm, then the Courts are not powerless to make orders so as to mitigate that harm. By parity of reasoning, in cases between a licensor and licensee also a similar order can be passed. Such orders as between a lessor and lessee are now expressly permitted under Order XVA, Civil P.C. By analogy, similar orders can be passed in cases between licensor and licensee also.

15. Learned Judges of the Division Bench in the above case also relied upon Order XXXIX, Rule 10, Civil P.C. in support of their decision. They held that in the case of a landlord and tenant, the tenant cannot dispute his liability to pay the rent to the landlord although the quantum of such rent may be in dispute. The Division Bench held that in such cases the tenant, in fact, is deemed to admit that some money is due to the plaintiff. In such a situation the court can direct the tenant to deposit such amount as the court may deem fit under Order XXXIX Rule 10. The same reasoning applies to a case between licensor and licensee also. The licensee can be similarly directed to deposit certain amounts in respect of licence fees or mesne profits under the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 10 in view of the Division Bench of this court in the above case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petn. No. 3870 of 1984

Decided On: 03.05.1985

Sangeeta Prints Vs Hemal Prints and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.V. Manohar, J.

Citation: AIR 1986 423
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