In the case of Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla [MANU/SC/0185/1991 : (1991) 1 SCC 422], dispute arose as to whether certain premises were let out for residential purpose or as to whether there was an oral agreement of letting out the premises to the tenant, for running a press. It was in that perspective, it was held in the said case that a lease deed though unregistered, could be considered for collateral purposes to show the purpose for which the premises was leased out. Thus, the lease deed was referred to for the sole purpose to defeat the claim of subsistence of an oral agreement. The ratio of this authority has been considered in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited (supra) and we follow that ratio. In the case of Satish Chand Makhan (supra), another coordinate Bench of this Court declined to accept admissibility of an unregistered lease agreement for determining duration of the lease (9 years in that case) on the reasoning that terms of lease would not constitute collateral purpose. It was observed in this judgment that "nature and character of possession" could constitute collateral purpose but that was not the point which was directly in lis before this Court. In our opinion, nature and character of possession contained in a flawed document (being unregistered) in terms Section 107 of the 1882 Act and Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act can form collateral purpose when the "nature and character of possession" is not the main term of the lease and does not constitute the main dispute for adjudication by the Court. In this case, the nature and character of possession constitutes the primary dispute and hence the Court is excluded by law from examining the unregistered deed for that purpose. In respect of the suit out of which this appeal arises, purpose of lease is the main lis, not a collateral incident. {Para 13}
15. In this case, factum of creation of tenancy has been established. But the purpose of tenancy, so as to attract the six months' notice period Under Section 106 of the 1882 Act cannot be established by such evidence as in such a situation, registration of the deed would have been mandatory. The onus would be on the Defendant to establish the fact that manufacturing activity was being carried on from the demised premises. A mere statement by the DW-1 to which we have referred earlier or the purpose of lease as specified in the lease agreement would not be sufficient to demonstrate the purpose of lease to be for manufacturing. This could be proved by explaining what kind of work was being carried on in the factory shed. In such a situation also, the registration of the deed would have been necessary. In absence of such registration, tenancy would have been of "month to month" character. For these reasons, we do not think the High Court erred in law in dismissing the Defendant's appeal. The present appeal shall stand dismissed on the same rationale.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 6149 of 2023.
Decided On: 25.09.2023
Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited Vs. Amit Chand Mitra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Aniruddha Bose and Vikram Nath, JJ.
Author: Aniruddha Bose, J.
Citation: 2023/INSC/854, MANU/SC/1051/2023.
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