Showing posts with label O 39 R 2-A of CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label O 39 R 2-A of CPC. Show all posts

Wednesday, 16 April 2025

Supreme Court: What will be proper order there is disobedience of interim injunction order and thereafter main suit is dismissed?

A question of maintainability of the application Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan MANU/SC/0564/1998 : 1998:INSC:334 : (1998) 7 SCC 59, it was held that even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience thereof is not erased. {Para 3}.

12. But the position Under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024.

Decided On: 05.03.2025

Lavanya C. and Ors. Vs. Vittal Gurudas Pai since deseased by L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0318/2025.

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Thursday, 3 February 2022

Whether court can punish defendant for breach of injunction if he has not wilfully disobeyed injunction order?

Viewed differently, contempt of a civil nature can be made out

under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC not when there has been

mere “disobedience”, but only when there has been “wilful

disobedience”. The allegation of wilful disobedience being in

the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to

the satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not

mere “disobedience” but “wilful” and “conscious”. This Court

in the case of Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC

204, considering the implication of exercise of contempt

jurisdiction, held that the power must be exercised with

caution rather than on mere probabilities. While delineating

the conduct which can be held to be “wilful disobedience”, this

Court held that:

“12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it

has to be established that disobedience of the

order is “wilful”. The word “wilful” introduces a

mental element and hence, requires looking

into the mind of a person/contemnor by

gauging his actions, which is an indication of

one's state of mind. “Wilful” means knowingly

intentional, conscious, calculated and

deliberate with full knowledge of consequences

flowing therefrom. It excludes casual,

accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or

genuine inability. Wilful acts does not

encompass involuntarily or negligent actions.

The act has to be done with a “bad purpose or

without justifiable excuse or stubbornly,

obstinately or perversely”. Wilful act is to be

distinguished from an act done carelessly,

thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It

does not include any act done negligently or

involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a

person means that he knows what he is doing

and intends to do the same. Therefore, there

has to be a calculated action with evil

motive on his part. Even if there is a

disobedience of an order, but such

disobedience is the result of some

compelling circumstances under which it

was not possible for the contemnor to

comply with the order, the contemnor

cannot be punished. “Committal or

sequestration will not be ordered unless

contempt involves a degree of default or

misconduct.”

(Emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 859-860 OF 2022


FUTURE COUPONS PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS Vs AMAZON.COM NV INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LLC

Author: N.V. RAMANA, CJI .

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Friday, 17 April 2020

Whether application for breach of an injunction under O 39 R 2A of CPC is tenable after disposal of the civil suit?

After final disposal of the said civil suit, on 8.9.2014 an application was filed by the non-applicant No. 1 under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the CPC complaining the breach of injunction on 5.2.2014. Thus, admittedly, the application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the CPC was filed by the non-applicant No. 1 after final disposal of the civil suit. The Apex Court in the case of Kanwar Singh Saini (supra) has held as under-

"An application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or order complained of the was one that is granted by the court under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to ensure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order and the court cannot entertain an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A. An application under Order 39 Rule 2-A is maintainable only during the pendency of the suit in case the interim order passed by the court or undertaking given by the party is violated."
8. Thus, as per the said judgment, an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A is maintainable only during the pendency of the civil suit in case the interim order passed by the court or undertaking given by the party is violated.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Civil Revision No. 443/2018

Decided On: 22.08.2019

Kanhaiyalal  Vs.   Rameshwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Vandana Kasrekar, J.

Citation: AIR 2020 MP 7
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Saturday, 11 January 2020

Whether court can direct restoration of possession in proceeding under O 39 R 2A of CPC?

 The settled proposition of law is that relief cannot be accorded to; what is exactly not prayed for and pleaded for the purpose.

14. Admittedly, the court below disbelieved the alleged violation of the ad interim order of injunction on the ground that violation, if be any, was done under bona fide belief, presuming that there subsisted no ad interim order of injunction by reason of the stay order being granted in connection with C.O. No. 1059 of 2003 of High Court, but proceeded to pass an order what was not even prayed for, directing opposite parties to restore possession of the dispossessed land to the petitioner/plaintiff within a stipulated period of time.

15. Order 39 Rule 2(A) of C.P.C. has taken care of the consequence for having caused disobedience or breach to the order of injunction by prescribing attachment of the property of the person making violation of the injunction order and further also for civil detention for a term not exceeding three months. So, attachment/civil detention for 03 months is the ultimate punishment provided for having made violation of the injunction order. There is however, no other punishment or eventualities even contemplated consequential to the order of attachment/civil detention, if any. Learned advocate for the appellant rightly pointed out that there could not be any order recorded by the court, what was neither pleaded nor prayer for.

16. Since the basic prayer of the petitioner/appellant in connection with Order 39 Rule 2(A) of C.P.C. was for attachment and/or civil detention of person causing violation of condition of the injunction order, what was supposed to be given in a case upon fulfillment of the condition mentioned in Order 39 of Rule 2(A) of C.P.C. itself, therefore, proof of condition, embedded in Order 39 of Rule 2(A) of C.P.C., is sine qua non to the determination of issue.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.O. No. 2941 of 2018

Decided On: 21.08.2019

 Swapan Kumar Debnath Vs.  Indian Oil Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Subhasis Dasgupta, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Cal 322
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Tuesday, 8 October 2019

How to prove breach of injunction?

 For finding a person guilty of willful disobedience of the order under XXXIX Rule 2A Code of Civil Procedure there has to be not mere "disobedience" but it should be a "willful disobedience". The allegation of willful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not mere "disobedience" but a "willful disobedience". As pointed out earlier, during the second visit of the Commissioner to the Appellant's shop, tea cakes and masala cakes were being sold without any wrappers/labels. The only thing which the Commissioner has noted is that "non removal of the hoarding" displayed in front of the Appellant's shop for which the Appellant has offered an explanation which, in our considered view, is acceptable one.

8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any "willful disobedience" on the part of the Appellant warranting invoking Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure and sentencing the Appellant to one week civil imprisonment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5775 of 2019 
Decided On: 22.07.2019

 U.C. Surendranath   Vs.  Mambally's Bakery

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R. Banumathi and A.S. Bopanna, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3799
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Friday, 26 July 2019

Whether person can be held guilty for breach of injunction if wilful disobedience of order of court is not proved against him?

For finding a person guilty of willful disobedience of the
order under XXXIX Rule 2A C.P.C. there has to be not mere
“disobedience” but it should be a “willful disobedience”. The
allegation of willful disobedience being in the nature of
criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the disobedience was not mere
“disobedience” but a “willful disobedience”. As pointed out
earlier, during the second visit of the Commissioner to the
appellant’s shop, tea cakes and masala cakes were being sold

without any wrappers/labels. The only thing which the
Commissioner has noted is that “non removal of the hoarding”
displayed in front of the appellant’s shop for which the
appellant has offered an explanation which, in our considered
view, is acceptable one.
8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find
any “willful disobedience” on the part of the appellant
warranting invoking Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the C.P.C. and
sentencing the appellant to one week civil imprisonment.
9. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and this
appeal is allowed. 
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 5775 OF 2019

U.C. SURENDRANATH  Vs  MAMBALLY’S BAKERY 
BANUMATHI, J.
Dated: JULY 22, 2019.
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Tuesday, 7 May 2019

What is distinction between O 39 R 2A of CPC and O 21 R 32 of CPC?

 In KANWAR SINGH SAINI v. HIGH COURT OF
DELHI  the Supreme Court discussed categorically about the distinction between Order XXXIX Rule 2A and Order XXI Rule 32 CPC. It is held: "An application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A lies only where disobedience/breach of injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the Court under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. On the other hand in case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach the execution Court under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC which provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in contempt which are summary in nature. An application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable once the suit is decreed. Law does not permit to skip the remedies available under order XXI Rule 32 CPC and resort to the contempt proceedings for the reason that the Court has to exercise its discretion under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 when an effective and alternative remedy is not available to the person concerned. Thus, when the matter relates to the infringement of a decree or decretal order embodies rights, as between the parties, it is not expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode of executing the decree or merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument that the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC would also include the case of violation of breach of permanent injunction granted at the time of passing of the decree. It is also observed that in an undertaking given to the Court during the pendency of the suit on the basis of which the suit itself has been disposed of becomes a part of the decree and breach of such undertaking is to be dealt with in execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC and no by way of contempt proceedings."
Supreme Court of India
Kanwar Singh Saini vs High Court Of Delhi on 23 September, 2011
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Thursday, 27 December 2018

What are necessary conditions for proof of breach of injunction?

 For invoking power under Order 39 Rule 2-A, the following three conditions must be satisfied, namely:- (i) there should be an order of injunction (ii) other party has knowledge about the injunction order and (iii) the said injunction order is violated or disobeyed.

THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Appeal From Order No. 344 of 2013

Decided On: 31.07.2018

Ashraf Ahmad  Vs. A.S. Bhartari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 Uttarakhand 198
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Monday, 17 September 2018

Whether application for breach of injunction is maintainable in disposed off suit?

 For the sake of convenience. I, shall first proceed to examine the matter in issue in the Notice of Motion No. 4572 of 1995 (A.O. No. 1256/1995). By this notice of motion the respondent-Shri Marathe wanted appropriate action to be initiated against the appellants in A.O. No. 1256/1995 on the ground that they have violated the terms of the order and decree passed by the City of Civil Court dated April 6, 1994. I have already adverted to all the reliefs claimed in the said Notice of Motion. The moot question that arises for consideration is, whether the said application was maintainable in law? The trial Court has examined various facets of the arguments advanced before it without adverting to this crucial question which, in my view, goes to the root of the matter. Undoubtedly, the suit filed by the appellants in A.O. No. 1256 of 1995, being Suit No. 5935 of 1992, was compromised between the parties and the same was disposed of on April 6, 1994 on the basis of the compromise terms duly signed by the parties. The Court by that order has merely recorded the compromise and disposed of the suit on that basis. Undisputedly, this notice of motion has been filed under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the C.P.C. Unquestionably, Order 39 of C.P.C. essentially deals with matters of temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders to be passed by the Court. Power conferred under Rule 2-A is a part of the said scheme of provisions. It necessarily follows that application under Rule 2-A of Order 39 can be maintained only when the suit is pending and the disobedience/breach of any injunction granted or other order made complained of was one granted by the Court under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of that Order which was naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit or till the application under Rule 1 or 2, as the case may be. Undoubtedly, the order passed by the trial Court dated April 6, 1994 while disposing of the suit is neither an order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39, but a decree passed in the suit on the basis of consent terms filed by the parties. In such a situation, the provisions of Rule 2-A will be inapplicable. It is well settled that the Court after passing decree becomes Functus Officio understood thus, the trial Court had no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the subject notice of motion purported to have been filed under Order 39, Rule 2-A, for the same was not maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 1260 of 1995 with Civil Application No. 6599 of 2000 with Appeal From Order No. 1256 of 1995

Decided On: 01.10.2001

 Chembur Trombay Education Society  Vs.  D.K. Marathe and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2002(3) Bom CR 161
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Sunday, 5 March 2017

When legal representatives of deceased defendant can be held guilty for violation of injunction order?

The learned Senior Counsel would submit that after bringing the legal representatives on record, it incumbent on the part of the respondents again to obtain a fresh order of status quo against the legal representatives so as to bind them and till no such order was obtained against the appellants, the appellants cannot be found fault with. Thus, the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law.
33. But, this contention cannot be accepted for the reason that though status quo order was granted against the father, yet the sons cannot be allowed to flout the status quo order which was granted against their father after they were brought on record as legal representatives. It is not the case of the appellants that they have parted with the property by executing sale deed prior to their bringing on record as legal representatives, but it is only after they were brought on record, they have parted with the property. Thus, it is clearly established that the appellants having full knowledge of the status quo order which was passed against their father, executed the sale deeds on the premise that the status quo orders would not in any way bind them. But, this contention has no legs to stand inasmuch as the status-quo order passed against Sharfuddin is required to be respected by the legal representatives who succeeded to the property in question. It is not a case of third party alleging that he is not bound by the injunction order passed against the defendants. But the appellants are none else than the legal representatives and they have the full knowledge of the status quo order passed against their father. Therefore, a person knowing fully well that an injunction order was passed against the defendant and still violates the injunction order irrespective of the fact whether he is a party to the injunction or not and commits violation of the order, is required to face the consequences under Rule 2-A of Order 39. Thus, we are not in a position to agree with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the appellants have not committed any contempt of the orders of the lower Court.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
LPA No. 94 of 1998
Decided On: 19.02.2003
 Mohd. Sharfuddin (died) by LRs.
Vs.
Mohd. Jamal and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G. Bikshapathy and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.
Citation: 2003(3) Civil court cases695 AP
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Whether a person can be held guilty for violation of interim orders passed by court which has no jurisdiction to try said case?

The learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2 submitted that this is not a proceeding for contempt but a proceeding under Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel submitted that proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A are a part of the coercive process to secure obedience to its injunction and that once it is found that the Court has no jurisdiction, question of securing obedience to its orders any further does not arise. Learned counsel also submitted that enforcing the interim order after it is found that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the said suit would not only be unjust and illegal but would also reflect adversely upon the dignity and authority of the Court. It is also suggested that the plaintiff had instituted the present suit in the Civil Court knowing full well that it had no jurisdiction to try it . It is not possible to agree with any of these submission not only on principle but also in the light of the specific provision contained in Section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment). In the light of the said provision, it would not be right to say that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass interim order or interim injunction, as the case may be, pending decision on the question of jurisdiction. The orders made were within the jurisdiction of the Court and once this is so, they have to be obeyed and implemented. It is not as if the defendants are being sought to be punished for violations committed after the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Here the defendants are sought to be punished for the disobedience and violation of the order of injunction committed before the decision of the High Court in Vishanji Virji Mepani. According to Section 9-A, the Civil Court- and the High Court - did have the power to pass interim orders until that decision. If they had that power they must also have the power to enforce them. In the light of the said provision, it cannot also be held that those orders could be enforced only till the said decision but not thereafter. The said decision does not render them (the interim orders passed meanwhile) either non-est or without jurisdiction. Punishing the defendants for violation of the said order committed before the said decision (Vishanji Virji Mepani) does not amount, in any event, to enforcing them after the said decision. Only the orders are being passed now. The violations are those committed before the said decision.
The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A - to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. the interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situation, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in foce, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the court on the question of Jurisdiction.
Supreme Court of India
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & ... vs Hind Rubber Industries Private ... on 19 February, 1997

Bench: B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Suhas C. Sen
Citation:(1997)3 SCC 443,[1997]2SCR152
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Whether court can direct that his orders be read along with pleading,proof and other data on record?

 Learned District Judge in his order dated November 3, 2000 noticed in para 3 that the plaintiff was owner of two trucks HP 12-2209 and HP 11-4009 and had deployed these trucks with defendant No. 2 for lifting the clinker from GACL Complex since April, 1997. Learned District Judge in his impugned order observed that the order passed by him has to be read along with the pleadings, proof and other data on record in the suit itself and the operative part of the order, though does not refer to particular registration number of the trucks, however, identity of these three trucks was to be found in the suit laid by the plaintiff and therefore, it was not open for the defendants to say that as registration numbers of the trucks were not given and, therefore, not bound to comply with the orders.
25. In our view, the reasoning given by the learned District Judge is fallacious and cannot be accepted. When an order is passed by the Court, it is not open to a party to go behind the order, by looking into the pleadings together the intention of the Court or mind of the Presiding Officer, to comply with the orders of the Court, particularly when any non-compliance entail punitive consequences. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
F.A.O. Nos. 319 and 426 of 2001
Decided On: 08.01.2003
 Sushil Mittal and Anr. Vs. R.D. Bhardwaj and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kamlesh Sharma, Actg. C.J. and K.C. Sood, J.
Citation: 2004(1) Civil court cases341 HP
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Whether person can be held guilty for breach of injunction order if there is unintentional disobedience?

 It is settled position that before a party can be punished for disobeying order under Rule 2-A of Order 39, it must be established by the other party that the order which is alleged to have been disobeyed was clear, unambiguous and the party was not under a bona fide apprehension as to the scope of such an order. It is equally true that when the injunction is in force, irrespective of the legality of the orders, the party is bound to obey the orders of the Court. In case of disobedience; such a party is liable to be proceeded under Order 39, Rule 2A(1) of the Code. The Jurisdiction of the Court to punish a contumacious party is to vindicate the majesty of rule of law. It is not intended to benefit the parties. It is equally settled that in a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant and their servants etc. from doing certain activity, the persons who are not party to the lis, cannot be held responsible in case of disobedience of the orders.
It is well settled that it is only wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court passed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which invites punitive action depriving a person of his personal liberty and property. The expression "wilful" means a deliberate or voluntary or Intentional Act. Unintentional disobedience is not enough to justify an action against the defaulter under Rule 3 of Order 39.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
F.A.O. Nos. 319 and 426 of 2001
Decided On: 08.01.2003
 Sushil Mittal and Anr.
Vs.
 R.D. Bhardwaj and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kamlesh Sharma, Actg. C.J. and K.C. Sood, J.
Citation: 2004(1) Civil court cases341 HP
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Precaution to be taken by court while passing order for attachment of property for disobedience of injunction order

The penalty imposed by the trial Court reads as hereunder:
"The opp. Parties are hereby found guilty of disobedience of status quo order of this Court. The properties of the O.Ps. be attached and they also be detained in Civil prison for seven days."
It is clearly readable from the above quoted law and underlined portion from the impugned order that the order of attachment of the property as one of the penalties is not in accordance with the provision of law. Extent of property and duration for which it should remain under attachment and extent of restriction for using or dealing with such properties by the person guilty of breach of order of injunction must be made clearly specific and no ambiguity or vagueness should be there. Apart from that, such penalty should be proportionate to the gravity of the act complained. Applying judicial discretion in that respect is the salutary principle.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Civil Revision No. 71 of 2002
Decided On: 09.05.2002
Jaigun Nisa Bibi and 2 Ors.
Vs.
 Sk. Badiruddin Zahed
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.K. Tripathy, J.
Citation:2002(3) Civil court cases 513 Orissa
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Whether person disobeying injunction order can be detained in civil prison as well as his properties can be attached?

 Hence the words "and may also" in Rule 2-A cannot be interpreted in the context as denoting to a step which is permissible only as additional to attachment of property of the opposite party. If those words are interpreted like that it may lead to an anomalous situation. If the person who defies the injunction order has no property at all the court becomes totally powerless to deal with such a disobedient party. He would be immuned from all consequences even for any open defiance of a court order. No interpretation shall be allowed to bring about such a sterile or anomalous situation (vide Constitution Bench in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, MANU/SC/0120/1963 : [1964]6SCR129 ). The pragmatic interpretation, therefore, must be this: It is open to the court to attach the property of the disobeying party and at the same time the court can order him to be detained in civil prison also if the court deems it necessary. Similarly the court which orders the person to be detained in civil prison can also attach the property of that person. Both steps can be resorted to or one of them alone need be chosen. It is left to the court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SLP (C) No. 11992 of 1998
Decided On: 01.09.1998

Samee Khan Vs. Bindu Khan


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Citation:1999(1) PLR465 SC
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How a party can prove that he has not violated injunction order?

 It is, however, to be borne in mind that where a person who is not a party to the suit is proceeded against in order to punish him it is essential that he should be made a party to the proceeding for violation and it should be brought home by sufficient and unimpeachable evidence that he had been guilty of abetting violation of injunction. A party proceeded against for violation of injunction can prove his innocence in the following manner, i.e. by proving that (a) the order was not within knowledge, or (b) the order was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation or (c) that in fact he did not intend to disobey the order, but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order. The question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner, and has conducted himself in accordance with such a construction is primarily one of fact. The party setting up such a plea has to prove it.
Citation : AIR 1994 Ori 173
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Misc. Appeal No. 170 of 1990
Decided On: 04.01.1994
 Prafulla Kumar Mohapatra
Vs.
Jaya Krushna Mohapatra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.
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Whether court should decide suit and application for breach of injunction by common judgment?

 A proceeding under Order XXXIX. Rule 2A, C.P.C., initiated on the ground of disobedience or breach of injunction order, is in the nature of a criminal proceeding as the person against whom such proceeding is initiated is liable to be detained in prison if it is found that he had committed breach of injunction order. Since a punishment is imposed and a person is sent to Jail, the principle on which these proceedings are decided are entirely different. Here the principle of criminal law will apply and the plaintiff will have to establish beyond any shadow of doubt that the defendants had committed disobedience or breach of the injunction order even though he had full knowledge of the same. The burden of proving its case in such cases lies entirely on the plaintiff. The principle on which a civil suit is decided are different as here decision on the issues arising out of pleadings is taken on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Therefore, a common judgment and order deciding the main suit as well as application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A. C.P.C. will not be proper. In my opinion, the order passed by learned Munsif on 11.12.1989 holding the defendants guilty in Misc. Case No. 67 of 1987 and directing them to be detained in civil prison is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
Citation : AIR 1998 All 228
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
C.M.W.P. No. 682 of 1990
Decided On: 06.02.1998

 Gyan Chand Jain   Vs.  XIIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Agra 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.P. Mathur, J.
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Whether application for breach of injunction order can be filed in transferee court if case is transferred?

 I squarely fall in line with the view taken by Punjab and Haryana High Court and on the foregoing analogy hold that whenever a suit, after passing an interlocutory order, is transferred to a subordinate Court, the business of the transferring Court will be deemed to have been transferred to the subordinate Court and any motion for disobedience of an order passed by the transferring Court can lie before the Court to which the matter has been transferred.
9. It is Rule 2-A of Order 39 which makes provision for disobedience of an ad interim injunction passed in terms of Rule 2. Therefore, an application projecting disobedience can be safely termed to be an offshoot of the action taken under Rule 2. After the transfer of business to the transferee Court, it will be the latter Court which will have jurisdiction to try this application. This is particularly so when Rule 2-A expressly makes it clear that "the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred may pass orders" in a particular mode.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
C.O.A. No. 5 of 1988
Decided On: 22.02.1996

Arjan Khajuria Vs.  Parkash Chand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Mir, J.

Citation : AIR 1997 J and K 34
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Whether a person can be held guilty for breach of injunction order even if he was not party to suit?

The respondent set up a case that the owner of the disputed premises is Smt. Savita Singh and the respondent No. 3 has denied to be present at the site during the period when the outlets in question were closed by filling earth. The architect who was working at the instance of respondent No. 3 had filed his affidavit and stated that he had filled the strip of land with earth at the instance of respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 stated that he had been away from Dehradun at the relevant time and also said that the petitioner has no right of easement. Now, after the judgment of the civil court decreeing the petitioners' suit for injunction accepting the easementary right, it is no more open to the respondent to plead otherwise and deny that there is no easementary right of flowing rain and flood water through the disputed outlets. The technical plea raised is that owner of the premises is Smt. Savita Singh and the respondent is not the owner and he has no concern with the same. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge shows that he mainly proceeded on placing reliance on 1962 ALJ 201 (supra) and has not noticed the relevant amendments made in the Code otherwise he would have invoked the inherent jurisdiction under O. 39, R. 2A. The question whether an agent of the defendant can be proceeded against in a proceeding under 0. 39, R. 2A of the Code as amended by 1976 Act, the Patna High Court in MANU/BH/0067/1983 Ram Pd. Singh v. Subodh Pd. Singh has held that a person is liable to be proceeded against under O. 39, R. 2A of the Code even if he was not presently party to the suit provided he is shown to be the agent or servant of the defendant and to have violated the orders of the Court in spite of knowledge that there was such an order. The respondent No. 3 is the husband of the owner of the premises. The architect stated on affidavit that the apertures were closed at the instance of the respondent No. 3. It is wholly immaterial whether the respondent was personally present at the time of actual closing of the outlets or not and whether he was a party in the suit or not.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19415 of 1988
Decided On: 13.07.1992

 K.L. Virmani  Vs.  IIIrd Additional Dist. Judge, and others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.L. Ganguly, J.

 Citation : AIR 1992 All 326
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When property attached for breach of injunction order should not be sold?

The only question, which arises for consideration in this revision is whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, the attached property could be ordered to be sold. This Court has deleted Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 2 of Order XXXIX and has added the following Rule 2-A:--
"2-A (1) In the case of disobedience to an injunction issued under Rule 1 or Rule 2, Sub-rule (2) or of breach of any terms of any such injunction the Court, in which the suit is proceeding may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime the court directs his release.
(2) No attachment under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award such compensation ,as it thinks fit and shall pay the balance, if any to the party entitled thereto."
The order of attachment of the applicants' property was passed under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2-A. The attached property can be sold under Sub-rule (2) only if the disobedience or breach of the injunction order continues at the end of the period of attachment. The trial court held that no further breach or disobedience of the injunction order was committed by the applicants after the attachment started and therefore, it could not be said that the disobedience or breach continued till the expiry of the period of attachment. It further held that there was no direction by the court that the earth removed was to be restored and the pits were to be filled up and, therefore, the failure of the applicants to do so could not amount to continuance of the breach of the injunction order. The appellate court has taken the view that it was immaterial whether any fresh breach of the injunction order was committed or not. It has held that since the applicants had committed the breach of the injunction order by removing the earth after digging pits in the land, the breach of the injunction order would continue until the act of digging pits and removing the earth was undone by filling up the pits with earth.
6. There can be a third class of cases where the injunction order remains capable of being obeyed after the first breach or disobedience which led to the attachment and the defendant obeys the order and does not commit any further breach. In this case, the attached property cannot be sold. In my opinion, the present case falls in the third category of cases referred to above. The order of injunction passed by the trial court restrained the applicants from removing earth from certain plots. The applicants disobeyed the order and removed some earth from some of the plots. But they did not remove all earth from all the plots and, therefore, it cannot be said that they made it impossible for themselves to obey the order of injunction after the first breach. In fact after the property was attached the applicants could if they decided to continue to disobey the order of injunction, have removed further earth from the plots. It thus appears that the order of injunction was still capable of being obeyed after the attachment of the applicants' property and that the applicants did obey the order. It, therefore, cannot be said that the disobedience or breach continued till the end of the period of attachment. That being so the present case did not fall within the mischief of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX and the attached property could not be ordered to be sold.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Civil Revn. No. 323 of 1972
Decided On: 04.04.1974

Uttam Bhatia Co. Vs.  Babu Ram and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Gyan Chand Mathur, J.

 Citation : AIR 1974 All 454
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