Showing posts with label Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016. Show all posts

Sunday, 29 March 2026

RPwD Act, 2016: A Notification May Designate the Special Court, But Cannot by Itself Confer Direct Cognizance

 Author’s Note: The question is not whether offences under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 deserve prompt and effective prosecution; they certainly do. The real issue is narrower and jurisdictional: when a Court of Session is notified as a Special Court under Section 84, does that notification alone authorize the court to take direct cognizance or entertain remand at the threshold stage? The safer answer is in the negative unless the parent statute or otherwise applicable criminal procedure expressly permits it.

1. Statutory Background

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Wednesday, 26 November 2025

LLM Notes: Understanding Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities



Human rights of disabled persons form a comprehensive framework ensuring their full participation in society, dignity, and equal treatment. This is built on international conventions and national legislation that have evolved from viewing disabled persons as objects of charity to recognizing them as rights-bearers with agency and autonomy.

International Framework

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted by the United Nations in 2006, serves as the principal international treaty on disability rights. India ratified this convention on October 1, 2007. The CRPD represents a paradigm shift from a medical model of disability—which emphasizes impairment and treatment—to a social rights model that recognizes disability as resulting from barriers created by society. The convention has been ratified by 191 parties including 190 states and the European Union as of November 2024.

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Sunday, 26 October 2025

Criminal Offences and Trials under The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: Role of JMFC and Session Judge

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 stands as a monumental piece of legislation that not only grants comprehensive rights to persons with disabilities but also creates a robust criminal justice framework to protect them from atrocities and discrimination. While much attention is given to the rights and entitlements under this Act, the penal provisions and trial procedures remain lesser explored territories that demand judicial scrutiny and understanding.

The Criminal Justice Architecture Under RPWD Act 2016

The RPWD Act 2016 represents a paradigm shift from the erstwhile Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Chapter XVI of the Act (Sections 89-95) creates a comprehensive penal framework that criminalizes various forms of discrimination, atrocities, and violations against persons with disabilities, transforming what were once civil wrongs into cognizable criminal offences.

Section 92: The Crown Jewel of Criminal Protection

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Sunday, 26 January 2025

Kerala HC: Under S.14 Disabilities Act, District Court And Designated Authority Have Concurrent Jurisdiction To Grant Limited Guardianship

The learned Government Pleader, Smt. K.B Sony, as well as the Central Government Counsel, Sri. Girish Kumar submits that, as per Section 14 (1) of the Act, the District Court or the designated authority has concurrent jurisdiction when entertaining a petition. The party is given the option of either the jurisdiction of the District Court or the designated authority. Therefore, the legislature, in its wisdom, had drafted the section to give concurrent jurisdiction to the District Court as well as the designated authority. {Para 11}


12. A combined reading of Section 14 (1) coupled with Rules 4, 7 and 8 of the Kerala Rules, it is amply clear that the District Court or the designated authority notified by the State Government has concurrent jurisdiction to entertain a petition or appointment of a limited guardian of person who is coming under the definition of 'person with disability' under Section 2(s) of the Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

FAO No. 32 of 2023

Decided On: 20.10.2023

Abootty K.A. Vs. Kolangottil Pathumma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Basant Balaji, J.

Citation: 2023:KER:69216, MANU/KE/3830/2023.

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Kerala HC: Parliament In Its Wisdom Permits Only Limited Not Permanent Guardianship For Mentally Disabled Person Under PwD Act

A co-joint reading of the above-extracted

provisions substantiates that the District Court or the

designated Authority are empowered to appoint a

limited guardian for a person who is suffering from a

disability as defined under Section 2(s) of the

Disabilities Act, which includes mental disability. {Para 9}

10. It is as per the provisions of the

Disabilities Act that the designated authority had

passed Exts.P14 and P15 orders.

11. On an analysis of the scheme of the

Disabilities Act, a person can only be appointed as a

limited guardian because the office of guardianship

operates on a mutual understanding and trust between

the guardian and the person with a disability for a

specific purpose or situation or to take a particular

decision in accordance to the will of the person with a

disability. Presumably, it is in the above context that the

Parliament, in its wisdom, has only permitted limited

guardianship and not permanent guardianship.

Therefore, the concept of permanent guardianship is

alien to the Disabilities Act. Similarly, there is no

provision under the National Trust Act to appoint a

guardian for a person with mental illness. (Read the

decision of this Court in Latha T.B @ Latha Ravi and

others v. Union of India [2021(3) KHC 304].

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO.25127 OF 2024

BINDUMOL A T  Vs  UNION OF INDIA

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

 8TH DAY OF JANUARY 2025.

Citation: 2025:KER:1151

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Saturday, 19 March 2022

Supreme court: State's Transfer Policy Must Give Consideration To Importance Of Protecting Employees' Family Life

The State while formulating a policy for its own employees has to give due consideration to the importance of protecting family life as an element of the dignity of the person and a postulate of privacy. How a particular policy should be modulated to take into account the necessities of maintaining family life may be left at the threshold to be determined by the State. In crafting its policy however the State cannot be heard to say that it will be oblivious to basic constitutional values, including the preservation of family life which is an incident of Article 21.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

 Civil Appeal No. 1243 of 2022;

SK Nausad Rahaman & Ors. Vs Union of India and Ors.

Coram: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud; Vikram Nath, JJ.

Dated:  March 10, 2022 

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Tuesday, 27 April 2021

Whether an employee should get alternative work and back wages if he acquires a physical disability during his service?

 Further, this arbitrary imposition under Clause 11 is in the teeth of the provisos to Sub Section (4) of Section 20 of the 2016 Act which read as under :

“Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is

not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to

some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the

employee against any post, he may be kept on a

supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he

attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.”

{Para 17}

18. The above provisos mandate that the Petitioners ought to be shifted to an alternative post with MSRTC with the same pay scale and service benefits and if it is not possible for MSRTC to adjust the Petitioners against any post immediately, they have to be kept on supernumerary posts until suitable posts are available or they attain the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. This is a mandate under the 2016 Act and a statutory right granted to the Petitioners. This right cannot be violated by Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular. MSRTC has no right and is in fact prohibited from treating the intervening period between the medical examination and a decision thereon as leave without pay. The very idea of restoring an employee to a position with the same pay scale and service benefits which he or she held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the action of termination taken by the employer.

19.  In our opinion, the Petitioners’ reinstatement by MSRTC entitles the Petitioners to claim back wages in their entirety. The denial of back wages to the Petitioners who have suffered due

to their disability would amount to indirectly punishing the Petitioners concerned and rewarding MSRTC by relieving them of their obligation to pay back wages. This would be wholly inequitable and unjust. This would be in contravention of the 2016 Act, as also in contravention of the Constitution of India. As a result, we are of the considered opinion that Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular is ultra vires the 2016 Act, as also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we hereby quash and set-aside Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular.

20. Keeping in line with the mandate of Section 20 of the 2016 Act, we order and direct MSRTC to provide each one of the Petitioners with alternative posts having the same pay scale and service benefits as their earlier position.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 9762 OF 2019

Vikas Khanderao Keng, Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: S.J. KATHAWALLA &

R.I.CHAGLA, JJ.

Dated : 16th JULY, 2020

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 131

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Tuesday, 17 November 2020

Whether an employer can terminate the services of the employee if he acquires a disability during his service?

 The proviso to section 47 of The Disabilities Act 1995 referred earlier says that if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. The certificate of disability issued by the board in the Solapur hospital as referred earlier shows that petitioner suffered 10% physical disability. Considering said disability and the fact that he was unable to work as a driver and as suggested by the Civil Surgeon, Osmanabad and the board at Solapur he was required to be given other posts or other work in the light of proviso to section 47 of The Disabilities Act, 1995, but instead respondent No. 3 terminated services of the petitioner by the impugned order without considering his request to provide him alternate work made in his application (Exh. 'B') dated 08-03-2010 and without hearing him or without any enquiry. Thus, termination of the petitioner was without any fault on his part. Therefore, we hold that the impugned order is not sustainable being in violation of section 47 of The Disabilities Act, 1995. Thus, as the termination of the petitioner is illegal and is liable to be set aside, he is entitled to financial/monetary benefits of his termination period i.e. from the date of his termination till the date of his retirement on superannuation as well as retiral benefits including pension.


 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 6939 of 2017

Decided On: 01.10.2019


Shaikh Salim Shaikh Amir Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.P. Deshmukh and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/3149/2019

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Thursday, 13 August 2020

Bombay HC: Employee should not be removed from employment if he acquires a disability during his service

The Supreme Court in the case of Kunal Singh vs.
Union of India (supra) was concerned with a case where an
employee suffered from 'locomotor disability' falling within
Section 2(i)(v), but did not have a certificate of a person with
disability under Section 2(t). The Court in that case succinctly
explained the difference between the expressions “disability”
under Section 2 (i) and “person with disability” under Section
2(t), particularly in the context of Section 47 in paragraph Nos.7,
9 and 10 of the judgment, which reads thus :-
“7. From the facts, which are not in dispute, it is clear that
the disability suffered by the appellant is covered by Section
2(i)(v)read with Section 2(o) of the Act. It is also not in
dispute that this disability was acquired by the appellant
during his service. Under Section 2 "disability" and "person
with disability" are separately defined and they are distinct.
We may also notice some provisions in Chapter VI of the Act
relating to employment. Section 32 deals with identification
of posts which can be reserved for persons with disabilities.

Section 33 speaks of reservation of such percentage of
vacancies not less than 3%for persons or class of persons
with disability of which 1% each shall be reserved for
persons suffering from (i) blindness or low vision; (ii) hearing
impairment and (iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy.
Section 38 requires the appropriate Governments and local
authorities to formulate schemes for ensuring employment
of persons with disabilities. Section 47 is included in Chapter
VIII of the Act. Chapter VI deals with employment relating to
persons with disabilities including identification of posts and
reservation of vacancies for such persons. Under this
Chapter, reservation of vacancies for persons with
disabilities is made for initial appointments. Section 47 in
Chapter VIII deals with an employee of an establishment
who acquires a disability during his service.
9. Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to
persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment.
Section 47, which falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an
employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability
during his service. It must be borne in mind that Section 2 of
the Act has given distinct and different definitions of
"disability" and "person with disability". It is well settled that
in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given
defining a word/expression, they must be understood
accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be
remembered that person does not acquire or suffer disability
by choice. An employee, who acquires disability during his
service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the
Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not
protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all
those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame
and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory
nature. The very opening part of Section reads "no

establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an
employee who acquires a disability during his service". The
Section further provides that if an employee after acquiring
disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could
be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and
service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee
against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post
until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of
superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no
promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground
of his disability as is evident from sub-section (2) of Section
47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer
shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who
acquires a disability during the service. In construing a
provision of social beneficial enactment that too dealing with
disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities,
protection of rights and full participation, the view that
advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must
be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and
paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is
plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the
employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during
service.
10. The argument of the learned counsel for the
respondent on the basis of definition given in Section 2(t) of
the Act that benefit of Section 47 is not available to the
appellant as he has suffered permanent invalidity cannot be
accepted. Because, the appellant was an employee, who has
acquired 'disability' within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the
Act and not a person with disability.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10254 OF 2019

Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking 
 Vs  Sadashiv Dnyandeo Gaikwad 

CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 12th August, 2020.

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