Supreme Court: High court or Session court should not give ad-interim relief in the nature of final relief while issuing notice in application for Anticipatory bail

The High Court has issued notice to the State and has passed an ad-interim order which reads thus"- "In the meantime, the petitioner is directed to join the investigation. In the event of arrest, he shall be on ad interim bail to the satisfaction of the arresting/investigating officer subject to the conditions as provided under Section 482(2) of the BNNS, 2023." {Para 11}

12. We take notice of the fact that in all other connected matters the High Court has said that till the anticipatory bail applications are decided the accused persons shall not be arrested.

13. What weighed with us in issuing notice and staying the operation of the impugned order referred to above was the nature of the ad interim relief the High Court thought fit to grant. 

14. Ordinarily, when the High Court takes up anticipatory bail application for hearing it has three options. Either it may reject it on the very first day or it may issue notice to the State but would not grant any ad-interim protection or in a given case may issue notice and may even deem fit to grant appropriate protection. The aforesaid is of course the discretion of the Court concerned having regard to the merits of the matter. However, what we disapprove in the present case is the nature of the ad-interim relief granted. The same is practically in the nature of granting the final relief.

15. There is no point in asking the accused to go before the investigating officer pending the final disposal of the anticipatory bail application before the High Court and further saying that in the event of arrest he shall be released on ad-interim bail. Such ad-interim reliefs have their own legal implications.

16. We may remind the High Court of what this Court observed in the case of Srikant Upadhyay & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., reported in 2024 INSC 202. We quote the relevant observations as under: "... A bare perusal of Section 438(1), Cr.PC, would reveal that taking into consideration the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. The proviso thereunder would reveal that if the High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.PC, it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application, it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an application without passing an interim order. This question was considered in detail by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay, in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal Jain and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra through EOW Unit II, Mumbai 2014 SCC Online Bom 549 and answered as above and we are in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be heard to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing interim order....

We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. ..." (Emphasis supplied)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5456 of 2024

Date of Order: 18.12.2024

Deepak Aggarwal Vs. Balwan Singh & Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/146578/2024.

Print Page

Whether injunction application to restrain daughter-in-law from entering the marital home is maintainable?

 In the present case, the first defendant has squarely questioned the title, of the plaintiff, to the suit property, and has contended that it is joint family property. She has claimed her right, therein, not merely on the ground that it is her matrimonial home, but as the mother of a coparcener to the joint family. These disputes required to be adjudicated, in the suit, and no order, interlocutory or otherwise, can be passed on the premise that the plaintiff is right, and the first defendant is wrong.

35. In my opinion, it is not necessary to enter, deeply, into the circumstances in which mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, can be granted at an interim stage, as these principles are well settled. The decisions, on which Ms. Rajkotia relies, and which have been cited hereinabove, clearly indicate that, essentially, a plaintiff, in order to be justified to claim an interlocutory mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, has to establish (i) a strong case in his favour, the standard being higher than that of a prima facie case, (ii) that denial of prohibitory injunction would result in irreparable loss to her, and (iii) that the balance of convenience is decidedly in favour of grant of mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction at the interlocutory stage. Additionally, grant of mandatory or prohibitory injunction, at an interim stage, has been approved where the failure, to do so, would result in the suit becoming infructuous, or the final relief, sought therein, being rendered illusory. None of these criteria are satisfied, in the present case. Most importantly, the first defendant had been residing with the plaintiff, since 2002 (or, at the latest, 2014, even if the plaintiff's stand were to be accepted), and it was only on 10th May, 2020 the first defendant left the house of the plaintiff, to visit her mother. It cannot, therefore, be said, by any stretch of imagination, that, by allowing the defendant to return to the house, where she had been staying till 10th May, 2020, irreparable harm would ensue, to the plaintiff. Mere bald assertions, to the effect that the first defendant was harassing the plaintiff, can hardly suffice. Given the option between allowing the first defendant to return to her matrimonial home, where she had been residing since 2002, or 2014, and banishing her, at least during the pendency of the suit, therefrom, the balance of convenience is also, decidedly, in favour of the former, rather than the latter, alternative.

36. Ms. Rajkotia had sought to submit that, were injunction, as prayed by her, in this application, not granted at this stage, the suit would be rendered effectively infructuous, as it would linger on for years. The submission fails to impress. The prayer, in the suit, is for a decree of possession, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in respect of the suit property, and for the decree of permanent injunction, restraining the first defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the plaintiff. In fact, the prayer, in the present application, effectively seeks grant of the prayers in the suit, before the suit is tried and at an interlocutory stage. If this Court were to restrain the first defendant, at this stage itself, from returning to the suit property, the plaintiff would secure possession thereof, and, effectively, a permanent injunction, in terms of prayer (b) in the suit, would also be granted. The plaintiff, therefore, effectively seeks decreeing of the suit without a trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.A. 4618/2020 in CS (OS) 506/2018

Decided On: 02.07.2020

Anita Chopra  Vs.  Rohini Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1332/2020

Print Page

Supreme Court: The family Court should not give final relief at interim stage

 By the impugned order, the court has directed the Court Receiver to take possession of the flat from the appellant and induct respondent-wife in the flat during the pendency of the appeal.

{Para 3}

4. In the appeal filed, the appellant has called in question the correctness or otherwise of the findings and the conclusion reached by the Family Court in Petition No. A-1072/2000 dated 6.2.2007, wherein the Family Court has reached the conclusion that both the husband and wife are joint owners of flat bearing No. 303, Rajesh Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Borivali (West), Mumbai.

Even before giving a verdict on the findings and the conclusions reached by the Family Court, by way of interim relief, the court has granted the main relief itself. This, in our opinion is unsustainable. It is settled legal position, that by way of interim relief, final relief should not be granted till the matter is decided one way or the other.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1788 of 2009 

Decided On: 23.03.2009

 Mehul Mahendra Thakkar  Vs. Meena Mehul Thakkar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tarun Chatterjee and H.L. Dattu, JJ.

Citation: 2009 (14) SCC 48: MANU/SC/0425/2009

Print Page

Whether court should reject prayer for interim injunction if relief sought in injunction application and suit is same?

 In Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and others reported in MANU/SC/0161/1990 : (1990) 1 SCR 332, the Supreme Court held that the relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last known uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable loss. Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

a) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

b) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

c) The balance of convenience is in favour of one seeking such relief.

20. There is no law that in case the relief sought through the suit and relief prayed for in a application for temporary mandatory injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC are the same, in that eventuality the ad interim injunction cannot be granted.

21. However, it is true that the court would be very slow in granting such relief and would grant the same only when it comes to the conclusion that great injustice has been done to the petitioner who has been thrown away from a property in which he was in lawful occupation and a person who has got no right or title to the said property has occupied the same. In Indian Cable Company Limited (supra), this court held that if a court is called upon to grant any relief on an interlocutory application which when granted would mean granting substantially the relief claimed in the suit, the court will be very slow and circumspect in the matter of granting such prayer. It is indeed true that such a relief is granted only in exceptional cases, still at the same time no court should think that in law there is any absolute bar to the court granting such a relief. In deserving cases, the court should not hesitate to come in aid of a litigant and upheld the cause of justice by granting such a relief. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

CO No. 359 of 2017

Decided On: 17.01.2019

Amita Sarbadhikary  Vs. Bandana Shome and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bibek Chaudhuri, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Cal 123

Print Page

Leading judgment of Supreme court on interim mandatory injunction and moulding of relief

 That apart, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have committed fundamental error in applying the principle of moulding of relief which could at best be resorted to at the time of consideration of final relief in the main suit and not at an interlocutory stage. The nature of order passed against the appellant is undeniably a mandatory order at an interlocutory stage. There is marked distinction

between moulding of relief and granting mandatory relief at an interlocutory stage. As regards the latter, that can be granted only to restore the status quo and not to establish a new set of things differing from the state which existed at the date when the suit was instituted.This Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden Versus Coomi Sorab Warden and Others,2 has had occasion to consider the circumstances warranting grant of interlocutory mandatory injunction. In paragraphs 16 & 17, after analysing the legal precedents on the point as noticed in paragraphs 11-15, the Court went on to observe as follows:

“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are: (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

2 (1990) 2 SCC 117

(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. The Court, amongst others, rested its exposition on the dictum in Halsbury‟s Laws of England, 4th edition, Volume 24, paragraph 948, which reads thus:

“A mandatory injunction can be granted on an interlocutory application as well as at the hearing, but, in the absence of special circumstances, it will not normally be granted. However, if the case is clear and one which the court thinks ought to be decided at once, or if the act done is a simple and summary one which can be easily remedied, or if the defendant attempts to steal a march on the plaintiff, such as where, on receipt of notice that an injunction is about to be applied for, the defendant hurries on the work in respect of which complaint is made so that when he receives notice of an interim injunction it is completed, a mandatory injunction will be granted on an interlocutory application.”

26. The principle expounded in this decision has been consistently followed by this Court. It is well established that an interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie material clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. (See Metro Marins and Another Versus Bonus Watch Co. (P) Ltd. and Others3, Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another Versus Praveen Kumar Singh4 and Purshottam Vishandas Raheja and Another Versus Shrichand Vishandas Raheja (Dead) through LRS. and Others5)

27. In the factual scenario in which mandatory order has been passed against the appellant, in our opinion, is in excess of jurisdiction. Such a drastic order at an interlocutory stage ought to be eschewed. 

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7079 OF 2018

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18465/2018)

Samir Narain Bhojwani Vs M/s. Aurora Properties and Investments

and Anr.

Dated:August 21, 2018.

A.M. Khanwilkar J,
Citation:  2018 (5) Bom.C.R. 731 : 2018 (5) RAJ 243 : 2018 (10) Scale 33 

Print Page

Whether interim relief can be granted which is beyond scope of suit?

As already stated, in the absence of MHADA being a party to the suit or any relief having been sought against it, the question of deciding the nature of the suit and jurisdiction of the Court on the assumption that it is a suit between the plaintiff and MHADA, could not and did not arise. Mr. Irani pointed out that although not in the suit but in the notice of motion the plaintiff did seek relief against MHADA, that was not considered by the trial Court. In my opinion, no relief can be asked for in a motion outside and beyond the scope of the suit itself and even if the same was sought, it was not required to be entertained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

A.O. No. 833 of 1993 with Civil Application No. 3413 of 1993

Decided On: 11.08.1993

Dinyar Behramji Irani Vs.  Kshirsagar Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.G. Chaudhari, J.

Citation: 1994(3) Bom CR 264

Print Page

Whether court should grant interim relief if final relief can not be granted?

In The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta MANU/SC/0012/1951 : [1952]1SCR28 a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted. The Court said that 'an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted. To illustrate this point, let us take the relief which the Bank seeks in its suit. The prayer is that the Corporation be restrained by an injunction of the Court from presenting a winding-up petition under the Companies Act, 1956 or under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In other words, the Bank seeks to restrain the Corporation by an injunction of the court from instituting a proceeding for winding-up of the Bank. There is a clear bar in Section 41(b) against granting this relief. The Court has no jurisdiction to grant a perpetual injunction restraining a person from instituting a proceeding in a court not subordinate to it, as a relief, ipso facto temporary relief cannot be granted in the same terms.

12. The interim relief can obviously be not granted also because the object behind granting interim relief is to maintain status quo ante so that the final relief can be appropriately moulded without the party's position being altered during the pendency of the proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7348 of 1983

Decided On: 19.09.1983

 Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.A. Desai and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1983 SC 1272).

Print Page

Whether court can grant final relief at interim stage?

Having heard the learned counsel on both the
sides, we are of the view that the High Court should
have refrained from passing a final order on the
issue at the interlocutory stage. All available
contentions are to be raised by the parties at the
stage of final disposal of the appeal.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11578-79 OF 2016

VISHNU BABU TAMBE 
 V
APURVA VISHNU TAMBE 
Dated:December 02, 2016. 
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC454, 2017(4) MHLJ 673

Print Page

Whether court will grant interim injunction if final relief cannot be granted?

 It is settled law that no interim injunction would be issued if the final relief cannot be granted. As was held in K. P. M. Aboobucker v. K. Kunhamoo, Air 1958 Mad 287: "An interim relief is granted to a person on the footing that that person is prima facie entitled to the right on which is based the claim for the main relief as well as the interim relief. That relief is granted as an interim measure till the disposal of the suit in which is to be investigated the validity of the claim or right that has been put forward. If no such claim has been put forward in the suit, it means that there can be no occasion for investigation of such a claim in the suit, there can be no justification for the grant of an interim relief which will just lapse on the termination of the suit, but which will leave the parties in the same position in which they were before the institution of the suit. in the course of which the interim relief was sought and obtained. That is not the scope of O. 39, Rule 1."

Delhi High Court

Raman Hosiery Factory, Delhi And ... vs J.K. Synthetics Ltd. And Ors. on 9 January, 1974

Equivalent citations: AIR 1974 Delhi 207, 1975 45 CompCas 374 Delhi

Bench: P Narain

Print Page

Whether court can grant final relief at interim stage against non party to suit?

Upon hearing the learned Counsel, I find that admittedly defendant
no. 3 was not a party to the Appeal preferred before the Appellate Court. The relief
of cancellation of registration essentially affects the rights of the defendant no. 3. In
such circumstances, before directing the cancellation of the registration, the
learned Judge ought to have heard the defendant no. 3 in the matter. The findings
of the learned Judge that the Deed of Conveyance and the Tri-partite Lease Deed
was submitted for registration after the exparte Order was passed on 03.04.2004,
cannot be faulted. No doubt, there is a contention raised by the defendants to the
effect that the Deed of Conveyance was executed much before the service of the
Exparte Order. This aspect in any case would have to be examined by the learned
Judge while deciding the suit on merits. After examining the paramount
consideration of granting such injunctions, the Court also has to balance the
equities of the parties. No doubt, a contemptuous act cannot be condoned by a
Court of equity. But, in the present case, it is the contention of the defendants that
much prior to the exparte Order, there were documents executed between the
defendant inter se in connection with the shed, There are also allegations that
possession was also parted in favour of defendant no. 3 pursuant to documents
executed by the defendant nos. 1 and 2. In such circumstances, one will have to
examine whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and
considering that admittedly the defendant no. 3 and the Goa Industrial Corporation
were not parties to the suit, what could be a just and appropriate relief. The learned
Trial Judge on the basis of the findings in the impugned Order passed by the Lower
Appellate Court, has proceeded to dispose of the application under Order 39 Rule
2-A and 11 of the Civil Procedure Code by striking off the defence of the
defendants. No doubt, the rights of the Plaintiffs would have to be established in the
suit and ascertain whether the transactions intended to be executed were in fact
contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and the effects thereof. In
such circumstances, one will have to grant an appropriate relief in the facts of the
present case. By directing the cancellation of the registration of the deeds, the
learned Judge has in fact granted at this stage, a final relief when the rights of thePlaintiffs have not been established. No doubt, an act committed in contravention
of an Order of the Court is to be dealt with severely and ensure that the illegality
which has been committed is undone in the facts and circumstances of each case.
Admittedly, the transactions which are impugned were with the consent of the Goa
Industrial Corporation who are not parties to the suit and the registration would also
effect their rights. In the present case, the party who is affected is in fact the
defendant no. 3 and the Industrial Corporation who were admittedly not parties to
the suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NOS. 279, 362 AND 626 OF 2006
WRIT PETITION NO. 279 OF 2006
Sachin Y.Mense,

V 
 Shri Sunil Noronha,

 Coram :- F. M. REIS, J

 Dated  : 16th January, 2015.
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR 146

Print Page

Whether court should grant interim relief if it can not grant final relief?

An interim relief granted during the pendency of a suit should not be of greater scope than what could be granted in the suit itself, after the party has established his right in the suit to that relief. In my opinion, that would be a very relevant factor to be taken into account in deciding whether a Court should or even could grant such an interim relief, especially so when the person against whom the interim injunction is sought is not a party to the suit, and against whom no relief could be granted in the suit itself.
 An interim relief is granted to a person on the footing that that person is prima facie entitled to the right, on which is based the claim for the main relief as well as the interim relief. That relief is granted as an interim measure till the disposal of the suit, in which is to be investigated the validity of the claim of right that has been put forward. If no such claim has been put forward in the suit, it means that there can be no occasion for investigation of such a claim in the suit, there can be no justification for the grant of an interim relief which will just lapse on the termination of the suit, but which will leave the parties in the same position in which they were before the institution of the suit, in the course of which the interim relief was sought and obtained. 
 Under such circumstances where no relief could be granted to the appellant against the respondent in the main suit itself, it is not permissible to grant any interim relief, to be operative till the disposal of the suit. Even were it only a question of discretion, I should hold that in such a case the Court should exercise its discretion against the grant of interim injunction. I would go further and hold that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant by way of interim relief what could never be granted in the main suit itself.

Madras High Court

K.P.M. Aboobucker vs K. Kunhamoo And Ors. on 20 December, 1957

Equivalent citations: AIR 1958 Mad 287, (1958) 1 MLJ 303

Print Page

Whether court should grant interim injunction if it can not grant final relief?

 It is settled law that no interim injunction would be issued if the final relief cannot be granted. As was held in K. P. M. Aboobucker v. K. Kunhamoo, Air 1958 Mad 287: "An interim relief is granted to a person on the footing that that person is prima facie entitled to the right on which is based the claim for the main relief as well as the interim relief. That relief is granted as an interim measure till the disposal of the suit in which is to be investigated the validity of the claim or right that has been put forward. If no such claim has been put forward in the suit, it means that there can be no occasion for investigation of such a claim in the suit, there can be no justification for the grant of an interim relief which will just lapse on the termination of the suit, but which will leave the parties in the same position in which they were before the institution of the suit. in the course of which the interim relief was sought and obtained. That is not the scope of O. 39, Rule 1."

Delhi High Court

Raman Hosiery Factory, Delhi And ... vs J.K. Synthetics

 Ltd. And Ors. on 9 January, 1974

Equivalent citations: AIR 1974 Delhi 207,

 1975 45 CompCas 374 Delhi

Bench: P Narain

Print Page