Showing posts with label person with disabilities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label person with disabilities. Show all posts

Wednesday, 26 November 2025

LLM Notes: Understanding Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities



Human rights of disabled persons form a comprehensive framework ensuring their full participation in society, dignity, and equal treatment. This is built on international conventions and national legislation that have evolved from viewing disabled persons as objects of charity to recognizing them as rights-bearers with agency and autonomy.

International Framework

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), adopted by the United Nations in 2006, serves as the principal international treaty on disability rights. India ratified this convention on October 1, 2007. The CRPD represents a paradigm shift from a medical model of disability—which emphasizes impairment and treatment—to a social rights model that recognizes disability as resulting from barriers created by society. The convention has been ratified by 191 parties including 190 states and the European Union as of November 2024.

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Sunday, 26 October 2025

Criminal Offences and Trials under The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016: Role of JMFC and Session Judge

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 stands as a monumental piece of legislation that not only grants comprehensive rights to persons with disabilities but also creates a robust criminal justice framework to protect them from atrocities and discrimination. While much attention is given to the rights and entitlements under this Act, the penal provisions and trial procedures remain lesser explored territories that demand judicial scrutiny and understanding.

The Criminal Justice Architecture Under RPWD Act 2016

The RPWD Act 2016 represents a paradigm shift from the erstwhile Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. Chapter XVI of the Act (Sections 89-95) creates a comprehensive penal framework that criminalizes various forms of discrimination, atrocities, and violations against persons with disabilities, transforming what were once civil wrongs into cognizable criminal offences.

Section 92: The Crown Jewel of Criminal Protection

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Wednesday, 20 September 2017

Whether mental age of person will make him child under POCSO Act?

 The pivotal issue that emanates for consideration in these appeals, by special leave, pertains to interpretation of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “the POCSO Act”), and the primary argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the definition in Section 2(d) that defines “child” to mean any person below the age of 18 years, should engulf and embrace, in its connotative expanse, the “mental age” of a person or the age determined by the prevalent science pertaining to psychiatry so that a mentally retarded person or an extremely intellectually challenged person who even has crossed the biological age of 18 years can be included within the holistic conception of the term “child”.
A perusal of the provisions of the Mental Healthcare Act would again show that a distinction is made between a mentally ill person and a minor. Under Section 14, every person who is not a minor shall have the right to appoint a nominated representative, whereas under Section 15, in case of minors, the legal guardian shall be their nominated representative unless the concerned Board orders otherwise, if grounds are made out under sub-section (2).
160. Similarly, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 maintains the selfsame distinction. Sections 2(s), 4, 9, 18 and 31 of the said Act read as under:
“2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -
(a) to (r) xxx xxx xxx
(s) “person with disability” means a person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective participation in society equally with others.”
“4. Women and children with disabilities - (1) The appropriate Government and the local authorities shall take measures to ensure that the women and children with disabilities enjoy their rights equally with others. (2) The appropriate Government and local authorities shall ensure that all children with disabilities shall have right on an equal basis to freely express their views on all matters affecting them and provide them appropriate support keeping in view their age and disability.”
“9. Home and family - (1) No child with disability shall be separated from his or her parents on the ground of disability except on an order of competent court, if required, in the best interest of the child.
(2) Where the parents are unable to take care of a child with disability, the competent court shall place such child with his or her near relations, and failing that within the community in a family setting or in exceptional cases in shelter home run by the appropriate Government or non-governmental organisation, as may be required.”
“18. Adult education - The appropriate Government and the local authorities shall take measures to promote, protect and ensure participation of persons with disabilities in adult education and continuing education programmes equally with others.”
“31. Free education for children with benchmark disabilities. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rights of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, every child with benchmark disability between the age of six to eighteen years shall have the right to free education in a neighbourhood school, or in a special school, of his choice.
(2) The appropriate Government and local authorities shall ensure that every child with benchmark disability has access to free education in an appropriate environment till he attains the age of eighteen years.”
161. A perusal of the aforesaid Sections would show that children with disabilities are dealt with separately and differently from persons with disabilities. Thus, Sections 4, 9 and 31 give certain rights to children with disabilities as opposed to the other provisions, in particular Section 18, which speaks of adult education and participation thereof by persons with disabilities, obviously referring to persons who are physically above 18 years of age.
162. As a contrast to the 2012 Act with which we are concerned, the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 would make it clear that whichever person is affected by mental retardation, in the broader sense, is a “person with disability” under the Act, who gets protection. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act reads as under:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The Government of India has become increasingly concerned about the need for affirmative action in favour of persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability.
2. In acknowledgement of a wide range of competencies among these individuals, the Central Government seeks to set up a National Trust to be known as a National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability. The said Trust will be promotive, proactive and protectionist in nature. It will seek primarily to uphold the rights, promote the development and safeguard the interests of persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability and their families.
3. Towards this goal, the National Trust will support programmes which promote independence, facilitating guardianship where necessary and address the concerns of those special persons who do not have their family support. The Trust will seek to strengthen families and protect the interest of persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability after the death of their parents.
4. The Trust will be empowered to receive grants, donations, benefactions, bequests and transfers. The Central Government will make a one-time contribution of rupees one hundred crores to the corpus of the Trust to enable it to discharge its responsibilities.
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid objectives.”
163. Relevant provisions of this Act are Sections:
2(g), 2(j), 14(1) and 17(1), and the same are reproduced as under:
“2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -
(a) to (f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) “mental retardation” means a condition of arrested or incomplete development of mind of a person which is specially characterised by sub-normality of intelligence;
(h) & (i) xxx xxx xxx
(j) “persons with disability” means a person suffering from any of the conditions relating to autism, cerebral palsy, mental retardation or a combination of any two or more of such conditions and includes a person suffering from severe multiple disability.”
“14. Appointment for guardianship.-
(1) A parent of a person with disability or his relative may make an application to the local level committee for appointment of any person of his choice to act as a guardian of the persons with disability.”
“17. Removal of guardian.-(1) Whenever a parent or a relative of a person with disability or a registered organisation finds that the guardian is-
(a) abusing or neglecting a person with disability; or
(b) misappropriating or neglecting the property,
it may in accordance with the prescribed procedure apply to the committee for the removal of such guardian.”
164. A reading of the Objects and Reasons of the aforesaid Act together with the provisions contained therein would show that whatever is the physical age of the person affected, such person would be a “person with disability” who would be governed by the provisions of the said Act. Conspicuous by its absence is the reference to any age when it comes to protecting persons with disabilities under the said Act.
165. Thus, it is clear that viewed with the lens of the legislator, we would be doing violence both to the intent and the language of Parliament if we were to read the word “mental” into Section 2(1)(d) of the 2012 Act. Given the fact that it is a beneficial/penal legislation, we as Judges can extend it only as far as Parliament intended and no further. I am in agreement, therefore, with the judgment of my learned brother, including the directions given by him.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(Before Dipak Misra and R.F. Nariman, JJ.)
Ms. Eera v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
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Sunday, 20 November 2016

Whether salary can be paid to physically handicapped employee even if she does not attend duty?

Now back to the case: As has been extracted, the medical

report is unambiguous; in fact, it reads distressingly. With loss of


bowl control and faecal incontinence--and further always to be

attended to--the employee has precious little to offer to her

employer as her contribution in the workplace. Prone to infections

and potential to spread them, the employee poses danger to herself

and to others as well. The employer seems to have understood that

keeping an employee on the rolls, as if she had been in service,

must mean that she should perform the ritual of attending office.

We are afraid it is misplaced, if not perverse. We cannot, however,

hide our surprise at the vigour with which, the giant of an

employer, the Railways, has pursued the matter against a woman

who has already been beaten by fate to her wheel chair for life.

      67. We do not deny that the employer may have been spurred

by a sense of duty, but a generous spirit of accommodation might

have been much appreciated. Lest the employer's insistence on the

employee's physical presence under impossible--and perilous--

circumstances should be taken as a display of official hubris. Let



us not forget every disabled person is not a Stephen Hawkins to

contribute, still.

       68. Here is a conflict, as it seems, between the employee's

constitutional right--right to dignity and privacy--and the

employer's right--right to compel an employee to discharge the

allotted functions. Need we say, it is the constitutional right that

prevails? Nevertheless, we hasten to add, it may be a constitutional

canon but needs the facts to justify it. Here, the facts, we think,

justify this conclusion.

       69. We may end our disposition with a quote that puts the

issue in perspective: "Dignity is as essential to human life as water,

food, and oxygen. The stubborn retention of it, even in the face of

extreme physical hardship, can hold a woman's soul in her body

long past the point at which the body should have surrendered it."34




34 Laura Hillenbrand, Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption (2010,
  Random House) [Gender changed to contextualize]



Result:

      70. Under these circumstances, we hold that the learned

Tribunal has rendered Ext.P10 order in consonance with the

principle of law calling for no interference. In the facts and

circumstances, we dismiss the Original Petition as devoid of merit.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                         PRESENT:

           MR.JUSTICE P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON
                                             &
              MR. JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

          3RD DAY OF OCTOBER 2016

                              OP (CAT).No. 182 of 2016 (Z)
                           

        UNION OF INDIA,
           Vs

                FANCY BABU,
             
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Sunday, 7 August 2016

Whether court can pass judgment if wife has not filed written statement due to her financial incapacity?

No doubt, under the applicative provisions of Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment in the absence of the pleadings in defence or even to treat the allegations of fact not denied as having been admitted, but that is the general rule which does not apply against a person under disability. When the basic allegations in an action of the present kind were that the defending person was of unsound mind and even on that basis the relief of nullity was sought, the provisions of Order 8, Rule 5 would hardly be attracted. Furthermore, the rule is not an absolute one nor of universal applicability. Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order 8 confers ample discretion upon the Court to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission and sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 8 lays down one of the categories in the matter of exercise of that discretion requiring the Court to have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have or has engaged a pleader. By reason of Section 21 of the Act, though this provisions would be applicable, that application is as far as may be possible. In other words, the matter is entirely in the discretion of the Court. As indicated above, even the application for the Court expenses and maintenance was not granted and the question in such cases would be whether, in want of such interim relief, the defending wife would or would not have had the adequate legal assistance. Not even considering the application filed by the wife for costs of the proceedings is by itself a good reason to hold that the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be made applicable to the facts of the present case apart from the allegation that the defendant was a disabled person. the First Appeal Court view, therefore, that by reason of the fact that no written statement was filed the decree for divorce should follow, does not warrant acceptance.
 It must be re-stated that the Procedural Law is a hand-maid of justice. It cannot overtake nor can it be allowed to overtake to basic necessity to be fair and to judge fairly not only the cause but also the parties involved therein. If, by the mere reason of the failure to file written statement decrees in marital causes were to follow, that should be only in exceptional and clear cases. In the controversy of the present kind that would lead to hazardous result. Court is bound in this jurisdiction to weigh the matters of procedure with the end results that follow. Not as a matter of general rule flowing from the procedural law of pleadings giving rise to the inferences of admission as are enacted by sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order 8 or lawful authority to render a judgment in want of pleadings as are provided by sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, but as a matter of necessity such recourse should be justified. Looking to the consequences that attach to the dissolution of the marriages, only in the exceptional cases resort may be had to these procedural statutory rules. It was not, therefore, right for the Court in want of adequate proof, looking to the allegations in the present case, to proceed to make a decree because of the failure of the defending wife to file written statement.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Second Appeal No. 67 of 1982
Decided On: 15.02.1983
Meena Deshpande
Vs.
Prakash Shriniwas Deshpande
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.A. Masodkar, J.

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Saturday, 14 May 2016

Supreme court granted compensation of Rs ten lakh to disabled passenger who was de-boarded from plane?

Learned counsel argued that the aforesaid provision is in two
parts: one applies to persons with disability and the second party
applies to persons with disability who require assistant devices or
aids. It was argued that the proviso applies to the latter category
only whereas Jeeja Ghosh is merely a person with cerebral palsy
and did not require any assistant device or aid. The only
assistance she required was regarding her baggage which she
asked for at the time of security check-in. Thus, there was no
reason as to why she was asked to de-board the aircraft when
there was no assistant device or aids about which she ought to
have informed the airlines. It is claimed that so far as requirement
of assistance regarding baggage is concerned, she had duly
informed the officials of the airlines. Refuting the argument of
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 predicated on
Rules 22 and 141 of the Rules, 1937, it was submitted that the
Operations Manual of the airline places an obligation on the Pilot
in-charge not to commence the flight until he/she is sure of the
safety of all the passengers. In the present case, there was no
evidence to prove that Jeeja Ghosh had posed any hazard to the
safety of the Pilot in-charge or other passengers. Moreover, the
decision to de-board her was taken without even interacting with
her. The claim of respondent No.3 that blood and froth was
oozing out of the sides of her mouth is denied with the submission
that there is no evidence to prove the same. On the contrary, it is
claimed, she was completely fine and it was only the conduct of
the respondent airline which became a cause of her subsequent
sickness. Referring to the offer given by the airline to fly Jeeja
Ghosh on the very next day, it is submitted that this act on the
part of the airlines itself shows that Jeeja Ghosh was alright and
there was no medical condition which would have been prevented
her from flying. Mocking the stand of the airline that the person
having cerebral palsy would, in emergency situation, not be able
to respond to the safety instructions and she is a risk to herself
and potential danger to the lives of co-passengers also, the
submission of the petitioners is that it is in complete contravention
of CAR, 2008 which prohibits the airlines from refusing to carry a
person with disability or person with reduced mobility. The
relevant provisions in this regard have already been extracted
above.
34) After considering the respective arguments of the counsel for the
parties and going through the relevant provisions of Rules and
CAR, 2008 brought to our notice, we arrive at the irresistible
conclusion that Jeeja Ghosh was not given appropriate, fair and
caring treatment which she required with due sensitivity, and the
decision to de-board her, in the given circumstances, was
uncalled for. More than that, the manner in which she was treated
while de-boarding from the aircraft, depicts total lack of sensitivity
on the part of the officials of the airlines. The manner in which
she was dealt with proves the assertion of Shapiro as correct and
justified that 'non-disabled do not understand disabled ones'.
35) It is not in dispute that the Pilot as well as the Crew members of
the airlines are supposed to ensure the safety of all the
passengers and a decision can be taken to de-board a particular
passenger in the larger interest and safety of other
co-passengers. The question is, whether such a situation existed
when Jeeja Ghosh was de-boarded? Whether this decision was
taken by the airlines after taking due deliberations and with
medical advise? Unfortunately, the answer is a big 'NO'. Jeeja
Ghosh is a disabled person who suffers from cerebral palsy. But
her condition was not such which required any assistive devices
or aids. She had demanded assistance regarding her baggage at
the time of security check-in, from the check-in counter. For
boarding of the aircraft, she came of her own. This was noticed
not only by the persons at the check-in counter but also by
security personnel who frisked her and the attendant who
assisted her in carrying her baggage up to the aircraft. Even if we
assume that there was some blood or froth that was noticed to be
oozing out from the sides of her mouth when she was seated in
the aircraft (though vehemently denied by her), nobody even
cared to interact with her and asked her the reason for the same.
No doctor was summoned to examine her condition. Abruptly and
without any justification, decision was taken to de-board her
without ascertaining as to whether her condition was such which
prevented her from flying. This clearly amounts to violation of
Rule 133-A of Rules, 1937 and the CAR, 2008 guidelines.
Jeeja Ghosh herself is a living example who has, notwithstanding
her disability, achieved so much in life by her sheer determination
to overcome her disability and become a responsible and
valuable citizen of this country. A little care, a little sensitivity and
a little positive attitude on the part of the officials of the airlines
would not have resulted in the trauma, pain and suffering that
Jeeja Ghosh had to undergo. This has resulted in violation of her
human dignity and, thus, her fundamental right, though by a
private enterprise (respondent No.3).
47) On our finding that respondent No.3 acted in a callous manner,
and in the process violated Rules, 1937 and CAR, 2008
guidelines resulting in mental and physical suffering experienced
by Jeeja Ghosh and also unreasonable discrimination against her,
we award a sum of ₹10,00,000 as damages to be payable to her
by respondent No.3 within a period of two months from today.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 98 OF 2012
JEEJA GHOSH & ANR.
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Dated:MAY 12, 2016.
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2393,(2016) 7 SCC 761
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Notable Excerpts of Supreme court on differently abled person

 We would like to conclude this judgment by observing that to
most disabled persons, the society they live in is a closed door
which has been locked and the key to which has been thrown
away by the others. Helen Keller has described this phenomena
in the following words:
“Some people see a closed door and turn away.
Others see a closed door, try the knob and if it
doesn't open, they turn away. Still others see a
closed door, try the knob and if it doesn't work, they
find a key and if the key doesn't fit, they turn way.
A rare few see a closed door, try the knob, if it
doesn't open and they find a key and if it doesn't fit,
they make one!”
These rare persons we have to find out.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 98 OF 2012
JEEJA GHOSH & ANR. 
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .
Dated:MAY 12, 2016.
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2393,(2016) 7 SCC 761
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Monday, 16 November 2015

Bombay high court; No quotas for persons with disabilities for posts of civil judges and JMFC in Maharashtra

MUMBAI: Reservations are not applicable for judicial posts in Maharashtra, the Bombay high court has ruled. In an important order, a division bench of Justice Ranjit More and Justice Rajesh Ketkar rejected a plea that sought implementation of three per cent reservation for persons with disabilities to the posts of civil judges and judicial first class magistrates. 

"The reservation in judiciary service by the state without consulting the high court or without concurrent recommendation of the HC is an encroachment on such exclusive powers," said the judges, while pointing to Supreme Court judgments that had said an "independent judiciary is a basic structure of the constitution and the high court alone can recognise vacancies and the reservation (to judicial posts) even if provided by the state." 

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