Supreme Court: Extra Judicial confession of Accused Absolving Himself & Incriminating Co-Accused Not Reliable

 PW3 on the other hand speaks not of a confession but an exculpatory statement made by A1 that it was A2 and A3 who killed the deceased. PW12 and PW14, two other witnesses who spoke of the extra-judicial confession also spoke in tandem with what PW3 stated. The exculpatory statement made absolving himself and accusing the co-accused, by its very nature is unreliable. It cannot be put against the other accused, for no cross examination being provided to them, of the one who made that statement. It cannot also incriminate the person who made the statement since there is no element of confession in the recital as spoken of by three witnesses, as against one.

11. It is also of relevant import that PW8 specifically spoke of a

mob having detained A1 and A2 and PW8 having taken A1 aside

to speak to him, when he made the confession in the presence of

PW3; thus again raising a suspicion of whether PW12 and PW14

were privy to the statement made by A1. The extra-judicial

confession by its very nature being a weak piece of evidence has

not at all been proved in the present case. In any event, the

statement is made when the two accused were detained by a

mob, on the accusation of murder. Obviously, there is

considerable pressure put on the detained persons, who could

have spoken, on undue duress or under threat of violence. In

fact, the records indicate that after arrest, when A1&2 were taken for medical examination, they had injuries on their body, which again cuts at the root of credibility of the statement made; which anyway has doubtful standing as a confession.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 2507 of 2026

Papan Sarkar @ Pranab Vs  State of West Bengal

Author: K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 528

Dated: MAY 22, 2026.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the court should not convict accused if prosecution fails to adduce evidence of Ballistic Expert In Cases Of Murder Caused By Firearms?

We find that the conviction on the basis of such evidence cannot be sustained. Apart from that, it is to be noted that even according to PW-11, the gun which was recovered from the car had two empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11). Furthermore, the evidence of Dr. Rakesh Kumar Goel (PW-5), who had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, would show that there was no external exit wound, and wad and pellets were preserved and sealed. It is to be noted that apart from not collecting any evidence as to whether the said gun belonged to the Appellant Manjit Kaur, even the Ballistic Expert has not been examined to show that the wad and pellets were fired from the empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11). {Para 22}

23. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab   MANU/SC/0305/1995 : (1995) 3 SCC 367:

21. .........It hardly needs to be emphasised that in cases where injuries are caused by firearms, the opinion of the ballistic expert is of a considerable importance where both the firearm and the crime cartridge are recovered during the investigation to connect an Accused with the crime. Failure to produce the expert opinion before the trial court in such cases affects the creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a great extent.

24. No doubt that this case has been recently distinguished by a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Gulab v. State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/1210/2021 : (2022) 12 SCC 677, relying on the earlier judgments of this Court in the cases of Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab   MANU/SC/0136/1962 : [1963] 3 SCR 585 and State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh   MANU/SC/0098/2002 : (2002) 3 SCC 234.

25. However, it is to be noted that the case of Jugraj Singh (supra) was a case of direct evidence, where there was evidence of two eye-witnesses. The present case is a case based on circumstantial evidence. In view of the serious doubt with regard to the credibility of the witnesses on the issue of extra-judicial confession and last seen theory, the failure to examine Ballistic Expert would, in our opinion, be a glaring defect in the prosecution case. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and, as such, the Accused are entitled to benefit of doubt.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1635 of 2010 and 1714 of 2010 

Decided On: 05.07.2023

Pritinder Singh Vs. The State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: 2023 INSC 614, MANU/SC/0754/2023.

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on appreciation of evidence of extra judicial confession

Apart from this there is the evidence of PWs. 5 and 9 who state on oath that one of the accused admitted before them that he had murdered the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge has brushed aside their evidence by presuming that their statements constituting an extra-judicial confession is a very weak type of evidence. This is a wrong view of the law. It is not open to any court to start with a presumption that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. In the instant case, after perusing the evidence of PWs. 5 and 9 we are unable to find anything which could lead to the conclusion that these independent witnesses were not telling the truth. The evidence of these two witnesses (PWs 5 and 9) which lends support to the evidence of PW 11 was sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused. The Sessions Judge has committed a grave error of law in analysing and appreciating the evidence of PWs. 5 and 9 and brushing them aside on untenable grounds.

{Para 7}

8. The matter does not rest here alone but it is clear from the evidence that the accused had made a confusion before the police and on the basis of their statements, a blood-stained farsi and a sword were recovered which were found to contain human blood as mentioned earlier. This circumstance, therefore, reinforces both the extra-judicial confession and the evidence of PW 11. The Sessions Judge, however, did not attach much importance to the recoveries which are undoubtedly admissible under the Evidence Act and afford a guarantee to the truth of the prosecution case.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 308 and 420 of 1976

Decided On: 19.07.1985

Narayan Singh and Ors. Vs. State of M.P.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A. Vardarajan and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.

Author: S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.

Citation: 1985 SCC( 4) 26,1985 CRIMES SC 2,1985 INSC 159, MANU/SC/0086/1985.

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Can Partial Circumstantial Evidence Sustain a Criminal Conviction? A Legal Analysis

  The court concludes that last seen theory, extrajudicial confession is not proved. Recovery of weapon under section 27 proved and court comes to conclusion that the answer given under 313 CPC is false. Whether accused can be held guilty?

An examination of conviction possibilities when key circumstantial evidence fails to meet judicial standards

Introduction

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What is difference between Confession and extra judicial confession and It's value?

 Understanding Confession

A confession is "the direct admission of matter or facts of the cases either in the form of a written or oral statement". According to Sir James Stephen, it is defined as "an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed a crime". Essentially, a confession is a statement made by an accused person that suggests or admits their guilt in relation to a criminal offense.

Types of Confessions

Confessions are broadly categorized into two main types: judicial confessions and extra-judicial confessions.

Judicial Confession

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Whether accused is entitled to be acquitted if prosecution has failed to examine the Ballistic Expert?

 Apart from that, it is to be noted that

even according to PW-11, the gun which was recovered from

the car had two empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11).

Furthermore, the evidence of Dr. Rakesh Kumar Goel (PW-5),

who had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, would

show that there was no external exit wound, and wad and

pellets were preserved and sealed. It is to be noted that apart

from not collecting any evidence as to whether the said gun

belonged to the appellant Manjit Kaur, even the Ballistic

Expert has not been examined to show that the wad and

pellets were fired from the empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11).

23. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of

this Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh v. State of

Punjab (1995) 3 SCC 367.

“21. ………It hardly needs to be emphasised that

in cases where injuries are caused by firearms,

the opinion of the ballistic expert is of a

considerable importance where both the firearm

and the crime cartridge are recovered during the

investigation to connect an accused with the

crime. Failure to produce the expert opinion

before the trial court in such cases affects the

creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a great

extent.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1635 OF 2010

PRITINDER SINGH @ LOVELY Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB 

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Dated: JULY 05, 2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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What are the pre-requisite for accepting extra judicial confession?

 In Balwinder Singh v. State of

Punjab [1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 : 1996 SCC (Cri)

59] this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p.

265, para 10)

“10. An extra-judicial confession by its

very nature is rather a weak type of

evidence and requires appreciation with

a great deal of care and caution. Where

an extra-judicial confession is

surrounded by suspicious

circumstances, its credibility becomes

doubtful and it loses its importance.”

57. In Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N. [(1997) 8 SCC

158 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1249] the Court held that:

(SCC p. 162, para 8)

“8. … It is well settled that it is a rule of

caution where the court would generally

look for an independent reliable

corroboration before placing any

reliance upon such extra-judicial

confession.”

58. Again, in Kavita v. State of T.N. [(1998) 6 SCC

108 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1421] the Court stated the

dictum that: (SCC p. 109, para 4)

2 (2012) 6 SCC 174

“4. There is no doubt that convictions

can be based on extra-judicial

confession but it is well settled that in

the very nature of things, it is a weak

piece of evidence. It is to be proved just

like any other fact and the value thereof

depends upon the veracity of the

witness to whom it is made.”

59. While explaining the dimensions of the

principles governing the admissibility and

evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession,

this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja

Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1965]

stated the principle that: (SCC p. 192, para 19)

“19. An extra-judicial confession, if

voluntary and true and made in a fit

state of mind, can be relied upon by the

court. The confession will have to be

proved like any other fact. The value of

the evidence as to confession, like any

other evidence, depends upon the

veracity of the witness to whom it has

been made.”

The Court further expressed the view that: (SCC p.

192, para 19)

“19. … Such a confession can be relied

upon and conviction can be founded

thereon if the evidence about the

confession comes from the mouth of

witnesses who appear to be unbiased,

not even remotely inimical to the

accused, and in respect of whom

nothing is brought out which may tend

to indicate that he may have a motive

of attributing an untruthful statement

to the accused….”

60. In Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B. [(2007) 12

SCC 230 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 264] , the Court,

while holding that reliance on extra-judicial

confession by the lower courts in absence of other

corroborating material, was unjustified, observed:

(SCC pp. 265-66, paras 87 & 89)

“87. Confession ordinarily is admissible

in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can

be acted upon. Confession may under

certain circumstances and subject to

law laid down by the superior judiciary

from time to time form the basis for

conviction. It is, however, trite that for

the said purpose the court has to satisfy

itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the

confession; (ii) truthfulness of the

confession; (iii) corroboration.

89. A detailed confession which would

otherwise be within the special

knowledge of the accused may itself be

not sufficient to raise a presumption

that confession is a truthful one. Main

features of a confession are required to

be verified. If it is not done, no

conviction can be based only on the sole

basis thereof.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1635 OF 2010

PRITINDER SINGH @ LOVELY Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB 

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Dated: JULY 05, 2023.

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Whether the court can rely on extra judicial confession made by accused to stranger?

 The question that falls for determination before this Court is as to whether extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by accused No. 1 on 22/5/2006 at Karbala ground is voluntary, truthful and has been a north star for the investigating agency. Firstly, P.W. 2 was a stray acquaintance with the accused No. 1. It is admitted by P.W. 2 that accused No. 1 was working as waiter in Hotel Metro, which was visited by P.W. 2 once in a week. There was no reason for accused No. 1 to repose faith in customer of the hotel. Moreover, the location of Karbala ground is just across the road from the scene of offence. He met P.W. 2 by chance and divulged his guilt to P.W. 2 which does not appeal to a prudent mind. Extra Judicial confession necessarily is to be made to a person in whom maker of the statement reposes faith. Moreover, accused had given graphic details of the act committed by him including the role of each of the accused persons and the manner in which they had killed both the deceased. It is rather very difficult to accept that the accused would make an extra judicial confession to a stranger, passing by the road, who is only acquainted. {Para 18 }

19. The material on record would show that immediate disclosure was made by P.W. 2 to investigating agency. However, there is no material on record to show that the investigating agency had made any efforts to apprehend the accused immediately. There is no material to show as to when the accused had left Bombay for Gonda after commission of offence. It is neither the case of the prosecution that they had absconded due to an apprehension of being placed under suspicion after disclosure was made by P.W. 2 to the police. However, suddenly the police had gone to Gonda in the month of June, 2006. In fact, extra judicial confession made to P.W. 2 was more than sufficient for the police to arrest the accused in Gonda itself and return to Bombay after obtaining a transit warrant from the Magistrate in Gonda. The accused had not resisted to go to Bombay. That the conduct of the accused would show that they had not absconded since their place of residence has not been brought on record by the police. There is no reference to taluka Karmalganj from where the accused were brought to Bombay. The Investigating Officer had made no attempts to record the statement of accused No. 1 under section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, although he had stated graphic details before P.W. 2.

20. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence.--When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.

[Explanation.--"Offence", as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit the offence.]

22. In fact, extra judicial confession has to be proved like any other evidence and the value of the same would depend upon veracity of the witness, to whom it was made. The confession is normally made to a person to avoid harassment from the police or the people concerned and also it is made to a person, who could otherwise protect the accused. P.W. 2 is neither influential and not even of any help to accused No. 1. It does not appeal to a prudent mind that the accused, who is not apprehended by police nor under any suspicion would confess the guilt before a stranger.

24. It would also be trite to refer to the Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Rajaram MANU/SC/0595/2003 : (2003) Cr.L.J. 3901, wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"It is not open to any court to start with the presumption that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstance, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded there on if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appeared to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken by the witness are clear unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. If the evidence relating to extra judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touch stone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of law. It is improbable that the accused would repose confidence on a person who is inimically deposed towards him and confess his guilt."

25. Upon meticulous examination of the evidence of P.W. 3, the manner in which it is narrated, the juncture at which the alleged extra judicial confession is said to have been made to P.W. 2 and the fact that the motive is falsified by the brother of the deceased (P.W. 14), we are of the opinion that this is not a fit case where implicit reliance could be placed on the extra judicial confession of the accused No. 1 for upholding the conviction. It is also clear that there is no independent corroboration to the alleged extra judicial confession. The manner in which it is said to have been made appears to be improbable and imprudent.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 685 of 2010, 

Decided On: 14.02.2022

Mansoorali Khan Ahmed Khan and Ors.  Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author: Sadhana S. Jadhav, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0450/2022

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Under which circumstance can the court convict the accused based on extra-judicial confession?

The submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent that extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence is controverted by the Learned APP by relying upon the judgment of the apex court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Rajaram MANU/SC/0595/2003 : (2003) Cr.L.J. 3901, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:

"an extra judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has made. The value of the evidence depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any court to start with the presumption that extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstance, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded there on if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appeared to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken by the witness are clear unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. If the evidence relating to extra judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touch stone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of law. It is improbable that the accused would repose confidence on a person who is inimically deposed towards him and confess his guilt."

{Para 54}

55. In the present case, the accused could not repose faith in his brother due to past experience, as is brought on record by PW 21 himself. According to PW 21, on one occasion, he had found the accused under the influence of alcohol and had sent him back to the native place, where he stayed for eight months. But as far as PW 14 is concerned, the accused felt that he would cause no harm and may find a solution and therefore, he had reposed faith in him after telling him the truth. But, PW 14 divulged to the brother of the accused all that was told to him in good faith and further asked him to verify the same from the accused. The accused therefore, had no option and was constrained to leave Mumbai for his native place. There is no material on record to show that PW 14 or the brother of accused had any animus against him. They co-operated with the police so much so that the brother of the accused accompanied the police to their native village and co-operated with the police in arresting the accused.

57. In this backdrop, we are of the opinion that the 1st extra judicial confession made to PW 14 is voluntary and truthful. And it is not necessary to presume at the threshold that it is a weak piece of evidence.

61. An arithmetical exactitude cannot be read into an extra judicial confession. All that needs to be seen is that, it was not induced by threat or coercion or any compulsion to divulge the commission of an offence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Confirmation Case No. 2 of 2019

Decided On: 08.02.2022

The State of Maharashtra  Vs. Mohammad Aabed Mohammad Ajmir Shaikh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author:Sadhana S. Jadhav, J.

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Should the court convict the accused for an offence under SC &ST(Atrocities) Act if the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused was aware that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste?

Only accused No.2 Nikhil was convicted for the penal

provisions under the Atrocities Act i.e. Section 3(1)(w)(1) and 3(1) (w)(ii). A plain reading of said penal provisions show that accused must know that the woman belong to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. He is also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act.

These two penal provisions show that at the time of

commission of the offence, the accused must have knowledge that

the victim belongs to either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and in spite of the knowledge, he commits the acts which are punishable.{Para 131}

132. As per the Caste Certificate (Exh.21) of the victim, she

belong to the caste which is a Scheduled Caste. Similarly, it is proved on record that accused no.2 is not belonging to Scheduled Caste. Accused no.1 was belonging to Scheduled Caste.

133. After a careful scrutiny of the evidence of the “victim” as

well as “father”, there is noting on record to show that accused no.2 was knowing and/or having knowledge that family of the victim belong to Scheduled Caste. Even learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State could not point out to us that aspect. If that be so, we are of the view that the learned Special Judge ought not to have convicted accused no.2 Nikhil for the penal provisions under the Atrocities Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

: NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL CONFIRMATION CASE NO. 01 OF 2020

 State of Maharashtra, Vs  Sagar Vishwanath Borkar,

CORAM : V. M. DESHPANDE and AMIT B. BORKAR, JJ.

Dated: SEPTMEBER 07, 2021

JUDGMENT [Per V. M. Deshpande, J.]

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How to appreciate evidence in the Murder case in case of circumstantial evidence?

Before analyzing the factual aspect, it may be stated that for a crime to be proved, it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed and must in all circumstances to be proved by direct, ocular evidence, by examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed.

7. A reference may be made to a decision in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1 Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defense or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’ established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

8. The prosecution has relied on the following circumstances:—

(i) Homicidal death of deceased Zuber.

(ii) Extra-judicial confession of appellant/accused.

(iii) The appellant/accused was in possession of factory premises of place of incident.

(iv) The appellant/accused had called deceased Zuber to his factory premises.

(v) Dead-body was pointed out by the appellant/accused.

(vi) Subsequent conduct of the appellant.

On going through the evidence on record, it can be said that the prosecution has established homicidal death of the deceased Zuber. The appellant/accused made voluntary extra judicial confession before his father in law, informant Makbul Malang Shah and PW-3/Mohd. Ismail Madar Shah. The said extra judicial confession is corroborated by other circumstances namely taking police and witnesses to his factory premises. It is established that the appellant/accused had a key in possession. He opened the shutter of factory. He pointed out dead body which was on mezzanine foor. Therefore, the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to the homicidal death of the deceased Zuber. The said circumstances unerringly point out the guilt of the appellant/accused and none else. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the case of Sharad Birad Chand Sarda (supra) the prosecution has proved all circumstances leading to the death of deceased Zuber, wherein the appellant/accused was involved. The said circumstances point out the guilt of the appellant/accused.

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Ranjit More and Surendra P. Tavade, JJ.)

Mohammad Ismail Noormohammad Madana Vs State of Maharashtra 

Criminal Appeal No. 659 of 2012

 Decided on February 12, 2020,

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 238

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on extra judicial confession

 Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the

court must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is

corroborated by other prosecution evidence. In order to accept

extra-judicial confession, it must be voluntary and must inspire

confidence. If the court is satisfied that the extra-judicial confession

is voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.

Considering the admissibility and evidentiary value of extra-judicial

confession, after referring to various judgments, in Sahadevan and

Another v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 6 SCC 403, this court held

as under:-

“15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1995 Supp (4) SCC

259 this Court stated the principle that:

“10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is

rather a weak type of evidence and requires

appreciation with a great deal of care and caution.

Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by

suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes

doubtful and it loses its importance.”

15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing

the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial

confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8

SCC 180 stated the principle that:

“19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and

made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court.

The confession will have to be proved like any other fact.

The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other

evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom

it has been made.”

The Court further expressed the view that:

“19. … Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction

can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession

comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be

unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in

respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to

indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an

untruthful statement to the accused.…”

15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the

Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 10 SCC 604

held that:

“29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial

confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although

ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated

by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v.

State of Mysore (1970) 2 SCC 105, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P.

AIR 1959 SC 902, Sivakumar v. State By Inspector of Police

(2006) 1 SCC 714 (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41

and 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of

Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 262 and Mohd. Azad alias

Shamin v. State of W.B. (2008) 15 SCC 449]”

10

14. It is well settled that conviction can be based on a voluntarily

confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible

it should be corroborated by independent evidence. Extra-judicial

confession of accused need not in all cases be corroborated. In

Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another (1992) 3 SCC

204, this court after referring to Piara Singh and Others v. State of

Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 452 held that the law does not require that

the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be

corroborated. The rule of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession must be separately and independently corroborated.

15. As discussed above, if the court is satisfied that if the

confession is voluntary, the conviction can be based upon the same.

Rule of Prudence does not require that each and every

circumstance mentioned in the confession with regard to the

participation of the accused must be separately and independently

corroborated. In the case at hand, as pointed out by the trial court

as well as by the High Court, R.K. Soni (PW-2) and R.C. Chhabra

(PW-3) were the senior officers of the bank and when they reached

the bank for inspection on 23.04.1994, the accused submitted his

confessional statement (Ex.-PW-2/A). Likewise, in the enquiry

conducted by R.C. Chhabra (PW-3), the accused had given

confession statement (Ex.-PW-3/A).

16. Contention of the appellant is that PWs 2 and 3 being the

higher officials, it cannot be said that the confession statement of

the accused has been made voluntarily and it must have been

under the inducement or under false promise of favour. Mere

allegation of threat or inducement is not enough; in the court’s

opinion, such inducement must be sufficient to cause a reasonable

belief in the mind of the accused that by so confessing, he would

get an advantage. As pointed out by the trial court and the High

Court, though the confession statement has been initially made in

the presence of R.C. Chhabra (PW-3) and M.P. Sethi by the

appellant, no question was put to R.C. Chhabra (PW-3) that extrajudicial

confession (Ex.-PW3/A) was an outcome of any threat,

inducement or allurement. The statement which runs to eleven

sheets has been held to be made by the appellant voluntarily.

Likewise, confession statement (Ex.-PW-2/A) made before R.K.

Soni (PW-2) was in the handwriting of the appellant made in the

presence of R.K. Soni (PW-2) and H.O. Agrawal, the then Assistant Chief Officer (Inspection). Here again, it was not suggested to R.K. Soni (PW-2) that Ex.-PW-2/A was outcome of some threat or

pressure. The trial court as well as the High Court concurrently held

that the confession statements (Ex.-PW-3/A and PW-2/A) were

voluntarily made and that the same can form the basis for

conviction. We do not find any good ground warranting interference with the said concurrent findings.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.576 OF 2010

RAM LAL Vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Dated: October 03, 2018.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 4616

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When accused can be held guilty for culpable homicide not amounting to murder?

 From the above narration, it is crystal clear that the appellant had committed two acts. The first act was manhandling the deceased by giving a slap.  Immediately, she fell down and became motionless, but, still she was alive. The second act was that believing that she had already died, he poured kerosene and set fire to her. The death was only due to the burn injuries. Whether from these two acts of the appellant, can it be concluded that he is guilty of murder or at least guilty of culpable homicide?

13. In English law, every offence is defined based only on general principles of the common law whereas, fortunately, in India, every offence is defined, both as to what must be done and with what intention it must be done, by the section of the penal code which creates it a crime. Section 299 of IPC defines culpable homicide.  The opening words of Section 299 of IPC need to be kept strongly in mind. Section 299 reads as follows:-

"299. Culpable homicide. Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide."

14. The death undoubtedly should have been caused by a human being as defined in Section 46 of IPC. Similarly, the act of causing death need not necessarily be by a single act and it may be by a series of acts which, as defined in Section 33 of IPC, may constitute a single act. It is not every such act / acts causing death that makes the act of the accused as an offence of culpable homicide. For a homicide being culpable, it should be further proved that the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death; or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. These three are the species of mens rea in culpable homicide.  Unless it is proved that the act of the accused would fall under any one of these three ingredients, it would not amount to an offence of culpable homicide. With this broad understanding of the definition of culpable homicide, let us again proceed further to analyze the facts of the present case.

15. As we have already concluded , the appellant had committed two acts. One was slapping the deceased and making her motionless/unconscious and the second was pouring kerosene and setting fire to her. Whether two or more acts of an accused would constitute a single act or not depends upon the fact whether there was continuity of action.  As defined in Section 33 of IPC, a series of acts may constitute a single act.  But, if more than one act are committed, not in series, it would not constitute a single act.  In the instant case, going by the evidences available on record, we are of the view that these two acts were committed in  a series and, therefore, they constitute a single act as defined in Section 33 of IPC. 

16. So far as the first act is concerned, undoubtedly, it will not fall within the ambit of Section 299 of IPC inasmuch as by the said act, the appellant did not cause the death of the deceased though he believed that he had caused death by the first act. Further, the first act of slapping was done not with either intention to cause death or intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge as defined in Section 299 of IPC. 

17. Now, so far as the second act is concerned,  it was only by this act he caused the death of the deceased. At the time when he did the same, according to him, he was under the belief that the deceased  was no more. Therefore, when he committed the second act also the appellant had no intention to cause death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Since the appellant  was under the belief that the deceased was already  dead, it cannot be said that the appellant, had intended to cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Thus, the second act of the appellant, causing the death of the deceased by pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased also,  would not fall within the first or second limb of Section 299 of IPC at all.  

18. Now, turning to the third limb of Section 299 of IPC, it speaks of knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.  Here again, it can be argued that since the appellant was under the belief that the deceased was no more, knowledge on his part that by his act he was likely to cause death cannot be imputed. But, such argument cannot be countenanced for, such belief can not be farcical or illogical. It should be examined whether the belief of the accused  in this case, that the deceased was no more was based on logic and on good faith. If the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead is based on due care and attention, then, the knowledge as dealt with in the third limb of section 299 of IPC cannot be imputed to him. But, if the belief that the deceased was dead was not based on due care and attention and such belief was recklessly held, then, certainly, knowledge as defined in Section 299 of IPC can be imputed to the accused. In other words, the belief of the appellant that the deceased was dead must be out of good faith.  The term Good faith is defined in Section 32 of IPC which reads as follows:-

52. Good faith . Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention.  

19. In the instant case,  the appellant, without taking due care and attention, that is, without fully ascertaining whether the deceased was already dead or not, in haste, had poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. There was total lack of due care and attention on the part of the appellant.  Thus, the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead was not based on due care and attention and so, he cannot escape by taking recourse to the plea of good faith as defined in Section 52 of IPC. In such view of the matter, we have to hold that the second act of the appellant in the instant case would squarely fall within the third limb of section 299 of IPC. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:     07.04.2016

CORAM:

 MR . JUSTICE M.JAICHANDREN

 MR. JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU

Criminal Appeal No.457 of 2013

Rajan Vs State Rep. by

The Inspector of Police,

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 500

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When extra judicial confession should not be relied on?

Insofar as the implication of other accused is concerned the prosecution relied on the testimony of PW9 Sukhwinder Singh cousin of Satnam Singh before whom accused Ranjit Singh is alleged to have made extra judicial confession. As rightly held by the High Court Sukhwinder Singh is not a person of any authority to help the said accused to get any assistance from him by confessing the crime and in the absence of any corroboration, his testimony with regard to extra judicial confession cannot be relied on. 

Supreme Court of India

State Of Punjab vs Jagga Singh Etc on 17 December, 2014

Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, C. Nagappan

Citation;2015 ALLSCR186

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Whether Extra judicial confession made to stranger can be relied on/

Delhi High Court: Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in Kishore Chand v. State of H.P., (1991) 1 SCC 286, the Court held that an unambiguous extrajudicial confession possesses high probative value as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and it is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the Court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872 or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The Court suggested that it is important to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or

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