Showing posts with label govt servant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label govt servant. Show all posts

Sunday, 21 August 2016

Sanction for prosecution of govt servant is required from which authority if he was holding plurality of offices?

 Now if the public servant holds two offices and he is accused of
having abused one and from which he is removed but continues to hold
the other which is neither alleged to have been used nor abused, is a
sanction of the authority competent to remove him from the office which is
neither alleged or shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The
submission is that if the harassment of the public servant by a frivolous
prosecution and criminal waste of his time in law courts keeping him away
from discharging public duty, are the objects underlying Section 6, the
same would be defeated if it is held that the sanction of the latter authority
is not necessary. The submission does not commend to us. We fail to see
how the competent authority entitled to remove the public servant from an
office which is neither alleged to have been used or abused would be able
to decide whether the prosecution is frivolous or tendentious. An illustration
was posed to the learned counsel that a Minister who is indisputably a
public servant greased his palms by abusing his office as Minister, and
then ceased to hold the office before the court was called upon to take
cognizance of the offence against him and therefore, sanction as
contemplated by Section 6 would not be necessary; but if after committing
the offence and before the date of taking of cognizance of the offence, he
was elected as a Municipal President in which capacity he was a public
servant under the relevant Municipal law, and was holding that office on
the date on which court proceeded to take cognizance of the offence
committed by him as a Minister, would a sanction be necessary and that
too of that authority competent to remove him from the office of the
Municipal President. The answer was in affirmative. But the very illustration
would show that such cannot be the law. Such an interpretation of Section
6 would render it as a shield to an unscrupulous public servant. Someone
interested in protecting may shift him from one office of public servant to
another and thereby defeat the process of law. One can legitimately
envisage a situation wherein a person may hold a dozen different offices,
each one clothing him with the status of a public servant under Section 21
IPC and even if he has abused only one office for which either there is a
valid sanction to prosecute him or he has ceased to hold that office by the
time court was called upon to take cognizance, yet on this assumption,
sanction of 11 different competent authorities each of which was entitled to
remove him from 11 different public offices would be necessary before the
court can take cognizance of the offence committed by such public
servant, while abusing one office which he may have ceased to hold. Such
an interpretation is contrary to all canons of construction and leads to an
absurd and product which of necessity must be avoided. Legislation must
at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a
rougue's charter. (See Davis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins)

26. Therefore, upon a true construction of Section 6, it is implicit therein
that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which
is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is
alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a
prosecution is intended to be launched against him.
 “ REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1454 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.61 of 2012)
Ajoy Acharya … Appellant
Versus
State Bureau of Inv. against Eco. Offence … Respondent
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1455 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 400 of 2012)
Dated:September 17, 2013.
Citation:2016 ALLSCR (CRI)648

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Tuesday, 5 July 2016

Supreme court: Government official’s illegal assets can not be attached if he’s dead


NEW DELHI: Disproportionate assets amassed by a government official cannot be attached from his family members if the officer dies during pendency of trial against him, the Supreme Court ruled on Monday.


Terming the orders of a trial court and the Andhra Pradesh high court allowing attachment of assets of a government official after his death a "gross miscarriage of justice", a bench of Justices S A Bobde and Amitava Roy said no proceedings could be allowed against a dead man.


The bench also slammed the trial court for convicting the accused, Ramachandraiah, for misappropriating Rs 657,355, two years after his death. The attachment order was passed on the basis of the conviction order and the HC also approved the attachment proceedings.

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Sunday, 12 June 2016

Whether govt servant can be held guilty under prevention of corruption Act if there is procedural lapse in his part?

Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act reads as under:
“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-

(d) If he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself
or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or”
The prosecution has sought to cover the case of the
appellant under sub-clause (ii) and not under sub-clause (i) and
sub-clause (iii). Insofar as sub-clause (ii) is concerned, it
stipulates that a public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct if he, by abusing his position as a public
servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage. Thus, the ingredients which will be
required to be proved are:
(1) The public servant has abused his position.
(2) By abusing that position, he has obtained for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.
18) It was not even the case set up by the prosecution that appellant
had taken that money from some person and had obtained any

pecuniary advantage thereby. It was the obligation of the
prosecution to satisfy the aforesaid mandatory ingredients which
could implicate the appellant under the provisions of Section 13(1)
(d)(ii). The attempt of the prosecution was to bring the case
within the fold of clause (ii) alleging that he misused his official
position in issuing the certificate utterly fails as it is not even
alleged in the chargesheet and not even iota of evidence is led as
to what kind of pecuniary advantage was obtained by the
appellant in issuing the said letter.
19) In C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193,
this Court held that even when codal violations were established
and it was also proved that there were irregularities committed by
allotting/ awarding the work in violation of circulars, that by itself
was not sufficient to prove that a criminal case was made out. The
Court went on to hold:
“22. On a careful consideration of the material on
the record, we are of the opinion that though the
prosecution has established that the appellants
have committed not only codal violations but also
irregularities by ignoring various circulars and
departmental orders issued from time to time in the
matter of allotment of work of jungle clearance on
nomination basis and have committed
departmental lapse yet, none of the circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution are of any
conclusive nature and all the circumstances put
together do not lead to the irresistible conclusion
that the said circumstances are compatible only

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants
and wholly incompatible with their innocence. In
Abdulla Mohd. Pagarkar v. State (Union Territory of
Goa, Daman and Diu), (1980) 3 SCC 110, under
somewhat similar circumstances this Court opined
that mere disregard of relevant provisions of the
Financial Code as well as ordinary norms of
procedural behaviour of government officials and
contractors, without conclusively establishing,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the officials
and contractors concerned, may give rise to a
strong suspicion but that cannot be held to
establish the guilt of the accused. The established
circumstances in this case also do not establish
criminality of the appellants beyond the realm of
suspicion and, in our opinion, the approach of the
trial court and the High Court to the requirements of
proof in relation to a criminal charge was not
proper....”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 131 OF 2007
A. SIVAPRAKASH .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF KERALA .....RESPONDENT(S)
Dated:MAY 10, 2016
A.K. SIKRI, J.
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Thursday, 21 April 2016

Whether govt servant who have no willingness to work can be retained in service?

Further, no compassion can be shown to a person who has no will to
work and no respect for the directions/ warnings issued by authorities. It is
absolutely clear that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner but
she showed no improvement. It seems she was absenting at her own whims
and fancies without bothering for the consequences.
21. In view of petitioner‟s unsatisfactory performance, I would agree with
the respondents that she could not have been confirmed.
22. On an independent scrutiny of the relevant documents on record as
discussed above, I am of the considered view that the order of termination
of the petitioner recorded by the competent authority purports to be in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment of a temporary
government servant. Such termination is neither punitive nor stigmatic in
nature, nor is it in any event, actuated with any motive. The language of the
order clearly shows that it is termination simpliciter, based under Rule 5(1)
of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. The notice
of termination issued by the respondents clearly states that the services of
the petitioner shall stand terminated w.e.f. the date of expiry of a period of
one month from the date on which the said notice was served on the
petitioner.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: April 06, 2016
 W.P.(C) 3965/2003
SMT. SUMAN TANEJA 
versus
DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE & ANR. .
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VED PRAKASH VAISH

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Tuesday, 5 April 2016

Whether govt servants are entitled to get house rent allowance even though they are not staying at headquarter/place of duty?

 In that view of the matter, we hold and declare
that, as long as, the said Government Resolution is intact
and the conditions to stay at the place of duty is dispensed
with, in favour of the employees working in the rural areas
under the establishment of Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in
view of the clause 4 of the said Government Resolution the
said   protection   cannot   be   taken   away   by   the   impugned
circulars and communications. In that view of the matter,
the   members   of   the   petitioner   association   and   all   other
similarly   situated   employees   covered   by   aforementioned
Government   Resolution   dated   5th  February,   1990,
throughout the State of Maharashtra, who are working in
rural areas are entitled for house rent even though they are

not staying at headquarter/place of duty. Therefore, that
part   of   the   circular   dated   5th  July,   2008   and   the
communication   dated   14th  March,   2014   and   6th  March,
2014, i.e.   employees who are not residing at the place of
headquarter,   their   house   rent   should   be   stopped,   stand
quashed   and   set   aside.   The   employees   in   rural   areas
working under the control and supervision of Respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 throughout the State of Maharashtra, covered by
clause 4 of the aforesaid Government Resolution dated 5th
February, 1990, who are entitled for house rent, their house
rent cannot be stopped on the ground that, they are not
residing at headquarters relying upon impugned circulars
and   communications. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 5822 OF 2014
Maharashtra Rajya Prathamik Shikshak Sangh, Jalgaon 

V
The State of Maharashtra 
CORAM :     S.S. SHINDE & 
     A. M. BADAR, JJ.
PRONOUNCED ON : 19th October, 2015
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Wednesday, 2 March 2016

When govt servant is entitled to get medical reimbursement for knee replacement surgery?

Before   we   proceed   further,   it   should   be   noted   that
respondent no.1 has not denied that the petitioner was suffering
from Osteoarthritis of knee joints since the year 2003 nor that the
petitioner underwent surgery for replacement of both her knees.  In
the fresh affidavit, the stand of the responldent is that osteoarthritis
is a chronic disease which has developed over a period of time and
the   surgery   is   a   planned   surgery     and   not   an   emergency   and,
therefore,  not  payable.  Respondent no.1  has  also   stated  that  the
petitioner   should   have   taken   prior   approval   or   advice   of   her
authorized medical attendant before she went for surgery from nongovernment
hospital. It is the case of the respondent no.1 that even
though Sancheti hospital where the surgery was performed was an
approved private hospital of respondent no.1, just because petitioner

did not take prior advice of her medical attendant, bills were not
payable.
9 Curiously respondent no.1 also states  in paragraph 12 that
as per the G.R. dated 16.11.2001, the approved diseases or disease
conditions are spine diseases, joint diseases, painful joint diseases
and   joint   replacement   surgery,   diagnostic   and   therapeutic
arthroscopy of knee joints and there are eight recognized hospitals
for these conditions and in case of emergency,  patients can directly
seek treatment from these hospitals. But in all other cases, patient
requires to get prior consent of her authorized medical attendant as
per   Rule   2(5)   of   the   Maharashtra   State   Services   (Medical
Attendance) Rules, 1961 ('Said Rules'). It is the case of respondent
no.1 that the treatment received by petitioner is not an emergency
but specialized treatment and that petitioner has not submitted any
emergency certificates issued by Sancheti Hospital and not submitted
any document of her authorized medical attendant referring her to
Sancheti   Hospital.   It   is   also   stated   that   the   petitioner's   medical
condition   is   chronic   disease   and   not   an   emergency.   Though
respondent   no.1   has   taken   various   stands,   the   main   grounds   for
rejection according to the respondent no.1 is that (a) in exceptional
cases   like   that   of   petitioner,   granting   approval   for   medical
reimbursement   has   to   be   decided   by   a   High   Level   Committee
constituted under the chairmanship of Additional Chief Secretary,
Public Health Department and it has been rejected by the committee,
and (b) Prior advice of her medical attendant was not taken.
     

10 On the ground of discrimination raised by petitioner that
one Mr. P.K.Chawre was reimbursed in the year 2004, it is stated that
same was sanctioned by Industrial, Energy and Labour Department at
their level on 19.5.2004 and before G.R. dated 19.3.2005 came into
existence.
11 It is true that Clause 8, Sub­clause 5 of the Said Rules,
provides that  written prior approval of an authorized medical officer
is required before the Government employee goes and seeks private
medical assistance. In this case, it is not the case of the petitioner
either that she had obtained any such prior approval. The question
that we are asking is, is it so vital to the case of the petitioner ?
Sancheti Hospital where the petitioner underwent surgery is in the
panel   of   hospitals   approved   by   the   Government.   The   knee
replacement surgery or joint related problems are also approved to
be   performed   at   Sancheti   Hospital.   By   a   letter   dated   28.5.2011
(Ex.'I')   to   the   petition,   it   is   stated   that   Sancheti   Institute   for
Orthopedic and Rehabilitation, Pune is an approved hospital where
Government   employee   or   the   members   of   the   family   of   such
Government   employee   can   take   treatment   for   the   ailments
mentioned therein. Items (2) and (3) of the said letter states “Painful
disease of joints and their replacement surgery” and “diagnostic and
surgical arthroscopy and knee joints”, respectively. If it has been so
approved, we fail to understand why the claim of the petitioner was
rejected as it appears from the said letter, the petitioner is entitled to
be reimbursed her medical cost. In the G.R. dated 16.11.2011, at

Item 7, the name of Sancheti Institute of Orthopedic Rehabilitation is
included for treatment of the ailments relating to knee joints. If one
considers the minutes of the meeting held on 23.10.2012, petitioner's
case is simply rejected on the basis that “Operation of the petitioner
is not disease”. In the minutes, it is nowhere explained as to how the
operation performed on the petitioner is not a disease. The relevant
column of the said Minutes is as under:
Decision   taken   in   the   meeting   of   the
Committee on        23.10.2012
An   operation   on   the   knee   of   Smt.
M.P.Patil,   Asst.   Registrar   was   done   in
Sancheti   Institute   of   Orthopedic   &
Rehabilitation, Pune. But as the disease of
knee was  not included in the list of the
prescribed   disease     and   hence   it   was
proposed  by the Dept. to present the case
of Smt. M.P.Patil before the Committee as
a special case. But the operation on Smt.
Patil is not any disease but it is a decided
operation  and “when such cases had been
presented   before   the   formed   Secretariat
Committee   before   this,   then   as   the
Committee had rejected such cases, hence
the  above said  case cannot  be presented
before Committee” and such remarks were
recorded   by   the   Health   Department   and
had denied to present the case before the
Committee.
                         But as Smt. M.P.Patil again
requested   for   to   present   the   above   said
proposal before the Committee , hence the
Dept. has presented the above said case for
the consideration of the committee as the
Special   point   but   the   committee   has
rejected the above said proposal.

This is also contrary to the affidavit filed by the Government on
7.5.2015 where it is stated that the condition of the petitioner is a
chronic disease. The Committee has rejected without even going into
the case in detail or applying its mind  and  simply stated that when
such   cases   had   been   presented   before   the   Formed   Secretariat
Committee   before   this,   then   as   the   committee   had   rejected   such
cases, hence the case of the petitioner cannot be presented before the
Committee and the Health Department had denied to present the
case before the committee but because the petitioner again requested
for to present her case before the  committee as a special point, the
department has presented the case   before the committee but   the
committee has rejected the proposal. This shows there is total nonapplication
  of   mind   and   from   the   decision   as   recorded   by   the
Committee,   it   shows   the   petitioner's   case   has   not   even   been
considered and analysed. The proposal of the petitioner was rejected
simply for the sake of rejecting because in the past committee had
rejected   such   proposal.   That   cannot   be   a   ground   to   reject.   The
committee ought to have given detailed reasons after considering the
proposal of the petitioner.
 Therefore,   impugned   communication   of   the   respondent
ought to be quashed and set aside.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.7305 OF 2013
Mrs. Madhuri Praful Patil V/s.  The State of Maharashtra, 

CORAM : ANOOP V.MOHTA AND
 K.R.SHRIRAM, JJ.

 PRONOUNCED ON: 14.8.2015 
Citation; 2016(1)ALLMR210
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Thursday, 25 February 2016

When acquittal of govt servant shall not be treated as honourable acquittal on merits?

 What is relevant in the present case which distinguishes the case of the Appellant from the above mentioned cases is Rule 16.3 of Punjab Police Rules, which reads as under:
16.3 Action following on a judicial acquittal:
(1) When a Police Officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge or on a different charge upon the evidence cited in the criminal case, whether actually led or not, unless:
(a) the criminal charge has failed on technical grounds; or
(b) in the opinion of the court or of the Superintendent of Police, the prosecution witnesses have been won over; or
(c) the Court has held in its judgment that an offence was actually committed and that suspicion rests upon the police officer concerned; or
(d) the evidence cited in the criminal case discloses facts unconnected with the charge before the court which justify departmental proceedings on a different charge; or
(e) additional evidence admissible Under Rule 16.25(1) in departmental proceedings is available.
(2)...
 Rule quoted above provides that when a police officer has been tried and acquitted by a criminal court, he shall not be punished departmentally on the same charge subject to certain conditions. In the present case, as is evident from Rule 16.3, requirement of not punishing the officer departmentally is not absolute, and it hinges on either of the five conditions mentioned above [(a) to (e)]. From the copy of the order of acquittal passed by the Judge, Special Court, Ludhiana (Annexure P-6), it is evident that the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile, and they appear to have been won over.
Equivalent Citation: 2015(9)SCALE645, (2016)1SCC671, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 5142 of 2009
Decided On: 08.09.2015

 Baljinder Pal Kaur Vs.  State of Punjab and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

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Thursday, 6 August 2015

Whether it is necessary to obtain sanction against each accused when prosecution is initiated by govt servant in case of defamation?

By careful reading of Section 199(4) of the
Cr.P.C., it does not indicate that in order to initiate
criminal proceedings against the accused, the public
servant needs to obtain sanction from the State
Government in respect of each one of the persons
against whom the same transaction of offence is alleged
and the names of the accused are required to be
mentioned specifically in the sanction order accorded
by the State Government. It is sufficient if one
sanction is accorded to prosecute all the concerned
persons involved in that occurrence, thus, the
contention on behalf of the appellants in this regard
is also liable to be rejected and is accordingly
rejected.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.857 OF 2012
RAJDEEP SARDESAI Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 
Citation; AIR 2015 SC2182
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Sunday, 12 July 2015

Government Staff Should Behave Well Off Duty Too, Rules HC


The Hyderabad High Court has refused to accept the contention that a government employee cannot be placed under suspension for his/her alleged involvement in a crime outside the zone of employment.
“Every person, who is in public employment, is required to bear a decent and appropriate conduct not only while he/she performs duty but even beyond the office hours. Government servants are required to bear the same conduct through their retired life as well since that will secure them a monthly pension support from the state”, the Court observed.
Justice Nooty Ramamohana Rao made these observations while dealing with a writ petition filed by an employee working in the Telangana State Power General Corporation Limited.
The counsel, appearing for the petitioner, argued that his client had been unnecessarily implicated in a criminal case inspite of the police knowing that he was in no way concerned with it. He further contended that the petitioner had not exhibited any conduct, which is even slightly blameworthy, while performing his official duties. 
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Wednesday, 1 July 2015

Govt servant to disclose source of funds before going abroad: Government

Central government employees going abroad need to disclose estimated expenditure and source of funds prior to their visits, according to a draft policy formed by the Centre.

Besides, they also need to give details of such trips taken by them during the past four years.

According to the draft policy formed by Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), the employees may be denied permission due to administrative exigencies and other factors.

The DoPT has also come out with a new proforma for seeking permission for foreign visits. Employees need to give details of period of travel, name of countries to be visited, purpose, estimated expenditure (travel, boarding, lodging, visa, miscellaneous, etc) and sources of funds.

They need to write in the proforma the details of foreign travel undertaken in the past four years, name of countries visited and purpose, it said.

"In case due to specific nature of work in a department, administrative exigencies or some adverse factors against the government servant etc., it is not expedient to grant permission to the government servant, such decision for refusal should not be taken below the level of head of department.

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Friday, 5 June 2015

'Beasts in disguise' should not be in government service: Delhi High Court

New Delhi: Delhi High Court has passed stringent strictures against a government employee while junking his plea challenging downgrading of his rank for sexually harassing two women family members of a female peon, saying "beasts in disguise" should not be in public service.
"People with upright moral values and integrity should only make way into public service and not those who are beasts in disguise," a bench of justices Kailash Gambhir and I S Mehta said while also imposing a penalty of Rs 50,000 on the government servant, SK Jasra.
Jasra's rank was downgraded in 2012 from Joint Director in the Directorate of Pay, Pension and Regulations in Defence Ministry to that of Deputy Director on grounds of harrassing the daughter and daughter-in-law of a lady peon who was also a widow.
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Wednesday, 27 May 2015

Whether disciplinary proceeding against govt servant can continue even after retirement even though no pecuniary loss is caused to Government?

 It is therefore apparent, that it is not only for pecuniary loss caused to the Government that proceedings can continue after the date of superannuation. An employee can be proceeded against, after the date of his retirement, on account of “... grave misconduct or negligence ...”. Therefore, even in the absence of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, it is open to the employer to continue the departmental proceedings after the employee has retired from service. Obviously, if such grave misconduct or negligence, entails pecuniary loss to the Government, the loss can also be ordered to be recovered from the concerned employee. It was therefore not right for the High Court, while interpreting Rule 10(1) of the 1971 Rules to conclude, that proceedings after the date of superannuation could continue, only when the charges entailed pecuniary loss to the Government.

Supreme Court of India
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Pronab Chakraborty on 15 October, 2014

Bench: Jagdish Singh Khehar, Arun Mishra
Citation; AIR 2015  SC 1278
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Tuesday, 12 May 2015

Whether there is violation of fundamental right of public servant when permission given to do him to undertake newspaper journalism is revoked?

 As regards the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for
the petitioner on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Indian Express
Newspaper Bombay Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Life Insurance Corporation
of India (supra), the fundamental right as conferred by Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution of India is not to be lightly interfered with and the
same is subject only to reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2)
thereof. In the present case, however, the privilege that was granted to
the petitioner was withdrawn as the same affected his teaching duties in
the opinion of the Municipal Council. This opinion was on the basis of
the report of the Headmaster. The Municipal Council acted within its
powers when it withdrew the privilege conferred on the petitioner to
undertake newspaper reporting as the same affected his teaching duties.
The petitioner who was a servant of the Municipal Council was duty

bound to satisfactorily discharge his duties. If the Municipal Council
formed an opinion on the basis of material available with it that
newspaper reporting was affecting the teaching duties of the petitioner,
it was within its jurisdiction to withdraw the privilege conferred by it. In
the present case, it can only be said that during the course of
employment, the Municipal Council did not permit the petitioner to
undertake newspaper journalism as the same affected his teaching
duties. By doing so, it cannot be said that the Municipal Council has in
any manner violated the petitioner’s fundamental right conferred by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
19. Thus viewed, it cannot be said that the impugned action
withdrawing permission is either illegal or arbitrary. The petitioner
being in employment of the Municipal Council was bound to discharge
his duties to the satisfaction of his master. Moreover, as a consequence
of withdrawing said permission, the petitioner’s entitlement to continue
in employment was not under any threat. It is, therefore, merely a case
of withdrawal of privilege that was conferred on the petitioner by the
Municipal Council. Hence, the challenges as raised cannot be accepted.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.6590 OF 2013
Anil Harishchandra Kadu, V  Additional Commissioner,

CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

DATED: 19-12-2014
Citation;2015(2) MHLJ 127
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Tuesday, 17 February 2015

Whether government employee can be kept suspended for more than three months if not formally informed about the charges?



In a remarkable judgment in service law jurisprudence, a two judge bench of the Supreme Court has held that a government employee cannot be kept suspended for more than three months if not formally informed about the charges. However, the charges under departmental proceedings may continue even after revocation or reinstatement to the job.
Based on the principle of human dignity and the right to speedy trial, the landmark verdict will affect a huge bunch of government employees across the country, many of whom are under suspension for years pending departmental proceedings. The praiseworthy judgment also impliedly takes care of vexatious cases filed against govt. employees leading to indefinite suspension in absence of an upper cap. This also will reduce bureaucratic discretionary powers under various departments.
It is settled law that suspension cannot be treated as a punishment. The sole object of suspending an employee is to disallow his employment temporarily till proven innocent for a fair probe. However, practically, years pass by without any settlement. “Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration,” the bench headed by Justice Vikramjit Sen said. However, if the charge sheet or memorandum of charges was served within this period of three months, the suspension could be extended.
“If it (suspension) is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning…, this would render it punitive in nature,” the court said.
It agreed with the petitioner’s averment that a suspension order can’t continue for an unreasonably long period. Protracted periods of suspension had become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be, the court said. It drew a parallel with criminal investigation wherein a person accused of heinous crime is released from jail after the expiry of 90 days if police fails to file the charge sheet.
The suspended persons suffers even before being charged and “his torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination”. “Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement,” the court said, setting aside a direction of the central vigilance commission that required departmental proceedings to be kept in abeyance pending a criminal investigation. The government, however, will be free to transfer the officer concerned to any department in any of its offices to ensure the employee did not misuse contacts for obstructing the probe, the court said.
The order came on a petition filed by defence estate officer Ajay Kumar Choudhary, who was suspended in September 2011 for allegedly issuing wrong no-objection certificates for the use of a four-acre land parcel in Kashmir. After failing to get relief from the Delhi high court, Choudhary had moved the top court in 2013. Since a charge sheet had already been served on Choudhary, these directions would not apply to his case, the court said.
   REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1918 OF 2015
                    (Arising out of SLP(C) No.30573 2012)


STATE OF KARNATAKA TR.                                   ... 

                                   Vs


VASAVADATTA CEMENT & ANOTHER                     ... 
Dated;FEBRUARY 16, 2015.

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,J


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Saturday, 2 November 2013

What will be appropriate punishment to govt servant when misconduct committed by him is administrative in nature?

The proved charges remained only charge nos.4 and 6 and in both the cases the misconduct seems to be of an administrative nature rather than a misconduct of a serious nature. It was not the case of the department that the appellant had taken the escort vehicle with him. There was only one vehicle which was an official vehicle for his use and charge no.6 stood partly proved. In view thereof, the punishment of compulsory retirement shocks the conscience of the court and by no stretch of imagination can it be held to be proportionate or commensurate to the delinquency committed by and proved against the appellant. The only punishment which could be held to be commensurate to the delinquency was as proposed by the Government of India to withhold two increments for one year without cumulative effect. It would have been appropriate to remand the case to the disciplinary authority to impose the appropriate punishment. However, considering the chequered history of the case and in view of the fact that the appellant had remained under suspension for 11 months, suffered the order of dismissal for 19 months and would retire after reaching the age of superannuation in December 2013, the facts of the case warrant that this court should substitute the punishment of compulsory retirement to the punishment proposed by the Union of India i.e. withholding of two increments for one year without having cumulative effect.

Supreme Court of India
S.R.Tewari vs Union Of India & Anr on 28 May, 2013
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