Supreme Court: Hindu Daughter-in-Law Who Becomes Widow After Father-in-Law's Death Entitled To Maintenance From His Estate :

Section 19 of the Act provides for the maintenance of "widowed daughter-in-law" of the deceased Hindu. It simply contemplates that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Thus, it casts an obligation upon the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law. The said obligation subsists only during the lifetime of the father-in-law as the aforesaid provision nowhere contemplates that the daughter-in-law would be entitled to maintenance from the estate of the father-in-law. In other words, Section 19 contemplates for the maintenance of the daughter-in-law during the lifetime of father-in-law, whereas, Section 22 contemplates "maintenance of dependants" including "widowed daughter-in-law" from the estate of her father-in-law meaning thereby that a claim Under Section 22 can be raised only after the death of the father-in-law. {Para 28}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 245-246 of 2026 

Decided On: 13.01.2026

Kanchana Rai Vs. Geeta Sharma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 54, MANU/SC/0059/2026,2026 SCC OnLine SC 59.

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Whether son-in-law can claim legal rights in the immovable property of the father-in-law?

 Does a son-in-law have any legal right in his

father-in-law's property and building? Admittedly, the plaint

schedule property was gifted in favour of the plaintiff by the

church authorities by virtue of Ext.A1 Gift Deed. The plaintiff

is paying tax to the property by virtue of Ext.A2. He is also

paying tax to the building. Exts.A3 to A9 would show that he

has been residing in the plaint schedule building. It is difficult

to hold that the defendant is a member of the family. The

family of the plaintiff consists of his wife and daughter. The

plaintiff has not filed any suit against his own daughter.

However, he does not want the defendant to stay along with

him. The plaintiff 's wife filed M.C.No.14/2012 against the

defendant for a protection order and at the instigation of the

defendant, the daughter of the plaintiff filed another

M.C.No.19/2012 against the plaintiff. Later, by Exts.B2 and

B4 awards, the cases were settled by way of compromise in

order to maintain harmony among the members of the family.

The settlement in the said cases would not enure any benefit to

the defendant. {Para 14}

15. Since the behaviour of the defendant became

intolerable, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent

prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from entering into

the plaint schedule property and building. This was resisted by

the defendant pointing out the fact that he had constructed the

building after availing a loan. He had also produced certain

receipts allegedly issued in his favour by Taliparamba Service

Co-operative Bank to show that housing loan was cleared by

him. Exts.B5(a) to B5(h) receipts would show that the

Thaliparamba Service Co-operative Bank issued receipts in the

name of the plaintiff. Merely because the defendant remitted

the amount, he could not claim any independent right over the

building to the detriment of the true owner.

16. In the present case, the possession of the

plaintiff was upheld by the two courts below concurrently.

The defendant cannot even make a plea to be in possession of

the suit property, as of right. It is a settled principle of law

that even a trespasser, who is in established possession of the

property, could obtain an injunction. However, the matter

would be different if the plaintiff himself is the true owner of

the property. The defendant is the son-in-law of the plaintiff.

It is rather shameful for him to plead that he had been

adopted as a member of the family, subsequent to the

marriage with the plaintiff's daughter. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

MR.JUSTICE N.ANIL KUMAR

 6TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2021 

RSA NO. 418 OF 2019

DAVIS RAPHEL Vs  HENDRY THOMAS,

Coram: N.ANIL KUMAR

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Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Bombay HC: Wife can claim maintenance from her father in law after the death of her husband from estate inherited by him

 At the outset, it is required to be submitted that the plain

reading of Section 19 of the Act contemplates that the respondents

have every right to claim the maintenance after the death of husband

from the estate inherited by her father-in-law i.e. the present petitioner.

That proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 contemplates that the

respondent has to demonstrate that she on her is unable to maintain

herself. It is in this eventuality she can claim maintenance from the

estate of her husband, still fact remains that the said burden can be

discharged by respondent no.1 at an appropriate stage. The object with

which the provision is made in the statute book for grant of interim

maintenance cannot be ignored.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO.4054 OF 2020

Sardool Singh Sucha Singh Matharoo Vs.  Harneet Kaur widow of Bhupinder Singh Matharoo & Anr. 

Coram : NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.

Date : 7th September, 2020

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Whether court can convict father-in-law for offence U/S 202 of IPC if he fails to inform the authorities about the suicide of daughter-in-law?

The learned Counsel for the respondent State of Rajasthan, however, submitted that the accused would atleast be liable of having committed other offences. It may be noted that the question whether they would be liable under Section 498-A or 304-B does not arise for consideration inasmuch as these provisions were not on the statute on the day of occurrence. However, A 1 was atleast under an obligation to give information about the death of the deceased since the same was unnatural. Assuming that the prosecution has not positively proved that the death was homicidal yet from the medical evidence it is clear that it was not a natural death and consequently the death should atleast be noted as one of suicide. Even in the case of suicide an offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 is inherent. There- fore, even in the case of a suicide there is an obligation on the person, who knows or has reason to believe that such a suicidal death has occurred , to give information. In Kalidas Achamma v. The State of A.P., S.H.O. Karimnagar. I Town P.S. [1987] 2 ALT 937 it was observed as under:

In the case of every suicide abetment is inherent. Whether ultimately it is proved or not, it is a different aspect. Abetment of suicide is an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and therefore whenever a case of suicide is there, the body cannot be disposed of without informing the Police and further as provided under Section 174 Cr. PC the Police have to hold an inquest since it is an unnatural death.

In the instant case A 1, who reached his house on 18.3.82 knowing fully well that the deceased had already died, informed P.W. 8 that the deceased was in a serious condition. Likewise he informed P.W. 12 on telephone without disclosing that the deceased was already dead. However, when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house where the dead body was lying, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated. To the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 13. P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, on his own went and gave a report to the police. It can thus be seen that A 1 intentionally omitted to give the information in respect of the death of the deceased which he was legally bound to give. Section 202 1. P. C. is in the following terms:

202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform-Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

This Section punishes the illegal omission of those who under law are bound to give information in respect of an offence which he is legally bound to give particularly being the head of the family. Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed (2) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that offence and (3) that the accused was legally bound to give that information. Shri R.K. Jain, however, relied on a judgment of this Court in Harishchandrasing Sajjansingh Rathod and Another v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0114/1979 : 1979CriLJ1025 and contended that the word "Whoever" occurring in the opening part of the Section refers to a person other then the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. In that case the accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 331 and 304 read with Section 34 IPC in respect of the death of the deceased and were acquitted.-On appeal by the State the High Court, however, convicted them under Section 202 IPC A Bench of this Court while reversing the order of High Court observed thus:

We have gone through the entire evidence bearing on the aforesaid offence under Section 202 but have not been able to discern anything therein which may go to establish the aforesaid ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The offence in respect of which the appellants were indicted viz. having intentionally omitted to give information respecting an offence which he is legally bound to give not having been established, the appellants could not have been convicted under Section 202 of the Penal Code. It is well settled that in a prosecution under Section 202 of the Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable under this section. The offence under Section 304 (Part II) and the one under Section 331 of the Penal Code not having been established on account of several infirmities it is difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The High Court has also missed to notice that the word 'whoever' occurring at the opening part of Section 202 of the Penal Code refers to a person other than the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. This is so because there is no law which casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself That apart the aforementioned ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code do not appear to have been made out against the prosecution. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that the aforesaid main offences had been committed.

(emphasis supplied)

19. From these observations it is clear that there was no evidence to show that the accused therein knew or had reason to believe that the said offences have been committed and on the other hand they were made principal offenders. In such a situation the ingredients of Section 202 can not be said to have been made out. It is in this context that the meaning of the word "whoever" has been considered. But in the instant case A 1 returned to his house where the dead body was lying on 18.3.82 and the circumstances clearly go to show that he had knowledge that the deceased died of an unnatural death. Therefore he had knowledge or atleast had reason to believe that an offence had been committed even if, at that stage, he thought that it was only a suicide. Therefore it was his bounden duty particularly as head of the family to inform the authorities. He omitted to do so. On the other hand, he went about telling that the deceased was still alive and her condition was serious. But when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house and enquired, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities. Therefore all the ingredients of Section 202 are made out against him and he clearly committed the offence punishable under this Section at that stage. The fact that he himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not absolve him of his complicity in respect of the offence punishable under Section 202 IPC So far A 2 is concerned, he came to the house only after the investigation commenced. Therefore his case stands on a different footing. In the result the convictions and sentences awarded against A 1 and A 2 l are set aside. A 1, however, is convicted under Section 202 IPC and sentenced to undergo six months' R.I. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 1984

Decided On: 28.08.1991

Bhagwan Swarup  Vs. State of Rajasthan

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Whether the father can seek eviction of the daughter in law from his house without seeking eviction of his son?

 Coming back to the facts of the present case, I find that in view of the specific assertion made in the plaint that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit property, the contents of paragraph 1 of the written statement clearly indicates that it is an admitted case of the defendant-appellant in his written statement that the suit property is the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff is an old person and his wife, the mother-in-law of the defendant, is a handicapped person with one amputated leg. It is also not in dispute that a divorce petition is pending between the son (husband) and the defendant and the assertion/pleadings of the plaintiff that his son has left the house and is living elsewhere could not be dislodged by the defendant-appellant and there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below, which do not appear to be perverse in nature so as to require any interference by this court. No objection was ever raised before the trial court that husband is a necessary party. This was not even the ground before the lower appellate court. As such this cannot be raised at this stage. As already observed a substantial question of law arises out of pleadings and the judgments of the lower court. As such, on this ground no such substantial question of law can be raised at this stage in the present appeal. Even otherwise, the answer to the substantial question of law framed in the present case is that even considering the definition of shared household as provided under Section 2 (s) of the Act, 2005, the appellant daughter-in-law can be evicted without seeking decree of eviction against son with whom she had moved on the 1st floor of the suit property after marriage of the son of the plaintiff with the appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Second Appeal No. 1079 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2020

Sujata Gandhi  Vs.   S.B. Gandhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1183/2020

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Whether father in law is primarily liable to pay maintenance to widowed daughter in law?

 Arguments of learned Counsel for the Appellant that father of Respondent-wife should be shown not able to support her & burden to prove such inability is/was upon her; is, therefore, misconceived. If said aspect is relevant, the burden squarely lay on the Appellant himself. It may become relevant only if as a matter of fact, she is already receiving any support from her father or then, even from some other source. The fact that her father is well placed and can easily support his widowed daughter, is also not material in these proceedings when such daughter claims maintenance from her father-in-law as a widowed daughter-in-law. As stated above, the respondent was entitled to maintenance from the estate of her husband. The appellant himself being in custody of the estate of Narendra, the question of the respondent seeking maintenance from her father or mother does not arise. If the respondent can be granted maintenance from the estate of her husband, then it is not necessary for her to claim maintenance from her father or mother. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned Judge of the Family Court dated 1-3-2012 rejecting the application below Exh. 46 that was moved by the appellant to examine the father of the respondent cannot be said to be illegal. In the wake of material on record, it would not be legally correct to drive the respondent to claim maintenance from her father or mother especially when her father-in-law was having control over the estate of her deceased husband. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 734 of 2012

Decided On: 20.07.2013

Madhukar  Vs. Shalu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Dharmadhikari and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Citation : 2013 (6)MhLj 391

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Whether wife can claim right of residence in property in the name of her father in law?

Against the above backdrop, the contentions raised by the
petitioner that she has a right to continue to live in a portion of the
above-mentioned property cannot survive. The claim of her husband
through whom she claims the right of residence in his property has
already been repelled by the civil court twice, once in the partition suit
and second time in the suit for partition brought by the first respondent
himself. The claim brought through her son has already been rejected,
the suit for partition having already been dismissed.
12. It is clear from the averments of the petitioner herself, she has
been permitted to use a portion of the property by the second
respondent. This averment may be assumed to be correct. But, then it
is clear from the averment itself that what was allowed was only a
permissive user. The petitioner cannot force herself on the owner of

the property, particularly when she has no vested or legal right to claim residence in his property.
13. The judgments reported as Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur & Ors. in FAO (OS 196/2014, decided by a division bench of this Court on 10.09.2014, and Smt. Preeti Satija vs. Smt. Raj Kumari & Anr. in RFA (OS) 24/2012, decided by another division bench of this Court on 15.01.2014, do not assist the petitioner in the present case in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169, particularly, the observations in para 29 of which read as under:-
“As regards Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 30th August, 2018
 Crl.M.C. 2082/2016 & Crl.M.A. 8823-24/2016

MANJU GUPTA  Vs  PANKAJ GUPTA 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA

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Whether muslim father in law is bound to maintain widowed daughter in law?

It has been held by the Hon'ble Division Bench of Bombay High

Court in the matter of Mahomed Abdul Aziz Hidayat (Supra) that under

the Muhamadan Law there is no obligation on the father-in-law to

maintain the widow of his son. The relevant portion of the above decision

is quoted below:-

“ 2. The principles with regard to maintenance under the Muhamadan

Law are fairly well settled, and the main principle is, as is to be found

in Mulla's Muhamadan Law, p. 286 and Mulla relies upon the

statement of law in Baillie's Digest of Muhamadan Law at p. 467,that

a person is liable to maintain another when that person could be the

heir of the person whom he is called upon to maintain. In this case the

father-in-law could never be the heir of his daughter-in-law, and

therefore on that principle there is no obligation to maintain the widow

of his son. ..........................”

 Section 36 of the PWDV Act, 2005 provides that the provisions of

that Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of

any other law, for the time being in force. In the decision of Mrs.

Nanadita Sarkar Nee Sen (Supra), the concept of Hindu Adoption and

Maintenance Act, 1956 was taken into consideration vis a vis the

provisions of PWDV Act, 2005. In the case in hand both parties are

Mohammedan and as such under the Muhamadan Law, opposite party

no.2, being father-in-law, is under no obligation to provide maintain

allowance to the widow of his son namely the petitioner.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Md. Mumtaz Khan

CRR No. 979 of 2017

Shabnam Parveen Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

Judgment on : 24.11.2017

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Whether landlord is entitled to evict tenant on ground that tenant is residing in house of his father in law?

I shall first advert to the ground of respondent No. 1 having secured alternative residential accommodation in the context of Section 13(1)(1) of the Act. As is seen from the finding recorded by the Courts below and, the evidence of P.W. No. 1 clearly concedes the position that the premises at Badlapur, where the respondent No. 1 was presently staying, are owned by his father-in-law and not by the respondent No. 1. The Apex Court in the case of Anandi Jadhav (supra) has clearly dealt with this situation and has observed that it is only when the Court is satisfied that after coming into operation of the Act, the tenant has built or has acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a suitable residence then decree for possession under that provision can be passed. In Para 6 of the said decision, it is further observed that burden to prove that any of the alternatives mentioned in the section is on the landlord and it is only when he establishes this then the burden will shift on the tenant to show that it is not a suitable alternative accommodation. In the present case, as is mentioned earlier, the Plaintiff went to the Court on the premise that the defendant No. 1 was staying at Badlapur in the premises owned by his father-in-law. Once this position is accepted then it necessarily follows that ground under Section 13(1)(1) would be unavailable and cannot be pressed into service against the defendant No. 1. In the circumstances, it will not be necessary for me to go into the other matters which found favour with the Appellate Court to answer that issue in favour of the respondent-tenant. Accordingly, to my mind, no decree under Section 13(1)(1) could be made against the respondents in the fact situation of the present case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

W.P. No. 1082 of 1985

Decided On: 14.08.2002

 Dattatraya Pyurshottam Bhave

Vs.

Jayant Sitaram Joshi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation:2003(3)MHLJ 161,2003(3) ALLMR963

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Whether son of sister of childless widow will inherit property inherited by her from her husband or father in law?

Learned counsel submitted that the observations of the
Hon’ble Apex Court clearly demonstrated that the Civil Court decree
dated 13.06.1995 was required to be compulsorily registered and
the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court has virtually
decided the fate of this case on the aforesaid aspect. Further in view
of Section 15(2) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property after
the death of defendant No.2 would revert back to the legal heirs of
Ganeshi. Sister’s son would not have even remote chance of
succession. Defendant No.2 allegedly got right for the first time in
the suit property, therefore, the decree was legally required to be
registered. The plaint and the written statement of the decree dated
13.06.1995 were only marked as Mark A2 and Mark A3. Defendant
No.1 was not the part of family.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
 RSA No.3938 of 2004(O&M)
 Date of Decision-11.01.2017
Hari Ram  Vs  Madan Lal and others

CORAM:- MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH
Citation: AIR 2017 P&H 69

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Whether daughter in law has right to reside in self acquired property of father in law?

The concurrent finding of the Courts below regarding the suit property
being self-acquired, the father-in-law is under no legal obligation to maintain 
the appellant No.1 and her adult son i.e. appellant No.2 in his self acquired
property in view of the legal position enunciated in the decision S.R.Batra vs.
Taruna Batra 2007 (3) SCC 169.
13. The respondent/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit claiming himself to be the
absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of documents executed by DDA
in his favour, Ex.PW-1/3, claiming it to be the self-acquired property. The
appellants/defendants on the other hand failed to place on record any
document to controvert the said plea of the plaintiff by showing that the suit
property was purchased out of the sale proceeds of any ancestral property in
which the husband of the appellant No.1 has right, title or interest. The
appellant No.1 being the daughter-in-law, her right would be dependent on
the rights of her husband. Her husband could have resided in the said house
as a matter of right only if it could be established to be an ancestral house in
which he can claim his share by seeking partition. Her husband has neither
contributed towards purchase of the suit property nor he had been residing in
that house. The appellant No.1 who got married in the year 1987 and her son
who was born in 1988 are independent and the respondent in his capacity as
father-in-law or grandfather is under no legal obligation to maintain them.

14. The appellant No.1 being the daughter-in-law and appellant No.2
being an adult grandson of the respondent/plaintiff have no right to reside in
self-acquired property of the respondent/plaintiff. Since the finding of the
courts below are in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
S.R.Batra vs. Taruna Batra 2007 (3) SCC 169. The appellants cannot claim
any legal right to live in the self-acquired property of respondent/plaintiff. 
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Date of Decision: December 2, 2016
 RSA 352/2016 & CM No.43607/2016

JOTSNA @ JYOTI  v LAKHPAT RAI

CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR(JOURNAL)14

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Whether daughter in law can claim possession of property purchased by her father in law in her name?

One argument, of course, could be raised that by purchasing the
property in the names of the wives in the family, the late Chaman Lal was
securing the interest of his own wife, as also the interest of his sons. That
argument even if raised, would also have to be rejected, because nothing
prevented him from then purchasing the property in the name of his wife and
sons, with no mention of the daughters-in-law. The very fact that he chose to
purchase the property in the name of his wife and daughters-in-law, would go
to prove that he actually intended it to be for their benefit.
That being so, it cannot be said in the context of the
circumstances of the present case, that the property was purchased by Chaman
Lal in the name of his wife and daughters-in-law, because they stood in any

fiduciary capacity to him. If that were so, he could have executed any
instrument by way of a family settlement etc. to make any such intention clear
in that regard. That no having been done, the property cannot be said to have
been purchased for the benefit of any other person, other than those in whose
names it was purchased.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA No.1504 of 2016
Date of Decision: 07.09.2016

Smt. Kanchan Jain Vs.  Babita Jain

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE AMOL RATTAN SINGH

Citation: AIR 2017(NOC)73 P&H

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Whether son in law can not claim that licence granted to him by his father in law has become irrevocable?

For availing the protection by invoking the provision of clause (b) Section 60, it must be shown that the execution of a work of permanent nature had been done by the licensee acting upon the licence. The work must be of a permanent character and the licensee must have incurred expenses in the execution. The expression 'acting upon the licence is of great significance in deciding the question of irrevocability of a licence under Section 60(b) of the Act. This Rule of irrevocability is, in fact, based on the principle of an implied grant arising from the conduct of the licensor which estops him from claiming his right of revocation.

In the present case, there is no such specific pleading that renovation work was made by the defendant acting upon the licence and in pursuance of the licence granted by the plaintiff. The defendant claims to have been gifted with the land and thus is in possession on his own right. So, the present stand as regards the irrevocability of the licence is in conflict with the main plea. He never comes forward in so claiming as a licensee nor has placed in the courts below that instead of the claim of relationship as landlord and tenant, there was the relationship of licensor and licensee between the plaintiff and the defendant. Moreover two important factual aspects as placed by the defendant being taken for consideration, those prevent with full force, the attractibility of the provisions of Section 60 (b) of Easements Act. The first one is that of leaving of one room at the desire of plaintiff without any demur and the next one is that of demand of the money spent after the renovation. In view of the relationship between the parties s father-in-law and son-in-law, even accepting for a moment that some renovation work was done by the defendant and in view the very case of the defendant as aforestated, the present submission to thwart the suit of the plaintiff banking upon the provision of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act falls flat.

Equivalent Citation: AIR2016Ori1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

RSA No. 9 of 2015

Decided On: 12.08.2015

Appellants: Mohammed Jamsed
Vs.
Respondent: Sk. Altab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:D. Dash, J.

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Right of daughter in law under Domestic violence Act Vs right of father in law under Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

I am in agreement with the aforesaid view.
Accordingly, it is to be held that the house in question
which is owned by respondent No. 2 (father-in-law of  petitioner )
is not a “shared household” in which the petitioner has any right of
residence which can be enforced under the 2005 Act.
This being the position, no question of the 2007 Act
being used at cross purposes with the 2005 Act arises in this case.
Thus, the judgment in Harmohinder Singh's case is not
relevant. In that case ejectment of the divorced wife and sons was 
being sought by the husband under the 2007 Act regarding which he
had also filed a suit. It is settled that even a divorced wife is to be
protected against her husband by a provision for maintenance which
includes a right of residence. Such a right could undeniably be
enforced under the 2005 Act. It was in this context that the Hon'ble
Court observed that the 2007 Act cannot be used at cross purposes
with and to annihilate the rights available under the 2005 Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP No.18009 of 2015 (O&M)
 Date of decision: January 25, 2016
Hamina Kang V District Magistrate (U.T.), Chandigarh and others 
Coram: MR.JUSTICE HARINDER SINGH SIDHU
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC)455 P&H

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Whether daughter in law can claim right in self acquired property of father in law under domestic violence Act?

Section 4 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
provides non obstante clause. In terms of which any obligation on
the part of in-laws in terms of an rule or interpretation of Hindu Law
or custom or usage as part of law before the commencement of the
Act are no longer valid. In view of the non obstante clause in terms
of Section 4 of the aforesaid Act, the provisions of the Act alone are
applicable and anything and any liability in respect of maintenance of
daughter-in-law on death of son cannot be fastened from the selfacquired
property of the parents.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No.24168 of 2014
Date of Decision: 6.04.2015
Sangeeta

Vs
Om Parkash Balyan and another

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH


RAJ MOHAN SINGH, J.
Citation; 2015 CRLJ 2635

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