Now if the public servant holds two offices and he is accused of
having abused one and from which he is removed but continues to hold
the other which is neither alleged to have been used nor abused, is a
sanction of the authority competent to remove him from the office which is
neither alleged or shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The
submission is that if the harassment of the public servant by a frivolous
prosecution and criminal waste of his time in law courts keeping him away
from discharging public duty, are the objects underlying Section 6, the
same would be defeated if it is held that the sanction of the latter authority
is not necessary. The submission does not commend to us. We fail to see
how the competent authority entitled to remove the public servant from an
office which is neither alleged to have been used or abused would be able
to decide whether the prosecution is frivolous or tendentious. An illustration
was posed to the learned counsel that a Minister who is indisputably a
public servant greased his palms by abusing his office as Minister, and
then ceased to hold the office before the court was called upon to take
cognizance of the offence against him and therefore, sanction as
contemplated by Section 6 would not be necessary; but if after committing
the offence and before the date of taking of cognizance of the offence, he
was elected as a Municipal President in which capacity he was a public
servant under the relevant Municipal law, and was holding that office on
the date on which court proceeded to take cognizance of the offence
committed by him as a Minister, would a sanction be necessary and that
too of that authority competent to remove him from the office of the
Municipal President. The answer was in affirmative. But the very illustration
would show that such cannot be the law. Such an interpretation of Section
6 would render it as a shield to an unscrupulous public servant. Someone
interested in protecting may shift him from one office of public servant to
another and thereby defeat the process of law. One can legitimately
envisage a situation wherein a person may hold a dozen different offices,
each one clothing him with the status of a public servant under Section 21
IPC and even if he has abused only one office for which either there is a
valid sanction to prosecute him or he has ceased to hold that office by the
time court was called upon to take cognizance, yet on this assumption,
sanction of 11 different competent authorities each of which was entitled to
remove him from 11 different public offices would be necessary before the
court can take cognizance of the offence committed by such public
servant, while abusing one office which he may have ceased to hold. Such
an interpretation is contrary to all canons of construction and leads to an
absurd and product which of necessity must be avoided. Legislation must
at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a
rougue's charter. (See Davis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins)
26. Therefore, upon a true construction of Section 6, it is implicit therein
that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which
is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is
alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a
prosecution is intended to be launched against him.
“ REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1454 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.61 of 2012)
Ajoy Acharya … Appellant
Versus
State Bureau of Inv. against Eco. Offence … Respondent
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1455 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 400 of 2012)
Dated:September 17, 2013.
Citation:2016 ALLSCR (CRI)648
Print Page
having abused one and from which he is removed but continues to hold
the other which is neither alleged to have been used nor abused, is a
sanction of the authority competent to remove him from the office which is
neither alleged or shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The
submission is that if the harassment of the public servant by a frivolous
prosecution and criminal waste of his time in law courts keeping him away
from discharging public duty, are the objects underlying Section 6, the
same would be defeated if it is held that the sanction of the latter authority
is not necessary. The submission does not commend to us. We fail to see
how the competent authority entitled to remove the public servant from an
office which is neither alleged to have been used or abused would be able
to decide whether the prosecution is frivolous or tendentious. An illustration
was posed to the learned counsel that a Minister who is indisputably a
public servant greased his palms by abusing his office as Minister, and
then ceased to hold the office before the court was called upon to take
cognizance of the offence against him and therefore, sanction as
contemplated by Section 6 would not be necessary; but if after committing
the offence and before the date of taking of cognizance of the offence, he
was elected as a Municipal President in which capacity he was a public
servant under the relevant Municipal law, and was holding that office on
the date on which court proceeded to take cognizance of the offence
committed by him as a Minister, would a sanction be necessary and that
too of that authority competent to remove him from the office of the
Municipal President. The answer was in affirmative. But the very illustration
would show that such cannot be the law. Such an interpretation of Section
6 would render it as a shield to an unscrupulous public servant. Someone
interested in protecting may shift him from one office of public servant to
another and thereby defeat the process of law. One can legitimately
envisage a situation wherein a person may hold a dozen different offices,
each one clothing him with the status of a public servant under Section 21
IPC and even if he has abused only one office for which either there is a
valid sanction to prosecute him or he has ceased to hold that office by the
time court was called upon to take cognizance, yet on this assumption,
sanction of 11 different competent authorities each of which was entitled to
remove him from 11 different public offices would be necessary before the
court can take cognizance of the offence committed by such public
servant, while abusing one office which he may have ceased to hold. Such
an interpretation is contrary to all canons of construction and leads to an
absurd and product which of necessity must be avoided. Legislation must
at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a
rougue's charter. (See Davis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins)
26. Therefore, upon a true construction of Section 6, it is implicit therein
that sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which
is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is
alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a
prosecution is intended to be launched against him.
“ REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1454 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.61 of 2012)
Ajoy Acharya … Appellant
Versus
State Bureau of Inv. against Eco. Offence … Respondent
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1455 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 400 of 2012)
Dated:September 17, 2013.
Citation:2016 ALLSCR (CRI)648







