Supreme Court: Coverage for the purpose of Motor accident claim petition under Insurance policy would begin from the day the money (i.e. premium) was received by the Insurance Company

Another aspect in need of consideration is as to whether the liability of the Insurance Company under the insurance certificate/policy granted by it would cover the incident. This is in reference to the question as to the date and time from when the concerned vehicle would be deemed to be covered by the policy. In the present case, the incident occurred on 11.04.2017 at 14:15 hrs, whereas the insurance policy discloses that insurance was obtained at 15:54 hrs on 11.04.2017. In this regard, on facts, the MACT has found that the premium was paid/given prior to the accident and it was the internal procedure, due to which the policy was issued the next day and, thus, coverage under the policy would begin from the day the money (i.e. premium) was received by the Insurance Company. {Para 11}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 15016-15017 OF 2024

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. Vs  MAYA DEVI AND OTHERS 

Author: AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Citation:  2024 INSC 1050.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 02, 2024.

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What are Special Damages and General Damages under which compensation is awarded in motor accident cases?

 The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on disability. account of permanent

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).

Recording that in routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under Head 1, 2-A and 4, but in serious cases of injury where there is specific medical evidence, corroboration the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi), relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.

20. When a claimant suffers a disability as a result of such injuries and on ascertaining that the disability is of permanent nature, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It is expected that the mechanical formulae of calculating the loss of earning capacity depending upon the percentage of permanent disability, is not to be applied as in most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss i.e. the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether Biker is Liable For Contributory Negligence If Parking Lights Of Stationary Vehicle Against Which He Dashed At Night Were Off?

 I am unable to understand findings given by the Tribunal regarding contributory negligence of the deceased when it has come on record that, no tail lamps or the indicators of offending tempo were put on or no proper precautions were taken by the driver of the offending tempo, to give signal to the other vehicles to show that, the offending tempo was stationed on the road.

{Para 9}

10. After the incident of accident Mohini Salunke, CW-1, widow of deceased and CW-3 Govind Suryawanshi have seen the place of accident while going to Civil Hospital, Latur where deceased was admitted after accident. They noticed that, offending tempo was stationed in the middle of road and its tail lamp or indicators were not on. It has come in the evidence of CW-4 Laxman Jadhav who runs Dhabha by name ‘Kaushik’ near the place of accident, that after hearing sound he went to the accident spot. He found that deceased was lying on the road and stationary offending tempo. He further stated that, indicators or tail lamp of the offending tempo were not on. It was stationed in the middle of the road. From the evidence of three witnesses it reveals that, offending tempo was stationed in the middle of road. No tail lamp or indicators of offending tempo were on.

11. It is signifcant to note that, driver of the offending tempo has not examined any witness to prove that, he had put on the tail lamp or indicators of the offending tempo. Latur Ambejogai road is highway. The accident is happened at 10:00 p.m. when offending tempo was stationed in middle of the road. It was duty of the driver of the offending tempo to put indicators or parking light of the offending tempo in on condition, so other vehicles could know about stationed tempo but it has come on record that, no such precautions were taken by driver of the offending tempo. When any vehicle stationed on the road at night time, as per Rule 109 of the Central Motor Vehicles rules, 1989 proper precautions are necessary to be taken. It reads thus:

[109. Parking light :

[[Every construction equipment vehicle, combine harvester and motor vehicle] and every motor vehicle other than motor cycles and three wheeled invalid carriages shall be provided with one white or amber parking light on each side in the front. In addition to the front lights, two red parking lights one on each side in the rear shall be provided. The front and rear parking lights shall remain lit even when the vehicle is kept stationary on the road:

Provided that these rear lamps can be the same as the rear lamps referred to in rule 105 sub-rule (2):

[Provided also that construction equipment vehicles [and combined harvesters], which are installed with food light lamps or sport lights at the front, rear or side of the vehicle for their off–highway or construction operations, shall have separate control for such lamps or lights and these shall be permanently switched off when the vehicle is travelling on the road.]

This rule states that, front and rear parking lights shall remain lit when the vehicle is kept stationary on the road.

12. It has come on record that, no such parking lights were put on the offending tempo, so liability of contributory accident cannot be fastened on the deceased by holding that, he should have seen the stationed tempo under the headlight of motorcycle. When there is specifc rule in respect of taking precautions by stationary vehicle, if such precautions are not taken by the driver/owner of stationary vehicle then liability cannot be shifted on motorcycle rider. Hence, I am setting aside the observations of the Tribunal that, there was 50% contributory negligence of the deceased in the said accident and I am holding that, driver of the offending tempo is sole responsible for the occurred accident.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD

FIRST APPEAL NO. 569 OF 2022; 

Mohini Mohanrao Salunke Vs Ramdas Hanumant Jadhav

Coram: S.G. DIGE, J.

Dated: 18th October, 2022

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Supreme Court: Multiplier Of Victims Upto The Age Group Of 15 Years Should Be Taken As '15' for grant of compensation under Motor accident claim petition

10.1.4 We are of the considered view that the selection of multiplier ‘15’ for the age group upto 15 years by the three-Judge Bench in Reshma Kumari’s case is having a sound basis. It is common knowledge that the age group of 21 to 25 years is regarded as the commencement of normal productive years as referred specifically by the two-Judge Bench in Sarla Verma’s case at paragraph 39. True that in Sarla Verma’s case the same multiplier viz., ‘18’ is selected for the age group 15 to 20 years. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, which is an enactment to prohibit the engagement of children in all occupation and to prohibit the engagement of adolescence in hazardous occupations and process and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. In the said Act the term “child” has been defined in Section 2(ii) as hereunder:

“S.2…

(i)…

(ii) "child" means a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age or such age as may be specified in the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (35 of 2009), whichever is more”

In the said circumstances, when there is clear prohibition under an enactment for engagement of children and the definition of “child” under the said enactment takes in children who have not completed their fourteenth year of age within its fold, there is certainly justification for selecting a lower multiplier of ‘15’ in the case of victims belonging to the age group upto 15 years. Since the Constitutional Bench in Pranay Sethi’s case held Rajesh’s case (supra) as not a binding precedent for not taking note of decision in Reshma Kumari’s case, held that the formula relating to multiplier has been approved in Reshma Kumari’s case after extracting the afore-extracted paragraph No. 43.1 and 43.2 in Reshma Kumari’s case and that the three-Judge Bench in Reshma Kumari held that as regards the cases where the age of the victim happens to be upto 15 years the multiplier should be ‘15’ we are bound to take the multiplier of victims upto the age group of 15 years as ‘15’. Hence, according to us, the High Court has rightly identified the multiplier by looking into the table in Sarla Verma’s case as 15.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

B.R. GAVAI; J., C.T. RAVIKUMAR; J.

Civil Appeal No. 7605 of 2022 

Divya  Vs The National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.

C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.

Dated: October 18, 2022

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Can the court reduce the liability of the driver of the vehicle for payment of compensation in a motor accident case considering his police statement?

After going through the judgment in detail as also the

documents produced by the learned advocate for the appellant

by a separate compilation, it emerges that the copy of chargesheet filed against the driver of the offending vehicle – Truck and the fact that he is prosecuted in the Court of law, if at all, chargesheet is filed against the driver, his own statement recorded in the said criminal case would never form a part of charge-sheet as it cannot be used against him during the course of trial. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that statement of the driver, which is read by the learned advocate for the appellant is forming part of the charge-sheet. Over and above that, even considering the same, in absence of driver being

examined before the Tribunal, the evidence led before it with

regard to sole negligence of the driver cannot be disputed by the

Insurance Company. If at all, the alleged accident took place in

the manner in which it is argued before the Court, no one has

prevented the Insurance Company to examine the driver of the

offending vehicle before the Tribunal so that claimants could

have cross-examined him to support their assertion in the claim

petition.

After examining the evidence led before it, the Tribunal has

correctly concluded in paragraph No.11 holding the driver of

offending vehicle -Truck to be solely responsible and negligent in

driving it, which caused the death of the deceased.

Neither from the statement nor from the judgment,

Mr.Mehta, learned advocate for the appellant could make out a

case for interference on the ground of attributing any

contributory negligence to the deceased and therefore, there is

no substance in this appeal as it is the sole point raised to assail

the impugned judgment and award. Therefore, the appeal is

liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 57 of 2022

RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

Vs ASHABEN VIKRAMBHAI CHAUHAN

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE UMESH A. TRIVEDI

Date : 08/03/2022

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How to assess quantum of compensation in motor accident case of child death?

 The second deceased was a school going child aged about

12 years. She had a whole future to look forward in life with all

normal human aspirations. She died prematurely due to the

accident at a very tender age for no fault of hers even before she

could start to understand the beauty and joys of life with all its

ups and downs. The loss of a human life untimely at childhood

can never be measured in terms of loss of earning or monetary

loss alone. The emotional attachments involved to the loss of the

child can have a devastating effect on the family which needs to

be visualised and understood. Grant of nonpecuniary

damages for the wrong done by awarding compensation for loss of expectation in life is therefore called for. Undoubtedly the injury

inflicted by deprivation of the life of the child is very difficult to

quantify. The future also abounds with uncertainties. Therefore,

the courts have used the expression “just compensation” to get

over the difficulties in quantifying the figure to ensure

consistency and uniformity in awarding compensation. This

determination shall not depend upon financial position of the

victim or the claimant but rather on the capacity and ability of

the deceased to provide happiness in life to the claimants had

she remained alive. The compensation is for loss of prospective

happiness which the claimant would have enjoyed had the child

not died at the tender age. Since the child was studying in a

school and opportunities in life would undoubtedly abound for

her as the years would have rolled by, compensation must also

be granted with regard to future prospects. It can safely be

presumed that education would have only led to her better

growth and maturity with better prospects and a bright future for which compensation needs to be granted under nonpecuniary

damages. (See R.K. Malik vs. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1).

13. The income of the minor girl child is incapable of precise

fixation. We find no reason to interfere with the assessed notional

income of the second deceased. 

It is well settled legal

principle that in addition to awarding

compensation for pecuniary losses, compensation

must also be granted with regard to the future

prospects of the children. It is incumbent upon the

courts to consider the said aspect while awarding

compensation…”

14. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender, (2006) 13

SCC 60, the deceased victim of the accident was a nine year old

school going child. Considering the claim for loss of future

prospects in absence of a regular income, it was observed that

the compensation so determined had to be just and proper by a

judicious approach and not fixed arbitrarily or whimsically. The

uncertainties of a young life were noticed in the following terms:“

12. In cases of young children of tender age, in

view of uncertainties abound, neither their income

at the time of death nor the prospects of the future

increase in their income nor chances of

advancement of their career are capable of proper

determination on estimated basis. The reason is

that at such an early age, the uncertainties in

regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in

career and thereafter advancement in life are so

many that nothing can be assumed with

reasonable certainty. Therefore, neither the income

of the deceased child is capable of assessment on

estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by

the parents is capable of mathematical

computation.”

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2624 OF 2020

RAJENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS Vs NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS

AUTHOR: NAVIN SINHA, J.

Dated: June 18, 2020

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Whether MACT can make the following deductions while granting compensation in the case of a motor accident?

  In my view, the assessment of compensation made by

the Tribunal is against the settled position in law. It is well settled

position in law that except the statutory deduction to be made

towards income tax, professional tax, no other deduction is

permissible under law. The deduction from salary of the deceased towards insurance, pensionary benefts, gratuity or grant of employment to kin of deceased is not permissible. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Sebastiani Lakra & others v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & another reported at 2018 ALL SCR 2175 wherein the Apex Court has observed in paragraph nos.12 to 16 as under:-

“12. The law is well settled that deductions cannot be

allowed from the amount of compensation either on

account of insurance, or on account of pensionary

benefts or gratuity or grant of employment to akin of the

deceased. The main reason is that all these amounts are

earned by the deceased on account of contractual

relations entered into by him with others. It cannot be

said that these amounts accrued to the dependents or

the legal heirs of the deceased on account of his death in

a motor vehicle accident. The claimants/dependents are

entitled to ‘just compensation’ under the Motor Vehicles

Act as a result of the death of the deceased in a motor

vehicle accident. Therefore, the natural corollary is that

the advantage which accrues to the estate of the

deceased or to his dependents as a result of some

contract or act which the deceased performed in his life

time cannot be said to be the outcome or result of the

death of the deceased even though these amounts may

go into the hands of the dependents only after his death.

13. As far as any amount paid under any insurance

policy is concerned whatever is added to the estate of

the deceased or his dependents is not because of the

death of the deceased but because of the contract

entered into between the deceased and the insurance

company from where he took out the policy. The

deceased paid premium on such life insurance and this

amount would have accrued to the estate of the

deceased either on maturity of the policy or on his death,

whatever be the manner of his death. These amounts are

paid because the deceased has wisely invested his

savings. Similar would be the position in case of other

investments like bank deposits, share, debentures etc..

The tortfeasor cannot take advantage of the foresight

and wise fnancial investments made by the deceased.

14. As far as the amounts of pension and gratuity are

concerned, these are paid on account of the service

rendered by the deceased to his employer. It is now an

established principle of service jurisprudence that

pension and gratuity are the property of the deceased.

They are more in the nature of deferred wages. The

deceased employee works throughout his life expecting

that on his retirement he will get substantial amount as

pension and gratuity. These amounts are also payable on

death, whatever be the cause of death. Therefore,

applying the same principles, the said amount cannot be

deducted.

15. As held by the House of Lords in Perry v. Cleaver

[(1969) 1 ALL ER 555] the insurance amount is the fruit

of premium paid in the past, pension is the fruit of

services already rendered and the wrong doer should not

be given beneft of the same by deducting it from the

damages assessed.

16. Deduction can be ordered only where the

tortfeasor satisfies the court that the amount has

accrued to the claimants only on account of death of the

deceased in a motor vehicle accident.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

FIRST APPEAL NO.754 OF 2012

Anita  Arun Memane, Vs  The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation,

CORAM: V.L. ACHLIYA, J.

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 24.07.2020

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Whether MACT can grant compensation to the victim of motor accident towards inevitable expenses in proceeding under Section 163A of the Motor vehicles Act?

  Learned Single Judge of this court in case of National Insurance Company Limited v/s. Chandraprabha and Ors., (supra) has held that the claim petition having been filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act would be governed by the structured formula of compensation provided in the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. This court in the said

judgment adverted to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Sarla Varma (supra) and held that under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant is entitled to just compensation. Supreme Court also made it clear in paragraph (20) of the said judgment in case of Sarla Varma (supra) that it was not dealing with the case under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which indicates that the ratio laid down in the said decision is applicable only to the cases under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Unless there is an amendment to the provisions of section, namely Section 163-A of the M.V. Act, it would not be permissible for the Tribunal to award the amount over and above one which is prescribed under the head of non pecuniary damages.{Para 48}

49. This court accordingly held that the Tribunal had committed an error in granting funeral expenses of Rs.25,000/- and Rs.10,000/- on account of love and affection which are not in conformity with the provision of second schedule. In my view, the said judgment of this court squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment. The

Tribunal thus could not have awarded a sum of Rs.23,25,000/- towards inevitable expenses in the impugned judgment and award contrary to Section 163-A read with Second Schedule. In my view, this part of the award allowing compensation towards inevitable expenses in the sum of Rs.23,25,000/- is contrary to the principles of law laid down by this court in case of National Insurance Company Limited v/s. Chandraprabha and Ors., (supra) and above referred judgments and thus deserves to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

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Whether MACT can apportion liability for payment of compensation to the victim of the motor accident between two tortfeasors?

 Insofar as judgment of Supreme Court in case of Khenyei v/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 is concerned, it is held by the Supreme Court that the apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. It is held by the Supreme Court that liability of the joint tortfeasor is joint and several. It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite

negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. There is no dispute about the proposition of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Khenyei v/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1.{Para 44}

45. In my view, since the respondent no.1 had filed an application for

compensation under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was no question of the respondent no.1 proving any negligence or default against any of the tortfeasors. A perusal of the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal clearly indicates that the Tribunal has rendered a perverse finding that the compensation amount of Rs.38,94,200/- was required to be apportioned equally between the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner of the Tata Magic vehicle in which the respondent no.1 was travelling. In my view, the impugned judgment and award deciding the negligence at the first instance on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as well as Tata Magic vehicle itself is contrary to the section 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act and shows total perversity. There is thus no question of apportionment of any liability in the ratio of 50 : 50 or in any other ratio between the owner of the offending vehicle and the owner of the Tata Magic vehicle. The judgment and award of the Tribunal thereby rendering the findings on the issue of negligence for the purpose of deciding the extent of contributory negligence and thereafter dividing the compensation at two parts is ex-facie perverse.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

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Whether the claimant can seek compensation for injury due to a motor accident in both U/S 163A and S 166 of the Motor vehicles Act?

Supreme Court in the said judgment clearly held that having regard to the fact that Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not arise. It is held that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Section 163-A and Section 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant

cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. One must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. {Para  28 }

In my view, the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act providing for

compensation on the basis of structured formula under Section 163-A read with Second Schedule and compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is different. Though in the application under Section 166 for compensation, the Tribunal can consider the compensation prescribed under Second Schedule as a guide, Tribunal cannot consider the compensation payable under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act while considering an application under Section 163-A. The Tribunal can award the compensation in an application under Section 163-A only on the basis of structured formula prescribed under Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988. The Tribunal cannot allow part of the compensation by granting part benefit under Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act and partly by awarding compensation payable under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The claimant once having applied for compensation under Section 163-A on the basis of structured formula prescribed under Second Schedule, cannot simultaneously seek compensation also under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.{Para 38 }

There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel that while awarding just compensation though the application was filed under section 163A, Tribunal was empowered to grant compensation payable under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 54 OF 2013

ICICI Lombard General Insurance  Company Limited,  Vs  Kumar Aftab Nasim Ansari

CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 26th JUNE, 2020

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 295

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Whether Motor accident claim tribunal can treat depreciation costs on capital assets as income for grant of compensation?

 It was then contended by Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj that this Court must add to the annual income of the deceased, depreciation costs on capital assets to the amounts of Rs. 21,642, 74,685 and 7,701 as reflected in the tax return for the assessment year 1997-1998. We are unable to accede to this contention. Depreciation is the deduction allowed for the decline in the real value of tangible or intangible assets over its useful life. Its value varies over time and cannot amount to tangible income for the purposes of computing annual income in a claim before the MACT.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9196-97 of 2019

Decided On: 09.12.2019

 Malarvizhi  Vs.  United India Insurance Company Limited 

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Supreme Court: Motor accident claim tribunal must determine compensation based on the income tax return where available

The tax return indicates an annual income of Rs. 2,11,131 in the relevant assessment year. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant contended that other documents were marked which reflected the income of the deceased. We are in agreement with the High Court that the determination must proceed on the basis of the income tax return, where available. The income tax return is a statutory document on which reliance may be placed to determine the annual income of the deceased. To the benefit of the Appellants, the High Court has proceeded on the basis of the income tax return for the assessment year 1997-1998 and not 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 which reflected a reduction in the annual income of the deceased.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9196-97 of 2019

Decided On: 09.12.2019

 Malarvizhi  Vs.  United India Insurance Company Limited 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation:(2020) 4 SCC 228, MANU/SC/1700/2019.

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Supreme Court: Pillion rider on a motor cycle along with the driver and one more person on the pillion, may be a violation of the law, but by itself cannot lead to a finding of contributory negligence.

But the above reason, in our view, is flawed. The fact that the deceased was riding on a motor cycle along with the driver and another, may not, by itself, without anything more, make him guilty of contributory negligence. At the most it would make him guilty of being a party to the violation of the law. Section 128 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, imposes a restriction on the driver of a two-wheeled motor cycle, not to carry more than one person on the motor cycle. Section 194-C inserted by the Amendment Act 32 of 2019, prescribes a penalty for violation of safety measures for motor cycle drivers and pillion riders. Therefore, the fact that a person was a pillion rider on a motor cycle along with the driver and one more person on the pillion, may be a violation of the law. But such violation by itself, without anything more, cannot lead to a finding of contributory negligence, unless it is established that his very act of riding along with two others, contributed either to the accident or to the impact of the accident upon the victim. There must either be a causal connection between the violation and the accident or a causal connection between the violation and the impact of the accident upon the victim. It may so happen at times, that the accident could have been averted or the injuries sustained could have been of a lesser degree, if there had been no violation of the law by the victim. What could otherwise have resulted in a simple injury, might have resulted in a grievous injury or even death due to the violation of the law by the victim. It is in such cases, where, but for the violation of the law, either the accident could have been averted or the impact could have been minimized, that the principle of contributory negligence could be invoked. It is not the case of the insurer that the accident itself occurred as a result of three persons riding on a motor cycle. It is not even the case of the insurer that the accident would have been averted, if three persons were not riding on the motor cycle. The fact that the motor cycle was hit by the car from behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the deceased was wearing a helmet and that the deceased was knocked down after the car hit the motor cycle from behind, are all not assailed. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that 2 persons on the pillion of the motor cycle, could have added to the imbalance, is nothing but presumptuous and is not based either upon pleading or upon the evidence on record. Nothing was extracted from PW-3 to the effect that 2 persons on the pillion added to the imbalance.

14. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that the wrongful act on the part of the deceased victim contributed either to the accident or to the nature of the injuries sustained, the victim could not have been held guilty of contributory negligence. Hence the reduction of 10% towards contributory negligence, is clearly unjustified and the same has to be set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2020 

Decided On: 08.01.2020

Mohammed Siddique  Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 57

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Supreme Court: Three steps inquiry for ascertaining the effect of permanent disability on earning capacity of the victim of a motor accident

Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent

disability on the actual earning capacity involves three

steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities

the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent

disability and what he could not do as a result of the

permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding

compensation under the head of loss of amenities of

life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation,

profession and nature of work before the accident, as

also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the

claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of

livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent

disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on

the activities and functions, which he was earlier

carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or

restricted from discharging his previous activities and

functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale

of activities and functions so that he continues to earn

or can continue to earn his livelihood.

14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is

amputated, the permanent physical or functional

disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the

claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of

earning capacity may virtually be hundred per cent, if

he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other

hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service,

the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of

employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as

he could perform his clerical functions; and in that

event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in

the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the

actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there

may not be any need to award any compensation under

the head of “loss of future earnings”, if the claimant

continues in government service, though he may be

awarded compensation under the head of loss of

amenities as a consequence of losing his hand.

Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in

service, but may not be found suitable for discharging

the duties attached to the post or job which he was

earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may

therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser

post with lesser emoluments, in which case there

should be a limited award under the head of loss of

future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced

earning capacity.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2551 OF 2020

SRI ANTHONY alias ANTHONY SWAMY  Vs  THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, K.S.R.T.C.

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Dated: June 10, 2020

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Leading Supreme court judgment on grant of compensation under motor accident claim petition

 In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our conclusions:

(i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench.

(ii) As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent.

(iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.

(iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.

(v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore.

(vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.

(vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier.

(viii) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014, 

Decided On: 31.10.2017

 National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2017) 16 SCC 680, 2018(3) MHLJ70

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How to ascertain extent of permanent disability in case of motor accident?

The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%.

Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8981 of 2010.

Decided On: 18.10.2010

 Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Anr.

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What is distinction between permanent disability and temporary disability?

Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 ('Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8981 of 2010.

Decided On: 18.10.2010

 Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Anr.

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How to consider defence of insurance company of breach of permit if victim is third party?

The second defence is in respect of breach of permit
which is covered by section 66 (1) of the Act. When the court
considers such defence it is expected to consider the facts of the
case in hand. The case in which the victim was 'third party'
needs to be dealt with from different angle and different
approach is required to be taken in the case, than the case in
which defence is of such breach and the victim was present on
the offending vehicle, he was not third party. It is true that when
the claim is made by a person victim who was on offending

vehicle and he wants to get compensation from Insurance
Company also, the initial burden is on him to show that he was
authorised to board the vehicle and travel in the vehicle. He can
show that he was either the owner of goods which he was
carrying in the vehicle or he was employee of the owner and he
was covered under the contract of insurance between the owner
and the Insurance Company. When there is statutory liability in
respect of the victim, when victim was driver and he was on
driver's seat for the owner, there is statutory liability to cover
such risk in view of the provision of section 147 of the Act. There
is similar statutory liability in respect of the owner of goods
under section 147 of the Act, but there is no statutory liability in
respect of gratuitous passengers. The case becomes different for
many reasons when the claimant is third party. The third party is
statutorily covered by policy in view of provision of section 147
of the Act. When the victim himself was cause of the breach of
the permit or breach of terms and conditions of policy the things
are different in view of the right of Insurance Company.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
FIRST APPEAL NO. 14 OF 2013
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,

V
 Meena Balkrushna Khandagale,

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.

Dated : 09/03/2016
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR 48

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Important judgments on motor accident claim petition

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5vWGtQ14k1BdHYxNUMyT290Mm8/view?usp=sharing

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Whether non-dependant heir of deceased who died in motor accident is entitled to claim compensation under MV Act?

In view of the clear and unambiguous language under Section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that application can be made
either by the injured or the legal representatives of the deceased.
Though legal representative is not defined under the provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, from Rule 2(g) of the A.P.Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989, it is clear that the definition of legal
representative is given same meaning as defined under Section 2(11)
of the Code of Civil Procedure.  In view of the judgment of Honble
Supreme Court in Manjuri Beras case (9 supra), it is clear that the
compensation which is payable on account of no fault liability will
form part of the estate of deceased.  In that view of the matter, there is
no basis for contending that the application is to be filed only by the
dependants.  As we have held that dependency is a matter to be taken
into consideration for award of compensation and merely because one
is not dependant, that by itself, is no ground for not entertaining any
claim made for grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
In view of the clear language under Section 166 of the Act and
in view of the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Manjuri
Beras case (9 supra), wherein, it is held that the compensation to be
awarded under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act will form part
of the estate of deceased, and further, as the Act also provides for
compensation on other conventional heads, we are of the view that the
non-dependant also can lay a claim by filing application under Section
166 of the Act.  It is also to be noticed that the situations may arise,
where, one may have suffered injuries initially but ultimately after
filing a claim, may have succumbed to such injuries also.  In such an
event, lot of amount would be spent towards hospitalisation etc., and
as already discussed in the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in
Montford Brothers case (5 supra), it is common in the Indian
society, where, the members of the family who are not even
dependant also can extend their support monetarily and otherwise to
the victims of accidents to meet the immediate expenditure for
hospitalization etc., in such cases, unless the legal representatives are
allowed to continue the proceedings initiated by the person who
succumbs to injuries subsequently, such claims will be defeated and
that will also defeat the very object and intentment of the Act.  Any
such measure would be wholly unequitable and unjust.  Plainly, that
would never be intent of any piece of legislation.  For the aforesaid
reasons and in view of the language under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 r/w. Rule 2(g) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1989,    we are of the view that even the legal representatives who are
non-dependants can also lay a claim for payment of compensation by 
making application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
    Accordingly, we answer the reference, holding that a
non-dependant heir of the deceased who died in a motor accident is
entitled to lay a claim for compensation under section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 where there is no other dependant legal heir
for claiming compensation.
HYDERABAD HIGH COURT                      

M.A.C.M.A.Nos.364 of 2010 

DATE: 01.02.2016  

Dr.Gangaraju Sowmini  .Appellant  
Vs
Alavala Sudhakar Reddy & another. Respondents    



HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY         
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH        
And 
HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO             

Citation:AIR 2016 hyd 162(FB)

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