Whether award passed by arbitrator which decides issue of limitation is interim award?

  In ITW Signode India Ltd. v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 at
74, a case strongly relied upon by Shri Sinha, this Court held in
the context of limitation qua recovery of duty under Section 11A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as follows:
“69. The question of limitation involves a question of
jurisdiction. The finding of fact on the question of
jurisdiction would be a jurisdictional fact. Such a
jurisdictional question is to be determined having
regard to both fact and law involved therein. The
Tribunal, in our opinion, committed a manifest error
in not determining the said question, particularly,
when in the absence of any finding of fact that such
short-levy of excise duty related to any positive act
on the part of the appellant by way of fraud,
collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of
facts, the extended period of limitation could not
have been invoked and in that view of the matter no
show-cause notice in terms of Rule 10 could have
been issued.”
Given the context of Section 11A of the Central Excise
Act, 1944, obviously the expression “jurisdiction” would mean
something more than merely being able to embark on the
merits of a dispute. In a recent judgment under Section 9A of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as inserted by the State of
Maharashtra), this Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society
Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412, referred to the
30expression “jurisdiction” occurring in Section 9A and held an
earlier judgment of this Court to be per incuriam. Though the
Constitution Bench judgment in Ittavira (supra) was mentioned
by the Bench, referring to the argument of one of the counsel
for the parties, in the concluding portion, this judgment is not
referred to at all. In any case, the reasoning of the Court in that
case was in the context of Section 9A which, when contrasted
with Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, made the
Court accept the wider concept of “jurisdiction” as laid down in
Pandurang (supra).
29. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the award dated 23rd
July, 2015 is an interim award, which being an arbitral award,
can be challenged separately and independently under Section
34 of the Act. We are of the view that such an award, which
does not relate to the arbitral tribunal’s own jurisdiction under
Section 16, does not have to follow the drill of Section 16(5)
and (6) of the Act. Having said this, we are of the view that
Parliament may consider amending Section 34 of the Act so as
to consolidate all interim awards together with the final arbitral
award, so that one challenge under Section 34 can be made
31after delivery of the final arbitral award. Piecemeal challenges
like piecemeal awards lead to unnecessary delay and additional
expense.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 824 OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.19771 OF 2017)
M/S INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER
CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED 
V
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS 
Dated:January 23, 2018.

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Whether Wrong understanding of award amount to contempt of court?

From the stand adopted by the newspaper establishments in the various counter affidavits filed; from the statements made in the reports submitted by the Labour Commissioners of different States from time to time; and also from the written arguments filed and the oral submissions advanced it is clear that part implementation/non-implementation of the Majithia Wage Board Award by the concerned newspaper establishments is on account of what the said establishments have perceived to be the scope and ambit of the Majthia Wage Board Award as approved and notified by the Central Government, the challenge to which has been dismissed by this Court by judgment dated 07.02.2014 passed in Writ Petition No. 246 of 2011. The stand taken for what is alleged to be non-implementation or partial implementation of the Award, as may be, having clearly stemmed from the understanding of the Award of the concerned newspaper establishments in a particular manner, it is our considered view that the said establishments cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed the judgment of this Court dated 07.02.2014 passed in Writ Petition No. 246 of 2011. At best, the default alleged has taken place on account of a wrong understanding of the Award as upheld by this Court. This would not amount to wilful default so as to attract the liability of civil contempt as defined Under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The default alleged though is unmistakably evident to us, in the absence of any wilful or deliberate intention to commit the same cannot make any of the newspaper establishments liable for contempt. On the other hand, they are entitled to one more opportunity to implement the Award in its proper spirit and effect in the light of what we now propose to say.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 411 of 2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 246 of 2011, 

Decided On: 19.06.2017

Avishek Raja and Ors.

Vs.

Sanjay Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and Navin Sinha, JJ.

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Whether award passed by Lok adalat can be quashed?

 I see that the Lok Adalath has merely endorsed the

terms of concurrence of the parties without considering the

probable issues of violation of morals and public policy in

permitting parties to settle on contingent terms which depends

on the decisions of this Court in future. This is grossly

inappropriate and I am of the view that the Lok Adalath

misdirected itself in allowing the parties to enter in to a

settlement which is contra bonos mores and contra public policy.

       13. I am of the firm view that the Lok Adalaths have a duty

to ensure that the settlements entered into by the parties confirm

to law, morals and public policy of the Society and the Polity. Any

settlement entered in contravention of these would be completely

unsustainable and incompetent. If this Court notices that the

settlement is one that offers undue advantage to one side on

account of prescription of certain contingencies, it becomes a

case of contravention of public morals as also of public policy

and, therefore, this Court would obtain certain justification in

interfering with such Awards under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India, it being null, void and non-est.


       14. The unexpendable requirement of Lok Adalats to invest

due care, attention and position while passing awards has already

been spoken to about by a Division Bench of this Court in

Rajagopala Rao v. State Police Chief [2016 (3) KLT 358].

The Bench had formated certain guidelines and are very pertinent

to read. I, therefore, deem it necessary to extract the relevant

paragraph of the said judgment as under:

       "18. In order to prevent the menace of passing awards

without due care, attention and precision by Lok Adalats, we

intend to formulate some guidelines. We may hastily add that

they are not exhaustive and may take in other things as well,

depending on the facts of each case. The crucial points to be

borne in mind by the persons presiding over the Lok Adalats and

the lawyers appearing for the parties are thus:

                      (i) The persons presiding shall thoroughly
              study and clearly understand the facts of the
              case coming up for settlement.
                      (ii) They must have a clear understanding
              about the legal issues involved in the dispute
              between the parties.
                      (iii) If the parties have engaged lawyers,
              they shall also participate in the proceedings
              before the Lok Adalat so that a proper
              settlement could be arrived at.
                      (iv) The persons presiding over the Lok
              Adalat and the lawyers concerned shall bear in
              mind the fundamental principles, under the


              Indian Contract Act, 1872, essentially required
              for executing a legally enforceable agreement.
                      (v) They shall bear in mind the principles
              under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the code of Civil
              Procedure, 1908 also, so that the award must
              be in the form of an enforceable decree, if the
              parties so wish. This is all the more important
              because by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section
              21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987,
              every award made by Lok Adalats shall be final
              and binding on the parties to the dispute and no
              appeal shall lie to any court against the award.
                      (vi) The persons presiding over the Lok
              Adalat shall see that the award passed is clear
              in its terms and there shall be no room for any
              confusion in respect of the terms and conditions
              in the award. They shall take care to see that
              on account of ill-drafting of the compromise, no
              litigation in future arises in respect of the
              matters once settled.
                      (vii) They shall see that the awards
              passed are not only legal, but also conforming
              to the norms prescribed for a decree with all the
              required details in clear and explicit terms."

       15. However, in spite of express declarations by this Court,

it is extremely disheartening and disquieting that lessons are not

being learnt requiring repeated interventions Court.

       16. In the case at hand, I see that the absence of a Clause

in Ext.P7 as to what would happen in the event this Court

dismisses Crl.M.C. No.295/2013, would render the settlement

between the parties, as recorded by the Lok Adalath, inoperative

and completely contingent and therefore, contrary to public



morals. Contingent Awards cannot be countenanced, especially

when such contingencies are relating to pending matters before

Courts, especially this Court.

       17. The malafides involved in the present stand of the 2nd

respondent would be very apparent because it now asserts that

since Crl.M.C. No.295/2013 has been withdrawn by the

petitioner, it is under no obligation to make payment at all. This

obviously offers an illegal and unlawful advantage to the 2nd

respondent, tilting the balance of the scales of justice capriciously

against the petitioner, merely because Ext.P7 Award had been

allowed to be entered into thoughtlessly by the competent

Authority of the 1st respondent. I cannot permit this to happen

and I, therefore, am of the view that I will be justified in

interfering with Ext.P7 Award and relegating the parties to their

normal channel of litigation, so that substantial justice can be

obtained for both sides.

       In such circumstances, I have no hesitation in striking down

and quashing Ext.P7 Award so as to pave way for the

proceedings before the Sub Court, Kollam pending in O.S.

No.381/2013 to be continued and concluded in the manner that



is appropriate in law. I do so.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

              MR. JUSTICE DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN

                 7TH DAY OF APRIL 2017

                                   WP(C).No. 35992 of 2015 


 P.O.THOMAS, S/O. OOMMAN, V   KOLLAM TALUK LEGAL SERVICE COMMITTEE,
        

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Whether award passed by registrar of co-operative society is executable even though no certificate is issued by him?

That takes me to the second contention urged by Mr. Karmarkar. His submission is that the issuance of a certificate by the Registrar as contemplated by Section 54 of the Act is a step in aid of execution of the award. Barring the bare contention there is nothing to support this contention. What Section 59 requires is, if a party in whose favour an award for money is made under the Act, then either for executing it through a civil Court or executing it through the Collector, a certificate signed by the Registrar is necessary. We are concerned in the present case with the execution through a civil Court and the relevant provision in that behalf is contained in Clause (a). Under that section an order under Section 54 of the Act shall, if not carried out on a certificate signed by the Registrar, be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and shall be executed in the same manner as a decree of such Court. The very language of this provision clearly indicates that unless a certificate is granted by the Registrar as contemplated by this clause it cannot be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court. Issuance of such a certificate has nothing to do with step in aid as contemplated under the Limitation Act. The very words used in Clause (a) of Section 59(1) indicates that an award is deemed to be a decree of a civil Court only if a certificate is issued by the Registrar. Even though in the present case the certificate was issued by the Registrar more than twelve years after the date of the award, still such an award is deemed to be a decree only upon issuance of such a certificate and as the present darkhast was filed within a period of less than three years in the year 1970 and the certificate was issued in the year 1969 it is not possible for me to take the view that the darkhast is barred by limitation.

Bombay High Court

Sivaji Ramji Patil vs Jalgaon Fal Wa Bhajipala Vikri ... on 23 November, 1977

Equivalent citations: (1978) 80 BOMLR 519

Bench: R Kantawala

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When there is deemed service of notices and award under arbitration Act?

In my view, the stand taken by the petitioners in the
rejoinder that the petitioner no.1 does not reside at House No.247, Acoi,
Karaswada, Mapusa, Bardez, Goa – 403 507 is inconsistent and contrary
to the statement made in the petition. It is thus clear that the petitioners
have not come to this Court with clean hands. This Court in the case of
Apex Encon Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. L & T. Finance Ltd. & Anr.
(supra) and in the case of Jasvinder Kaur Vs. L & T Finance Ltd. &
Anr. (supra) after adverting to the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) of the
Arbitration Act and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act has held that
the notices are sent by the Registered Post A.D. at the last known
addresses of the petitioners and the same have not been returned by the
postal authority and therefore, it would amount to a deemed service of
such notices and proceedings. In my view, the said two judgments
squarely apply to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the
aforesaid two judgments.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.1231 OF 2014
Francisco A. D'Souza 
 Vs.
L & T Finance Ltd. 
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 DATE :  30th April 2015
Citation:2016 (3) ALLMR803

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Whether Motor accident claim tribunal can recall award passed by it on ground of fraud?

In the above facts, when compensation was secured by playing
fraud on the Tribunal, the technical objection of the vehicle owner can’t be
accepted as the entertainment of the delay objection will defeat justice.
Therefore considering the ratio of Rajendra Singh (supra), it has to be declared
that the MAC Tribunal was competent to recall its award, if the same is found to
be obtained by practicing fraud or misrepresentation. Consequently, the learned
Tribunal’s decisions to reject the applications of the Insurance Company are held
to be unsustainable and accordingly the Tribunal’s impugned decisions are set
aside.
 The Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur
reported in (2004)2 SCC 1, held that the insurance company is entitled to recover
the wrongly awarded amount from the owner of the vehicle and such claim can
be entertained by the Tribunal itself. In view of this decision and since the
awarded amounts were disbursed to the claimants by the insurance company,
the petitioner is permitted to recover the same from the truck owner through the
forum of the MAC Tribunal.

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

 CRP No. 322/ 2010
United India Insurance Company Ltd., V Smt. Kulasori Mirdha,

BEFORE
 MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY
Dated : 28th April, 2015
Citation;2016(1)ALLMR(JOURNAL)43

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Whether award passed by Lok Adalat can be challenged before high court?

 It is contended by respondent by placing reliance on
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of P. T. Thomas Vs.
Thomas Job reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 3575 that judicial
review of the decision arrived at Lok Nyayalaya is not permissible on the
ground as raised in the writ petition. The Supreme Court, referring to the
decision in the matter of Board of Trustees of the Port of Visakhapatnam Vs.
Presiding Officer, Permanent, Lok AdalatcumSecretary,
District Legal
Services Authority, Visakhapatnam
and another reported in 2000(5) ALT
577, as observed that “The award is enforceable as a decree and it is final.
In all fours, the endeavour is only to see that the disputes are narrowed
down and make the final settlement so that the parties are not again driven
to further litigation or any dispute. Though the award of Lok Adalat is not
a result of a contest on merits just as a regular suit by a Court on a regular
trial, however, it is as equal and on par with a decree on compromise and
will have the same binding effect and conclusive just as the decree passed
on the compromises cannot be challenged in a regular appeal, the award of
the Lok Adalat being akin to the same, cannot be challenged by any regular
remedies available under law including invoking Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging the correctness of the award on any
ground. Judicial review cannot be invoked in such awards especially on the

grounds as raised in this writ petition.” 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 4835 OF 2013
Jalna District Central Cooperative
Bank Ltd.

VERSUS
Umesh s/o Nanasaheb Kawade

CORAM : R. M. BORDE &
A. M. BADAR, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 2nd MAY, 2014.
Citation;2014(4) MHLJ 807

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