Showing posts with label recall of order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label recall of order. Show all posts

Sunday, 18 May 2025

Karnataka HC: Under which circumstances the motor accident claim tribunal should recall the order of grant of compensation?

 It is significant to note that the complaint was lodged by the father of the claimant on 19.1.2007 whereas the claim petition was filed by the minor claimant represented through his mother, natural guardian. The mother of the claimant was examined as PW-1. Complainant, father of the claimant has not stepped into the witness box. The claim petition first bears the signature of the father of the claimant and the same is erased, subsequently instituted through the mother of the claimant. At this juncture, it is beneficial to refer to the Judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court on the issue on hand. In the case of United India Insurance co. ltd. v. Rajendra Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that fraud and justice cannot dwell together, it is unrealistic to expect the insurer to resist claim on the basis of fraud at earlier instance without knowledge about fraud. If order is not recalled even after noticing fraud, it leads to serious miscarriage of justice. The Insurance company when it comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation after the award has already been passed, no court or Tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim.

{Para 8}

9. In Rajendra Singh v. Vinitha Yadav (supra), it is held that the claimants have not been able to explain the statements which were given by them before the Delhi police on the very day on which they received the injuries, wherein they said that the injuries were caused due to accident of the tractor on which they were travelling. However, the testimony of the claimants and their witnesses established that the accident took place with an ambassador car. In that context, it is held that the claim set up by the claimants was an absolutely false case and they were not entitled to any compensation. This was a case where the version of the claimants saw the light of the day for the first time, 32 days after the alleged accident when the FIR was lodged.


10. In the case of S.P. Changalavaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath reported in MANU/SC/0192/1994 : AIR 1994 SC 853, it is observed that "fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. A Judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law is the settled proposition of law, such a judgment/decree can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.


11. It is settled legal position that fraud and collusion vitiates even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd. vs. Beaslay observed at Queens Bench pages 712-713 All England Report page 345-C-D) "No judgment of a court, no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

M.F.A. No. 2162/2011 [MV]

Decided On: 24.10.2016

Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shoukath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Sujatha, J.

Citation: 2017 ACJ 1840 karnataka HC, MANU/KA/2671/2016.
Read full judgment here: Click here.
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Karnataka HC: Under which circumstances non examination of material witness is fatal to motor accident claim petition?

 In order to answer this point, it is axiomatic to refer to the factual matrix of the case as available on record. In this context, Ex. R1 plays a pivotal role. Ex. R1 is the register extract maintained by R.L. Jalappa hospital where the claimant was taken treatment for the injuries sustained by him due to the alleged accident. This Ex. R1 clearly establishes the history of injuries sustained by the claimant. Scanning through this document, it can be viewed that one Chand Pasha, the uncle of the claimant, accompanied him to the hospital on the fateful day i.e. 18.10.2006, the history of injuries as gathered from the uncle of the minor claimant/patient reveals that the patient along with his uncle was travelling in a goods auto rikshaw which toppled and the minor sustained injuries. LTM of minor boy was taken as the identification mark and the statements of the uncle of the minor were recorded with his signature. In other words, Ex. R1 bears the signature of Pasha. This crucial witness was not examined by the claimant to discern the truth. It would be inferred that the claimant is suppressing the material facts, particularly, when the specific defence was taken by the appellant/insurer as regards the claimant travelling as a gratuitous passenger. {Para 6}

7. It is an admitted fact that the accident occurred on 18.10.2006 and the complaint was lodged by the father of the claimant on 19.1.2007. It is trite law that no claim can be rejected merely on the ground of delay unless satisfactory explanation is offered for the delay caused in filing the complaint. As could be seen from Ex. P2, certified copy of complaint, it is stated that the complainant delayed filing of complaint due to the assurance given by the elders of the village to settle the dispute but the same is not substantiated by examining any witness on this aspect. Ex. R1 speaks that the claimant, minor boy was travelling in the goods auto accompanied with his uncle, whereas complaint Ex. P2 discloses that the minor boy was standing along with his father at the bus-stop. These inconsistencies are not satisfactorily explained by the claimants. It remains a jumble of facts, unresolved.

13. Considering the aforesaid principles of law and background of facts, it is manifestly clear that it is a case of dubious concoction having made with sinister object of extracting the claim as the claimant if found to be travelling as a gratuitous passenger in a goods vehicle, was not entitled to compensation for breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy. The long time gap between the occurrence of the accident and the filing of the complaint would be the reason for ingeniously designing a device to make a claim for which the claimant was not legally entitled to.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

M.F.A. No. 2162/2011 [MV]

Decided On: 24.10.2016

Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shoukath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Sujatha, J.

Citation: 2017 ACJ 1840 karnataka HC, MANU/KA/2671/2016.
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Saturday, 7 September 2024

Whether the court can recall or review its own order if latest amendment in statute is not brought to its notice at the time of passing of previous order?

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case including the written submissions, we are inclined to recall our order dated 07.01.2019 because, in our view, it contains an error apparent on the face of the order. {Para 6}

7. The apparent error is that it was not brought to our notice that the Parliament, consequent upon the decision of this Court in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra), had amended the definition of "employee" as defined in Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act by amending Act No. 47 of 2009 with retrospective effect from 03.04.1997. This amendment, in our opinion, had a direct bearing over the issue involved in this appeal.

8. What was brought to our notice was only the decision of this Court rendered in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra) by contending that the issue involved in this appeal remains no longer res integra and stands answered in Appellant's favour. We accepted this submission.


9. In our view, the error mentioned above is an error apparent on the face of the record of the case because the material, subsequent event, which came into existence, had a direct bearing over the controversy involved in this appeal, was not brought to our notice at the time of hearing the appeal. It is this apparent error, which led to passing of the order dated 07.01.2019 in favour of the Appellant.

10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we recall our order dated 07.01.2019 passed in this appeal. As a consequence, the appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2530 of 2012) is restored to its original number for its disposal on merits in accordance with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2530 of 2012

Decided On: 07.03.2019

Birla Institute of Technology Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author:Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

Citations: 2019 (4) SCC 513, AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 1309, AIRONLINE 2019 SC 481, MANU/SC/0337/2019.

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Sunday, 29 January 2023

Whether Bail Order Passed in an offence under SC & ST Atrocities Act Without Notice To Victim A Nullity, Liable To Be Recalled?

 It is to be noted that in this regard that, as per Section

15A(3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, a victim or his dependent

shall have the right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of

any court proceedings including any bail proceedings and the

said Public Prosecutor or the State Government shall inform the

victim about the proceedings under the Act. In this case, as one

of the offences were under the provisions of the Schedules

Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,

a notice was mandatory as contemplated under the above

provision. Therefore, issuance of an order without complying with such statutory mandate makes the order nullity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [2011 (14) SCC 770], it was observed as follows:

“If a judgment has been pronounced without

jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice

or where the order has been pronounced without giving

an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or

where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of

Court which would really amount to its being without

jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall

such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the

order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section

362 Cr.P.C. would not operate. In such eventuality, the

judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram

partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is

different from the power of altering/reviewing the

judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration

has to establish that it was not at fault..............” {Para 6}

7. After referring to the observations made by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision, this Court in

Pushpangathan's case as well as Babu @ Achayan's case held

that, when the order passed by this Court in a criminal proceeding was without jurisdiction and without notice to the affected parties and thereby in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same can be recalled. In this case, despite the fact that there was a mandate as contemplated under Section 15A(3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, the order is seen passed without giving a proper notice to the victim. Therefore, it is an order issued not only in violation of the statutory provisions and also in violation of principles of natural justice. This Court passed the order without taking note of the fact that, no such notice was served upon the  affected parties. In such circumstances, I am of the view that, the order passed by this Court is liable to be recalled in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar's case cited supra.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.M.APPL.NO.4/2022 IN BAIL APPL. NO. 330 OF 2022

BABU T., S/O CHACKO THOMAS, Vs  BYJU SEBASTIAN

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.

Monday, the 23rd day of January 2023 

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Wednesday, 16 March 2022

What is distinction between Procedural review and substantive review?

We are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji MANU/SC/0433/1970 : AIR1970SC1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act. While the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Section 11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and not in Sub-section (3) of Section 11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held that no review lies on merits unless a status specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal. {Para 13}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2355 of 1979

Decided On: 12.12.1980

 Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. and A.P. Sen, J.

Citation: 1980 (supp) SCC 420,MANU/SC/0308/1980

Author:A.P. Sen, J.

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Whether application for recall of order for procedural review is maintainable U/S 362 of CRPC?

This application for recall of the order was maintainable as it was an application seeking a procedural review, and not a substantive review to which Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, would be attracted. [Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1980 (supp) SCC 420]. On the aspect of the difference between recall and review and when an order of recall can be passed reference can be made to Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb and Others, (1999) 4 SCC 396.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Coram: SANJIV KHANNA; BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ. 

S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021;

 GANESH PATEL Vs UMAKANT RAJORIA

Dated: MARCH 07, 2022

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Thursday, 3 February 2022

Whether a court can recall an order passed by it by mistake?

  It can thus be seen that three Supreme Court cases cited, negative inherent powers under Section 151 of the Civil P. C. in the face of specific provisions in C. P. C. while one case lays down that powers under Section 151 C. P. C. cannot be invoked for interference with substantive rights of the parties. There is no specific provision in C. P. C. enabling the Court to recall an earlier order which is the result of mistake committed by Court. No question of interference with substantive rights arises. The question involved in the present case is very much procedural. Only be cause some rights are wrongly presumed in favour of a party, it cannot be said that the case involves a question of substantive rights. {Para 11}

12. (D) Even otherwise and apart from the provisions of Section 151 C.P.C. every Court of record has got inherent powers to correct its own mistakes. If an authority is needed for this proposition one can find it in Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah (1913-40 Ind App 151). this was an appeal before Privy Council from the judgment and decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner, Oudh. Due to mistake of court orders and rules applicable to a defaulter were applied to a dead man Privy Council was of the opinion that the case was covered by provisions of Section 151 of the C.P.C. but while expressing such an opinion their Lordships further observed:--

"Lordships opined that such abuse has occurred by the course adopted in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Quite apart from Section 155, any Court might have rightly considered itself to possess an inherent power to rectify the mistake which had been inadvertently made".

To similar effect are the observations of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jodha Singh v. Padey Gokaram Das (AIR 1925 All 622) where it was held:---

"That the order of the Court was wrong and that the court was right in setting it aside when the mistake was brought to its notice by the party."

Bombay High Court
Gangabai And Ors. vs Ratan Kumar And Ors. on 25 August, 1982
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Sunday, 28 November 2021

Whether Criminal court can recall order passed by it under S 362 Cr.P.C?

 Learned counsel for the parties do not dispute the fact that

in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C. the Court does not have the power to

alter the judgment and order once passed, except to correct the

clerical or arithmetical error. In the present case, by a judgment

and order dated 20.04.2021 FIR had been quashed by the High Court

by a detailed reasoned order, which has been recalled by the

impugned order dated 28.04.2021. There is no power, except under

Section 362 Cr.P.C., which only provides for correction of any

clerical or arithmetical error. The same does not empower the court to recall the earlier order passed after contest and that too suo moto.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1444/2021


XXX  Vs  THE STATE OF KERALA 

Dated: NOVEMBER 22, 2021

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Wednesday, 22 May 2019

Whether Sole Arbitrator after termination of proceedings U/S 32 (2) (c) of Arbitration Act can recall said order?

The sole arbitrator who was appointed in this case
terminated proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘Act’), by order dated 04.05.2017. However, on an
application dated 05.05.2017 to recall the aforesaid order,
the learned arbitrator passed an order on 18.05.2017 stating
that, as good reasons had been made out in the affidavit for
recall, he was inclined to recall the order even though
under the Act, in law, it may be difficult to do so. A
revision filed against the aforesaid order was dismissed by
the High Court on 14.06.2017.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are
of the view that the matter is no longer res integra. In
SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Tuff Drilling
Private Limited’ [(2018) 11 SCC 470], this Court held:
22. Section 32 contains a heading “Termination of
Proceedings”. Sub-section (1) provides that the
arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final

arbitral award or by an order of the Arbitral
Tribunal under sub-section (2). Sub-section (2)
enumerates the circumstances when the Arbitral
Tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of
the arbitral proceedings. The situation as
contemplated under Sections 32(2)(a) and 32(2)(b) are
not attracted in the facts of this case. Whether
termination of proceedings in the present case can be
treated to be covered by Section 32(2)(c) is the
question to be considered. Clause (c) contemplates
two grounds for termination i.e. (i) the Arbitral
Tribunal finds that the continuation of the
proceedings has for any other reason become
unnecessary, or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as
contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when
the claim is not terminated under Section 25(a) and
proceeds further. The words “unnecessary” or
“impossible” as used in clause (c) of Section 32(2),
cannot be said to be covering a situation where
proceedings are terminated in default of the
claimant. The words “unnecessary” or “impossible”
has been used in different contexts than to one of
default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Subsection
(3) of Section 32 further provides that the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate with
the termination of the arbitral proceedings subject
to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34.
Section 33 is the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to
correct any computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature or to give an interpretation of a
specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4)
reserves the power of the court to adjourn the
proceedings in order to give the Arbitral Tribunal an
opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to
take such other action as in the opinion of the
Arbitral Tribunal will eliminate the grounds for
setting aside the arbitral award. On the termination
of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1),
Section 33(3) further contemplates termination of the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal, whereas the
aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When the
legislature has used the phrase “the mandate of the
Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate” in Section 32(3),
non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to be
treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and
object can only be that if the claimant shows
sufficient cause, the proceedings can be
recommenced.”

It is clear, therefore, that a distinction was made by
this Court between the mandate terminating under section 32
and proceedings coming to an end under section 25. This
Court has clearly held that no recall application would,
therefore, lie in cases covered by section 32(3).
This being the case, we allow the appeal that is being
filed and set aside the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka dated 14.06.2017.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4956 OF 2019


SAI BABU  Vs  M/S CLARIYA STEELS PVT. LTD. 

Dated:May 01, 2019.
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Thursday, 13 September 2018

Whether magistrate can recall his own order U/S 156 of CRPC if it was obtained by fraud?

I have carefully gone through the papers with able assistance of the learned advocates of both the sides. Though it sounds pessimistic, in my considered view, there is no apparent illegality committed by the two Courts below. They have consistently demonstrated as to how the material facts were not disclosed by the petitioner while lodging the OMCA No. 522/2015 and as to how the order was procured from the Magistrate on 8/6/2015 directing an investigation under Sub Section 3 of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They have concurrently held that since it was a matter of fraud, the order was non est and the learned Magistrate has simply declared it and has quashed and set aside the order passed by him on 8/6/2015.
7. There cannot be dispute about the trite principle as laid down in the case of Subramanium and Iris Computers (supra) that a Magistrate does not have any power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to recall, review or reconsider his own order howsoever illegal it might be. However, these principles do not cover the case of the present nature where it is not a matter of legality or otherwise of the order passed by the Magistrate but the manner in which the order was procured by misleading the Court by suppressing material facts and circumstances. Therefore, here is not a case where a jurisdiction not vested in the Magistrate was invoked by him. It is a case of bare and simple fraud practised upon the Court and it is trite that fraud vitiates everything. The two Courts below have rightly referred to and relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court including the one in A.V Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P; (2007) 4 SCC 221 : AIR 2007 S.C 1546 and K.D Sharmav. Steel Authority of India; (2008) 12 SCC 481. It is not a matter that the Magistrate having exercised a jurisdiction which is not vested in him but has exercised the powers which inherits in him in cancelling/recalling his order which according to him was procured by practising fraud.

In the High Court of Bombay
(Before Mangesh S. Patil, J.)
Dr. Deepak S/o Vasantrao Kesari, 
v.
 Dr. Shriram S/o Mukundrao Kalyankar 

Criminal Writ Petition No. 269 of 2017
Decided on August 20, 2018,
Citation:2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2199
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Saturday, 10 June 2017

What is difference between recall of order and review of order?

 If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan & Ors. v. Mahboob Ilahi, 1970 Crl.L.J. 378; Deepak Thanwardas Balwani v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1985 Crl.L.J. 2.
Supreme Court of India
State Of Punjab vs Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & ... on 7 December, 2011
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Sunday, 28 May 2017

Factors to be considered by court while considering application of recalling of order of closing evidence


 On perusal of the findings in the impugned order, I find that the learned
Judge failed to note that on two occasions the matter was adjourned on
account of administrative reasons. These adjournments cannot be attributed
to the Appellant. Apart from that, the matter was fixed for clarification at the 
instance of the learned Judge and ultimately though the matter was adjourned
at the instance of the Appellant to lead evidence on 10.09.2014, the matter
was posted on the said date for clarification. The matter was thereafter
posted on 26.09.2014 when the order came to be passed closing the evidence
of the Appellant in view of the objections raised by the respondent.
15. Though it is well settled that adjournment cannot be granted at the
asking of the parties but the fact remains that the adjournment sought in the
present case, i.e., on 26.09.2014 was as the Advocate desired to withdraw his
appearance on behalf of the Appellant. The fact that there was a delivery in
the family of the Appellant and, in fact, a child was born during the first
fortnight of September, 2014 on 04.09.2014 cannot be disputed. The fact that
the Appellant was in Pune in connection with the delivery of his daughter has
also not been disputed. Though the learned Judge has taken into
consideration the information produced by the Respondent no. 1 that the
delivery of his daughter was normal, that by itself cannot exclude a situation
when complications can occur subsequent to the delivery. There is no
positive material produced by the Respondent to suggest that the contention
of the Appellant that the delivery resulted in some complications to his
daughter is patently false. In any event, in case the respondents were
seriously disputing the averments on the grounds which the application was
filed, the Court could have proceeded to hold an inquiry and an opportunity 
given to the parties to support their respective contentions in terms of the
provisions of the Civil Courts Manual. In the present case the records cannot
suggest that the Appellant was not diligent and was only bent on delaying the
matter. Though the learned Advocate for the Appellant before the Trial Court
sought adjournment for three weeks on the subject dates, the learned Judge in
view of the objections raised by the Respondents could have granted a shorter
adjournment subject to payment of costs or other terms. In such
circumstances, I find that the learned Judge was not justified to dismiss the
application filed by the Appellant for recalling the order of closing of the
evidence. It would be material to note that the application itself was filed
within 30 days and an affidavit was sworn by the Appellant on the said date.
This would further suggest that the Appellant was in Goa to proceed with the
evidence in case the learned Judge had permitted him to do so. Rules of
procedure are meant for facilitating the cause of justice and not to defeat it.
16. The Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by Mr. Lawande, learned
Counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 1, would be applicable to the facts
of the present case. Considering the old age of the Petitioner and the facts
that the ground raised by the Petitioner to justify his absence on the relevant
date are plausible as admittedly his daughter had delivered a few days prior
to such date and looking into the roznama of the Court proceedings, it cannot
be said that the Petitioner has been deliberately seeking adjournments in 
recording his evidence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL No. 65 OF 2015
Mr. Deepak Shah,

 V/s.
 M/s. Shah Builders,


 CORAM:- F.M. REIS, J


Dated : 02.12.2016
Citation: 2017 (2) ALLMR 207
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Tuesday, 14 March 2017

Whether trial court can recall order of acquittal if it is obtained by impersonating witnesses?

An application was moved by the opposite party no.3 i.e. complainant on 26.5.2006 stating that the persons produced before the court as P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W. 4 are forged. Real persons were not produced before the Court. Judgment was obtained after playing fraud upon court which should be set aside. Retrial of the accused should be held. 
 As pithily stated in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All ER 997 "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it free, and those who seek its protection lose hope." 
Courts have to ensure that accused persons are punished and that the might authority of the State are not used to shield themselves or their men. It should ensured that they do not wield such powers which under the Constitution has to held only in trust for the public and society at large. If deficiency in investigation prosecution is visible or can be perceived by lifting the veil trying to hide realities or covering the obvious deficiencies, courts have to deal with the same was an iron hands appropriately within the framework of law. It is as much the duty of prosecutor as of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on record so that there might not be miscarriage of justice, (See Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan Vasant Raghunath Dhoble (2003) 7 SCC 749). 
41. Learned trial court has rightly held that the prosecution agency i.e. concerned police of concerned police station was also in connivance with accused and produced the witnesses who has impersonated themselves as P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W. 3 and P.W.4. 
42. In the case of Tribhuvan vs. State of U.P. 1992 (LCR R) Lucknow Criminal Report 165; a Division Bench of this Court has held that in Para 13 and 14. 
"13. The power to recall a judgment in such a situation has been held to be available to the High Court in the case of Prem Singh vs. State, Full Bench decision of Jammu & Kashmir High Court reported in (1982 Cr. LJ 297). Relying upon the decision of Madras and Calcutta High Courts it was held that where the conditions laid down by law as precedent and requisite to the hearing of the case are not observed, the court acts without jurisdiction and its order is, therefore, void ab initio and the case can be reheard and that such rehearing would not be barred by Section 369 Cr.P.C. This corresponds to Section 362 of the present Code. 
14. In this case a revision was also filed, decided in absence of the revisionist and the question whether such an order can be recalled and revision reheard was under consideration. The Full Bench answered accordingly in affirmative." 
43. Power of Section 362 Cr.P.C. are defined but at the same time when a fraud is played upon the Court, Court cannot became a silent spectator. Even for the sake of argument it is expected that the learned trial court was not having such power than this Court in exercise of inherent power also can quash the earlier judgment of the learned trial court which was obtained by the accused after playing fraud upon the court. It is a case where the bar of section 362 Cr.P.C. would not come into play. 
44. Accordingly, I am of the view that the learned trial court has rightly passed the impugned order and issued necessary direction. Revision is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH 

Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 477 of 2006


 Bimal Kumar  Arun Kumar Dixit Vs  State of U.P. through Principal Secretary,


Dated:
 10.3.2017 
Hon'ble Anil Kumar Srivastava-II,J. 

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Monday, 22 August 2016

When court can recall its own order under its inherent powers?

Supreme Court in Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, (1999) 4 SCC 396, held that what is a power to recall? Inherent power to recall its own order vesting in tribunals or courts and set aside an orders:- 
(i) obtained by fraud practised upon the court, 
(ii) when the court is misled by a party, or 
(iii) when the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party. 
13. In the present case, Narendra Kumar Sharma filed an application (registered as Misc. Case No. 16/74/2006) under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C., which was dismissed by Executing Court by order dated 04.09.2009. Executing Court should have allowed execution case and directed that decree holders be put into possession of the property, in view of Order 21 Rule 98 (2) C.P.C. on same day. Later on, ejectment of the petitioners was stayed in Writ-C No. 74825 of 2010, by order dated 22.12.2010, which was operative till 03.12.2014. Due to interim order of this Court, Executing Court was unable to pass any order in execution case except adjourning it. Order dated 15.10.2011 was passed during continuance of interim order of this Court. Executing Court committed two mistake, firstly on 04.09.2009, while dismissing application under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C., he would have allowed the execution case under Order 21 Rule 98 (2) C.P.C. on the same day and secondly due to interim order of this Court dated 22.12.2010, Executing Court was unable to pass any order, except adjourning execution case; although order dated 22.12.2010 was operative till 03.12.2014 but execution case was dismissed in default on 15.10.2011. This mistake of court can be rectified, exercising inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. Supreme Court in Om Prakash Marwaha v. Jagdish Lal Marwaha, (2009) 1 SCC 510, relying upon in Jang Singh v. Brij Lal, AIR 1966 SC 1631, held that a litigant should not suffer on account of the lapse made by an officer of the Court. Applying the well-known maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, that an act of court should do no harm to a litigant, this Court held that the mistake should be rectified by the Court and the parties relegated to the position on the date when the mistake occurred. Madhya Pradesh High Court in Khoobchand Jain Vs. Kashi Prasad, AIR 1986 MP 66 and this Court in Arjun Prasad Smt. Ameer Jahan Begum, 2007 (8) ADJ 726 and Matter Under Article 227 No. 7036 of 2015 State of U.P. Vs. Saifi Abdul Hasan (decided on 11.12.2015) also held that if due to mistake committed by Court case was dismissed in default then order can be recalled. 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

 

Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 7035 of 2015 

Narendra Kumar Sharma
V Nand Kishore Sharma 

Hon'ble Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J. 

DATED: 20.5.2016 
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Wednesday, 10 August 2016

Whether inherent power U/S 482 of CRPC can be exercised to recall a matter which has been finally disposed of by court?

There is no power of review with the criminal court after the judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and is dis-entitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the order for disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. There is also no provision for modification of the judgment. ( Vide Hari singh Mann Vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, 2001 (1) SCC 169).
Moreover the prohibition contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C is absolute; after the judgement is signed, even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 CrP.C has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same ( vide Moti Lal Vs. State of M.P. (2012) 11 SCC 427).
If a judgement has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principle of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions ofSection 362 Cr.P.C would not operate. In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault.( vide Chitawan Vs. Mahboob Ilahi, 1970 Cri. LJ 378( All), Asit Kumar Kar Vs. State of West Bengal (2009) 2 SCC 703 ).
Supreme Court by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution has been invested with an express power to review any judgment in criminal law and while no such power has been conferred on the High Court, inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code itself ( Vide State Vs. K.v. Rajendran, 2008(8) SCC 673.
In Sooraj Devi Vs. Pyare Lal, 1981 (1) SCC 500, apex court held that the prohibition in Section 362 CrPC against the court altering or reviewing its judgment, is subject to what is "otherwise provided by this code or by any other law for the time being in force". These words, however, refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorized by the code or other law to alter or review its judgement. The inherent power of the court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 CrPC and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.
Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the criminal justice delivery system does not clothe the court to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as specifically been provided under the statute itself after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate forum in accordance with law (Refer State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770).
The same principle is applicable while considering an application for recall /modification/review of an order passed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. Such power, cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Where there are no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a view which is expressly barred under Section 362 CrPC.
Allahabad High Court
Virendra Kumar Anand @ V.K. Anand vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 30 May, 2016
Bench: Suneet Kumar

Crl. Misc. Recall Application No. 126367 of 2016
 
IN
 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 5938 of 2016
 
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Friday, 13 November 2015

When bail granted by court can not be cancelled?


Order granting bail cannot be cancelled in the light of provision
contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C.

Applying the statement of law rendered by their Lordships
of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases particularly
Abdul Basit (supra), it is limpid that the petitioners herein
have sought cancellation of order granting bail on the
ground that bail order was granted to the respondent No.2
by suppression and misrepresentation of facts as well that
the order considering bail reflects consideration of irrelevant
material of a substantial nature and additionally new
adverse facts have surfaced, thereby claiming that the
order of bail is absolutely unjustified, illegal and perverse. It

is not the case of the petitioners herein that the respondent
No.2 has misconducted himself after grant of bail by this
Court warranting cancellation of bail order, therefore, order
granting bail deserves to be cancelled. The facts and
grounds pleaded in an application for cancellation of bail
under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and submissions made
therein, in light of the law laid down by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court in the above mentioned judgment is not the
scope and jurisdiction of this Court, as such alleged
illegality, perversity cannot be determined by this Court in
this application for cancellation of bail filed under Section
439(2) of Cr.P.C. as it would amount to review/recall of bail
order, which impermissible, in the light of express bar
contained in Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. which bars the
jurisdiction of this Court to alter or review the bail order or
judgment except to correct an clerical or arithmetical error.

 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
 Cr.M.P.No. 469 of 2015
Savita Khande W/o Mahesh Khande, 
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh 

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

Dated;27/07/2015
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Sunday, 18 October 2015

Whether Magistrate can recall his order passed under S 156 of CRPC?

In fact, the learned single judge of this Court in the case of Dashrath Chawhan v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra) has held that once the investigation is ordered by the Magistrate under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate cannot interfere in investigation in progress by recalling his order. This case may not be strictly applicable to the facts of this case, yet when the Magistrate orders investigation under Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure he has power and jurisdiction to ensure that the order of investigation is complied with and the report of investigation is submitted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
Cri. Rev. Appln. No. 109 of 1998
Decided On: 02.02.2001

Vasant Laxman Ruikar  Vs. S.Y. Khaire and others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Batta, J.

Equivalent Citation: 2001(3)MhLj409

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Wednesday, 3 June 2015

Whether court can recall its order when judgment is rendered in ignorance of fact that necessary party has not been served at all?

 In my view application made by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.4797 of 2013 was also maintainable under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure though the petitioner was not a party to the suit. In my view, the court has inherent power to recall and set aside the order obtained by fraud practiced upon the court or when the court is mislead by the party. The court can also recall its order when a judgment is rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all.
Bombay High Court
Shri. Horace Kevin Gonsalves vs Miss. Prabha Ganpat Borkar Alias ... on 28 January, 2015
Bench: R.D. Dhanuka
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)542 Bom
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