What is theft, Extortion, Dacoity, Robbery, Kidnapping and Abduction, as per provisions of IPC?

 Under the IPC, these offences are easiest to remember if you link each one to its core act: theft = taking, extortion = obtaining by fear, robbery = theft/extortion plus instant violence, dacoity = robbery by 5 or more persons, kidnapping = taking away a person unlawfully, and abduction = compelling or inducing a person to go from a place by force or deceit.

Theft

Theft is defined in Section 378 IPC. It means that a person, with dishonest intention, takes movable property out of the possession of another person without that person’s consent, and moves that property in order to take it.

So, in simple words: theft means dishonestly taking someone’s movable property without consent.

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Supreme Court: Bodily Injuries Not Necessary To Prove Sexual Assault; Victims Respond To Trauma In Different Ways

We must caution that bodily injuries are not necessary to

prove sexual assault1 and neither it is important to raise a hue or

cry. In this regard, the Supreme Court’s Handbook on Gender

stereotypes(2023) provides as under:

“Different people react differently to traumatic

events. For example, the death of a parent may

cause one person to cry publicly whereas another

person in a similar situation may not exhibit any

emotion in public. Similarly, a woman’s reaction

to being sexually assaulted or raped by a man may

vary based on her individual characteristics.

There is no “correct” or “appropriate” way in

which a survivor or victim behaves.” {Para 8}

9. It is a common myth that sexual assault must leave injuries.

Victims respond to trauma in varied ways, influenced by factors

such as fear, shock, social stigma or feelings of helplessness. It

is neither realistic nor just to expect a uniform reaction. The

stigma associated with sexual assault often creates significant

barriers for women, making it difficult for them to disclose the

incident to others. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1005 OF 2013

DALIP KUMAR @ DALLI APPELLANT(S)  Vs  STATE OF UTTARANCHAL 

Dated: JANUARY 16, 2025.

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What are the essential ingredients of an offence of Kidnapping for ransom U/S 364-A of IPC?

33. After noticing the statutory provision of Section 364-A and the law laid down by this Court in the above noted cases, we conclude that the essential ingredients to convict an accused under Section 364-A which are required to be proved by the prosecution are as follows:

(i) Kidnapping or abduction of any person or keeping a person in detention after such kidnapping or abduction; and

(ii) threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt or;

(iii) causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or any Governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom.

Thus, after establishing first condition, one more condition has to be fulfilled since after first condition, word used is “and”. Thus, in addition to first condition either Condition (ii) or (iii) has to be proved, failing which conviction under Section 364-A cannot be sustained.”

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Sanjay Kishan Kaul and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No. 987 of 2009

Ravi Dhingra Vs State of Haryana 

Decided on March 1, 2023

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 199

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Supreme court: In case of Kidnapping For Ransom, it is Necessary To Prove Threat To Cause Death Or Harm For Conviction

 After noticing the statutory provision of Section

364A and the law laid down by this Court in the above

noted cases, we conclude that the essential

ingredients to convict an accused under Section 364A

which are required to be proved by prosecution are as

follows:-

(i) Kidnapping or abduction of any person or

keeping a person in detention after such

kidnapping or abduction; and

(ii) threatens to cause death or hurt to such

person, or by his conduct gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that such person may

be put to death or hurt or;

(iii) causes hurt or death to such person in order

to compel the Government or any foreign State

or any Governmental organization or any other

person to do or abstain from doing any act or

to pay a ransom.

34. Thus, after establishing first condition, one

more condition has to be fulfilled since after first

condition, word used is “and”. Thus, in addition to

first condition either condition (ii) or (iii) has to

be proved, failing which conviction under Section

364A cannot be sustained.

35. The second condition which is “and threatens to

cause a death or hurt to such person, or by his

conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that

such person may be put to death or hurt” is relevant

for consideration in this case since appellant has

confined his submission only regarding nonfulfillment

of this condition. 

39. The High Court has not dealt with the grounds

taken before it by the accused that no threat to

cause death or hurt was extended by the accused. From

the judgment of the high court, thus, it can be said

that there is no finding regarding fulfillment of

condition No.2. Both the Courts having not held that

condition No.2 as noted above was found established

on the evidence led before the Court the conviction

under Section 364A become unsustainable. The present

is not a case where applicability of condition No.

(iii), i.e., “or causes hurt or death” is even

claimed. Thus, fulfillment of condition No.(ii) was

necessary for conviction under Section 364A.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.533 OF 2021

SHAIK AHMED  Vs  STATE OF TELANGANA 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Dated: JUNE 28, 2021.

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Whether a consensual affair can be a defence against the charge of kidnapping a minor?

A perusal of Section 361 of IPC shows that it is necessary that

there be an act of enticing or taking, in addition to establishing the child’s minority (being sixteen for boys and eighteen for girls) and care/keep of a lawful guardian. Such ‘enticement’ need not be direct or immediate in time and can also be through subtle actions likewinning over the affection of a minor girl. Thakorlal D Vadgama v. State of Gujarat, (1973) 2 SCC 413, ¶ 10. 

13. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the appellant has

unintentionally admitted his culpability. Besides the victim being

recovered from his custody, the appellant admits to having established  sexual intercourse and of having an intention to marry her. Although the victim’s deposition that she was forcefully removed from the custody of her parents might possibly be a belated improvement but the testimonies of numerous witnesses make out a clear case of

enticement. The evidence on record further unequivocally suggests that the appellant induced the prosecutrix to reach at a designated place to accompany him.

14. Behind all the chaff of legalese, the appellant has failed to

propound how the elements of kidnapping have not been made out. His core contention appears to be that in view of consensual affair between them, the prosecutrix joined his company voluntarily. Such a plea, in our opinion, cannot be acceded to given the unambiguous language of the statute as the prosecutrix was admittedly below 18 years of age.

15. A bare perusal of the relevant legal provisions, as extracted

above, show that consent of the minor is immaterial for purposes of

Section 361 of IPC. Indeed, as borne out through various other

provisions in the IPC and other laws like the Indian Contract Act, 1872, minors are deemed incapable of giving lawful consent.Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 7 SCC 359, ¶ 15.Section 361 IPC, particularly, goes beyond this simple presumption. It bestows the ability to make crucial decisions regarding a minor’s physical safety upon his/her guardians. Therefore, a minor girl’s infatuation with her alleged kidnapper cannot by itself be allowed as a defence, for the same would amount to surreptitiously undermining the protective essence of the offence of kidnapping.

17. The ratio of S. Varadarajan (supra), although attractive at first

glance, does little to aid the appellant’s case. On facts, the case is

distinguishable as it was restricted to an instance of “taking” and not “enticement”. Further, this Court in S. Varadarajan (supra) explicitly held that a charge of kidnapping would not be made out only in a case where a minor, with the knowledge and capacity to know the full import of her actions, voluntarily abandons the care of her guardian without any assistance or inducement on part of the accused. The cited judgment, therefore, cannot be of any assistance without establishing: first, knowledge and capacity with the minor of her actions; second, voluntary abandonment on part of the minor; and third, lack of inducement by the accused.

18. Unfortunately, it has not been the appellant’s case that he had

no active role to play in the occurrence. Rather the eyewitnesses

have testified to the contrary which illustrates how the appellant had drawn the prosecutrix out of the custody of her parents. Even more crucially, there is little to suggest that she was aware of the full purport of heractions or that she possessed the mental acuities and maturity to take  care of herself. In addition to being young, the prosecutrix was not much educated. Her support of the prosecution version and blanket denial of any voluntariness on her part, even if presumed to be under the influence of her parents as claimed by the appellant, at the very least indicates that she had not thought her actions through fully.

19. It is apparent that instead of being a valid defence, the

appellant’s vociferous arguments are merely a justification which although evokes our sympathy, but can’t change the law. Since the relevant provisions of the IPC cannot be construed in any other

manner and a plain and literal meaning thereof leaves no escape route for the appellant, the Courts below were seemingly right in observing that the consent of the minor would be no defence to a charge of kidnapping. No fault can thus be found with the conviction of the appellant under Section 366 of IPC.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1919 of 2010

Anversinh @ Kiransinh Fatesinh Zala Vs State of Gujarat 

Dated:  12.01.2021

Author: Surya Kant, J:

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Whether a father taking away a minor child from the custody of the mother can be held guilty for the offence of kidnapping?

Therefore what we have proved in this case is that the child was in the keeping of his mother who was a lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 361, Indian Penal Code and that the child was taken or enticed away out of her keeping. Section 361 says that "whoever takes or entices...is said to kidnap" and there can be no doubt that the word "whoever" will include P.W. l's husband. But this is not quite sufficient. The exception to Section 361 states as follows:

This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.

7. Now, if a person who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of a child cannot commit an offence under Section 361, Indian Penal Code, it seems to follow a fortiori that a person who is in fact the father of the child, and therefore in law entitled to the lawful custody of the child cannot come within the scope of Section 361, Indian Penal Code. In this case it can be said on behalf of the first accused that he did not merely in good faith believe himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of his child, but that he was beyond the possibility of any challenge entitled to the lawful custody of the child, and that therefore his act in taking the child from the keeping of his mother could not amount to an offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship.

I am fortified in this opinion by the reasoning of Rankin, C.J., in the case in Saharali Mohammad v. Kamizuddin Mahammad (1930) I.L.R. 58 Cal. 897. The learned Chief Justice quoted with approval the decision in Emperor v. Sital Prasad (1919) I.L.R. 42 All. 146 as authority for the proposition that:

The explanation to Section 361 cannot be used* to mean that, as against a person, who, in fact, is the civil guardian of the minor, mere de facto guardianship can be set up so as to convict the real civil guardian of an offence under Section 361.
Madras High Court

In Re: Kanneganti Chowdarayya And ... vs Unknown on 22 February, 1938

Equivalent citations: (1938) 1 MLJ 670

Author: Burn

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How to decide bail application in case of Rape and kidnapping of minor girl when accused and victim are in love with each other?

The overall considerations while deciding such applications can be  summed up as -

When a boy and a minor girl are in love with each other and chose

to live together without consent of their parents, then the following factors

are to be considered:

(i) What is the age of the prosecutrix, who is minor.

(ii) Whether the act is violent or not.

(iii) Whether there are antecedents or not.

(iv) Whether the offender is capable of repeating the Act or not.

(v) Whether there is likelihood of threats or intimidation, if at all the

boy is released.

(vi) Whether any chance of tampering with the material witnesses

when their statements are recorded.

(vii) It is also to be taken into account in such cases that a boy in

his early 20's deserves to get employment and to plan,

stabilize and secure his future.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 1036 OF 2015

Sunil Mahadev Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra .

 CORAM: MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.

 DATE : AUGUST 3, 2015

Citation;2016 CRLJ(NOC) 36 Bom

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Whether offence of kidnapping for ransom is to be proved in three stages?

The important ingredient of Section 364A is the abduction or kidnapping, as the case may be. Thereafter, a threat to the kidnapped/abducted that if the demand for ransom is not made then the victim is likely to be put to death and in the event death is caused, the offence of Section 364A is complete. There are three stages in this Section, one is the kidnapping or abduction, second is threat of death coupled with the demand of money and lastly when the demand is not made, then causing death. if the three ingredients are available, that will constitute the offence under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code. 

Supreme Court of India

Vishwanath Gupta vs State Of Uttaranchal on 21 March, 2007

Bench: A.K. Mathur, Lokeshwar Singh Panta

Citation;2007CriLJ2296, JT2007(5)SC48,

 2007N.C.C.603, 2007(5)SCALE114,

 (2007)11SCC633, 

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When offence of kidnapping for ransom is proved?

 We would however like to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Akram Khan v. State of West Bengal reported in MANU/SC/1470/2011 : 2012(1) SCC 406.

"28) In Malleshi vs. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/0758/2004 : (2004) 8 SCC 95, while considering the ingredients of Section 364A IPC, this Court held as under:

12. To attract the provisions of Section 364-A what is required to be proved is: (1) that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; (2) kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and (3) that the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom.....

To pay a ransom, as stated in the above referred Section, in the ordinary sense means to pay the price or demand for ransom. This would show that the demand has to be communicated.
29) We have already pointed out the evidence of PW-3 that he had received 8 or 9 calls from the accused persons demanding ransom for release of his son and the evidence of PW-7, an employee of a public telephone booth, also corroborates with the evidence of PW-3 who deposed that the calls were made on several occasions by the appellant from the telephone booth and on 2 or 3 occasions along with the child.
30) In Vinod vs. State of Haryana, MANU/SC/7005/2008 : AIR 2008 SC 1142, while reiterating the principles enunciated in Malleshi (supra), this Court accepted the case of the prosecution and confirmed the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed under Section 364A IPC.
31) Though learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the case falls only under Section 363, namely, mere kidnapping and not under Section 364A i.e., Kidnapping for ransom, in the light of the acceptable evidence led in by the prosecution, relied on and accepted by the trial Court and the High Court, we reject the said contention.

27. It is not necessary for the prosecution to establish the offence u/s. 364-A of IPC that the abductors have actually extort some ransom and in not fulfilling the demand of ransom the abductee had been resulted in death. But the prosecution has to prove that the abductee was kept in detention and threatened to cause death or hurt in order to extort ransom and communicates that demand for ransom.

28. In the present case the prosecution has proved all the three ingredients of section 364-A of IPC which are enunciated in Malleshi's case. Thus the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants has no force that the case falls under 365 of IPC and not under section 364A of IPC.

 Citation: 2015CriLJ1418, 2015(1)JLJ134

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)
DIVISION BENCH

Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 2008

Decided On: 05.01.2015

 Balindar Kumar
Vs.
 State of Madhya Pradesh

Coram:Shantanu Kemkar and J.K. Jain, JJ.

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When taking away of the minor will not amount to an offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship?

Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 361-"Take out of keeping of the lawful guardian", meaning of.
HEADNOTE:

Where a minor girl, alleged to be taken away by the accused person, had left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing and voluntarily joined the accused, it could not be said that the accused had taken her away from the keeping,, of her lawful guardian within the meaning of s. 361 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). Something more had to be done in a case of that kind, such as an inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention, either immediately prior to the minor leaving her father's protection or at some earlier stage. If the evidence failed to establish one of these things, the accused would not be guilty of the offence merely because after she had actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her she - joined the accused, and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place.

 Mere passive consent on the part of a person in giving shelter to the minor does not amount to taking or enticing of the minor but the active bringing about of the stay of the minor in the house of a person by playing upon the weak and hesitating mind of the minor would amount to "taking" within the meaning of s. 361.

Supreme Court of India

S. Varadarajan vs State Of Madras on 9 September, 1964

BENCH:
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
SUBBARAO, K.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.

Equivalent citations: 1965 AIR 942, 1965 SCR (1) 243

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