Showing posts with label benami prohibition Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label benami prohibition Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 10 May 2026

Rejecting Benami Claims at the Threshold: Supreme Court’s 08.05.2026 Order VII Rule 11 Judgment Critically Examined

 



Executive overview

In its judgment MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 2026 INSC 465  dated 8 May 2026, the Supreme Court has converted Order VII Rule 11 CPC from a largely under‑used procedural filter into a robust jurisdictional gatekeeper, particularly in suits tainted by benami arrangements, unlawful land transactions and disqualifications under succession law. The decision arises from a challenge to a trial court order rejecting a plaint as barred under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 ("Benami Act") and Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which was reversed by the Karnataka High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court restores and fortifies the approach of the trial court, while laying down an exacting standard for pleadings that seek to dress up benami and unlawful claims as innocuous civil disputes.

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Supreme Court: A plaintiff arraigned as the principal accused in the murder of a testator is prima facie disqualified from claiming succession rights under that testator's Will

 25.5. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which such person committed or abetted the commission of murder. Section 27 further declares that where a person is so disqualified, the property shall devolve as if such person had predeceased the intestate. Section 30 recognises testamentary succession and enables any Hindu to dispose of property by Will or other testamentary disposition in accordance with the Indian Succession Act, 1925 or any other applicable law. Thus, the Hindu Succession Act contemplates both intestate and testamentary succession. Consequently, the bar under Section 25 applies equally to a person who seeks to inherit the estate of the deceased through testamentary succession.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7370 OF 2026

[Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 7924 of 2024]

MANJULA AND OTHERS Vs    D.A. SRINIVAS 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Dated: MAY 8, 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 465.

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Saturday, 4 April 2026

Bombay HC: Whether third party has locus standi to plead on behalf of the real owner that it is he (real owner), who was to be benefited by the Benami transaction?

 It is, therefore, necessary to understand whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that the appellant was holding property Benami. The appellant's husband is not party to the suit and, therefore, he has not claimed himself to be the real owner of the property. To my mind and in terms of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions Act, the question, whether the property held Benami was for the benefit of real owner, can only be answered when the real owner either files a suit or raises a defence on this count. It is so because the intention behind the Benami transaction is known to the person in whose name the property has been purchased or the person who has purchased the property in the name of other. A third party has no locus to plead on behalf of the real owner that it is he (real owner), who was to be benefited by the Benami transaction, unless third party otherwise proves. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 616/2007

Decided On: 26.04.2024

Badrunisa Vs. Sabdar Khan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil L. Pansare, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:4870, MANU/MH/2715/2024.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Whether agreement executed by husband of original owner will be concluded contract and will bind his wife?

 The respondents have placed on record a document Exh.-78, allegedly signed by the plaintiff's husband stating therein that the suit property is agreed to be sold to the respondent No. 1. As such, the husband has denied execution of document and even if the document is presumed to be signed by the appellant's husband, it does not satisfy the ingredients of the concluded contract, at least, not against the appellant and, therefore, the question of granting protection under Section 53-A of the Act does not arise at all. {Para 17}


18. Both the Courts below have thus committed serious error of law in holding that the transaction under question was Benami and secondly that there was valid contract between the appellant and the respondents.


19. Put all together, it cannot be said that agreement dated 07.07.1995 is binding upon the appellant-plaintiff inasmuch as the document is the unilateral document, signed by the appellant's husband. The respondents failed to establish a concluded contract with the plaintiff. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 616/2007

Decided On: 26.04.2024

Badrunisa Vs. Sabdar Khan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil L. Pansare, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:4870, MANU/MH/2715/2024

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Saturday, 24 June 2023

How to appreciate evidence if son is claiming that his mother had no earnings and is holding immovable property as benamidar of his father?


Crucial question which is to be answered in the present appeal is whether the transaction i.e. the purchase of suit property under registered deed of sale dated 20.01.1970 by Lila is benami transaction. {Para 11}

12. Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 defines the expression, 'benami transaction' and equipped the appropriate authority with powers to acquire benami property. Provisions of three sections being Sections 3, 5 & 8 of the 1988 Act, which was initially a 9-section legislation, came into force with effect from 5.9.1988 whereas the remaining provisions thereof came into force from the date being 19.9.1988. Section 3 being a prohibitory legislation cannot have retrospective operation but the Section 2(a) of the Act which is a piece of declaratory legislation can have its application irrespective of its date or duration. So, definition of the expression 'benami transaction' can be borrowed from Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act in respect of the transaction held prior to promulgation of the said Act. As defined in Section 2(a) of the Act 'benami transaction' means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any other person. A transaction must, therefore, be benami irrespective of its date or duration.

13. In India, two kinds of benami transactions are generally recognized. Where a person buys a property with his own money but in the name of another person without any intention to benefit such other person, the transaction is called benami. In that case, the transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money, and he is the real owner. The second case which is loosely termed as a benami transaction is a case where a person who is the owner of the property executes a conveyance in favour of another without the intention of transferring the title to the property thereunder. In this case, the transferor continues to be the real owner. [See, the judgment delivered in the cases of Bhim Singh - vs- Kan Singh, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 72 and Pulin Behari Addy (supra)].

14. However, there is a presumption in law that the person who purchases the property is the owner of the same and such presumption can be displaced only by pleading and successfully proving that the person whose name appears in the document is not the real owner, but only a benami and heavy burden lies on the person who pleads that recorded owner is mere name-lender.

15. Now, coming to the case at hand, it can be argued that to hold the subject transaction as benami transaction, it is to be proved by the principle of preponderance of probability that although the suit property was purchased in name of Lila but the consideration money was paid or provided by her husband and not by Lila.

16. Indisputably, subject deed of sale was executed and registered on 20.01.1970. Sekhar preferring the suit in 2011 claimed that Lila, transferee was mere name-lender and Sekhar adduced his oral testimony only and he did not produce any document whereas Lila deposed in 2016 and adduced her oral accounts which found support from the evidence of DW-2 and Lila had produced all the documents relating to suit property.

17. During course of hearing, both the appellant and the respondents advanced their arguments on the issue relating to 'burden of proof'. So, main question centred around the present appeal is whether it was Sekhar who had to discharge the burden to prove that the subject sale transaction was benami transaction or it was Lila who was to prove that she purchased the suit property from own fund or 'stridhan' properties detailing the source of such fund and disclosing every details of payment of consideration money.

18. The question relating to burden of proof has been set at rest in the judgment of Jaydayal Poddar (Deceased) thr. Lrs. -vs. Mst. Bibi Hazra reported in AIR 1974 SC 171 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled as follows:

"It is well settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact or benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the courts are usually guided by these circumstances: (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale."

19. In the given case, Sekhar claimed that his mother, Lila was a mere name-lender. He deposed that at the relevant time of sale, he was not present and he could not say the actual amount of consideration money and he admitted that he did not verify from attesting witness, identifier etc. whether his father paid the consideration money and he admitted that his father never claimed himself to be the real owner of the suit property and he admitted that he did not have any document to show that his father paid the consideration money.

20. From evidence of Lila, it appears that Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life and she had no independent income of her own and she asserted that she purchased the suit property from her 'stridhan' properties. She claimed that she herself purchased the property selling her gold ornaments. Admittedly, Lila testified that during his stay in the suit property, Sekhar used to behave well with her.

21. Mr. Poddar tried to convince us that since both the parties have led evidence, question of burden of proof has lost its significance and Court should pass judgment appreciating evidence let in by the parties and since, Lila failed to disclose the particulars of her 'stridhan' properties and since, Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life having no independent income of her own, the learned Court below should have come to the conclusion that Lila was nothing but a mere name-lender.

22. At the cost of reiteration, it may be stated that a Court is required to bear in mind the well-settled principles to the effect that the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction always lies on the person who asserts it. In the Indian society, if a husband supplies the consideration money for acquiring property in the name of his wife, such fact does not necessarily imply benami transaction. Source of money is, no doubt, an important factor but not a decisive one. The intention of the supplier of the consideration money is the vital fact to be proved by the party who asserts benami. In other words, even if it is proved that Sailendra paid the consideration money, the plaintiff must further prove that Sailendra really intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone.

23. In the case before us, Sekhar could not bring any evidence even to show what was amount of consideration money and how the consideration money was paid and how the suit property was purchased and even he could not prove who paid the consideration money. He could not produce any document relating to the suit property. Title deed and all documents relating to the suit property were all along in the custody of Lila and Lila all along paid municipal tax and got the suit property mutated in her name and Sekhar could not bring any evidence on record to lead any prudent man to infer that his father had a motive to create benami in name of his mother or Sailendra intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone. Judgments relied upon by the appellant in spite of having unquestionable value of the proposition laid down therein, shall not come in aid of the appellant in the factual matrix of the case at hand.

24. As a result, we are inclined to hold that learned Court below has correctly held that Sekhar has failed to discharge his burden to prove that subject sale transaction is benami transaction and we have not found any wrong in the approach and decision of the learned Court below and we are of the view that judgment and decree impugned cannot be annihilated. 

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Sri Sekhar Kumar Roy vs Smt. Lila Roy & Another on 7 June, 2023
Present: The Hon'ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty 
&The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
Author: Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.
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Sunday, 20 November 2022

Would Benami Prohibition Act hit the transaction if the sale deed was taken in the name of a few persons even though more persons contributed money?

 This takes me to consider the next question with regard to the benami transaction. The suit property was admittedly purchased by 11 persons by equally contributing towards consideration but sale deed was taken in the name of 5 persons only. It is therefore clear that those persons in whose favour the sale deed was executed had contributed towards consideration. It is not that plaintiffs alone paid the consideration but obtained the sale deed in defendants name. Essential ingredient of benami transaction is that the real owner must contribute the entire consideration. It was a simple case of obtaining the sale deed in the name of few though large members have contributed. Parties always intended that each one of the contributor would be joint owner to the equal extent. That is so evident from agreement Ex. 42. Further defendants had not raised a plea of benami at all in their pleadings. In the absence of such a plea being raised no issue in fact could arise. In a decision reported in Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah MANU/SC/1161/1996 : Judgment Today 1996 (4) S.C. 725, Supreme Court holds that the question whether sale is benami or not is a question of fact. If it is question of fact then such a question cannot be raised for the first time in Second Appeal. Further if the grounds of appeal before the District Court are seen it would be clear that in those grounds of appeal such a plea was not at all raised. Learned Judge of the First Appellate Court therefore had erred in holding the transaction to be a benami transaction and dismissing the suit. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 448 of 1996

Decided On: 07.10.2009

Shrikant Gopalkrushna Tare and Ors.  Vs.  Vasant Nagorao Mahalley and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.L. Pangarkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1151/2009,2010(1) ALLMR 114.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the question of fact can be raised for the first time in second appeal?

 Further defendants had not raised a plea of benami at all in their pleadings. In the absence of such a plea being raised no issue in fact could arise. In a decision reported in Heirs of Vrajlal J. Ganatra v. Heirs of Parshottam S. Shah MANU/SC/1161/1996 : Judgment Today 1996 (4) S.C. 725, Supreme Court holds that the question whether sale is benami or not is a question of fact. If it is question of fact then such a question cannot be raised for the first time in Second Appeal. Further if the grounds of appeal before the District Court are seen it would be clear that in those grounds of appeal such a plea was not at all raised. Learned Judge of the First Appellate Court therefore had erred in holding the transaction to be a benami transaction and dismissing the suit.

{Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 448 of 1996

Decided On: 07.10.2009

Shrikant Gopalkrushna Tare and Ors.  Vs.  Vasant Nagorao Mahalley and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.L. Pangarkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1151/2009,2010(1) ALLMR 114.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court can grant specific performance of contract if plaintiff has prayed for grant of mandatory injunction?

Shri R.R. Deshpande learned Counsel for the respondents submits that prayer itself would show that plaintiff should have prayed for specific performance and when he makes a prayer for mandatory injunction the suit ought to be held to be hit by provisions of Clause (h) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 41(h) reads as follows:

41(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust. {Para 7}

8. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that where equally efficacies relief can be had injunction cannot be granted. The law is well settled that mofussil pleadings are to be interpreted liberally. While doing so mere reading of the prayer clause would not do. The prayer clause will have to be read in the context of the pleadings and then interpreted to hold whether the relief is in fact one for injunction or specific performance. If the plaint is read as a whole it would be very clear that plaintiffs essentially filed suit for conveyance of the plots in favour of the plaintiffs which defendants had agreed to convey. Thus what plaintiffs essentially want is conveyance of plots in their favour. 

9. If the prayer is read in this context it would be clear that plaintiffs demanded the execution of the sale deed in their favour. Even while passing a decree for specific performance the Court would have even otherwise directed execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Such a direction even in a suit for specific performance by the Court is nothing less than a mandate. The prayer clause in the instant case at the most could be said to be not very happily worded but the purport of the relief is one to seek specific performance. Simply because the words mandatory injunction are used it is not as such a suit for mandatory injunction but a suit for specific performance. The bar of Clause (h) would not apply in such cases.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 448 of 1996

Decided On: 07.10.2009

Shrikant Gopalkrushna Tare and Ors.  Vs.  Vasant Nagorao Mahalley and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.L. Pangarkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1151/2009,2010(1) ALLMR 114

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Sunday, 4 September 2022

Supreme Court Declares Section 3(2) Of Benami Transactions Prohibition Act As Unconstitutional; 2016 Amendment Act To Have Only Prospective Effect

 18. Conclusion

18.1. In view of the above discussion, we hold as under:

a) Section 3(2) of the unamended 1988 Act is declared as unconstitutional for being manifestly arbitrary. Accordingly, Section 3(2) of the 2016 Act is also unconstitutional as it is violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution.

b) In rem forfeiture provision Under Section 5 of the unamended Act of 1988, prior to the 2016 Amendment Act, was unconstitutional for being manifestly arbitrary.

c) The 2016 Amendment Act was not merely procedural, rather, prescribed substantive provisions.

d) In rem forfeiture provision Under Section 5 of the 2016 Act, being punitive in nature, can only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

e) Concerned authorities cannot initiate or continue criminal prosecution or confiscation proceedings for transactions entered into prior to the coming into force of the 2016 Act, viz., 25.10.2016. As a consequence of the above declaration, all such prosecutions or confiscation proceedings shall stand quashed.

f) As this Court is not concerned with the constitutionality of such independent forfeiture proceedings contemplated under the 2016 Amendment Act on the other grounds, the aforesaid questions are left open to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5783 of 2022 

Union of India (UOI) and Ors. Vs. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, C.J.I., Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli, JJ.

Decided On: 23.08.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/1028/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

 

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Tuesday, 16 August 2022

Whether the court can reject plaint if there are disputed question of fact?

In the present case, the controversy has arisen in an application Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the matter comes within the purview of Section 4(3) of the Act is an aspect which must be gone into on the strength of the evidence on record. Going by the averments in the Plaint, the question whether the plea raised by the Appellant is barred Under Section 4 of the Act or not could not have been the subject matter of assessment at the stage when application Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure was taken up for consideration. The matter required fuller and final consideration after the evidence was led by the parties. It cannot be said that the plea of the Appellant as raised on the face of it, was barred under the Act. The approach must be to proceed on a demurrer and see whether accepting the averments in the plaint the suit is barred by any law or not. We may quote the following observations of this Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association MANU/SC/0516/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 510:


10. Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the time of considering an application filed Under Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases only where the statement made by the Plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3367 of 2019 

Decided On: 02.04.2019

Pawan Kumar  Vs. Babulal since Deceased through L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: U.U. Lalit, J.

Citation: (2019) 4 SCC 367,MANU/SC/0461/2019

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Saturday, 3 April 2021

When can the daughter not claim that her mother is in a fiduciary relationship with her?

  To establish a fiduciary relationship of the mother (D1) with her children, the appellant has once again used the same facts and chain of reasoning. It was submitted that the compensation paid to Yashpal Sain for the acquisition of his land, was ploughed back for the purchase of the suit property and since all the legal heirs were entitled to inherit the assets of Yashpal Sain on his death, she had a 1/4th share in the suit property and therefore, D1 held it only in a fiduciary capacity for all of the legal heirs and the allotment of the suit property and the documentation in the sole name of D1 could not nullify her rights in it. It was sought to be pointed out that D1 in her letter to the Society had herself stated that she was seeking the allotment of the very plot of land earlier allotted to her husband and was seeking it only to be able to take care of her children and therefore, it was clear that she was allotted the plot of land only in a fiduciary capacity. The appellant emphasized that her siblings were minor at that time and she herself was barely 18 years old, but still contributed her share in her father’s assets towards the cost of the suit property. These facts were enough to establish that D1 was holding the suit property in a fiduciary capacity.{Para 28}

29. However, we are unable to accept this submission. Being a mother, D1 would have naturally assumed the role of the caretaker of her children including the appellant after the death of her husband. By setting out a ground for allotment of a plot to her, it cannot be assumed that D1 had entered into a fiduciary relationship with her children. Fiduciary relationships have legal connotation and are not equivalent to filial relationships. Fiduciary relationships or capacity involve the existence of a duty or obligation that is more than parental duties or obligations.

 58. The scope of fiduciary relationship consists of the following rules:

“(i) No conflict rule — A fiduciary must not place himself in a position where his own interests conflict with that of his customer or the beneficiary. There must be ‘real sensible possibility of conflict’.

(ii) No profit rule — A fiduciary must not profit from his position at the expense of his customer, the beneficiary.

(iii) Undivided loyalty rule — A fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to the beneficiary, not to place himself in a position where his duty towards one person conflicts with a duty that he owes to another customer. A consequence of this duty is that a fiduciary must make available to a customer all the information that is relevant to the customer's affairs.

(iv) Duty of confidentiality — A fiduciary must only use information obtained in confidence and must not use it for his own advantage, or for the benefit of another person.”

32. The facts and circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the suit property by D1 and its subsequent use do not establish any of the above elements. A parent would be in a fiduciary relationship with an offspring only when the child lacks legal capacity due to minority or disability and the relationship discloses an absolute dependency on the parent for decision making. The appellant was 18 years old and legally major when the suit property was purchased. Her very case is that she consciously allowed her mother to take the property in her own name and voluntarily, even paid for it. There are no facts pleaded to show how D1 had ever established superior control over the appellant and took over her responsibility. No duty or obligation is stated to have been taken by D1 to advice the appellant or that the appellant was completely dependent on D1 for such advice. Rather, according to the appellant, her husband had all along helped D1 in dealing with the suit property. There is no pleading to the effect that a Trust had been created for the children of late Yashpal Sain and D1 had been appointed its Trustee.

33. In short, there is nothing to show that D1 had taken the allotment of the suit property for the benefit of her family and that she was holding it in trust for her children and that in view of the fiduciary nature of her title, even if the documents are recorded only her name, the appellant had a right to claim a share in the property. The decision in Marcel Martins Vs. M. Printer and others, (2012) 5 SCC 342 is distinguishable on facts as in that case, the Municipal Authorities had insisted on mutating the property only in the name of one legal heir whereas the husband and all children of the deceased owner had inherited the property jointly on her death. Here the suit property was not in existence at the time of the death of Yashpal Sain as it was allotted to D1after his death.

34. While the mother may be ethically and morally bound to do the best in the interests of her children, there is no legal duty placed on her to act solely in the interests of her children (unless minor or disabled), unlike a situation where apart from being a mother, she was required to act as their Trustee in a Trust created for their benefit or was the Karta of an HUF obligated to act in the best interest of the coparceners. When no fiduciary capacity has been established, it is apparent that the appellant’s claim is not covered under Section 4(3)(b) either. This Exception is also not available to the appellant to escape the rigours of the prohibition of Section 4 of the Benami Act and the learned Single Judge rightly held the claim to be barred by law.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Date of Decision: 03rd November, 2020

 RFA (OS) 63/2018

SAVITA ANAND  Vs  KRISHNA SAIN 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ASHA MENON

[VIA VIDEO CONFERENCING]

JUSTICE ASHA MENON

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Tuesday, 1 September 2020

Whether the widow of one brother can claim Benami joint ownership of the property if it is in the name of another brother?

Furthermore, it is essential to observe that the present appellant's claim also does not fall within the exception (iii) to Section 2(9)(A) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which reads to the effect as under:-

"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

(8) "benami property" means any property which is the subject matter of a benami transaction and also includes the proceeds from such property;

(9) "benami transaction" means,--

(A) a transaction or an arrangement--

(a) where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and

(b) the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration,

except when the property is held by--

(i) .

(ii) .

(iii) any person being an individual in the name of his spouse or in the name of any child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual;

(iv) .",



as observed by this Court in Deepak Aggarwal & Anr. Vs. Shakuntala Devi (Supra), the benefit of the said provision also can only be considered to be in relation between the individual who has paid for the purchase of any property as consideration in the name of his spouse or in the name of the child of any such individual and can certainly not relate back to any other property or joint property or an HUF property or any trust property in relation to which there is only an averment made on behalf of the appellant in the written statement that the property in question was purchased with the funds of her deceased spouse or her father in law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA
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Whether the court must frame an issue and record evidence if the defendant takes plea of Benami joint owner of the property?

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the respondents on the verdict of this Court in Bhavna Khanna Vs. Subir Tara Singh decided on 01.02.2019 in CS (OS) No. 356/2016 with observations in para 23 thereof wherein it was observed to the effect:

"Be that as it may, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 which came into force on 5th September, 1988 i.e. much prior to the sale deed dated 16th December 2003, defined a benami transaction as a transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another persons. Section 3 thereof barred all persons from entering into benami transaction. Section 4 of the Act barred any defence in any suit, claim or action based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person. The claim of the defendant that out of total sale consideration of Rs. 55 Lacs, Rs. 39.5 was contributed by him but the sale deed of the property obtained in the exclusive name of his wife Dr. Rachana Khanna falls within the definition of benami transaction and which transaction was barred on the date of sale deed and the defendant is also barred from defending this suit on the plea of being the benami joint owner of the property. The said Act was, vide amendment of the year 2016, renamed as Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,1988 and through there has been an overhaul of all the provisions of the earlier statute but the effect remains the same. Section 4 bars a defence in respect of any property held benami. The defence of the defendant in the present suit is thus barred by the said law and once the defence is barred, again permitted evidence to be led would be only at the cost of the valuable time of this Court and the Court ultimately after recording of evidence also will be bound to decide in accordance with law. It is for this reason that I say that the defence of the defendant of joint ownership does not raise any material proposition of fact or law for an issue to have been framed thereon."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anu Malhotra, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1402/2020
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Monday, 29 June 2020

Whether the court can reject the plaint at the initial stage on the ground that the Benami Prohibition Act bars suit?

 In the present case, the controversy has arisen in an
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Whether the matter
comes within the purview of Section 4(3) of the Act is an
aspect which must be gone into on the strength of the evidence
on record. Going by the averments in the plaint, the question
whether the plea raised by the appellant is barred under
Section 4 of the Act or not could not have been the subjectmatter
of assessment at the stage when application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was taken up for consideration. The
matter required fuller and final consideration after the
evidence was led by the parties. It cannot be said that the plea
of the appellant as raised on the face of it, was barred under
the Act. The approach must be to proceed on a demurrer and
see whether accepting the averments in the plaint the suit is
barred by any law or not. We may quote the following
observations of this Court in Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] : (SCC p. 515,
para 10)
10. Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears
from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.
Disputed questions cannot be decided at the time of
considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases
only where the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint,
without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by
(emphasis added)

23. If we go strictly by the averments made in the plaint and the
documents filed by the appellant/plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the
suit ought not to have been rejected outright under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
on the ground that the pleas taken by the appellants/plaintiffs are barred
under Section 4(3) of the unamended Benami Act. In our view, the matter
would require a more comprehensive consideration after permitting the
parties to lead evidence in the case. Order VII Rule 11 CPC was not the
appropriate stage for testing the veracity of the pleas taken in the plaint and
return any finding on the merits of the said plea taken by the
appellants/plaintiffs in the plaint or to extensively examine the underlying
intent of the parties on a perusal of the documents filed by the appellants. On
a bare reading of the averments made in the plaint read in conjunction with
the documents placed on record, we are of the opinion that sufficient
material facts have been disclosed requiring determination only after a
proper trial. At the stage of deciding an application moved by the
respondents under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, there was no occasion for the
court to have taken pains to interpret and analyse the documents filed by the
appellants/plaintiffs to hold in favour of the respondents.
24. In the instant case where it has been asserted that the suit premises
was purchased in the name of the respondent No.1, but from the exclusive
contributions made by late Shri R.P. Dhir and therefore in reality, was meant
for the benefit of all the family members, the real test would be the source
from which the purchase money came from, the nature and status of
possession of the property after its purchase, the motive if any for giving the
transaction a Benami colour, the position of the parties and their inter se
relationship, between the appellants/plaintiffs and the respondent No.1, the

overall conduct of the parties in dealing with the suit premises after it was
acquired, etc. [Refer: Jaydayal Poddar (Deceased) through LRs and Anr. vs.
Mst. Bibi Hazra and Ors. reported as (1974) 1 SCC 3] It would therefore be
imperative to weigh the evidence in the instant case for the court to
conclusively decide as to whether the appellants/plaintiffs can succeed in
their claim that the respondent No.1 is holding the suit premises in a
fiduciary capacity, for the benefit of all the family members.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RFA(OS) 73/2019 and CM APPL. 35637-35638/2019
Date of decision: 01.05.2020

IN THE MATTER OF:
NEERU DHIR Vs KAMAL KISHORE DHIR 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ASHA MENON
HIMA KOHLI, J.
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Friday, 3 April 2020

Whether a person contributing money in the purchase of immovable property can claim title in it or can only recover money paid by him?

Merely because the money for purchase of plot underneath the property and/or for making construction thereon may have flowed from the
defendant No. 3/counter-claimant Ravinder Khanna to the defendants No. 1 & 2, does not make the property of the defendant No. 3/counter-claimant Ravinder Khanna in law and the right, if any of the defendant No. 3/counter-claimant Ravinder Khanna was only for recovery of the amounts so paid by him to defendants No. 1 & 2 with interest, if entitlement thereto is proved. The said question is no longer res integra. Reference in this respect may be made to K.L. Garg Vs. Rajesh Garg MANU/DE/0321/2013, Kalpana Balupuri Butta Vs. Pritendra Kumar Butta MANU/DE/2912/2018, Satya Prakash Vs. Natho Devi MANU/DE/2656/2018 and Satish Kumar Gupta Vs. Shanti Swaroop Gupta MANU/DE/2338/2018.

17. Even otherwise, the claim in the Counter-Claim is in the teeth of the bar contained in the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, since known as the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. The Act, prior to its amendment and now, bars a suit, claim or action, to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or any other person, by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 210/2016, 

Decided On: 15.01.2020

 Vinay Khanna  Vs.  Krishna Kumari Khanna

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.


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Tuesday, 31 March 2020

What material facts are to be pleaded by a party claiming property to be joint family property?

I may note that the requirement of pleading in a clear cut manner as to how the HUF and its properties exist i.e. whether because of pre 1956 position or because of the post 1956 position on account of throwing of properties into a common hotchpotch, needs to be now mentioned especially after passing of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Benami Act") and which Act states that property in the name of an individual has to be taken as owned by that individual and no claim to such property is maintainable as per Section 4(1) of the Benami Act on the ground that monies have come from the person who claims right in the property though title deeds of the property are not in the name of such person. An exception is created with respect to provision of Section 4 of the Benami Act by its sub-section (3) which allows existence of the concept of HUF. Once existence of the concept of HUF is an exception to the main provision contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act, then, to take the case outside sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act it has to be specifically pleaded as to how and in what manner an HUF and each specific property claimed as being an HUF property has come into existence as an HUF property. If such specific facts are not pleaded, this Court in fact would be negating the mandate of the language contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Benami Act."

 The clear legal position is that a party which claims that a particular property is joint family property must specifically plead the origin of the HUF, whether pre 1956 or post 1956, and give sufficient particulars as to the creation of the HUF as well as the ownership of the property by the HUF.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 1214/2014

Decided On: 11.02.2020

 Rajeev Chawla  Vs. Deepak Chawla

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prateek Jalan, J.


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Thursday, 26 March 2020

Whether small cause court has jurisdiction to try the suit if the plaintiff takes inconsistent pleas of gratuitous licensee and trespasser?

Issue No. II:

Are there any contradictory pleas in the plaint to non-suit the plaintiff?

22. The petitioners here maintain that Vishala has taken contradictory pleas in the plaint. Those pleas are mutually destructive; they, in fact, denude the Small Cause Court of any jurisdiction to try the case.

23. First, I will refer to the authorities Vasanthi has relied on. In Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha, the Supreme Court has held that the Legislature having once conferred exclusive jurisdiction on one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor, it would not have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. Let me consider the next one. In another case, the High Court declared a sub-tenant trespasser and ordered his eviction. In that context, in Hiralal Vallabhram, the Supreme Court has held that once an occupant is a trespasser, the Civil Court, not the High Court, has the jurisdiction to order his eviction.

24. Parties to a suit are, it is true, entitled to make contradictory pleas in the alternative in their pleadings. So held the Supreme Court in Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad. Then, on facts, it has observed that the appellant did not attempt, during the trial, to establish accession by adverse possession. On the contrary, he wanted to make out a case of easementary rights by prescription. That plea, the Court held, was incompatible with the appellant's claim of adverse possession.

25. In Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia [MANU/SC/0302/1975 : [1976] 2 SCR 246], the Supreme Court has held that any ingenious method of construction after compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation, or inversion of the language of the pleadings runs counter to the cardinal cannon of interpretation. In other words, a pleading must be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to single out a sentence or a passage, and to read it out of the context--in isolation. Udhav Singh has further held that "it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into."

26. In Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College [MANU/SC/0043/1987 : [1987] 2 SCC], the Supreme Court has further observed that the pleadings should receive liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.

27. Coming back to the facts, I may note that in para 10 of the plaint, Vishala has pleaded that she moved to occupy the flat in February 1969. Her sister and brother-in-law followed her to the suit flat on the ground that their residence was uncomfortable and inadequate. Given their relationship, she could not object. Then, she pleads in para 26 that they are "in permissive occupation of the suit flat" along with her from 1969 to 1986, when Vishala sought their eviction.

28. In para 31, Vishala has pleaded that her sister turned dishonest and falsely advanced the benami-story. She again asserts that until "11.6.1986 the defendants were in permissive occupation. . . without any payment of charge." She has further pleaded that "from 11.6.1986, the defendants [have been] virtually trespassers in the suit flat and are hence liable to [be] vacate[d]."

29. True, when the suit was transferred, Vishala, it seems, added to the prayer clause that she is "the licensor and the defendants are the gratuitous licencees." This assertion, though, is not without foundation in the pleadings. Besides, Vishala has described her sister and brother-in-law as "virtual trespassers." In Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. [MANU/SC/1047/2004 : (2005) 1 SCC 705], the Supreme Court has held that "after determination of the tenancy, the position of the tenant is akin to that of a trespasser." Indeed, in that sense, Vishala has used the expression trespasser. This expression, I am afraid, neither contradicts nor confounds Vishala's pleas in the pleadings.

30. In Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli, the plaintiff pleaded that the licence granted to the defendant ended. So he contended that the defendant's possession was wrongful and illegal, and was "that of a trespasser." The plaintiff also wanted the court to declare the defendant a "trespasser." In this context, a Division Bench of this Court has examined whether a Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction.

31. Is the suit really in substance a suit for a declaratory decree or an injunction, or a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property camouflaged in the guise of a suit for a declaration and injunction? To answer this question, Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli has held that "it is the determination of the issue whether the licence has come to an end or not which would give the right to the plaintiff to obtain the relief of possession." The declaration sought does not, according to it, change the real nature of the suit. Finally, Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli has interpreted Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and held that this provision speaks of "all suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in Greater Bombay". Significantly, the words used in Section 41 are "suits relating to the recovery of possession" and not "suits for possession". Then, it has concluded that despite the plaintiff's prayer for a declaration that the defendant is a trespasser, the Small Cause Court can try the suit.

32. After all, litigation is not mere logomachy--a fight over words; it is a fight over intentions. The intentions result in deeds, and the deeds get described in words. The words, as they describe the deeds, take their roots from the intentions.

33. An occupier may be a 'tenant', a licencee included, or a 'trespasser', one with a positive connotation and the other with a negative connotation. And 'occupier', on the other hand, is value neutral. Every word has a penumbral meaning, besides its core content. We do not, nor can we, always weigh words in the semantic scales; of course, they never remain in the prescriptive bounds, too. I may recall Anthony Burgess's coruscating comment on the imprecision of the language: Language has, in fact, many of the qualities possessed by the human beings themselves: it tends to be emotional when pure reason is required, it is sometimes unsure of what it means, it changes from meaning, sound. It is slippery, elusive, hard to fix, define, delimit.1 Glanville Williams classifies as a common error 'the idea that the words are somehow important of themselves, and irrespective their symbolic function."2 Edward de Bono may be right when he says "words [in a sense] are encyclopedias of ignorance because they freeze perceptions at one moment in history and then insist we continue to use these frozen perceptions when we should be doing better."3

34. So I hold that Vishala's suit pleadings are not contradictory; they do not denude the Small Cause Court of its jurisdiction, either. Vasanthi and others are not trespassers in the statutory sense, though they may be in the sense Atma Ram Properties used.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 36 of 2018

Decided On: 17.09.2019

Vasanthi Shridhar Bangera Vs. Vishala Bokapatna Laxman

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.


Citation: AIR 2020 Bom 31
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Sunday, 22 December 2019

Whether in eviction proceeding landlord is required to prove absolute ownership?

Qua the challenge to ownership of the respondent as also to relationship of owner-tenant between the parties, the learned Trial Court has noted the respondent has purchased the subject property from one Jitender Kumar Sachdeva and Smt. Iqbal Kaur, predecessors in title vide registered a sale deed dated 02.06.2012. A copy thereof has been placed on record and thus the respondent has become the sole and absolute owner of the premises in question. Admittedly, the petitioner has not denied the execution of the sale deed in favour of the respondent by the predecessors in title. His assertion that the respondent was unemployed and a student at the time of the purchase of the property and hence the transaction is hit by the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act is a frivolous argument. All that the respondent need to show in these proceedings is the respondent/owner has a better title than the tenant/petitioner and nothing more. The respondent is not obliged to prove absolute ownership as is required under the Transfer of Property Act, since this is not a lis determining his title.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 398/2018 and CM Appl. 33400/2018

Decided On: 10.01.2019

 Neelam Sharma Vs.   Ekant Rekhan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Yogesh Khanna, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 464
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Saturday, 26 October 2019

Guidelines of Supreme Court for determining whether a transaction is benami transaction

In the case of Thakur Bhim Singh (Supra) this Court in paragraph 18 observed and held as under:

18. The principle governing the determination of the question whether a transfer is a benami transaction or not may be summed up thus: (1) the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who asserts that it is such a transaction; (2) it is proved that the purchase money came from a person other than the person in whose favour the property is transferred, the purchase is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the person who supplied the purchase money, unless there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true character of the transaction is governed by the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money and (4) the question as to what his intention was has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the parties, the motives governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct, etc.

8.2. In the case of P. Leelavathi (Supra) this Court held as under:

9.2 In Binapani Paul case (Supra), this Court again had an occasion to consider the nature of benami transactions. After considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this Court in that judgment observed and held that the source of money had never been the sole consideration. It is merely one of the relevant considerations but not determinative in character. This Court ultimately concluded after considering its earlier judgment in the case of Valliammal v. Subramaniam MANU/SC/0699/2004 : (2004) 7 SCC 233 that while considering whether a particular transaction is benami in nature, the following six circumstances can be taken as a guide:

(1) the source from which the purchase money came;

(2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase;

(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour;

(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar;

(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and

(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (supra), SCC p. 7, para 6)

8.3. After considering the aforesaid decision in the recent decision of this Court in the case of P. Leelavathi (Supra), this Court has again reiterated that to hold that a particular transaction is benami in nature the aforesaid six circumstances can be taken as a guide.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4805 of 2019 

Decided On: 09.05.2019

Mangathai Ammal  Vs.  Rajeswari and Ors.
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Whether property in the name of wife can be treated as ancestral property if husband has made part payment of sale consideration?

 The first reason which is given by the learned Trial Court while holding the suit properties as benami transactions is that part sale consideration was paid by Narayanasamy Mudaliar at the time of the purchase of the property vide Sale Deed Exh. B3. As held by this Court in catena of decisions referred to hereinabove, the payment of part sale consideration cannot be the sole criteria to hold the sale/transaction as benami. While considering a particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the nature of transaction. The intention of the person, who contributed the purchase money, has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances; the relationship of the parties; the motives governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct etc. It is required to be noted that Narayanasamy Mudaliar, who contributed part sale consideration by purchasing property at Exh. B3, might have contributed being the husband and therefore by mere contributing the part sale consideration, it cannot be inferred that Sale Deed in favour of the Defendant No. 1-wife was benami transaction and for and at behalf of the joint family. Therefore, the Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in holding the suit properties as benami transactions/ancestral properties on the basis of the document at Exh. B3.

9.2. Similarly, merely because of the stamp duty at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 was purchased by Narayanasamy Mudaliar, by that itself it cannot be said that the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 in favour of Defendant No. 1 was benami transaction. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4805 of 2019 

Decided On: 09.05.2019

Mangathai Ammal  Vs.  Rajeswari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 2918
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