Whether widow will acquire ownership right over property in her possession recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance?

 It may be noted that in the Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Daulalji, there was no mention of the suit property. What was stated in the Will was that whatever movable and immovable property, which belonged to Harinarayanji would be devolved upon Daulalji. It was only in the Probate proceedings filed by Daulalji in respect of the said Will, he had shown the suit property in the Schedule. It is true that the objections raised by Bhonri Devi against granting of Probate in favour of Daulalji were not accepted by the Probate Court, and the alleged Will executed by Harinarayanji in favour of Bhonri Devi was also not proved by her in the said proceedings. Nonetheless, in view of her pre-existing right to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and in view of her exclusive settled possession of the suit property prior to and after the commencement of the Act of 1956, the only conclusion which could be drawn, would be that Bhonri Devi had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the said Act of 1956. {Para 19}

20. As stated earlier, Hindu woman's right to maintenance is a tangible right against the property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. Such right was recognized and enjoined under the Shastric Hindu Law, long before the passing of the 1937 and the 1946 Acts. Where a Hindu widow is found to be in exclusive settled legal possession of the HUF property, that itself would create a presumption that such property was earmarked for realization of her pre-existing right of maintenance, more particularly when the surviving co-parcener did not earmark any alternative property for recognizing her pre-existing right of maintenance. The word "possessed by" and "acquired" used in Section 14(1) are of the widest amplitude and include the state of owning a property. It is by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956, that the Hindu widow's limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right, when such property is possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement of 1956 Act in lieu of her right to maintenance.

21. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court had rightly held that Bhonri Devi had pre-existing right to maintenance in the suit property that had ripened into full ownership by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5894 of 2019

Decided On: 18.05.2022

Munni Devi (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. Rajendra (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0665/2022.

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Whether replication is part of pleading?

Qua concealment, I may say replication, being a part of the pleadings, the tenant has no right to allege the averments made by the respondent in the replication cannot be read. Admittedly there was an earlier litigation between the parties wherein an issue of ownership was never raised by the petitioner and if in such circumstances an eviction petition was filed without disclosing the details qua ownership, the respondent was fully justified in disclosing those in his replication on denial of his ownership by the petitioner herein in his written statement. The replication thus was an explanation to the denials/issues raised in written statement by the petitioner herein, and hence the petitioner cannot allege concealment on the part of the respondent. A bare perusal of the eviction petition show it contains all necessary ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act. It was only when the petitioner raised issues in his leave to defend application, the respondent clarified all such facts in his rejoinder/replication.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 105/2016, CM Appl Nos. 44082/2016 and 27383/2017

Decided On: 28.01.2019

Aero Traders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ravinder Kumar Suri

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Yogesh Khanna, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 303 Delhi

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Whether a person can acquire easementary right over property which is owned by him?

 With regard to the nature of occupation of the defendant and the finding that the license in his favour was irrevocable under Section 60 of the said Act, it is necessary to refer to the respective pleadings of the parties. While the plaintiff came up with a specific case that he was the owner of the suit property by virtue of the sale-deed dated 16th August, 1983, according to the defendant this document was nominal in nature and executed by way of security for the amount borrowed. It was pleaded that the ownership of the defendant continued and the defendant did not lose his title by virtue of the sale-deed. In alternate, it was pleaded that the occupation of the defendant was by way of a license and a permanent structure had been constructed. As noted above, the relief with regard to declaration of title was rightly granted in favour of the plaintiff by the trial Court.

10. The Full Bench of this Court in Raychand Vanmalidas [supra] has held that though a party may raise inconsistent pleas of ownership and easement in the alternative in the same suit, such party has to elect one of the pleas through the course of the proceedings. Even if a party does not choose one of the alternate pleas, he can lead evidence on both and it is for the Court to decide whether he is entitled to succeed on one of his pleas. This judgment of the Full Bench was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Dand [supra] and the same came to be affirmed. It was observed that after taking the plea of ownership and failing in the same, a party cannot subsequently turn around and claim that right as an easement by prescription. For establishing the right based on easement, such right has to be exercised on the property owned by somebody else and not as an incident of his own ownership of that property. In the light of this legal position, it is clear that the defendant having failed to prove his ownership cannot now be permitted to turn around and claim that by virtue of easementary right, he had undertaken a permanent construction and, therefore, was not liable to be evicted. In Shankar Gopinath Apte [supra], this position has been reiterated by emphasizing that the party undertaking the work of a permanent character should do so while "acting upon the license" under Section 60(b) of the said Act.

11. In view of this legal position, it is found that both the Courts committed an error in refusing the relief of possession to the plaintiff by relying upon the provisions of Section 60(b) of the said Act. Having failed to prove his title, it was not open for the defendant to fall back upon his other plea that he had easementary right in the suit property. Both the Courts refused the relief of possession by wrongly applying the law. Substantial question of law No. 2 is answered by holding that the defendant is not entitled to claim that on account of permanent construction being made, the license was irrevocable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 384 of 2003

Decided On: 09.02.2018

 Tulshidas  Vs. Madhukar

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Whether a person can be landlord without ownership rights?

 I do find that there is no registered sale-deed indicating sale of the demised
premises but it appears that there was some similar kind of arrangement
between Narinder Singh and Piara Singh (presently respondent) by way of
some power of attorney executed by Narinder Singh in favour of Piara
Singh. Though the power of attorney (Ex.P-3) is dated 9.9.2008 and the Will
(Ex.P-4) is dated 12.9.2008, which is later in point of time viz-a-viz the rent
note dated 2.5.2008, but by way of executing the aforesaid power of attorney
and the Will in favour of the respondent-landlord coupled with deposition of
Narinder Singh in Court, it is very apparent that the respondent/landlord had

been acting as a landlord with the consent of said Narinder Singh and
Narinder Singh had never expressed any objection for the same. The
execution of the Will in his favour also goes a long way to show that there
was no dispute inter-se between the present landlord and Narinder Singh.
Even if there is no formal sale-deed in favour of the present respondentPiara
Singh, still it is well settled that a person can be a landlord even
without having ownership rights. The above-stated facts leave no manner of
doubt that it is Piara Singh and not Narinder Singh, who is the landlord.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
 CR-3663-2018 (O&M)
 Date of Decision:-29.5.2018

Ashok Kumar  Vs  Piara Singh
CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL

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Whether ownership rights can be annulled on basis of executive instruction?

 From the aforesaid judgments, it is settled principle
of law that on the basis of the executive instructions
passed by the Government, the proprietary rights can
not be brought to an end and the right of ownership
which may be less than absolute ownership can only be
brought to an- end by due procedure of law and such
law has not been shown.
8. Learned counsel for the State could not distinguish
the order passed by this Court either on the facts or on
the law in the present case.
9. In view of the above submissions and taking into
consideration the facts of the present case and also the
law laid down by this court, the present petition is
allowed. The action of the respondents entering the
name of the Collector as Manager in the Revenue Record
is declared illegal and accordingly it is directed that the
name of the Collector as Manager in the revenue record
be deleted. However, the land which are attached to the
temple shall be governed by the law led down by the
Apex Court in the Case of Mst. Kanchaniya and ors.
Vs. Shiv Ram and Ors., 1992 Supp(2) SCC 250W.P. No. 
(supra) no third party right shall be created and the
land of the temple shall not be alienated, transferred in
any manner by the persons who are managing the
aforesaid land on behalf of the temple.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, PRINCIPAL SEAT AT
JABALPUR
SINGLE BENCH: JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA
Writ Petition No. 7357 of 2014
Ranumal Sharma @ Ranu
V
The State of Madhya Pradesh

Dated:03.01.2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 (NOC)210 MP

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When landlord can be treated as owner for purpose of eviction of tenant from suit property?

 It entitles a landlord to seek a premises got evicted from defendant, if it is required by him for his own occupation provided he is owner. The definition of "landlord" was given in Section 2which has been quoted in para 6 of judgment stating, "any person who, for the time being, is entitled to receive or but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether or not on his own account ....." The Court held that definition shows if the rent is received by a person not on his own account but on account of any other person, such as his principal or his ward, he is for the purpose of the Act a landlord. Any such person is, therefore, entitled to institute a suit for eviction. The Court then noticed that Section 13(1)(ff) further provides that the landlord must be owner if he required the premises for his own occupation, or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held. The contention was that term "owner" has to be interpreted strictly so as to exclude any person having less than full ownership rights, while appellant contended that it was the lease with heritable and transferable rights, and, therefore, for all purposes, he was owner of the property in dispute. It is in this contest, the Court considered as to what term "ownership" means and in para 8 said:

8. "Ownership denotes the relation between a person and an object forming the subject-matter of his ownership. It consists in a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem, being good against all the world and not merely against specific persons." (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th ed., Ch. 8, p. 246 et. seq.). There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. Such a right may be indeterminate in duration and residuary in character. A person has a right to possess the thing which he owns, even when he is not in possession, but only retains a reversionary interest, i.e., a right to repossess the thing on the termination of a certain period or on the happening of a certain event."

65. The Court then said that what plaintiff needs to prove is that he has a better right than the defendant, he has no burden to show that he has the best of all possible titles. His ownership is good against all the world except true owner. The rights of an owner are seldom absolute, and often are in many respects controlled and regulated by statute. The question, however, is whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person challenging it. Then the Court in para 10 said as under:

"10. The plaintiff is an allottee in terms of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983: (See Sections 87 and 89). He has a right to possess the premises for a period of 99 years as a heritable and transferable property. During that period he has a right to let out the premises and enjoy the rental income therefrom, subject to the statutory terms and conditions of allotment. The certificate of allotment is the conclusive evidence of his title or interest. It is true that he has to obtain the written consent of the Society before letting out the premises. But once let out in accord- ance with the terms of allotment specified in the statute, he is entitled to enjoy the income from the property. Al- though he is a lessee in relation to the Society, and his rights and interests are subject to the terms and conditions of allotment, he is the owner of the property having a superior right in relation to the defendant. As far as the defendant is concerned, the plaintiff is his landlord and the owner of the premises for all purposes dealt with under the provisions of the Act."

66. In view thereof, the plaintiff was held owner and the judgment of Trial Court was restored by setting aside judgments of Appellate Court.

Allahabad High Court

Sh. Suneel Galgotia And Another vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy. And 3 ... on 23 September, 2015

Bench: Sudhir Agarwal, Brijesh Kumar Srivastava-Ii

Citation: 2016 (92) ALLCC 40

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What is concept of ownership in Rent control laws?

It is also now a settled principle of law that the
concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation
governed by Rent control laws has to be distinguished
from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a
relative term, the import whereof depends on the
context in which it is used. In rent control legislation,
the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is
entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from
for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant
and then to retain control, hold and use the premises
for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof

of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably
may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a
claim for ownership in a title suit. (vide Sheela & Ors.
vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, (2002) 3 SCC
375).
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.167 OF 2007

M/s Boorugu Mahadev & Sons V  Sirigiri Narasing Rao & Ors.

Citation;AIR 2016 SC433
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

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Whether testator can execute valid will in respect of property of which he is not owner?

 From the judgment impugned, it is evident that learned lower court has relied upon Vikas Singh & others vs. Devesh Pratap Singh reported in 2001(2) P.L.J.R. Page-184 on this score, but on minute observation, it is evident that the principle so decided therein has not been properly considered during course of consideration of the controversy relating to adjudication over nature of property. Though the aforesaid judgment while dealing with the issue has not taken into account the definition incorporated under Section 2(h), on the contrary dealt with the issue in terms of Section 59, however, laid down in following way under Para-6:-

"6. As regards the use of the words "his property", it is clear and, if I may say so, implicit that a person can execute a Will like any transfer-deed, only with respect to his own property and not someone else's property and, therefore, nothing much turns on use of those words in Section 59 as to confer jurisdiction on the probate Court to decide any dispute relating to title, ownership, etc. of the testator/testatrix in the property which is the subject-matter of the Will. It is settled legal position that it is not the duty of the probate Court to consider any issue as to title of the testator to the property with which the Will propounded purports to deal or to the disposing power the testator may have possessed over such property or as to the validity of the bequeaths made. See, for example, the case of Kashi Nath v. Dulhin AIR 1941 Patna 475. Proceedings for grant of Probate or Letters of Administration is not suit in the real sense, it only takes the "form" of a regular suit according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, "as early as may be" vide Section 295 of the Act. Reference may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sidhnath Bharti v. Jai Narayan Bharti 1994 (1) PLJR 644, a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Panzy Ferondes v. M.F. Queoros, AIR 1963 Allahabad 153, and a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Batai Lall Banerjee v. Debaki Kumar Ganguly, AIR 1984 Calcutta 16. The grant of Probate or Letters of Administration is decisive only of the Will propounded and not of the title, etc. of the testator to the property. As the issues relating to title, ownership etc. are not to be gone into in such proceedings, it follows that even a favourable decision in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff granting Probate or Letters of Administration in his favour does not operate as res judicata in any future suit which the Objector is at liberty to bring seeking declaration of his right, title, interest, etc. in the property. In the above premises the objection of the objector as to disposing capacity, i.e., ownership of the testatrix is rejected".

33. After careful scrutiny of the aforesaid finding, it is crystal clear that will is to be executed with regard to the property which the testator possesses, and the dispute, if any, relating to the same is not to be scuttle down under proceeding brought under probate. However, different kind of picturization has to be perceived whereunder admittedly the property not belonging to testator have been bought up under deed of will. Then, is it found out of domain of probate proceeding, and if the principle so laid down, as referred above, is appreciated in its true spirit wherein, execution of Will relating to own property of testatrix is to be effected. Then certainly, it will come within the purview, as with regard to these properties neither probate nor letter of administration could be granted, otherwise it will allow multiplicity of the proceeding, which does not happens to be intention of legislature. Aforesaid view is found supported with Smt. Radhika Devi vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma reported in 2011(1) P.L.J.R. 845.

Patna High Court

Most Kewala Devi & Anr vs Sri Krishna Devi & Anr on 15 December, 2015

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Whether legal heirs and not nominees will get ownership rights of share certificates?

Declaring the judgment of Harsha Nitin Kokate v. The Saraswat Cooperative Bank Ltd 2010  to be per incuriam, a bench comprising of G.S. Patel, J has held that legal heirs and not the nominees will get the ownership rights of share certificates. The Court declared the earlier judgment to be per incuriam, which means it had been wrongly decided and does not have to be followed. In the Kokate judgment,the Court had mistakenly concluded that once a nomination is made, the securities in question automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of the shares and not to the legal heirs.

The Court had considered the provisions of Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956, and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act and held that they do not displace the law of succession. The Court also discussed the purpose of nomination under Section 39 of the Insurance Act and various Supreme Court cases where it has been laid down that although the insurance company would pay the amount due on insured’s death to the nominee, they would hold it in “trust” and ultimately only the legal heirs of the deceased could claim the property. Disagreeing with the views of Kokate judgment, the Court observed that it had failed to consider many binding judgments of the Supreme Court     including the judgment ofSarbati Devi v Smt. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424.

The Court held that that the rights of a nominee to shares of a company cannot override the rights of legal heirs of deceased and therefore the amount received by the nominee can be claimed by the legal heirs of the deceased. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY & INTESTATE JURISDICTION
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 822 OF 2014
IN
SUIT NO. 503 OF 2014
In the matter between
JAYANAND JAYANT SALGAONKAR,

versus
 JAYASHREE JAYANT SALGAONKAR,

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 31st March 2015

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Whether defendant can get title by adverse possession if he does not prove who is owner of suit property?

The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise

Supreme Court of India

T. Anjanappa And Ors vs Somalingappa And Anr on 22 August, 2006

CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3594 of 2006

BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

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