Whether the court can quash prosecution against accused for an offence U/S 306 of IPC if no material is available him in chargesheet regarding that offence?

In the present case, at the outset, we must note that the

Applicant, a Judicial Officer, was never involved in the pending

lis, as the suit property was purchased by his brother

exclusively and only he was party to the litigation. There is no

reason for the deceased to have implicated the Applicant, as he

was not connected with the dispute at all. The material in the

charge-sheet in form of statements implicating the Applicant,

are too far fetched and definitely fall short of any instigation/

incitement and a bare reference to his presence in Miraj in the

month of May, where he is alleged to have threatened the

deceased and asked him to vacate the subject property is not

sufficient to attract instigation/incitement, as the offence is

registered on 24/06/2016. In any case, even it is not the

allegation of the prosecution that the Applicant abetted the

suicide by instigating or inciting the deceased in any manner,

as abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person

or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without

a positive act on part of the Applicant to instigate or aid in

commission of suicide by the deceased, he cannot be convicted

for an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC.

In order to attract the offence under Section 306, clear

mens rea to commit the offence has to be established, as it

requires active/direct act, leading the deceased to commit

suicide left with no other option, but in the present case, the

material in the charge-sheet falls short of proving the

ingredients of Section 306 and, hence, in our view, by

exercising the inherent power conferred under Section 482,

the purpose of it being to prevent the abuse of process or to

secure the ends of justice, we deem it appropriate to safeguard

the interest of the Applicant.

In absence of we exercising the power, the Applicant will

have to unnecessarily face the rigmarole of trial, which

ultimately would result in acquittal, as no material in the

charge-sheet collected by the prosecution attract the

ingredients of Section 306 of IPC and we would be failing in

discharge of our duty, if we do not step in and save the

Applicant from undergoing the long drawn process of trial, as

the material in the charge-sheet through close scrutiny, do not

in any manner, establish the ingredients of abetment of suicide

under Section 306 of IPC against him.

For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied that

human liberty, which is the most cherished constitutional

value, must be protected by us, by exercising the inherent

power conferred under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.959 OF 2016

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2060 OF 2024

Nasirhusen Mohiddin Jamadar Vs  The State of Maharashtra & Anr. 

CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE & MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ.

 DATED : 18 th  NOVEMBER, 2024

ORDER (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J.) :-

Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:45637-DB.

Print Page

Whether an offence of abetment to commit suicide is made out against accused if there was quarrel on the day of suicide?

 Now so far as the offence under Section 306 IPC is concerned, in a case where if any person instigates other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished for the offence under Section 306 IPC for abetting the commission of suicide. Therefore, in order to bring a case within the provision of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigating or by doing a certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Amalendu Pal (supra), mere harassment without any positive action on the part of the accused proximate to the time of occurrence which led to the suicide would not amount to an offence under Section 306 IPC.

9.1 Abetment by a person is when a person instigates another to do something. Instigation can be inferred where the accused had, by his acts or omission created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. In the instant case, the allegation against the appellant is that there was a quarrel on the day of occurrence. There is no other material on record which indicates abetment. There is no material on record that the appellant-accused played an active role by an act of instigating the deceased to facilitate the commission of suicide. On the contrary, in the present case, even the appellant-accused also tried to commit suicide and consumed pesticide. Under the circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of the case and there is no other material on record which indicates abetment, both the High Court as well as the learned trial Court have committed an error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 306 IPC.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE M.R. Shah JUSTICE Aniruddha Bose

Velladurai Vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 953 OF 2021

14th September 2021

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 441

Print Page

Whether court can convict father-in-law for offence U/S 202 of IPC if he fails to inform the authorities about the suicide of daughter-in-law?

The learned Counsel for the respondent State of Rajasthan, however, submitted that the accused would atleast be liable of having committed other offences. It may be noted that the question whether they would be liable under Section 498-A or 304-B does not arise for consideration inasmuch as these provisions were not on the statute on the day of occurrence. However, A 1 was atleast under an obligation to give information about the death of the deceased since the same was unnatural. Assuming that the prosecution has not positively proved that the death was homicidal yet from the medical evidence it is clear that it was not a natural death and consequently the death should atleast be noted as one of suicide. Even in the case of suicide an offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 is inherent. There- fore, even in the case of a suicide there is an obligation on the person, who knows or has reason to believe that such a suicidal death has occurred , to give information. In Kalidas Achamma v. The State of A.P., S.H.O. Karimnagar. I Town P.S. [1987] 2 ALT 937 it was observed as under:

In the case of every suicide abetment is inherent. Whether ultimately it is proved or not, it is a different aspect. Abetment of suicide is an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and therefore whenever a case of suicide is there, the body cannot be disposed of without informing the Police and further as provided under Section 174 Cr. PC the Police have to hold an inquest since it is an unnatural death.

In the instant case A 1, who reached his house on 18.3.82 knowing fully well that the deceased had already died, informed P.W. 8 that the deceased was in a serious condition. Likewise he informed P.W. 12 on telephone without disclosing that the deceased was already dead. However, when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house where the dead body was lying, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated. To the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 13. P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, on his own went and gave a report to the police. It can thus be seen that A 1 intentionally omitted to give the information in respect of the death of the deceased which he was legally bound to give. Section 202 1. P. C. is in the following terms:

202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform-Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

This Section punishes the illegal omission of those who under law are bound to give information in respect of an offence which he is legally bound to give particularly being the head of the family. Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed (2) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that offence and (3) that the accused was legally bound to give that information. Shri R.K. Jain, however, relied on a judgment of this Court in Harishchandrasing Sajjansingh Rathod and Another v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0114/1979 : 1979CriLJ1025 and contended that the word "Whoever" occurring in the opening part of the Section refers to a person other then the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. In that case the accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 331 and 304 read with Section 34 IPC in respect of the death of the deceased and were acquitted.-On appeal by the State the High Court, however, convicted them under Section 202 IPC A Bench of this Court while reversing the order of High Court observed thus:

We have gone through the entire evidence bearing on the aforesaid offence under Section 202 but have not been able to discern anything therein which may go to establish the aforesaid ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The offence in respect of which the appellants were indicted viz. having intentionally omitted to give information respecting an offence which he is legally bound to give not having been established, the appellants could not have been convicted under Section 202 of the Penal Code. It is well settled that in a prosecution under Section 202 of the Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable under this section. The offence under Section 304 (Part II) and the one under Section 331 of the Penal Code not having been established on account of several infirmities it is difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The High Court has also missed to notice that the word 'whoever' occurring at the opening part of Section 202 of the Penal Code refers to a person other than the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. This is so because there is no law which casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself That apart the aforementioned ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code do not appear to have been made out against the prosecution. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that the aforesaid main offences had been committed.

(emphasis supplied)

19. From these observations it is clear that there was no evidence to show that the accused therein knew or had reason to believe that the said offences have been committed and on the other hand they were made principal offenders. In such a situation the ingredients of Section 202 can not be said to have been made out. It is in this context that the meaning of the word "whoever" has been considered. But in the instant case A 1 returned to his house where the dead body was lying on 18.3.82 and the circumstances clearly go to show that he had knowledge that the deceased died of an unnatural death. Therefore he had knowledge or atleast had reason to believe that an offence had been committed even if, at that stage, he thought that it was only a suicide. Therefore it was his bounden duty particularly as head of the family to inform the authorities. He omitted to do so. On the other hand, he went about telling that the deceased was still alive and her condition was serious. But when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house and enquired, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities. Therefore all the ingredients of Section 202 are made out against him and he clearly committed the offence punishable under this Section at that stage. The fact that he himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not absolve him of his complicity in respect of the offence punishable under Section 202 IPC So far A 2 is concerned, he came to the house only after the investigation commenced. Therefore his case stands on a different footing. In the result the convictions and sentences awarded against A 1 and A 2 l are set aside. A 1, however, is convicted under Section 202 IPC and sentenced to undergo six months' R.I. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 1984

Decided On: 28.08.1991

Bhagwan Swarup  Vs. State of Rajasthan

Print Page

Whether court can convict accused for an offence U/S 306 of IPC if he was charged under S 498A and 304B of IPC?

 Both the Courts below have found the husband guilty of cruel treatment of his wife and as a result the wife committed suicide within seven years of their marriage. On such evidence the presumption which arises under Section 113A of the Evidence Act is that the husband abetted the suicide. The word "cruelty" as mentioned in the Explanation below Section 113A of the Evidence act has been given the same meaning as contained in the Explanation below Section 498A, IPC. On the fact found, 'the wilful' conduct of the husband in forcing the deceased to part with her land which she had received in marriage as "stridhana" and for that purpose concealing her postal mail was so cruel that she was driven to commit suicide. A case of conviction and sentence of accused No. 1 under Section 306, IPC has thus clearly been made out even though his acquittal for commission of the offence of 'dowry death' punishable under Section 304B, IPC is not found liable to be disturbed.

20. The learned counsel for the accused has argued that in the absence of a charge framed against the accused under Section 306 IPC, the accused cannot be convicted under the said Section.

21. From the record we find that although a charge specifically under Section 306 IPC was not framed but all facts and ingredients constituting that offence were mentioned in the Statement of Charges framed under Section 498A and Section 304B of IPC. 

22. Mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the Criminal Court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The Code of Criminal procedure has ample provisions to meet a situation like the one before us. From the Statement of Charge framed under Section 304B and in the Alternative Section 498A, IPC (as quoted above) it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing charge for offence under Section 306, IPC existed in the case. The mere omission on the part of the trial Judge to mention of Section 306, IPC with 498A, IPC does not preclude the Court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found proved. In the alternate charge framed under Section 498A of IPC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide. The provisions of Section 221 of Cr.P.C. take care of such a situation and safeguard the powers of the criminal court to convict an accused for an offence with which he is not charged although on facts found in evidence, he could have been charged for such offence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 1457 of 1995

Decided On: 25.10.2002

 K. Prema S. Rao  Vs.  Yadla Srinivasa Rao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.B. Shah, K.G. Balakrishnan and D.M. Dharmadhikari, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0890/2002,(2003) 1 SCC 217

Print Page

What is distinction between 304-B (Dowry death) and 498-A IPC?

There is a succinct distinction between the offences under Section
304-B and 498-A IPC. For an offence being brought within the purview
of dowry death, it is imperative on part of the prosecution to establish
that the death of the woman is caused within seven years of her marriage
and only when it is established that before her death she was subjected to
harassment or cruelty by her husband or any relative for or in connection
with the demand for dowry. However, in case of Section 498-A IPC, the
husband or the relative of the husband who subject a woman to cruelty
are liable for punishment and the meaning of the term ‘cruelty’ is set out
in clauses (a) and (b) to Explanation appended to the said section, which
contemplate to mutually exclusive contingencies. Thus, Section 498-A
and Section 304-B IPC make out two distinct offences. The cruelty
defined in Explanation to Section 498-A IPC may be the same which is
contemplated under Section 304-B IPC. However, under Section 498-A
IPC cruelty itself is made punishable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.503 OF 2002

Mandakini Balasaheb Kalbhor  Vs. The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, C.J. &
SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 4th SEPTEMBER, 2019.
JUDGMENT:- [Per: Smt. Bharati Dangre, J.]

Print Page

Whether husband and his relatives can be convicted for abetment of suicide of wife if they are acquitted in offence U/S 498A of IPC?

This Court in an illuminating judgment in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh MANU/SC/0654/2001 : (2001) 9 SCC 618 has stated the law as follows:

This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the Accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression-"the other circumstances of the case" used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says-"Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.

8. We find that having absolved the Appellants of the charge of cruelty, which is the most basic ingredient for the offence made out Under Section 498A, the third ingredient for application of Section 113A is missing, namely, that the relatives i.e., the mother-in-law and father-in-law who are charged Under Section 306 had subjected the victim to cruelty. No doubt, in the facts of this case, it has been concurrently found that the in-laws did harass her, but harassment is something of a lesser degree than cruelty. Also, we find on the facts, taken as a whole, that assuming the presumption Under Section 113A would apply, it has been fully rebutted, for the reason that there is no link or intention on the part of the in-laws to assist the victim to commit suicide.

9. In the absence of this vital link, the mere fact that there is a finding of harassment would not lead to the conclusion that there is "abetment of suicide".

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 790/2017 

Decided On: 24.04.2017

 Heera Lal  Vs.  State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Print Page

Whether slapping husband in presence of others amounts to instigation to commit suicide?

 In the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is that she had slapped the deceased 3 days prior to the deceased committing suicide. There is nothing to suggest that the petitioner instigated, conspired or aided in commission of suicide by the deceased. There is no allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner instigated or exhorted the deceased to commit suicide.

18. The allegation is that the petitioner slapped the deceased in presence of others. Even if one were to consider the incident of alleged slapping as instigation then one has to keep in mind that the alleged conduct should be such as to drive any normal prudent person into committing suicide. Mere act of slapping the husband in presence of others would not under normal circumstances instigate a husband to commit suicide.

19. Further, alleged suicide note relied on by the prosecution does not refer to any incident of slapping. On the other hand, the suicide note alleges that the father of the petitioner had not revealed about the deformity in the back of the petitioner on account of which the deceased's life had become a joke. The suicide note alleges that the accused had made allegations about the relationship between the deceased and his sister-in-law (brother's wife) and had also alleged that the deceased's brother was mentally unsound. The suicide note does not make any reference to any incident of slapping.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.)

Shikha Gupta v. State (GNCT of Delhi) .

Crl. Rev. P. 330/2017

Decided on January 8, 2019,

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6394

Print Page

When accused can be discharged for offence of abetment to commit suicide?

 The offence which has been sought to be charged against the
applicant is the one which is punishable under Section 306 of the Indian
Penal Code.  This offence is of abetment to commit suicide.  For abeting a
thing, as required under Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, there has
to be instigation given by one person to the another for doing the thing
or engagement with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for
doing of an illegal thing or illegal omission or intentional aiding by any
act   or   illegal   omission  or   willfully  misrepresenting  or  concealing   the
material fact which is bound to be disclosed.  Having regard to the facts
of this case, we shall be concerned in this case only with those aspects of
abetment of a thing which are in the nature of instigation or intentional
aiding.   In the case of  Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of

M.P., reported in  (2002) 5 SCC 371, referred to me by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained the
requirement of offence of abetment to commit suicide from this view
point.  The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for an instigation to be
completed,   as   contemplated   under   the   law,   there   must   be   some
incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or in other
words presence of mens rea is the necessary ingredient of the instigation.
Relevant   observations   of   the   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   as   they   appear   in
paragraph 12 are re­produced as under :
“Even if we accept the prosecution story that
the appellant did tell the deceased “to go and die”, that
itself does not constitute the ingredient of “instigation”.
The word “instigate” denotes incitement or urging to do
some   drastic   or   inadvisable   action   or   to   stimulate   or
incite.   Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary
concomitant of instigation.”
7. Bearing in mind the above referred principles of law that we
have to consider if there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the
accused or not, which is the basic requirement of Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.  Sufficiency of the material for proceeding further
against   the   accused   would   depend   upon   what   is   disclosed   by   the
witnesses, when their statements are accepted as they are.  If it is found
that if the statements of the witnesses taken at their face value, do not
disclose any material sufficient to fulfill the necessary ingredients of the
offence of abetment to commit suicide, it would have to be held that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further against the accused.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION No.146 OF 2015
Dr. Dashrath Bhande,

V
State of Maharashtra,

        CORAM  :   S.B. SHUKRE, J.
        DATE      :       19thSEPTEMBER, 2016.
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)4394

Print Page

When offence of abetment of suicide U/S 306 of IPC is not made out?

The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by
this court are clear that in order to convict a person under section 306 IPC
there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an
active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no
option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a
position that he/she committed suicide.

        33.  Generally, the person who commits suicide used to/liked to leave a
suicide note naming  certain person as responsible for his committing
suicide. Merely because a person has been so named in the suicide note we are 
not to immediately jump to the conclusion that he is an offender under
section 306 I.P.C.

        34. The contents of the suicide note and other attending circumstances
have to be examined to find out whether it is abetment within the meaning of
section 306 I.P.C. read with section 107 I.P.C. There may be a case where in
the suicide note victim had named a person, who is responsible for his
committing suicide, but, on proper analysis, section 306 I.P.C. may not be
attracted to him.

        35. Recently, in Rajamannar v. State rep. by The Inspector of Police,
Sewapet, Police Station,Thiruvallur District (Crl.O.P. No. 8230/2014 dated
3.4.2014). A-2 introduced A-1 to the deceased as a person who will get
railway jobs for money. Relying on this, the deceased collected money from
many and gave it to A-1. Ultimately, A-1 cheated him. The job seekers
pressurised the deceased to return their money. Under these circumstances,
the deceased and his family members have committed suicide and the deceased   
left a suicide note that A-2 is responsible for their death. A-2 was arrested
for an offence under section 306 I.P.C.

        36. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, this Court came to
the conclusion that prima facie section 306 I.P.C. is not attracted towards
A-2 and observed as under:
?7. On reading the entire suicide note from the beginning to end, it is seen
that A-1 duped Sugumar, who received money from many persons. They have asked    
him and humiliated him. Unable to bear this humiliation, Sugumar committed
suicide.

8. For an offence under Section 306 IPC, there are twin requirements, namely,
suicide and abetment to commit suicide. No need to explain what is suicide.
But what is abetment has to be understood. It is not stated in Section 306
IPC. It is 'instigation', 'provocation', compelling a person to do certain
things or not to do certain things. This may be by words, deeds or writing or
even by signs. May be humiliation, degrading a person in the presence of
others. The act must be such that it must force, desire, compel a person to
take the extreme decision. But, it must be a positive act. Thus, the act
alleged to have committed on the part of the accused must have played a key
role for the victim to take a decision to commit suicide.

9. If a lover commits suicide due to love failure, if a student commits
suicide because of his poor performance in the examination, a client commits
suicide because his case is dismissed, the lady, examiner, lawyer
respectively cannot be held to have abetted the commission of suicide. For
the wrong decision taken by a coward, fool, idiot, a man of weak mentality, a
man of frail mentality, another person cannot be blamed as having abetted his
committing suicide. Now, in this case, the suicide note shows that unable to
bear the humiliation given by the job seekers, Sugumar committed suicide. For
this, petitioner cannot be blamed. Further, no act or deed in the nature of a
positive act forced Sugumar and his family members emanated from the 
petitioner to force them to commit suicide. The conclusion would be Sugumar
died like a coward. Instead of protecting the family, he perished like an
unsuccessful man in life foolishly he also took along with him his other
family members also. For this, how can the petitioner be directly blamed.?

        37. Sometimes, the decision to commit suicide might be taken by the
victim himself/herself, unaccompanied by any act or instigation etc. on the
part of the accused. A person may die like a coward. On his failure in the
examination, a student may commit suicide. They are weak minded. They are  
persons of frail mentality. For their foolish mentality/decision, another
person cannot be blamed. 

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT               

DATED: 16.06.2016  

CORAM   
THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE P.DEVADASS            

Crl.A.(MD)No.142 of 2016 


Manikandan                            
Vs.

State,
rep. by the Inspector of Police,

Print Page

When Magistrate can release accused on default bail U/S 306 of IPC?

 The offence under section 306 is punishable with a maximum term of 10 years. The punishment for lesser term can certainly be awarded for the said offence. Therefore, in cases relating to the investigation into an offence punishable under section 306 of IPC sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) would be applicable; and consequently, the maximum period during which the detention of offender can be authorized, pending investigation, would be 60 days (and not 90 days). The learned Magistrate was, therefore, right in releasing the petitioner on bail.

Bombay High Court

Shakil Khan Yasin Khan vs Through Police Station Officer on 9 January, 2014

Bench: A.M. Thipsay J

Citation; 2014 CR.L.J(NOC)506 Bom

Print Page

Whether abetment to commit suicide is punishable U/S 306 of IPC if suicide abetted is not committed?

 It is lastly contended that in any view of the matter, when the same offence is punishable under two sections, accused can be forced to suffer the punishment only for the lesser offence. It is contended that attempt to commit suicide can be abetted and therefore at worst the offence would fall only under Section 309 r/w. 116 I.P.C. The offence shall then be punishable only with imprisonment for three months and consequently in any view of the matter, the offence would be bailabled. Therefore anticipatory bail is only to be granted, it is submitted.

22. In this context I take note of the observations of the Supreme Court in Satvir Singh extracted above, which shows that abetment of a mere attempt to commit suicide would be preposterous. The abetment undoubtedly was for commission of suicide and a mere abetment of the attempt to commit suicide cannot be held to be made out. More over, i must further note, as stated earlier, that the content and character of an offence of attempt to commit suicide is qualitatively different from the attempt to abet the commission of suicide. Suicide and its' attempt on the one had and abetment of commission of suicide and its attempt on the other are treated differently by law and therefore the one who abets the commission of an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide cannot be held to be punishable merely under Section 309 r/w. 116 I.P.C. To implement the scheme of law he has got to be held to be punishable under Section 306 r/w. 511 I.P.C.

23. In the above view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the miscreants, against horn allegations are raised under Section 306 r/w. 511 I.P.C. that they attempted the abetment to commit suicide by the unfortunate victim in this case can legitimately be proceeded against under Section 306 r/w. 511 I.P.C. and there is no inherent legal defect, infirmity or impossibility in such prosecution.

Kerala High Court

Berin P. Varghese And Ors. vs State Of Kerala on 18 December, 2007

Coram: R. Basant, J.

Print Page

A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

“Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of “instigation”, though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes “instigation” must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an “instigation” may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

Supreme Court of India

Praveen Pradhan vs State Of Uttranchal & Anr on 4 October, 2012

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Fakkir Mohamed Kalifulla

Print Page