Showing posts with label Rape victim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rape victim. Show all posts

Sunday, 30 November 2025

Leading Supreme Court Judgment banning two-finger test of Rape Victim as violative of human rights.

 In view of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966; United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985, rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not retraumatize them or violate their physical or mental integrity and dignity. They are also entitled to medical procedures conducted in a manner that respects their right to consent. Medical procedures should not be carried out in a manner that constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and health should be of paramount consideration while dealing with gender-based violence. The State is under an obligation to make such services available to survivors of sexual violence. Proper measures should be taken to ensure their safety and there should be no arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy. {Para 12}


13. Thus, in view of the above, undoubtedly, the two finger test and its interpretation violates the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and mental integrity and dignity.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1226 of 2011

Decided On: 09.04.2013

Lillu and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.S. Chauhan and F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2013 SC 1784,MANU / SC / 0369 / 2013,( 2013 ) 14 SCC 643.

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Monday, 29 April 2024

Whether the court can rely on evidence of mother of rape victim?

 The next question is whether the mother can be regarded as an "independent" witness. So far as this case is concerned, I have no doubt on that score. It may be that all mothers may not be sufficiently independent to fulfill the requirements of the corroboration rule but there is no legal bar to exclude them from its operation merely on the ground of their relationship. Independent merely means independent of sources which are likely to be tainted. In the absence of enmity against the accused there is no reason why she should implicate him falsely. It is true the accused suggested that they were on bad terms but that has not been believed by anyone. {Para 37}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1951

Decided On: 20.12.1951

Rameshwar Vs. The State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyid Fazl Ali and Vivian Bose, JJ.

Authored By : Vivian Bose, Saiyid Fazl Ali

Vivian Bose, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0036/1951,1951SCC 1213,1951 SCCONLINE SC 83,AIR 1952 SC 54.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Friday, 6 October 2023

Under which circumstances the court can held that victim was minor even though no ossification test was conducted?

 There was no ossification test conducted in this case, however, this question would come when the girl is on the border line. When there is still margin of four years, it cannot be said that the girl was not a "child" as defined under Section 2(d)of the POCSO Act. The father of the victim who has the knowledge of the date of birth of the daughter, his testimony would be also important in that respect and, therefore, in this case the prosecution had proved that the victim was a child.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 718 of 2016

Decided On: 03.10.2023

 Sunil  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and Abhay S. Waghwase, JJ.

Author: Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3996/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here
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Whether the court can rely on identification of accused by victim even if she has not stated name of accused in her statement U/S 164 of CRPC?

The identification of the accused is the important point raised on behalf of the accused, however, only a stray suggestion or question was asked in the cross-examination. It was not tried to be elaborated and it was not extracted as to whether she had seen the accused prior to the incident or not. She was certain in saying that the boy was from out of village and she is unable to tell his name and after the incident he ran away. Only on the basis of this statement, we cannot come to the conclusion that the identification of the accused by the victim is false or inadmissible. A witness may not be knowing name of the accused, but thereafter with the description or some other particulars like relative of somebody to whom the witness is knowing or would have seen residing in a particular place are the criteria with which the identity can be established. Here, no questions were asked on that point, but the fact is that the incident is alleged to have taken place at 8.00 a.m. i.e. the broad daylight and she had sufficient time to recognize the accused. Rather it has been extracted in her cross-examination that she had stated about the incident to her brother after returning home and after her parents reached there, they went to the police station on the same day. That means what has been left out in the examination-in-chief has been extracted in the cross-examination. Therefore, we do not find any fault as regards the identification of the accused. Her identification before the Court i.e. in the substantial evidence carries importance. No doubt, in her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she has not stated the name of the accused, but at that time, the accused was not before the girl and, therefore, the identification is important, rather than the name. {Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 718 of 2016

Decided On: 03.10.2023

 Sunil  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and Abhay S. Waghwase, JJ.

Author: Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/3996/2023.

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Saturday, 5 August 2023

Bombay HC Directs Police To file Photos of victim in sealed cover alongwith chargesheet to avoid disclosure of identity of Victim of Sexual assault

We would like to specifically mention here that Section 228-A was inserted in Indian Penal Code with effect from 25.12.1983, which prohibits disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences. By S. 4 of Act 13 of 2013, words "offence under Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or section 376D" were substituted/inserted with effect from 03.02.2013. Thereafter, by Act 22 of 2018 further amendment in respect of other Sections has been made with effect from 21.04.2018. Thus, the identity of the victim cannot be disclosed by any of the authorities in the charge-sheet. Nowadays, we are finding that photographs are taken i.e. either the old photographs are collected or even victim showing the spot of occurrence are taken and those photographs are produced in the charge-sheet. We do not say that such photographs should not be collected or should not be taken, but we expect that those photographs should not be openly added as part of charge-sheet. A charge-sheet travels from the office of the investigating agency (may be handled by many persons), then it comes to either the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class or directly presented before the learned Special Judge where also it is handled by many persons. Under such circumstance, the identity of the victim is disclosed. The investigating agency has to be sensitive in the matter. If they want to produce such documents, then it should be put in a sealed envelope including in the copies of the charge-sheet also, so that the identity of the victim is not disclosed in any manner. In the catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, it has been stressed that the identity of the victim in such cases, i.e. under Section 376 and other Sections of Indian Penal Code, POCSO Act, should not be disclosed. We are constrained to make these observations, as we are coming across such incidences time and again. We may also observe that when it was found that the accused facing charge under these Sections want to rely on certain photographs in which victim is seen then those photographs are openly placed/annexed in the petition. Coordinate Bench at Principal Seat has given directions that they should be filed under sealed envelope. We take those directions further and direct all the concerned agencies, who are dealing with the investigation of such crime that henceforth the photographs of such victims should be filed in sealed envelope before the concerned Courts. We may also say that failure to follow the directions may invite the action for the offence under Section 228-A of the Indian Penal Code. These directions are also to the concerned Courts where the charge-sheet is accepted. They should also see that such photographs are produced in sealed envelope before them and the identity of the victim is not disclosed in any manner.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 869 of 2022

Decided On: 08.02.2023

Sajjan  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and Abhay S. Waghwase, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/0509/2023.

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Monday, 14 September 2020

Whether court must hear victim while releasing accused on default bail U/S 167 of CRPC in a Rape case?

Coming to the bail under Section 167(2) of the Code,
it is fundamentally different from the bail under Sections 437, 438
and 439 of the Code. The contrast is particularly stark since Section
167(2) grants an indefeasible right to an accused, whereas Sections
437, 438 and 439 do not grant any such right to the accused and
grant of bail under those provisions is only a matter of judicial
discretion. The right of an accused to seek bail under Section 167(2)
accrues upon the default of the investigating officer in concluding the
investigation within the requisite time specified in the provision.
While considering an application for bail under Section 167(2), a
court does not consider the merits of the case, but only considers the
question as to whether there is default on the part of the
investigating agency in completing the investigation in the case
within the prescribed period. If the investigating agency fails to file
the final report in the case within the time prescribed, the accused in
custody gets an absolute right to bail.

There is no hard and fast rule also regarding grant or refusal to
grant bail under those provisions and the case has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case and on its own merits.
15. Section 439(1A) of the Code reads thus:
“The presence of the informant or any person authorised
by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing of the
application for bail to the person under sub-section (3) of
section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section
376DB of the Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860).”
It brooks no argument that Section 439(1A) is mandatory vis-à-vis applications for bail are concerned other than the applications under Section 167(2) of the Code. True, the phraseology of Section 439(1A) favours the section being considered as mandatory for applications for bail under Section 167(2) also. But the phraseology alone cannot be the decisive factor for resolving the question as to whether
Section 439(1A) of the Code applies to an application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code. The question is whether the legislature intended that provision to be applied for grant of bail under Section 167(2) of the Code. The purpose of Section 439(1A) of the Code is to ensure that a victim or a person acting in the interest of the victim shall also be heard before a decision on a bail application is made. No doubt, such an opportunity is vital as regards applications under Sections 437,438 and 439 of the Code, for the same would certainly aid the court while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to grant or
refuse bail to the accused under those provisions. However, a
decision on the application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code being one taken by the court on the basis of the period of custody undergone by the accused, compliance of the provision contained in Section 439(1A) of the Code does not make any difference. Even if it is held placing reliance on the phraseology used in Section 439(1A) of
the Code that the provision therein is to be followed while granting
bail under Section 167(2) of the Code, it would be an empty formality.
The purpose of Section 167(2) is to protect the liberty of an individual
who has been detained and continues to be detained pending
investigation in a case. It is trite that in matters relating to personal
liberty of an individual, the court must lean in favour of personal
liberty [See Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, 2017(4) KLT
284 (SC)]. In the aforesaid circumstances, I am inclined to hold that
the provision contained in Section 439(1A) of the Code does not
apply to an application for bail under Section 167(2) of the Code.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT

Crl.MC.No.3463 OF 2020(C)


X  Vs  STATE OF KERALA
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Sunday, 26 January 2020

Whether it is necessary to prove that accused caused death of Rape victim with mensrea for applicability of S 376A of IPC?

The above cited principles have been minutely observed by us,
taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case
in hand. At the outset, we would highlight that the High Court while
confirming death has observed that the girl was found bleeding due to
forcible sexual intercourse — which fact, however, is not supported by
medical evidence. However, such erroneous finding has no impact on
conviction under Section 376A of the I.P.C. for a bare perusal of the section
shows that only the factum of death of the victim during the offence of rape is required, and such death need not be with any guilty intention or be a
natural consequence of the act of rape only. It is worded broadly enough to
include death by any act committed by the accused if done
contemporaneously with the crime of rape. Any other interpretation would
defeat the object of ensuring safety of women and would perpetuate the
earlier loophole of the rapists claiming lack of intention to cause death to
seek a reduced charge under Section 304 of I.P.C. as noted in the Report
of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, headed by Justice
J.S. Verma, former Chief Justice of India:
“22. While we believe that enhanced penalties in a substantial
number of sexual assault cases can be adjudged on the basis of
the law laid down in the aforesaid cases, certain situations
warrant a specific treatment. We believe that where the offence
of sexual assault, particularly ‘gang rapes’, is accompanied by
such brutality and violence that it leads to death or a Persistent
Vegetative State (or ‘PVS’ in medical terminology), punishment
must be severe – with the minimum punishment being life
imprisonment. While we appreciate the argument that where
such offences result in death, the case may also be tried under
Section 302 of the IPC as a ‘rarest of the rare’ case, we must
acknowledge that many such cases may actually fall within the
ambit of Section 304 (Part II) since the ‘intention to kill’ may
often not be established. In the case of violence resulting in
Persistent Vegetative State is concerned, we are reminded of
the moving story of Aruna Shanbagh, the young nurse who was
brutally raped and lived the rest of her life (i.e. almost 36 years)
in a Persistent Vegetative State.
23. In our opinion, such situations must be treated differently
because the concerted effort to rape and to inflict violence may
disclose an intention deserving an enhanced punishment. We
have therefore recommended that a specific provision, namely,
Section 376 (3) should be inserted in the Indian Penal Code to
deal with the offence of “rape followed by death or resulting in a
Persistent Vegetative State”.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1523-1524 OF 2019

Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 
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Saturday, 23 June 2018

What is difference between mental illness and mental retardation?

The three-Judge Bench referred to the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short, '1995 Act') and opined that in the said Act also "mental illness" has been defined as mental disorder other than mental retardation. The Court also took note of the definition of "mental retardation" under the 1995 Act. The definition read as follows:

2(r) 'mental retardation' means a condition of arrested or incomplete development of mind of a person which is specially characterised by subnormality of intelligence.

31. The Court also apprised itself that the same definition of "mental retardation" has also been incorporated Under Section 2(g) of the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999. Analysing the provision of Act. The Court opined that while a guardian can make decisions on behalf of a "mentally ill person" as per Section 3(4)(a) of the 1971 Act, the same cannot be done on behalf of a person who is in a condition of "mental retardation". Thus, the difference between the 'mental illness' and 'mental retardation' as recognized in law, was emphasised.

32. The three-Judge Bench proceeded to address the 'best interest' of the victim and invocation of the doctrine of parens patriae. In that context, it held:

As evident from its literal description, the "best interests" test requires the Court to ascertain the course of action which would serve the best interests of the person in question. In the present setting this means that the Court must undertake a careful inquiry of the medical opinion on the feasibility of the pregnancy as well as social circumstances faced by the victim. It is important to note that the Court's decision should be guided by the interests of the victim alone and not those of the other stakeholders such as guardians or the society in general. It is evident that the woman in question will need care and assistance which will in turn entail some costs. However, that cannot be a ground for denying the exercise of reproductive rights.

33. After so stating, the Court adverted to the facts of the case and came to hold that though the victim had been described as a person suffering from mild mental retardation, that did not mean that she was entirely incapable of making decision for herself. It discarded the 'substituted judgment' test, which requires the Court to step into the shoes of a person who is considered to be mentally incapable and attempt to make the decision which the said person would have made, if she was competent to do so. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10463 of 2017

Decided On: 17.08.2017

 Z  Vs  The State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra, Amitava Roy and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

Citation: ( 2018) 11 SCC 572
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Sunday, 9 October 2016

How to appreciate evidence of Rape victim who was taking financial help from accused?

We have lent our anxious consideration to the materials on record as well as the competing arguments based thereon. Having regard to the charge levelled, the fulcrum of the prosecution case logically is the testimony of the prosecutrix. Undeniably therefore the credibility and trustworthiness of the victim’s version is the decisive factor to adjudge the culpability of the appellants.
18. Filtering the unnecessary factual details, suffice it is to recount that the incident allegedly had occurred at 7.30 p.m. on a public road while the prosecutrix was returning home after the day's work. Her version is that while she was on the way, an auto rickshaw with two persons therein pulled up by her side and she was dragged in forcibly. After moving for about 10 minutes, the abductors were joined by two more persons, whereafter she was taken to a garage and was molested against her will forcibly.
19. To start with, the prosecutrix has contradicted herself qua the place of alleged kidnapping. In the complaint, she mentioned the spot to be near Richmond park, whereas in her evidence she referred to the same as opposite Johnson market. It is more or less authenticated by the evidence on record that after her abduction and on the way to the garage as narrated by her, she did not scream or cry for help. This is of utmost significance as it is not alleged by her that the abductors had put her under fear on the point of any weapon threatening physical injury thereby. This is more so, as admittedly the prosecutrix at the relevant time was a major and could very well foresee the disastrous consequences to follow. She has admitted in her deposition as well that while she was ravished inside the garage and even during the intermittent breaks, she did not shout for any help. Her version in the complaint with regard to the offending act and the number of persons, who had committed the same, is inconsistent with her testimony on oath at the trial. Notably in the complaint she mentioned about four persons of whom three raped and out of them, two committed the act twice. She did not disclose in her complaint that the accused persons were known to her from before and disclosed that they during the time had been referring to themselves as Raju, Venu, Parkash and Francis. This, however has been denied by the investigation officer. On oath, she however introduced a fifth person as well. She accused all the four persons to have committed sexual intercourse with her for the second time. Though grudgingly, as admitted by her, she also consumed the food as offered to her by her molesters.
In cross-examination, she admitted that she was not married to Sarvana though she claimed him to be her husband in her examination-in-chief. She disclosed more than once that the accused persons used to tease her for about 5-6 months prior to the incident and that she used to talk to them as well. In view of this admission of hers , the identification by the prosecutrix of the accused persons in the TIP pales into insignificance. She contradicted herself in the cross-examination by stating that three of the four did rape her for the second time. She was also inconsistent with regard to the writer of her complaint.
Her conduct during the alleged ordeal is also unlike a victim of forcible rape and betrays somewhat submissive and consensual disposition. From the nature of the exchanges between her and the accused persons as narrated by her, the same are not at all consistent with those of an unwilling, terrified and anguished victim of forcible intercourse, if judged by the normal human conduct.
Her post incident conduct and movements are also noticeably unusual. Instead of hurrying back home in a distressed, humiliated and a devastated state, she stayed back in and around the place of occurrence, enquired about the same from persons whom she claims to have met in the late hours of night, returned to the spot to identify the garage and even look at the broken glass bangles, discarded litter etc. According to her, she wandered around the place and as disclosed by her in her evidence, to collect information so as to teach the accused persons a lesson. Her avengeful attitude in the facts and circumstances, as disclosed by her, if true, demonstrably evinces a conduct manifested by a feeling of frustration stoked by an intense feeling of deprivation of something expected, desired or promised. Her confident movements alone past midnight, in that state are also out of the ordinary. Her testimony that she met a cyclist to whom she narrated her tale of woe and that on his information, the Hoysala police came to the spot and that thereafter she was taken to successive police stations before lodging the complaint at Sampangiramanagara police station as well has to be accepted with a grain of salt.
20. PW8, who medically examined her, opined in clear terms that she was accustomed to sexual intercourse and that no sign of forcible intercourse was discernible. This assumes great significance in view of the allegation of forcible rape by 3 to 4 adult persons more than once. The medical opinion that she was accustomed to sexual inter course when admittedly she was living separately from her husband for 1 and ½ years before the incident also has its own implication. The medical evidence as such in the attendant facts and circumstances in a way belies the allegation of gang rape.
21. The evidence of PW2 Geeta who admittedly had offered shelter to the prosecutrix and her minor daughter, though had been declared hostile, her testimony as a whole cannot be brushed aside. In her testimony, this witness indicated that the prosecutrix used to take financial help from the accused persons and that she used to indulge in dubious late night activities for which her husband had deserted her. The defence plea of false implication as the accused persons had declined to oblige the prosecutrix qua her demand for financial help therefore cannot be lightly discarded in the overall factual scenario. Her version therefore is a plausible one and thus fit in with the defence plea to demolish the prosecution case.
22. That the evidence of a hostile witness in all eventualities ought not stand effaced altogether and that the same can be accepted to the extent found dependable on a careful scrutiny was reiterated by this Court in Himanshu @ Chintu (supra) by drawing sustenance of the proposition amongst others from Khujii vs. State of M.P. (1991) 3 SCC 627 and Koli Lakhman Bhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 8 SCC 624. It was enounced that the evidence of a hostile witness remains admissible and is open for a Court to rely on the dependable part thereof as found acceptable and duly corroborated by other reliable evidence available on record.
23. The seizures said to have been effected by the investigating agency also do not inspire confidence. Not only PW 4 Muthu denied that the seizure of ear studs had been made in his presence, DW1 on oath had stated that this item of jewellery had in fact been purchased by the police from a local shop which he could identify on the basis of the symbol ‘MP’ inscribed thereon. In any view of the matter, the seized articles per se in absence of any evidence of corroboration of charge would not, irrefutably prove the involvement of the appellants in the offence alleged.
24. This Court in Raju (supra), while reiterating that the evidence of the prosecutrix in cases of rape, molestation and other physical outrages is to be construed to be that of an injured witness so much so that no corroboration is necessary, ruled that an accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication. It was underlined that the testimony of the victim in such cases, though commands great weight but the same, cannot necessarily be universally and mechanically accepted to be free in all circumstances from embellishment and exaggeration. It was ruled that the presumption of absence of consent of the victim, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved as contemplated in Section 114A of the Evidence Act, was extremely restricted in its application compared to the sweep and ambit of the presumption under Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. It was exposited that insofar as the allegation of rape is concerned, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be examined as that of a injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should always without exception, be taken as gospel truth.
The essence of this verdict which has stood the test of time proclaims that though generally the testimony of a victim of rape or non- consensual physical assault ought to be accepted as true and unblemished, it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a casual, routine and automatic acceptance thereof results in unwarranted conviction of the person charged.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Raja & Ors vs State Of Karnataka on 4 October, 2016

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Amitava Roy
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Tuesday, 12 July 2016

Whether newly born child of Rape victim is child in need of care and protection as per juvenile justice Act?

"Surrendered child" means a child who in the opinion of the child welfare committee is relinquished on account of physical emotional and social factors beyond the control of the parent or legal guardian; 
The newly born child is a ''child in need of care and protection' and falls within the expression ''Surrendered or orphan child'. The necessary directions for her rehabilitation including adoption are thus required to be issued to the competent authority under the JJ Act read with the Guidelines 2015 in the welfare of the child.
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
LUCKNOW BENCH
Writ Petition No.8210 (M/B) of 2015. 
"A" through her Father "F" 
Versus 
State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy., Med. & Health Ser. & Ors. 
Hon'ble Shabihul Hasnain, J. 
Hon'ble D. K. Upadhyaya, J. 
(Delivered by Shabihul Hasnain, J.) 
Dated:03.11.2015.
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC)396 ALL

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Saturday, 4 June 2016

Guidelines of High court in respect of termination of pregnancy of Rape victim

In view of the foregoing discussion, interim directions are
issued as under:
(i) Principal Secretary, Department of Health & Family
Welfare, Government of Haryana, shall deposit a sum
of `5000/- per month in the account of petitioner No.
1 for food and medical expenses. The deposit shall be
made on or before 7th of each calendar month w.e.f.
01.06.2016 for one year.
(ii) The Chief Medical Officer, Nuh and the Medical

Superintendent of Civil Hospital-cum-SHKM
Government Medical College Malhar shall depute a
senior obstetrician/ gynecologist to examine petitioner
No. 1 from time to time and give proper advice in the
matter of medicine and due medical facilities of
health professionals i.e nurses etc.. This will be in
addition to the help and assistance to be provided to
Petitioner No. 1 by AIIMS, New Delhi.
(iii) The Medical Superintendent of AIIMS shall also
provide the adequate medical help as aforesaid to
victim-petitioner No. 1.
(iv) Whenever Petitioner No. 1 visits for medical checkup
and counselling , the concerned doctors shall deal
with her sympathetically. The counselling shall be
provided to her regularly as per the mental health of
petitioner No. 1 and the requirement for the same in
view of the alleged threat of suicide by her.
(v) The State of Haryana shall also deposit an amount of
Rs.5 lakh in fixed deposit in the name of petitioner
No. 1 as damages and expenses as the officers at the
helm of affairs failed to act with due diligence. This
amount will be in addition to the other claim of
petitioner No. 1 under the provisions of law. The said
amount shall remain in fixed deposit in a scheduled

Bank; however, the interest accruing on it can be paid
to petitioner No.1 only after 31.06.2017, by the
concerned bank, if demanded by petitioner No. 1.
(vi) It is clarified that the amounts awarded by this Court
are in addition to the entitlement as per provisions of
Code of Criminal Procedure.
(vii) This Court has already issued directions in various
cases as Kavita, Vijender and Bashir Khan (supra),
referred in the earlier part of the judgement. It is
emphasized that each of those directions should also
be followed in letter and spirit.
(viii) The Central Government is advised to consider
making amendments to the Medical Termination Of
Pregnancy Act, 1971 and clarify in so many words to
the doctors that they will not be unnecessarily
prosecuted if they act in accordance with the rules in
good faith to save the life of a victim of rape or to
prevent grave injury to her physical and mental
health. Termination of pregnancy in good faith which
results from crime is otherwise permitted under the
provision of MTP Act.
(ix) Seminars for investigating agencies, doctors, lawyers
and judicial officers who have occasion to deal with
such cases should be organized periodically. They

should be sensitized about the urgency and immediate
need of counselling and other medical assistance
required to a rape victim. The respective departments
having control over these agencies should regularly
update its officers/officials about the legal provisions
and settled law on the subject.
(x) The Refresher Courses for the members of the
Superior and Subordinate Judiciary of the States of
Punjab, Haryana and U.T.Chandigarh be held to make
them aware of the provisions of the MTP Act and
urgency in such cases. In order to ensure that if any
case is brought before the gestation period reaches 20
weeks, victim be informed about her choice to seek
termination at the earliest.
(xi) The copy of this judgment be sent to the offices of
Advocate Generals of Punjab and Haryana and the
Standing Counsel for U.T., in order to ensure that if,
and when, any case is brought to Court for passing of
any orders under the MTP Act, the said case can be
determined on the first day itself by sending the
woman to the medical board immediately for quick
action if possible under the provisions of law. The
need for filing of reply should not arise so as to avoid
wasting of precious time available with the pregnant

victim.
(xii) The Registry is directed not to mention the name of
rape victim in the cause list, judgment order, but they
may refer to her name by mentioning the first
alphabet of her name.
(xiii) The Counsel representing the victim of rape are also
requested not to disclose the identity of victim in the
petition in the head-note of petition. They may also
write the first alphabet of name of the victim and may
quote 'name withheld' in particulars.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
 CWP-6733-2016
 Date of Decision: 30.05.2016
R (name withheld) and another
 ... Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Haryana and others
 ... Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH
 DHALIWAL

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Sunday, 24 January 2016

Whether Rape convict should be released as he married with victim?

 The appellant suffered conviction as the prosecutrix was
below 16 years of age on the day of occurrence. Record reveals that the
appellant has remained in custody in this case for around three years. He
is not a previous convict and is not involved in any other criminal case.
Material aspect is that both the appellant and the victim have married on
27.06.2015 on ‘X’s attaining majority. They were in love and it was a case
of elopement with consent. Physical relations (if any) between the two 
were consensual. No external injuries were found on ‘X’s body including
private parts at the time of medical examination. Considering these facts
and circumstances, sufficient and adequate reasons exist to modify the
Sentence order to enable them to enjoy their married life. No useful
purpose will be served to send the appellant in custody to serve out the
remaining period of substantive sentence.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
DECIDED ON : JANUARY 21, 2015

CRL.A.46/2013
RAHUL 
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI 
Complainant present with her
parents.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P.GARG

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Friday, 6 November 2015

How to frame charge in case of multiple Rapes?

The basic requirement in every criminal trial therefore, is that the charge must be so framed as to give the accused person a fairly reasonable idea as to the case which he is to face, and that validity of the charge must in each case be determined' by the application of the test, viz., had the accused a reasonably sufficient notice of the matter with which he was charged ? It is quite conceivable that in some cases by making the charge too vague in the matter of the time of the commission of the offence an accused person may substantially be deprived of an opportunity to make a defence of alibi, and so, the criminal courts naturally take the precaution of framing charges with sufficient precision and particularity in order to ensure a fair trial ; but we do not think it would be right to hold that a charge is invalid solely for the reason that it does not specify The particular date and time at which any offence is alleged to have been committed. In this connection, it may be relevant to bear in mind that the .-requirements of procedure are generally intended to subserve the ends of justice, and so, undue emphasis on mere technicalities in respect of matters which are not of vital or important significance in a criminal trial, may sometimes frustrate the ends of justice. Where the provisions prescribed by the law of procedure are intended to be mandatory, the legislature indicates its intention in that behalf clearly and contravention of such mandatory provisions may introduce a serious infirmity in the proceedings themselves ; but where the provisions made by the law of procedure are not of vital importance, but are, nevertheless, intended to be observed, their breach may not necessarily vitiate the trial unless it is shown that the contravention in question has caused prejudice to the accused. This position is made clear by sections 535 and 537 Cr. P. C.
Take, for instance, the case of murder where the prosecution seeks to prove its case against an accused person mainly on circumstantial evidence. In such a case, investigation would generally begin with, and certainly gather momentum after the discovery of the dead body. In cases of circumstantial evidence of this character, it would be idle to expect the prosecution to frame a charge specifying the date on which the offence of murder was committed. All that the prosecution can do in such cases is to indicate broadly the period during which the murder must have been committed. That means the precision of the charge in respect of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed will depend upon the nature of the information available to the prosecution in a given case. Where it is possible to specify precisely the necessary particulars required by's. 222 (1), the prosecution ought to mention the said particulars in the charge, but where the said particulars cannot be precisely specified in the charge having regard to the nature of the information available to the prosecution, failure to mention such particulars may not invalidate the charge.
In this connection, it may be useful to refer to the facts in the present case. The evidence of Sandhya shows that she and the members of her family had to face the terrible problems posed before the refugees in that part of the country, and in her anxiety to help her destitute family in its hour of need Sandhya was very easily persuaded by Manibala to adopt the course of earning money by selling her body. In such a case, if the minor girl has been exposed to the risk of having sexual intercourse with several people from time to time, it is unreasonable to expect that she would be able to specify the precise dates on which particular individuals had intercourse with her. If it is insisted that in a case of this kind, the charge of rape framed against the appellant must specify the date on which the offence was committed by him, it would really mean that the appellant cannot be charged with the offence because the unfortunate victim would, in the ordinary course of things, not be able to state precisely the dates on which she was made to submit to the appellant. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether the charge framed in a criminal trial has contravened s. 222 (1), the Court will have to examine all the relevant facts and if it appears to the Court that having regard to them, the charge could and ought to have been framed more precisely, the Court may reach that conclusion and then enquire whether the defective charge has led to the prejudice of -the accused. That, in our opinion, is the reasonable course to adopt in dealing with contentions like the one raised by the appellant before us. The question of prejudice did not impress the High Court, because it has summarily dismissed the appeal
Supreme Court of India
Chittaranjan Das vs State Of West Bengal on 22 April, 1963
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1696, 1964 SCR (3) 237



BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS

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Sunday, 1 November 2015

Whether doctor can refuse to examine Rape victim on the ground that she is not referred by police?

From the admission of medical officer on oath it is apparent
that victim was brought before doctor on 30-06-10 at 8.30
P.M but doctor had examined her on next day i.e. 01-07-
2010 meaning thereby victim was medically examined after
about 12 hours even after her production with police requisition
before doctor, which itself diminishes the possibility of the
presence of any positive sign of rape particularly when victim is
rustic, schedule-tribe illiterate old women.
10. The delay caused by medical officer in examination of victim
cannot be justified in any way particularly when the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs Manjana reported in
2000 (6) SCC 188 recognised that the rape victim's need for
medical examination constituted a “medico-legal emergency” and
it is the right of the victim of rape to approach medical services
first before legally registering a complaint in police station. Thus,
the doctor or hospital is now required to examine victim of rape
promptly even if she reports to hospital directly, and voluntarily
without a police requisition. Second; it was the right of the victim
of rape to approach medical services first before legally
registering a complaint in a police station. The hospital was
obliged to examine her right away; they could always
subsequently initiate a police complaint on the request of the
victim. As a result of this landmark judgment, the doctor or
hospital is now required to examine a victim of rape if she reports
to the hospital directly, and voluntarily, without a police 
requisition. The judgment recognises the three ways by which a
hospital may receive a victim of rape: voluntary reporting by the
victim; reporting on requisition by the police, and reporting on
requisition by the Court. Unfortunately this information has not
been disseminated to all doctors, and the majority of them still
insist on a police requisition before examining a rape victim.
11. An amendment in Cr.P.C by which Section 164 A has been
inserted by Code of criminal procedure (amendment) Act 2005
(w.e.f. 23-06-2006) to meet out the aforementioned situation with
an object that the medical examination of the rape victim should
be carried out as early as possible without any delay with consent
of victim preferably by a lady doctor.
12. Section 164 A Cr.P.C is binding on the doctors, which runs
inter-alia, Section 164 A Cr.P.C. Medical examination of the
victim of rape. –
(1) Where, during the stage when an offence of committing
rape or attempt to commit rape is under investigation, it is
proposed to get the person of the woman with whom rape is
alleged or attempted to have been committed or attempted,
examined by a medical expert, such examination shall be
conducted by a registered medical practitioner employed in a
hospital run by the Government or a local authority and in the
absence of a such a practitioner, by any other registered
medical practitioner, with the consent of such woman or of a
person competent to give such consent on her behalf and such
woman shall be sent to such registered medical practitioner
within twenty-four hours from the time of receiving the
information relating to the commission of such offence.
(2) The registered medical practitioner, to whom such woman
is sent shall, without delay, examine her and prepare a
report of his examination giving the following particulars,
namely:-
(I) the name and address of the woman and of the
person by whom she was brought;8
(II) the age of the woman;
(III) the description of material taken from the person
of the woman for DNA profiling;
(IV) marks of injury, if any, on the person of the
woman;
(V) general mental condition of the woman; and
(IV) other material particulars in reasonable detail.
(3) The report shall state precisely the reasons for each
conclusion arrived at.
(4) The report shall specifically record that the consent of the
woman or of the person competent to give such consent on her
behalf to such examination had been obtained.
(5) The exact time of commencement and completion of the
examination shall also be noted in the report.
(6) The registered medical practitioner shall, without delay
forward the report to the investigation officer who shall
forward it to the Magistrate referred to in section 173 as part
of the documents referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (5)of
that section.
(7) Nothing in this section shall be construed as rendering
lawful any examination without the consent of the woman or
of any person competent to give such consent on her behalf.
Explanation. – For the purposes of this section, “examination”
and “registered medical practitioner” shall have the same
meanings as in Section 53.


JHARKHAND HIGH COURT

Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 412 of 2013


 Gujua Manjhi @ Gajju Hansada Vs. The State of Jharkhand

PRESENT
 MR.JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH, CHIEF JUSTICE
 MR.JUSTICE P.P.BHATT
Citation; 2015 CRLJ 4303 Jharkhand
Dated 1st July, 2015
Per Virender Singh, C.J.
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Friday, 2 May 2014

Supreme Court: Copy of statement under section 164 Cr. P. C. of victim not to be given to accused until filing of chargesheet.

On considering the same, we have accepted the suggestion offered by the learned counsel who appeared before us and hence exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we are pleased to issue interim directions in the form of mandamus to all the police station in charge in the entire country to follow the direction of this Court which are as follows:
i. Upon receipt of information relating to the commission of offence of rape, the Investigating Officer shall make immediate steps to take the victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial Magistrate for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. A copy of the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. should be handed over to the Investigating Officer immediately with a specific direction that the contents of such statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. should not be disclosed to any person till charge sheet/report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is filed.
ii. The Investigating Officer shall as far as possible take the victim to the nearest Lady Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate.
iii. The Investigating Officer shall record specifically the date and the time at which he learnt about the commission of the offence of rape and the date and time at which he took the victim to the Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate as aforesaid.
iv. If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking the victim to the Magistrate, the Investigating Officer should record the reasons for the same in the case diary and hand over a copy of the same to the Magistrate.
v. Medical Examination of the victim: Section 164 A Cr.P.C. inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in Cr.P.C. imposes an obligation on the part of Investigating Officer to get the victim of the rape immediately medically examined. A copy of the report of such medical examination should be immediately handed over to the Magistrate who records the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
State of Karnataka  Vs. Shivanna @ Tarkari Shivanna
[Special Leave Petition (CRL.) No. 5073/2011]
Dated; 25 April 2014
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Sunday, 13 January 2013

Supreme court: State is liable for torts committed by its employees

Running of Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing Yatri Niwas at various Railway Stations to provide lodging and boarding facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of Sovereign power. The employees of the Union of India who are deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the Railway Stations and Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the Govt. machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt., of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. 

Supreme Court of India
The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors vs Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors on 28 January, 2000
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