Under which circumstances the court can grant relief to defendant?

 It has long been recognized that one or more of several persons jointly interested can bring an action in respect of joint property and if their right to sue is challenged can amend by joining their co-contractors as plaintiffs if they will consent or as co-defendants if they will not Such cases as Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co. (1879) 11 Ch D 121 and Cullen v. Knowles (1898) 2 Q.B. 380 are examples of this principle. Nor indeed would it matter that a wrong person had originally sued though he had no cause of action: see Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (1902) 2 K.B. 485 Once all the parties are before the Court, the Court can make the appropriate order and should give judgment in favour of all the persons interested whether they be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. Prima facie therefore the trial Court in the present case should have given judgment in favour of the eight of the original partners who survived, though some of them had been made defendants: see Cullen v. Knowles (1898) 2 Q.B. 380 at page 382. {Para 11}

 BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Decided On: 02.05.1939

Manghibai  Vs. Cooverji Umersey

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Porter, Thankerton and George Rankin, JJ.

Author: Porter, J.

Citation: AIR 1939 PC 170, MANU/PR/0023/1939.

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Whether the court can reject plaint if plaintiff has not claimed appropriate reliefs?

 We have taken note that the grievance essentially put

forth by the respondents for which an application under

Order VII Rule 11 was filed, is that the appellant

herein, had not sought for an appropriate prayer to

declare the sale deeds dated 03.12.2015 and 26.02.2016 as

illegal, null and void and no court fee in that regard

was paid.

5. To that extent, we take note that the prayer, as

made, in any event, had been valued and the court fee has

been paid. Whether an appropriate prayer should have

sought, is a matter ultimately to be decided in the suit

and not an issue to be considered while deciding the

application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, in the manner

in which it had been done in the facts and circumstances

arising in the instant case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 4221 of 2023

SAJJAN SINGH  Vs  JASVIR KAUR & ORS.

Dated: 06th July, 2023.

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Can the court grant a conditional decree for specific performance of contract if vendor can not execute sale deed without permission of competent authority?

  It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, and amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accrued to the respondent. {Para 4}

SUPREME COURT

K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.

K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. S Vs. Alliance Ministries And Others

Spl. Leave Petn. (Civil No. 9397 of 1995

1st May, 1995

Citation: 1995 ALLMR ONLINE 586 (S.C.)

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Can the court permit an amendment of plaint to add a prayer for specific performance of the contract if that relief is time-barred?

 Apart from this, a perusal of the original plaint and the proposed amendment filed on behalf of the  petitioner would show that the cause of action for the proposed prayer for grant of decree of specific performance and declaration was very much available to the petitioner when he filed the suit for permanent injunction on 11.09.2013. Having failed to incorporate prayers for aforesaid reliefs and restricting the suit only for the relief of permanent injunction, clearly shows that the attempt subsequently made by the petitioner by filing application for amendment on 24.01.2017 was barred by operation of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. It is clear that the petitioner was now seeking to change the very nature of the suit, which was impermissible. {Para 12}

16. In the case of K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. .vs. Alliance Ministries (supra) referred to in the above quoted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:-

"4. It is seen that the permission for alienation is not a condition precedent to file the suit for specific performance. The decree of specific performance will always be subject to the condition to the grant of the permission by the competent authority. The petitioners having expressly admitted that the respondents have refused to abide by the terms of the contract, they should have asked for the relief for specific performance in the original suit itself. Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed from the date of filing fo the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, any amendment on the grounds  set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accrued to the respondent."

17. The position of law as elucidated in the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents shows that in the present case also prayers sought to be added by the petitioner by way of amendment were not only barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but also by operation of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C.

18. Insofar as the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that relief of specific performance could have been sought by the petitioner only after the competent authority had granted regularisation under the provisions of the Gunthewari Act, as noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit .vs. Ramesh Chander (supra), nothing prevented the petitioner to make a prayer for decree of specific performance when the suit for permanent injunction was filed on 11.09.2013. The Court would certainly have the power to pass a decree of specific performance in favour of the petitioner, which would be a conditional decree, subject to the competent authority in the present case granting order of regularisation under the provisions of the Gunthewari Act. Therefore, the said submission raised on behalf of the petitioner is also untenable.

Bombay High Court

Mangesh S/O Madhukar Giri vs Lata D/O Ganpatrao Korde And ... on 23 January, 2019

Bench: Manish Pitale

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Whether court should reject prayer for interim injunction if relief sought in injunction application and suit is same?

 In Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and others reported in MANU/SC/0161/1990 : (1990) 1 SCR 332, the Supreme Court held that the relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last known uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable loss. Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

a) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

b) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

c) The balance of convenience is in favour of one seeking such relief.

20. There is no law that in case the relief sought through the suit and relief prayed for in a application for temporary mandatory injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC are the same, in that eventuality the ad interim injunction cannot be granted.

21. However, it is true that the court would be very slow in granting such relief and would grant the same only when it comes to the conclusion that great injustice has been done to the petitioner who has been thrown away from a property in which he was in lawful occupation and a person who has got no right or title to the said property has occupied the same. In Indian Cable Company Limited (supra), this court held that if a court is called upon to grant any relief on an interlocutory application which when granted would mean granting substantially the relief claimed in the suit, the court will be very slow and circumspect in the matter of granting such prayer. It is indeed true that such a relief is granted only in exceptional cases, still at the same time no court should think that in law there is any absolute bar to the court granting such a relief. In deserving cases, the court should not hesitate to come in aid of a litigant and upheld the cause of justice by granting such a relief. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

CO No. 359 of 2017

Decided On: 17.01.2019

Amita Sarbadhikary  Vs. Bandana Shome and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bibek Chaudhuri, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Cal 123

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Whether court can grant relief to a party if he has not pleaded for that relief?

 The last contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is in relation to application of Section 53A of the T.P. Act. It is well settled that the Defendant who intends to avail the benefit of this provision must plead that he has taken possession of the property in part performance of the contract. Perusal of the written statement of the first Defendant shows that he has not raised such a plea. Pleadings are meant to give to each side, intimation of the case of the other, so that, it may be met to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties. No relief can be granted to a party without the pleadings. Therefore, it is not open for the first Defendant/Appellant to claim the benefit available Under Section 53A of the T.P. Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5415 of 2011

Decided On: 02.07.2018

 Shyam Narayan Prasad  Vs.  Krishna Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 17

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Whether court should frame issue on point which is not in pleading?

 This Court has consistently held that the court cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties. The parties have to take proper pleadings and establish by adducing evidence that by a particular irregularity/illegality, the result of the election has been "materially affected". There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted". Thus, a decision of the case should not be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. In absence of pleadings, evidence if any, produced by the parties, cannot be considered. It is also a settled legal proposition that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and parties are bound to take all necessary and material facts in support of the case set up by them. Pleadings ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised and they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence before the court for its consideration. The issues arise only when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other party. Therefore, it is neither desirable nor permissible for a court to frame an issue not arising on the pleadings. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5710-5711 of 2012

Decided On: 04.02.2014

 Arikala Narasa Reddy Vs.  Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.S. Chauhan, Jasti Chelameswar and M. Yusuf Eqbal, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2014 SC 1290

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Whether party can claim benefit of doctrine of part performance without pleading?

 The last contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is in relation to application of Section 53A of the T.P. Act. It is well settled that the Defendant who intends to avail the benefit of this provision must plead that he has taken possession of the property in part performance of the contract. Perusal of the written statement of the first Defendant shows that he has not raised such a plea. Pleadings are meant to give to each side, intimation of the case of the other, so that, it may be met to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties. No relief can be granted to a party without the pleadings. Therefore, it is not open for the first Defendant/Appellant to claim the benefit available Under Section 53A of the T.P. Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5415 of 2011

Decided On: 02.07.2018

Shyam Narayan Prasad Vs. Krishna Prasad and Ors.

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Whether relief of specific performance of contract and injunction can be claimed on basis of same cause of action?

Therefore, we have to examine the question as to whether the Plaintiff was entitled to claim a relief of specific performance of agreement in the previous suit on the basis of cause of action pleaded by the Plaintiff in the previous suit against the Respondents/Defendants in relation to suit property.

29. In other words, the question that arises for consideration is whether Sucha Singh (original Plaintiff) could claim the relief of specific performance of agreement against the Respondents/Defendants in addition to his claim of permanent injunction in the previously instituted suit?

30. Our answer to the aforementioned question is in favour of the Plaintiffs (Appellants) and against the Defendants(Respondents). In other words, our answer to the aforementioned question is that the Plaintiff could not claim the relief of specific performance of agreement against the Defendants along with the relief of permanent injunction in the previous suit for the following reasons.

31. First, the cause of action to claim a relief of permanent injunction and the cause of action to claim a relief of specific performance of agreement are independent and one cannot include the other and vice versa.

32. In other words, a Plaintiff cannot claim a relief of specific performance of agreement against the Defendant on a cause of action on which he has claimed a relief of permanent injunction.

33. Second, the cause of action to claim temporary/permanent injunction against the Defendants from interfering in Plaintiff's possession over the suit premises accrues when Defendant No. 1 threatens the Plaintiff to dispossess him from the suit premises or otherwise cause injury to the Plaintiff in relation to the suit premises. It is governed by Order 39 Rule 1(c) of the Code which deals with the grant of injunction. The limitation to file such suit is three years from the date of obstruction caused by the Defendant to the Plaintiff (See-Part VII Articles 85, 86 and 87 of the Limitation Act).

34. On the other hand, the cause of action to file a suit for claiming specific performance of agreement arises from the date fixed for the performance or when no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused by the Defendant. The limitation to file such suit is three years from such date (See-Part II Article 54 of the Limitation Act).

35. Third, when both the reliefs/claims namely, (1) Permanent Injunction and (2) SpeciTherefore, we have to examine the question as to whether the Plaintiff was entitled to claim a relief of specific performance of agreement in the previous suit on the basis of cause of action pleaded by the Plaintiff in the previous suit against the Respondents/Defendants in relation to suit property.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3777 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 13256 of 2014)

Decided On: 13.04.2018

Sucha Singh Sodhi (D) thr. L.Rs.Vs.  Baldev Raj Walia and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 6 SCC 733,2019(2) MHLJ 16

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Whether relief claimed constitute cause of action?

Submission of learned counsel for respondent No. 2-trust was that requirement of law being reading the plaint in its totality, the appellants cannot take the plea that they would give up or relinquish some of the reliefs sought for. That would not be permissible. The plea clearly overlooks the basic distinction between statements of the facts disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for. The reliefs claimed do not constitute the cause of action. On the contrary, they constitute the entitlement, if any, on the basis of pleaded facts.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 448 of 2004 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 20366/2002)

Decided On: 23.01.2004

Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors.

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Whether court can grant larger relief than one claimed by plaintiff?

Where the relief prayed for in the suit is a larger relief and if no case is made out for granting the same but the facts, as established, justify granting of a smaller relief. Order VII Rule 7 permits granting of such a relief to the parties. However, under the said provisions a relief larger than the one claimed by the plaintiff in the suit cannot be granted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (civil) 3406 of 1998

Decided On: 09.11.2001

 Rajendra Tiwary vs.  Basudeo Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.S.M. Quadri and S.N. Phukan, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2002 SC 136

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Whether plaint can be rejected if subsequent suit is filed seeking same relief founded on same cause of action?

After hearing the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, we find substance in the aforesaid submission of the Defendants. Even if we presume that the suit was maintainable, at the same time the Plaintiff also had remedy of filing the statutory appeals, etc., by agitating the matter under the Finance Act. It chose to avail the remedy under the Finance Act. The Doctrine of Election would, therefore, become applicable in a case like this. After choosing one particular remedy the Plaintiff cannot avail the other remedy as well, in respect of the same relief founded on same cause of action.

3. The plaint is, therefore, rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Original Suit No. 1 of 2016

Decided On: 04.10.2016

 State of Rajasthan Vs.  Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and N.V. Ramana, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 83

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Whether relief can be granted to a party without pleading?

 The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is in relation to
application of Section 53A of the T.P Act. It is well settled that the defendant who
intends to avail the benefit of this provision must plead that he has taken
possession of the property in part performance of the contract. Perusal of the
written statement of the first defendant shows that he has not raised such a plea.
Pleadings are meant to give to each side, intimation of the case of the other, so that,
it may be met to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the
parties. No relief can be granted to a party without the pleadings. Therefore, it is
not open for the first defendant/appellant to claim the benefit available under
Section 53A of the T.P. Act.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5415 OF 2011

SHYAM NARAYAN PRASAD Vs KRISHNA PRASAD AND ORS.

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Whether family court can grant maintenance even if it is not claimed by wife?

From the careful reading of the above said provisions, it is
apparent that the court would not be empowered to grant
the relief unless sought. In the present case, it appears that
at the time of delivering judgment, the court suo motu
considered the application under section 26 of the Domestic
Violence Act thereby clearly denying an opportunity to non applicant
to meet with the same. It was obligatory on the
part of the Family Court to hear the non-applicant before
awarding maintenance under Section 26 of the Domestic
Violence Act. Since the Family Court failed for the same and
since the applicant/present non-applicant failed to establish
that she entered into domestic relationship or she was
legally married to non-applicant, she was not entitled to
relief of maintenance either under Section 125 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure or under the provisions of the
Domestic Violence Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION [APL] NO.664 OF 2011
Gautam s/o Jairam Gavai,

V
Sau. Ragini alleged w/o Gautam,Gavai, 
CORAM : KUM. INDIRA JAIN, J.
DATED : JANUARY 20, 2017.

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Whether relief claimed in memorandum of appeal determines value of appeal for purposes of court-fee?

The question for determination in this appeal is whether the order of the Judicial Commissioner demanding additional court-fee can be sustained in law. A memorandum of appeal, as provided in article 1 of Schedule I of the Court-Fees Act, has to be stamped according to the value of the subject-matter in dispute in appeal; in other words, the relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal determines the value of the appeal for purposes of court-fee. The only relief claimed in the memorandum of appeal was the first one mentioned in the plaint. This relief being purely of a declaratory character, the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped under article 17 of Schedule II.

10. It is always open to the appellant in an appeal to give up a portion of his claim and to restrict it. It is further open to him, unless the relief is of such a nature that it cannot be split up, to relinquish a part of the claim and to bring it within the amount of court-fee already paid : Brahmanandam v. Secretary of State for India I.L.R.(1930)Mad. 48; Ram Prasad v. Bhiman I.L.R. (1905) All. 151; Karam Chand v. Jullundur Bank Ltd A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 543; Neelachalam v. Narasingha Das MANU/TN/0263/1931 : AIR1931Mad716 ; Sah Ramchand v. Pannalal MANU/UP/0232/1929 : AIR1929All308 ; Chuni Lal v. Sheo Charanlal Lalman MANU/UP/0189/1925 : (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 756. The plaintiffs in express terms relinquished the second relief they had claimed in the plaint, in their memorandum of appeal. For the purpose of deciding whether the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped according to the subject-matter of the appeal, it was not open to the Judicial Commissioner to canvass the question whether the suit with the second prayer eliminated from it fell within the mischief of the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. That was a question which related to the merits of the appeal and did not concern its proper institution. On this ground, therefore, the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction to demand additional fee from the plaintiffs and the appeal could not be dismissed for failure to meet it. We are thus of the opinion that the order demanding additional court-fee on the memorandum of appeal as it stood, that is, minus the second prayer, was erroneous and we hold that the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped, as the subject-matter of the appeal was purely of a declaratory character.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1950

Decided On: 10.11.1952

Nemi Chand and Anr. Vs. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.C. Mahajan, S.K. Das, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1953 SC 28

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Whether plaintiff can get past mesne profit if said relief is not claimed in plaint?

"Order XX Rule 12 C. P. C. enables the court to pass a decree for both past and future mesne profits but there are important distinctions in the procedure for enforcement of the two claims. With regard to past mesne profits the plaintiff has an existing cause of action on the date of institution of the suit. In view of Order, VII, Rules 1, 2 and 7 C. P. C., and Section 7(1) of the Court-fees Act a plaintiff must plead his cause of action, specifically claim a decree for past mesne profits, value the claim approximately and pay court-fees thereon. With regard to future mesne profits, the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of institution of the suit and it is not possible for him to plead this cause of action or to value it, or to pay court-fee thereon at the time of institution of the suit. Moreover, he can obtain relief in respect of this future cause of action only in a suit in which provisions of Order XX rule 12 apply. But, in a suit to which the provisions of Order XX Rule 12 apply, the court has discretionary power to pass a decree directing an enquiry into future mesne profits and the court may grant a general relief though it is not specifically asked for in the plaint."

Madras High Court

C. Vasantha vs S.C. Pandian on 26 July, 1977

Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 Mad 138, (1978) 1 MLJ 1

Bench: R Rao, R Pandian

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Whether court can grant relief which is not claimed by plaintiff?

 In the present case, the plaintiff as well as the contesting defendant both alleging independent right, title and interest over the disputed plot, it was not for the court of appeal below to make out a new case for the parties and to hold that the plaintiff and the contesting defendants were entitled to half and half and that they were in joint possession The court cannot make out a new case for a party. It is true that the courts are bound to take into consideration all the rights of the parties to the suit, both legal and equitable, and give effect thereto by their decrees as far as possible but the courts are not at liberty to grant a relief either not sought for in the plaint or that does not naturally flow from the grounds of claim as stated in the plaint.

Patna High Court

Gobind Prasad Sinha vs Mst. Kulwanti And Ors. on 15 March, 1984

Equivalent citations: AIR 1985 Pat 31

Bench: A K Sinha

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When doctrine of laches will act as bar for getting relief from court?

“The doctrine of laches” is based upon maxim that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their
rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which,
taken together with the lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in Court of
equity. The elements of laches are – (i) unreasonable lapse of
time, (ii) neglect to assert a right or claim, (iii) to the detriment
of another. If these three elements are met, then the doctrine
of laches will act as a bar in Court.
 Laches is, therefore, considered as an unreasonable
delay in pursuing a right or claim. In a way it prejudices the
opposing party. When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable
defence, or doctrine. The person invoking laches is asserting
that an opposing party has slept of on his “right” and that as a
result of this delay, circumstances have changed such that it is
no longer just to grant the petitioner’s claim. To put in other
way, failure to assert one’s right in a timely manner results in a
claim being barred by laches.
 Laches is a defence to a proceeding in which a
petitioner seeks equitable relief. Cases in equity are
distinguished from cases at law by the type of remedy, or
judicial relief, sought by the petitioner. Generally, law cases
involve a problem that can be solved by the payment of
monetary damages. Equity cases involve remedies directed by
the Court against a party. The law encourages a speedy
resolution for every dispute. Cases in law are governed by
statutes of limitation, which are lodged that determine how long
a person has to file a law suit before the right to sue expires.
Different types of injuries have different time periods in which
to file a law suit. Laches is the equitable equivalent of statutes
of limitation. However, unlike statutes of limitation, laches
leaves it up to the Court to determine, based on the unique
facts of the case, whether a petitioner has waited too long to
seek the relief.
In the case of Shankara Cooperative Housing
Society Limited Vs. M. Prabhakar & ors., reported in
(2011) 5 SCC 607, the Apex Court in para 46 and 47 has held
as follows:-
“46. Delay and laches is one of the factors that
requires to be borne in mind by the High Courts
when they exercise their discretionary power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In
an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his rights taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time and other circumstances. 
47. The Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co.
V. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which was approved
by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. V. Industrial Court,
AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC V.
Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329,
has stated: (Lindsay Petroleum Co. Case, LR pp.
239-40).
 “Now the doctrine of laches in courts of
equity is not an arbitrary or a technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust
to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy,
yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay
are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as it relates to the remedy.”
THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
W.P.(C) NO. 426 OF 2013

Shri Prasanna Hari Jamatia,
V
The State of Tripura,

BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. DEEPAK GUPTA
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. C. DAS

Dated : 03.03.2015.

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Whether court can grant relief which is not claimed by party?

In the case of Manohar Lal -vs- Ugrasen & Ors. (supra) the Apex Court held :

"In Trojan & Co. -vs- Nagappa Chettiar (AIR 1953 SC

235) this Court considered the issue as to whether relief not asked for by a party could be granted and that too without having proper pleadings. The Court held as under: (AIR p.240, para 22) "22..... It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate it it an alternative case." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar observing that a party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed.

Dealing with the same issue, this Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi held: (SCC p.246, para 30) "30. .... Though the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner."

In Fertilizer Corpn. Of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath this Court held that "the High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for".

In view of the above, law on the issue can be summarised that the court cannot grant a relief which has not been specifically payed by the parties. 

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Glodyne Technoserve Ltd vs State Of M. P. Reported In on 19 March, 2013

            M.A.T. 231 of 2013
                     with
            A.S.T. 38 of 2013

                     

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Whether court can decide jurisdiction of court on basis of reliefs claimed dehors factual averments made in plaint?

 On this background, if we turn to the contents of the plaint itself, then it is apparent that under the guise of getting established his civil rights given under the settlement deed, the plaintiff has also surreptitiously added certain aspects which indeed touch the business and working of the trust itself. For example, in paragraph 16 of the plaint, he has stated that the defendants are obstructing him from supervising the construction work of the new temple. In fact, this act of so called supervision over the construction of new temple is not at all the right given to the plaintiff under the settlement deed and the new construction is the sole matter within the discretion of the trustees under the registered trust and if any relief is sought for that purpose, then it will definitely require interference from this Court. It is well settled law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai and Ors. wherein, it is laid down that a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, the averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed dehors the factual averments made in the plaint. The court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If we follow this ratio vis-a-vis the contents and letter & spirit of the plaint itself, there is no doubt whatsoever that the plaintiff has very cleverly blended his private rights in the affairs of the trust which cannot be allowed in law. 

Bombay High Court

Datta Devasthan Trust, Through ... vs Milind Govind Kshirsagar And Ors. on 28 February, 2007

Equivalent citations: 2007 (5) BomCR 460, 2007 (3) MhLj 148

Bench: P Kakade

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