Showing posts with label argument. Show all posts
Showing posts with label argument. Show all posts

Saturday, 22 December 2018

Whether a plea can be taken in argument in appeal in absence of pleading?

As far as argument of discrimination is concerned, there are no foundational facts in support of this argument. No such plea was taken either before the AFT or in the instant appeal. Only with the additional documents, communication dated February 6, 2014 is enclosed which the Appellant has received under the Right to Information Act, 2005 in respect of Surg Cdr Haresh Maini. On the basis of this document, oral submission was made at the time of arguments. It is not known as to under what circumstances recovery of proportionate cost was made in his case. Moreover, in the absence of pleadings, the Respondents did not have any opportunity to explain the same. Therefore, such a plea cannot be allowed in the facts of this case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1491 of 2018 (Arising out of Diary No. 35797 of 2017)

Decided On: 01.02.2018

Ashwini Kumar Handa Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 25
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Saturday, 14 April 2018

Whether stray sentence in a judgment without focused argument can be considered as ratio of judgment?

It is clear that a stray sentence in a judgment without a focused argument cannot be considered as the ratio of such a judgment. Also, on a careful reading of the second sentence in paragraph 19, it is clear that all that is stated by this Court is that, while exercising its power Under Section 26A of the Drugs Act, the basis of the Central Government's decision must be "expert advice". The sentence then goes on to add that the Drugs Act makes provision for obtaining such advice through the Board and the DCC. According to us, there was no focused argument on whether such advice is or is not mandatory before powers Under Section 26A of the Drugs Act can be exercised, and merely reading a stray sentence in this judgment does not lead to such a conclusion. Equally, the single Judge's reliance upon a Division Bench judgment contained in E. Merck (supra), where, in holding Section 26A to be constitutional, the Court stated:

Before the Government records its satisfaction to prohibit the manufacture, sale, distribution etc. of a particular drug, opinion of the DTAB and/or Drugs Consultative Committee is obtained.

This is an equally stray sentence and what has been stated with respect to Systopic Laboratories (supra), applies equally to this sentence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 22972 of 2017 

Decided On: 15.12.2017

 Union of India (UOI) and Ors. Vs. Pfizer Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 2 SCC 39


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Sunday, 24 December 2017

Whether Advocates have right of unlimited argument or unlimited cross-examination?

However that may be, the principle is, I think, indisputable that the Court has, and should have, a discretion in controlling the cross-examination, and while the Court will allow reasonable latitude to an advocate or counsel to cross-examine a party or a witness, it should always be remembered that the Court has an undoubted control and  discretion in the matter of controlling the cross-examination of a party by counsel of the opposite party.

4. This principle is not new and its soundness has been recognised in several decisions, both of the Privy Council and of this Court. In the first place, there is a decision of the Privy Council reported in - 'Vassiliades v. Vassiliades', AIR 1945 PC 38, and the principle laid down in that case will be found set out at p. 41, This is what the Privy Council says :

(No doubt) cross-examination is one of the most important processes for the elucidation of the facts of a case and all reasonable latitude should be allowed, but the Judge has always a discretion as to how far it may go or how long it may continue. A fair and reasonable exercise of his discretion by the Judge will not generally be questioned by an appellate Court. As Lord Sankey L. C. said in - "Mechanical and General Inventions Co. and Leh-wess v. Austin Motor Co.', 1935 AC 348:

"....a protracted and irrelevant cross-examination not only adds to the cost of litigation, but is a waste of public time'."
This principle has been put in another form in a judgment of the Privy Council reported in -- "Raj Kumar Sen v. Ram Sundar Shaha', AIR 1932 PC 39.

"The Court should check abuses in the cross-examination of witnesses on commission, when such examination is unduly protracted and is wholly irrelevant to the issues raised in the suit."
This ruling again says that the Court has control over the cross-examination of witnesses and the Court has got power to control the cross-examination if such examination appears to the Court to unduly protracted and wholly irrelevant. Then there are two judgments of this Court reported in -- 'Emperor v. Rahimatalli', 22 Bom LR 166: AIR 1920 Bom 402 and 'Queen-Empress v. Sayad Surfuddin', Rat Un Cr C 344 (E). This is what shah J. observed in the former case (p. 178):

"...Making due allowance for all these circumstances the arguments before us have left on my mind the impression that the length of the proceedings could have been and should have been appreciably reduced by the exercise of a more judicious control on the part of the Court over the proceedings before it consistently with the statutory rights of the parties to be heard and to examine and cross-examine witnesses under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act and by a more active desire on the part of counsel on both sides to save the time of the Court by avoiding questions and arguments which could have at best a re-mole bearing on the points arising in the case, and the omission whereof could involve no detriment to their respective cases."
Hayward J. expressed his view in similar terms by pointing out that (p. 184) :

". .Counsel must exercise their right of audience in a reasonable manner. They have their obligations no less than their privileges. They have no right of unlimited argument or examination of witnesses but only so much as would be reasonably necessary in the particular matter."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Revn. Appln. No. 1427 of 1954

Decided On: 17.12.1954

Yeshpal Jashbhai Parikh Vs. Rasiklal Umedchand Parikh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Y.V. Dixit, J.

Citation : AIR 1955 Bom 318

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Wednesday, 12 October 2016

When Advocate is held liable for contempt of court?

 In Jaswant Singh versus Virender Singh1995 Supp.(1) SCC 384, it was
observed :
“36. …………. An advocate has no wider protection
than a layman when he commits an act which
amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for
an advocate to make imputations against the Judge
only because he does not get the expected result,
which according to him is the fair and reasonable
result available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated
to seek favorable orders. Only because a lawyer
appears as a party in person, he does not get a license
thereby to commit contempt of the Court by
intimidating the Judges or scandalising the courts. He
cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during
arguments, which is either intemperate or
unparliamentary. These safeguards are not for the
protection of any Judge individually but are essential
for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the Courts
and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and
courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and
reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,
even if, out-spoken, but made without any malice or
attempting to impair the administration of justice and
made in good faith in proper language do not attract

any punishment for contempt of court. However, when
from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and
calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the
image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to
impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute the courts must
bistre themselves to uphold their dignity and the
majesty of law. The appellant, has, undoubtedly
committed contempt of the Court by the use of the
objectionable and intemperate language. No system of
justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part
of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the
liberty of scandalising a Court by casting unwarranted,
uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity,
ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the
discharge of his judicial functions as it amounts to an
interference with the dues course of administration of
justice.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2006

Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate  Vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Dated:July 05, 2016.
Citation:2016 CRLJ 3734
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Sunday, 14 August 2016

What is duty of court if he is allowing production of voter list at stage of final argument?

Exhibit Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are the certified copies of voter
list of village-Kudahansa of the year 1973, 1980 and 1983
respectively. Those were admitted into evidence and marked as
exhibits at the stage of the argument. Thus, defendants had no
opportunity to adduce any rebuttal evidence to the same or crossexamine
the witnesses of the plaintiffs in that regard. Exhibits 6, 7
and 8 are public documents and admissible in evidence. But that by
itself does not prove the entries made in it. Onus is on the plaintiffs
to prove the entries made in Exhibits 6, 7 and 8. The Court has
discretion under Order 13 Rule 1 C.P.C. to accept any document 
produced belatedly if good cause is shown to its satisfaction. This
Court in the case of Bhikari Charan Patra vs Basanti Bewa And
Ors., reported in AIR 1985 Ori 49 held as under:-
11. Whereas the object of Order 13, Rule 1 is
to lay down the stage when a party shall file
documentary evidence so that each knows on
what document the other seeks to rely and gets
ready for the trial, Order 13, Rule 2 makes
provision for meeting certain contingencies. The
object of the rules is not to penalize the party
but to secure a fair trial of the case, Where
Order 13, Rule 2 is invoked mala fide, where the
move is to cause delay or is vexatious, the cause
shown cannot be held to be good cause shown to
the satisfaction of the Court. The doors of the
discretionary jurisdiction should be closed.
Where, however, the document is vital and
would assist the Court in coming to a decision,
the doors should not be shut out.”
Where however, documentary evidence is sought to be introduced,
the Court has duty to scrutinize the cause shown by the party
seeking introduction of documentary evidence before exercising the
discretion and also to give opportunity to the adversary to explain
the documents so produced by adducing rebuttal evidence. This view
gets support from decisions of this Court in the case of Keshaba
Padhan alias Sukru and others Vs. Mst. Padma Padhani
(having died) Upasi Gurandi and others, reported in 1976 (1)
CWR 154 and Property Association of Baptist Churches Private
Limited and another Vs. State of Orissa and others, reported in
1984 (I) OLR 166.11
In the instant cases, no good reason has been assigned
by learned trial Court to accept Exts. 6, 7 and 8 at the stage of
argument of the suit. it is also not clear as to whether any prayer for
seeking leave of the Court was made to adduce further documentary
evidence at a belated stage. In addition to it, neither any opportunity
was given to the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiffs on Exts. 6,
7 and 8 nor they were allowed to adduce rebuttal evidence on the
same.
Further, the entries in Exts. 6, 7, and 8 does not by
itself conclusively prove that plaintiff No.1 was the son of Dubraj
through his first wife. Learned Civil Judge has not made any
endeavour to find out as to whether Basi has ever married to Dubraj.
There is also no reliable evidence available on record to come to such
conclusion. When the relationship of Basi and Dubraj is not proved,
the plea that plaintiff No.1 was the son of Dubraj through Basi
cannot be accepted. In that view of the matter, the answer to Issue
No.5 is erroneous and cannot be accepted.
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK
 F.A. NO. 174 OF 1988

Hema Majhi (dead) represented
by LRs and others 

 -VersusDubraj
Majhi …
 Date of Judgment: 20.04.2016

P R E S E N T:
 THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE K.R. MOHAPATRA
Citation:AIR 2016 (NOC)477 Orissa

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Sunday, 4 October 2015

Whether binding effect of judgment of Supreme court is weakened on the ground that particular argument was not considered?

 Learned counsel for the peti- tioners urged that the questions which are being raised in the present proceedings were neither raised nor considered by this Court in Punjab Tin Supply Company's case, therefore it is open to them to question the validity of Section 3 and the Notification dated 24.9.1974. This submission is con- trary to the principles of res judicata and it further ignores the binding effect of a decision of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. The binding effect of a decision of this Court does not depend upon whether a par- ticular argument was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced subse- quentiy was actually decided in the earlier decision,
 Supreme Court of India

Kesho Ram & Co. & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 2 May, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1989 SCR (2)1005, 1989 SCC (3) 151


BENCH:
SINGH, K.N. (J)
KANIA, M.H.
SHARMA, L.M. (J)

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Saturday, 25 October 2014

How to make your winning argument by winning trust of judges?


Moving isn't the easiest thing in the world.  When you move from one home to another, you're basically transferring your entire life (and your family's life) to a new destination. As I was putting some stuff into storage this week, it brought up some memories of our previous experience, when we moved into our current home a few years ago.
What we moved into our new home, we had too much stuff (more specifically, too much HEAVY stuff) to move by ourselves, so, like most people, we had to hire a moving company.  Out of all the movers we contacted, only one of them called us back, but they did a terrific sales job.  He told me how all of their movers were bonded, how reliable they were, how careful they were, etc. etc.  Most importantly, he promised me that they'd be at our home "sometime between 11 AM and 1 PM" to help us move.
11 AM arrived, and as you'd expect, the movers weren't on time, but no big deal -- they said they be there between 11 and 1...
12 PM...  No movers.
1 PM...  No movers.
2 PM...  Still no movers, but when I call the moving company, he tells me that the truck got stuck in traffic, and promises me that they'll be there "in half an hour."
3 PM...  No movers, and my calls go to voicemail.
4 PM...  No movers, and no return phone call.  I finally get through to a customer service representative, and he tells me that the truck had a mechanical problem, but will be there in "half an hour."
5:15 PM... No movers, and no return phone calls, but I get a promise that they will be there "first thing" tomorrow morning, between 8 and 9 AM.
Next day...
8 AM...  No movers.
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Saturday, 6 September 2014

How to convince Judge about merits of your case?



It was a great opening statement...
Within the first 15 seconds, it was obvious that the jurors were hooked.  They leaned forward in their seats, eager to hear every detail as the prosecutor weaved a gripping story and brought the shooting to life right there inside the courtroom.  As he described each gunshot striking the victim, you could see the jurors wincing in reaction.  It was as if the young man was being shot again, right before their very eyes: first in the chest, then through the neck, and finally, the fatal shot to the head.... 
As the prosecutor delivered his final call to action, several jurors quietly nodded their heads in agreement.  He paused, making eye contact with each of them as if to acknowledge their special bond, and then returned to his seat.
Silence filled the courtroom.  The prosecutor's opening statement had been so powerful that even the judge was involuntarily caught up in the emotion of the occasion, and it seemed like several moments passed before she finally asked, “Would the defense like to make an opening statement?”
Everyone in the courtroom wondered what he was going to say.  They had just seen the prosecutor deliver one of the best opening statements ever presented in that courthouse, using a combination of vocal dexterity and verbal mastery to etch an indelible image into their minds.  They could only think, “How was the defense going to compete with that?!?”
The defense attorney rose from his seat, buttoned his jacket, and then pushed his chair back beneath the table.  Standing beside his client and placing his right hand on the man's shoulder, he began by formally addressing the judge, “May it please the court?”
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