Showing posts with label attachment of property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label attachment of property. Show all posts

Thursday, 23 May 2024

Whether executing court can pass an order of attachment of Residential premises/home in execution of claim petition award?

Learned counsel seeks to contend that a procedure prescribed for enforcement of process against land must be understood as a procedure that causes an interdict against attachment through enforcement provided under the Civil Procedure Code. This argument, in my view, is fallacious. for there are no means by which the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be incorporated in a procedure, which is independently prescribed under the Land Revenue Act. They operate in two distinct fields and certain special privileges which Civil Procedure Code provides for enforcement of decrees cannot be applied to enforcement of awards. The Motor Vehicles Act itself is a complete Code and the extent to which Civil Procedure Code provisions are applicable are brought through the Motor Vehicles Act itself. Such procedure and powers are set out under section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act. The references to civil and criminal procedures are available only in so far as taking of evidence on oath, enforcement of attendance of witnesses and compelling the party for production of documents. Power under section 174 is independent of any power to recover under the Civil Procedure Code itself by attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor. If the decree holder seeks to resort to attachment of the property enforcing the award as a decree of civil court, he shall be perfectly at liberty to do so but if the recovery of money is sought from any person under an award after securing a certificate for amount from the Collector then the procedure that the Collector will follow shall only be what is provided under the Land Revenue Act itself. {Para 2}


3. The issue of whether the exceptions provided under the Civil Procedure Code for properties that cannot be attached could be invoked in proceedings for recoveries under the Land Revenue Act has come for consideration before the Supreme Court itself in State of Punjab v. Dina Nath, 1986 RRR 490. The point which was directly at issue was whether an attachment and sale of property for recovery of revenue due to State was barred in respect of building used for residential purpose and whether the provisions of section 60(ccc) would be applicable was taken up and the court held that exemption was only for properties specified under the Act. The court held that Punjab Land Revenue Act was a complete Code providing for modes and machinery for recovery of arrears of revenue and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to attachment and sale in revenue recovery proceedings. The award which is passed by Tribunal, which obtains a status through a certificate issued by the Collector as land revenue payable, ought to therefore obtain a different treatment and the trappings of the Civil Procedure Code and limitations contained therein cannot, therefore, be attracted. This point was also subsequently decided under the Motor Vehicles Act itself by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Vorghese v. Sunny, 2009 ACJ 2704 (Kerala), where the court held that execution of award by Tribunal after issuance of a certificate to the land recovery authority cannot avail to a judgment-debtor to plead for the benefit of section 60(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

C.R. No. 2000 of 2012

Decided On: 04.02.2013

Prem Chand Vs. Akashdeep

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Kannan, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/4481/2013,2014 ACJ 1467 (P&H).

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Saturday, 9 April 2022

What is distinction between attachment of property and charge over property?

 12 We take this opportunity to explain the effect of attachment and also the effect of charge. In Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 8th Edn., the law as applicable in India is thus summarised (p. 187):

“Attachment creates no charge or lien upon the attached property. It merely prevents and avoids private alienations; it does not confer any title on the attaching creditors. There is nothing in any of the provisions of the Code which in terms makes the attaching creditor a secured creditor or creates any charge or Hen in his favour over the property attached. But an attaching creditor acquires, by virtue of the attachment, a right to have the attached property kept in custodia legis for the satisfaction of his debt, and an unlawful interference with that right constitutes an actionable wrong.”

13 The Privy Council in Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin (1897) I.L.R. 25 Cal. 179, p.c. where Lord Hobhouse stated (p. 185):

“Attachment, however, only prevents alienation, it does not confer title.”

14 Similarly, in the Calcutta Full Bench case of Frederick Peacock v.

Madan Gopal (1902) I.L.R. 29 Cal. 428, F.B. Sir Francis Maclean, in

delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, says (p. 431):

“I think, therefore, it must be taken that the attaching creditor here did not obtain by his attachment any charge or lien upon the attached

property, and if so, no question as to the Official Assignee only taking the property of the insolvent subject to any equities affecting it, can arise.”

And Mr. Justice Ghose says (p. 483):

“I am clearly of opinion that the attaching creditor did not acquire any title or charge upon the property by reason of the attachment in

question.”

15 A charge on the other hand under Section 48 of the GVAT Act

creates no interest in or over a specific immovable property, but is only a security for the payment of money. (See : Dattatreya Shanker Mote vs. Anand Chintaman Datar and others (1974) 2 SCC 799).

16 The concept of charge emanates from Section 100 of the Transfer

of Property Act. Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

defines “charge” as follows:

“100. Charges.- Where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust- property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge.”

17 The above-mentioned Section clearly indicates the following types of charges :

1) Charges created by act of parties; and

2) Charges arising by operation of law.

18 The words “by operation of law” are more extensive than the

words “by law” and a charge created by operation of law includes a

charge directly created by the provisions of an Act (like Section 48 of the GVAT Act) as well as other charges created indirectly as a legal consequence of certain conditions. The expression “operation of law” only means working of the law.

19 A charge, as we have already seen, is a right to receive a certain

sum of money. If a dealer registered under the GVAT Act incurs any

liability towards payment of tax, then the State has a right to receive a certain sum of money as crystallized in the form of liability. This

recovery of the money from the property can be by attaching the assets of the defaulting dealer, and thereafter, putting those to auction. This type of recovery would be governed by the provisions of Section 46 of the GVAT Act.

20 In the case on hand, it could be said that the day the assessment

order came to be passed determining the liability of the writ applicant under the provisions of the GVAT Act, a charge over the immovable assets of the writ applicant could be said to have been created in favour of the State by operation of law, as envisaged under Section 48 of the GVAT Act. Today, the recovery might have been stayed by the first appellate authority, but, tomorrow, if the first appeal as well as the second appeal that may be filed by the writ applicant is dismissed, then the next step in the process would be the recovery of the requisite amount. What could be said to have been done as on date is just to make one and all aware that by operation of law, as envisaged under Section 48 of the GVAT Act, there is a charge of the State Government over the immovable properties owned by the writ applicant, as described above. How would all come to know about the same. It is for this reason that an entry is ordinarily made in the revenue records.

21 We would like to clarify that what has been done by the Talati-cum-Mantri does not amount to attachment of the property. There is no attachment. We reiterate that there is a fine distinction between attachment of property and a charge over the property by operation of law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5413 of 2022

SHREE RADHEKRUSHNA GINNING AND PRESSING PVT. LTD. Vs STATE OF GUJARAT

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and  MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE

Date : 29/03/2022

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)

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Friday, 27 August 2021

Whether Revenue is entitled to attach properties of Private Trust to recover dues of trustees?

 The controversy then remaining in the

present Petition is whether the Revenue is

entitled to attach the properties belonging to a

Private Trust to recover dues of the trustees, who

was a director of a company which had allegedly

defaulted in paying its tax dues. The contention

of the Revenue appears to be that the property

being attached does not belong to the Trust but is

a property of one late Mrs. Sushila Laliwala- the

mother of the defaulting trustee. Therefore, the

properties could be attached to the extent it

devolved upon the ex-director of the defaulting

company as her legal heir.


 10. Mr. Suresh Kumar appearing on behalf of the

Revenue also fairly submits that pursuant to issuance of the

Letters of Administration by this court to the trustees of the

trust, the above position is settled in law that the subject

properties stand in the name of the trust and do not belong to

the original petitioner No.1 against whom the Revenue has

initiated recovery proceedings. He however submitted that

the recovery proceedings being civil in nature would however

continue against the original petitioner No.1 and his estate in

the hands of his legal-heirs and representatives. But in so far

subject properties are concerned, he has fairly accepted the

position that continuance of the attachment orders would now

not be sustainable in law in view of the Letters of

Administration issued to the trust.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.1657 OF 1998

Rajesh T. Shah Vs  The Tax Recovery Officer

CORAM : UJJAL BHUYAN, &

MILIND N. JADHAV, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 13th March 2020.

JUDGMENT (PER MILIND N. JADHAV, J.) :-

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Sunday, 23 August 2020

Questions and answers on law part 11

Q When bail is rejected by Magistrate,under which provision,it can be challenged before session court?
Ans:- If bail application is rejected by Magistrate,accused can seek bail from session court as per S 439 of CRPC.
439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct—
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;
(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified:
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Friday, 24 July 2020

Under which circumstances the court can lift attachment from immovable property of proclaimed offender prosecuted for the dishonour of cheque after passing of two years?

The scope of Section 83 Cr.P.C is to attach the property of a person who is absconding or concealing himself defying warrant against him. Once proclamation is issued against such person, his property can be attached as per Section 82 Cr.P.C. Under Section 85 (1) Cr.P.C., the proclaimed person shall appear within the time specified in the proclamation order and on his appearance, the Court shall make an order to release the property from attachment. Under Section 85 (2), if the proclaimed person does not appear, within the time specified in the proclamation, the property under the attachment shall be at the disposal of the State Government; but it shall not be sold until the expiration of six months from the date of the attachment or until any claim preferred or objection made under Section 84 Cr.P.C. Sub-clause (3) of Section 85 Cr.P.C., which is relevant for the present case is that if within two years from the date of attachment, any person whose property is or has been at the disposal of the State Government, under sub-section (2), appears voluntarily or is apprehended and brought before the Court by whose order the property was attached, proves to the satisfaction of such Court that he did not abscond or conceal himself for the purpose of avoiding execution of the warrant, and that he had no such notice of the proclamation as to enable him to attend within the time specified therein, such property shall be delivered to him or if it had been sold after satisfying all the cost incurred in consequence of the attachment his residue shall be returned.
 From the petition filed before the Court below, this Court could not find particulars about the date of proclamation, attachment and subsequent arrest. To some extent, the order of the trial Court is correct that de hors of the outcome of the criminal proceedings, proclamation for absconding or concealing is an independent cause of action. At the same time, if reasonable cause shown the attachment made consequent to the proclamation can be raised. The two years period referred for lifting the attachment cannot be read literally to say the belated application are not maintainable, even if there is a justifiable cause for not appearing before the Court or for not seeking relief of raising the attachment after two years. If the petitioner makes out a justifiable cause for filing the present application after 12 years of attachment and able to convince the trial Court that he has not absconded himself wantonly, then, the Court has every right to consider the application and lift the attachment. Procedure is hand maid of justice. The endeavour of the Court should be to render justice by appropriate interpretation of statute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Crl. O.P. No. 18113 of 2017

Decided On: 01.09.2017

 K. Govindaraj  Vs.  Subbian and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. G. Jayachandran, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/2809/2017
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Saturday, 27 October 2018

Whether it is necessary to hear judgment debtor prior to attachment of household goods?

 Having regard to the contention of the appellant and the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered view, the Executing Court ought to have heard the application on merits. Considering the nature of the movable properties - Bureau, Television, Refrigerator, etc., the seizure of household articles would cause serious prejudice to the appellant. In such view of the matter, the contention of the appellant that petition under Order 21 Rule 58 could be filed only after actual attachment cannot be accepted. Therefore, the order of the court below giving a finding that the Petition under Order 21 Rule 58 of C.P.C. is to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside.
Madras High Court
Mrs.Nalini Sivaprakash vs K.A.Ganesan on 12 January, 2012
      

CORAM:

 MRS.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI
and
 MRS.JUSTICE S.VIMALA

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Saturday, 25 August 2018

Whether property of mother in law can be attached for recovery of maintenance granted to wife?

 Maintenance of a married wife, during subsistence of marriage, is on the husband. It is a personal obligation. The obligation to maintain a daughter-in-law arises only when the husband has died. Such an obligation can also be met from the properties of which the husband is a co-sharer and not otherwise. For invoking the said provision, the husband must have a share in the property. The property in the name of the mother-in-law can neither be a subject matter of attachment nor during the life time of the husband, his personal liability to maintain his wife can be directed to be enforced against such property.

19. Wholly un-contentious issues have been raised before us on behalf of Sonalben (wife). It is well settled that apparent state of affairs of state shall be taken a real state of affairs. It is not for an owner of the property to establish that it is his self-acquired property and the onus would be on the one, who pleads contra. Sonalben might be entitled to maintenance from her husband. An order of maintenance might have been passed but in view of the settled legal position, the decree, if any, must be executed against her husband and only his properties could be attached therefore but not of her mother-in-law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2003 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1061 of 2007)
Decided On: 14.03.2008

Vimalben Ajitbhai Patel and Ors. Vs.  Vatslabeen Ashokbhai Patel and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.B. Sinha and V.S. Sirpurkar, JJ.
Citation: 2008 (4) SCC 649

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Tuesday, 17 October 2017

Whether defendant can be made liable to pay mesne profits for land which was under court attachment?

The fourth contention deserves consideration. The definition of mesne profits as given in the Codeof Civil Procedure, Section 2, Sub-Section (12) runs in these words: "Mesne profits of properties means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received there from together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profit s due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession." Wrongful possession by the defendant is the very essence of a claim for mesne profits, and the very foundation of a decree therefor. In the case of Haradhun Duit v. Joy Kisto Banerjee (1869) 11 W.R. 444, Jackson, J. observed that it would be impossible to hold the defendant liable for profits which he had not received and could not have received. In the case of Indurjeet Singh v. Radhey Singh (1874) 21 W.R. 269, Phear J., observed as follows: "Generally from the nature of claim to mesne profits, means profits ought not to be estimated for any period during which the defendant, who is to be made responsible for them was not active in keeping the plaintiff out of possession." In that case the property was in the hands of a Receiver appointed by the Court and the learned Judge pointed out that the defendant could not be answerable for damages for mesne profits in respect of those years during which an officer of the Court and not the defendant was keeping the plaintiff out of possession. In the case of Abbas v. Fassihuddin [1897] 24 Cal. 413 Trevelyan and Beverley, JJ., observed, "If the defendant was excluded from possession she can scarcely be said to have been in wrongful or any possession. She cannot be said to have actually or even impliedly received the profits, nor could she, with ordinary or extraordinary diligence, have received them." It was further held in that case that a wrongdoer is not responsible for the acts of another wrong-doer who is independent of him. In the case of Ishan Chandra Budhan v. Amuddin [1901] 5 C.W.N. 720, Hill, J. held that damages are claimable only for the period of the defendant's wrongful possession actual or constructive. The same principle is deducible from the decisions in the case of Churn Singh v. Rangoo Singh [1871] 15 W.R. 221 and Kishnanand v. Partab Narain [1884] 10 Cal. 785. In the case of Kali Charan v. Ashutosh [1916] 25 C.L.J. 140 Sanderson, C.J., at p. 144 very clearly pointed out the necessity of the defendant being in possession during the period for which the mesne profits were claimable, and Mookerjee, J. at pp. 147-148 on a review of the authorities laid down " that it is an elementary rule that in an action for mesne profits when the ground of the action is the bare fact of possession, damages can only be recovered for the time possession was actually retained." Applying these principles to the question which we have to consider in my opinion it is impossible to hold by any stretch of imagination, that during the time that the lands remained under attachment by the operation of the order under Section 146, Cr.P.C. and this Court was in custody of it on behalf of the rightful owners, that is to say of the plaintiffs in the present case, that the defendants were in possession of the lands. The direction regarding mesne profits in so far as it relates to the 9 hals of land kept under attachment as aforesaid cannot therefore be supported in law.

Calcutta High Court

Chhaganmull Agarwalla And Ors. vs Amanathulla Mohammad Prodhan And ... on 13 March, 1924
Equivalent citations: AIR 1924 Cal 1010

JUDGMENT M.N. Mukerji, J.
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Saturday, 24 June 2017

Whether bank is liable for payment of compensation for wrongful attachment of property?

 Given the above narration of facts, we are satisfied that the
action of the Bank touted as a “mistake”, was not a genuine
mistake but was a deliberate act which they have stood by even
after they were put to notice that they had illegally attached the
petitioner’s property. The respondents did not withdraw the
attachment even when the petitioner filed objection on 14th
September, 2015 against the order of attachment before the Debt
Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow. The petitioner attempted follow-up
with the detailed reminder dated 29th September, 2015 to the
Canara Bank as well as the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery
Tribunal which was of no avail. Even the filing of this writ
petition on the 25th of October 2016 did not persuade the
respondent bank to seek cancellation of the attachment which was
informed by the petitioner as being completely wrongful. The
attachment was withdrawn only on 7th of March 2017 by the
Recovery Officer. 
31. It is evident that if the petitioner had not agitated before the
Recovery Officer, the respondents may have very well proceeded
with the attachment and may have even sold the property pursuant
to the recovery certificate.
32. The act of attachment of the property is a serious matter.
This attachment was effected without taking the basic care and
effecting a title search. The attachment remained in force from 14th
September, 2015 to 7th March, 2017. Undoubtedly, the present
case is a fit case where the petitioner deserves to be compensated
for the wrongful act of the respondents and the harassment,
insecurity and the trauma which has been faced by 68 year old
petitioner for over one and a half years.
33. It would appear that the compensation amount at the rate of
Rs.15,000/- per month of the attachment i.e., from 14th September,
2015 to 7th March, 2017 (seventeen and half months) being a total
of Rs.2,62,500/- would be a reasonable compensation for the
petitioner.
34. We may note that the petitioner has been compelled to
contest the attachment in Lucknow and by filing the present writ
petition in this court. The petitioner is entitled to litigation costs as
well which are quantified at Rs.1,00,000/-.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 W.P.(C) 10210/2016 & CM No.40335/2016
 Date of decision : 20th June, 2017
V.K. BHATNAGAR 
v
CANARA BANK & ANR
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHAWLA
Dated:JUNE 20, 2017
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Sunday, 5 March 2017

Precaution to be taken by court while passing order for attachment of property for disobedience of injunction order

The penalty imposed by the trial Court reads as hereunder:
"The opp. Parties are hereby found guilty of disobedience of status quo order of this Court. The properties of the O.Ps. be attached and they also be detained in Civil prison for seven days."
It is clearly readable from the above quoted law and underlined portion from the impugned order that the order of attachment of the property as one of the penalties is not in accordance with the provision of law. Extent of property and duration for which it should remain under attachment and extent of restriction for using or dealing with such properties by the person guilty of breach of order of injunction must be made clearly specific and no ambiguity or vagueness should be there. Apart from that, such penalty should be proportionate to the gravity of the act complained. Applying judicial discretion in that respect is the salutary principle.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Civil Revision No. 71 of 2002
Decided On: 09.05.2002
Jaigun Nisa Bibi and 2 Ors.
Vs.
 Sk. Badiruddin Zahed
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.K. Tripathy, J.
Citation:2002(3) Civil court cases 513 Orissa
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Whether person disobeying injunction order can be detained in civil prison as well as his properties can be attached?

 Hence the words "and may also" in Rule 2-A cannot be interpreted in the context as denoting to a step which is permissible only as additional to attachment of property of the opposite party. If those words are interpreted like that it may lead to an anomalous situation. If the person who defies the injunction order has no property at all the court becomes totally powerless to deal with such a disobedient party. He would be immuned from all consequences even for any open defiance of a court order. No interpretation shall be allowed to bring about such a sterile or anomalous situation (vide Constitution Bench in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, MANU/SC/0120/1963 : [1964]6SCR129 ). The pragmatic interpretation, therefore, must be this: It is open to the court to attach the property of the disobeying party and at the same time the court can order him to be detained in civil prison also if the court deems it necessary. Similarly the court which orders the person to be detained in civil prison can also attach the property of that person. Both steps can be resorted to or one of them alone need be chosen. It is left to the court to decide on consideration of the fact situation in each case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SLP (C) No. 11992 of 1998
Decided On: 01.09.1998

Samee Khan Vs. Bindu Khan


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and K.T. Thomas, JJ.
Citation:1999(1) PLR465 SC
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When property attached for breach of injunction order should not be sold?

The only question, which arises for consideration in this revision is whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, the attached property could be ordered to be sold. This Court has deleted Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 2 of Order XXXIX and has added the following Rule 2-A:--
"2-A (1) In the case of disobedience to an injunction issued under Rule 1 or Rule 2, Sub-rule (2) or of breach of any terms of any such injunction the Court, in which the suit is proceeding may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime the court directs his release.
(2) No attachment under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award such compensation ,as it thinks fit and shall pay the balance, if any to the party entitled thereto."
The order of attachment of the applicants' property was passed under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2-A. The attached property can be sold under Sub-rule (2) only if the disobedience or breach of the injunction order continues at the end of the period of attachment. The trial court held that no further breach or disobedience of the injunction order was committed by the applicants after the attachment started and therefore, it could not be said that the disobedience or breach continued till the expiry of the period of attachment. It further held that there was no direction by the court that the earth removed was to be restored and the pits were to be filled up and, therefore, the failure of the applicants to do so could not amount to continuance of the breach of the injunction order. The appellate court has taken the view that it was immaterial whether any fresh breach of the injunction order was committed or not. It has held that since the applicants had committed the breach of the injunction order by removing the earth after digging pits in the land, the breach of the injunction order would continue until the act of digging pits and removing the earth was undone by filling up the pits with earth.
6. There can be a third class of cases where the injunction order remains capable of being obeyed after the first breach or disobedience which led to the attachment and the defendant obeys the order and does not commit any further breach. In this case, the attached property cannot be sold. In my opinion, the present case falls in the third category of cases referred to above. The order of injunction passed by the trial court restrained the applicants from removing earth from certain plots. The applicants disobeyed the order and removed some earth from some of the plots. But they did not remove all earth from all the plots and, therefore, it cannot be said that they made it impossible for themselves to obey the order of injunction after the first breach. In fact after the property was attached the applicants could if they decided to continue to disobey the order of injunction, have removed further earth from the plots. It thus appears that the order of injunction was still capable of being obeyed after the attachment of the applicants' property and that the applicants did obey the order. It, therefore, cannot be said that the disobedience or breach continued till the end of the period of attachment. That being so the present case did not fall within the mischief of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX and the attached property could not be ordered to be sold.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Civil Revn. No. 323 of 1972
Decided On: 04.04.1974

Uttam Bhatia Co. Vs.  Babu Ram and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Gyan Chand Mathur, J.

 Citation : AIR 1974 All 454
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Tuesday, 5 July 2016

Supreme court: Government official’s illegal assets can not be attached if he’s dead


NEW DELHI: Disproportionate assets amassed by a government official cannot be attached from his family members if the officer dies during pendency of trial against him, the Supreme Court ruled on Monday.


Terming the orders of a trial court and the Andhra Pradesh high court allowing attachment of assets of a government official after his death a "gross miscarriage of justice", a bench of Justices S A Bobde and Amitava Roy said no proceedings could be allowed against a dead man.


The bench also slammed the trial court for convicting the accused, Ramachandraiah, for misappropriating Rs 657,355, two years after his death. The attachment order was passed on the basis of the conviction order and the HC also approved the attachment proceedings.

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Saturday, 14 May 2016

Whether person in whose favour agreement of sale is executed can file objection to attachment of property?

 Though an agreement to sell does not create any title in an immovable
property as understood by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, 
but it is settled law that objections to attachment of immovable property can
be preferred under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure by a
person in whose favour there is a contract of sale of immovable property
because the word ‘interest’ contemplated by said Rule is not in the sense in
which the expression ‘interest’ has been used under Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As held by a Division Bench of this Court
in the decision reported as 94 (2001) DLT 841 (DB) Asha M.Jain Vs.
Canara Bank & Ors., the attached immovable property can be sold subject
to the interest that has been created in the property with possession handed
over under an agreement to sell, and we may highlight that an interest is
recognized in a property, where under an agreement to sell the entire sale
consideration is paid and possession taken over by the purchaser from the
seller with an irrevocable power of attorney executed by the seller in favour
of the buyer, and falling within the interest irrevocably protected by Section
202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment Delivered on: May 13, 2016
 W.P.(C) 4505/2015
SWARAJ KISHORE ARORA 
versus
INDIAN BANK AND ORS. 
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
Read full judgment here; click here
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Saturday, 30 April 2016

When court can issue order of attachment of property of absconding person along with proclamation U/S 82 of crpc?

 Moreover, in order to issue an order of attachment of property of a person absconding under Section 83 of the Cr.P.C., the Court issuing a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C., may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, at any time after the issue of the proclamation, order the attachment of any property, movable or immovable, or both belonging to the proclaimed person, provided that the Court is satisfied that the person in relation to whom the proclamation is to be issued; (a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or (b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local jurisdiction of the Court. Only on satisfaction of such condition, the Court may order the attachment simultaneously with the issue of the proclamation.
Equivalent Citation: 2016CriLJ1231
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
CRLMC No. 4819 of 2015
Decided On: 03.12.2015
 Antaryami Barik and Ors.
Vs.
 State of Orissa
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.K. Mishra, J.

Citation;2016 CRLJ1231
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Saturday, 9 January 2016

Whether court can execute decree by attachment of properties situated outside its territorial jurisdiction?

The order deputing Special Bailiff to execute the warrant of attachment of movables, purporting to be in exercise of the power under Rule 224 of the Civil Rules of Practice, is still worse. The movables in question belonged to the judgment-debtor who at the time of execution of the warrant resided at Bombay. The movables were in his custody at his residence at Bombay. No Court can execute a decree by attachment of properties situate entirely outside its territorial jurisdiction. It is rather difficult to believe that the Vacation Judge, who is a senior Judicial Officer, was ignorant of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code reproduced above, which provide for transfer of decree to another Court within the State and to Court in another State for execution in such manner as might have been prescribed by Rules in force in the State.
Karnataka High Court
Shyamsunder D. Chugh vs Ram Narayan on 31 May, 1995
Equivalent citations: ILR 1995 KAR 2036

Bench: Shivaprakash
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Wednesday, 5 August 2015

What remedy is available if mortgaged property is attached as per provision of Maharashtra co-operative societies Act?

The question still arises, as to what remedy respondent No. 4 would 9 WP3511/2011 avail if she believed that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity/mistake or fraud and that because of such sale she had sustained substantial injury etc. As mentioned above, as per the provisions of sub-rule 14 (i), respondent No. 4 had an ample opportunity to challenge the legality of the sale on the grounds mentioned above. It is also observed above that soon after the auction sale, she came to this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 5112 of 2009 and this Court dismissed her petition probably on the ground that she had alternate remedy available to her. Despite of the clear suggestion of the Court, unfortunately respondent No. 4 was not given legal advice to approach Recovery Officer by making proper application under sub-rule 14 (i). The enquiry contemplated under sub-rule 14(i) is very important. It allows the applicant to prove her case on facts. After holding such enquiry the Recovery Officer is required to pass a reasoned order. And such order probably could be challenged in a revision under S.154.
Bombay High Court
The Manager Adarsh mahila nagri sahakari bank ltd vs The State Of Maharashtra on 13 October, 2011
Bench: A.V. Nirgude
Citation;2012(2) ALLMR 566
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Monday, 19 August 2013

Third person's property can not be attached in execution merely on the basis of the vague and general statement of DH

 I am inclined to observe that the
Defendants   residence   or     address   that   itself     cannot   be   the
foundation to attach movable or immovable property to execute an ex­
parte decree like this.   The Plaintiffs or a party  who wants to attach
movable as well as immovable  property must demonstrate on record
that  the  Judgment  debtor's    property   is  owned,  and/  or  possessed
and/ or he has right to dispose   of the property in question.       I am
inclined   to  observe   that   in  absence      of  any  such  averments,     the
issuance of warrant  of attachment of the property in such a fashion
is contrary  to the provisions of law and can cause great injustice and
hardship   to all  the concerned.     The third person's property       just

cannot be attached by the Plaintiff merely on the basis   of the vague
and general statement.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
CHAMBER SUMMONS NO.   1562   OF  2010
IN
EXECUTION APPLICATION  NO. 594  OF 2010
IN 
SUMMARY SUIT NO.   3206   OF   2008 

M/s. N.V. Balta Industries V/s. M/s. Tike International 

CORAM :    ANOOP  V.  MOHTA, J.
DATE    :     24th APRIL,   2013.
Citation; 2013 (4)ALL M R 204,2013(5) Mh. L.J. 128
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Monday, 4 February 2013

Whether Interest of tenant in non-residential premises is attachable and saleable in execution of decree against him?

 Tenant's right to remain in occupation of the non-residential premises governed by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is a property; such property is saleable and the tenant has disposing power over the interest of tenancy for his benefit and in view thereof, we hold that the interest of the tenant of non-residential premises to which the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 applies is attachable and saleable in execution of the decree against the tenant.
 Section 26 forbids the voluntary transfer of interest in the premises by the tenant but does not prevent the transfer by the court. Where the transfer is by an operation of law and not by act of the parities, Section 26 shall have no application. The argument that what the defendant could not have done otherwise legally could not be done through court is misplaced and devoid of merit. For one, it is consistently held for more than a century that restriction on assignment to transfer by the tenant under the lease or otherwise does not apply to an assignment by operation of law taking the effect in invitum as a sale under an execution. The other, neither Section 26 nor any other provision in the Act of 1999 restricts a sale in execution of the decree.

Mr. Ramchandani has invited our attention to a passage in Sir D. F. Mulla's Law of Insolvency in India, second edition, 1958, and argued that whatever may be the position in regard to the alienability of the property' or otherwise, even such a tenancy is property and must vest in the Official Assignee. In particular, he relies upon para 501 at page 471, which reads as follows:
" 'Property' includes any property over which, or over the profits of which, any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. In view of that definition, all property in the hands of the insolvent, though inalienable, would vest in the Officer Receiver, unless exempted by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or by any other enactment for the time being in force from liability to attachment and sale in execution of a decree."

Bombay High Court
Tangerine Electronics Systems ... vs Indian Chemicals And Ors. And ... on 4 March, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR 2004 Bom 198, 2004 (5) BomCR 673, 2004 (2) MhLj 305

Bench: R Lodha, S Vazifdar, A V Mohta

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Friday, 11 May 2012

Basic principles for attachment of property under CRPC

"The procedure laid down under Section 83 has to be followed strictly. Jurisdiction to pass an attachment order cannot be assumed unless a proclamation under Section 82 of the Code had been issued. The normal rule is that the Magistrate has to wait until the expiry of 30 days to enable the accused to appear in terms of the proclamation. The words "at any time after the issue of proclamation" are not to he interpreted in isolation. The key for gathering the intention of the law makers is to be found in Section 82 of the Code. Sections 82 and 83 of the Code 4 not spell out dichotomous procedures, they are to be read in harmony. Thus except in cases covered by the proviso to Section 83(1) the attachment order has to maintain a distance of not less than 30 days from the date of the publication under Section 82. These 30 days are to be computed from the date of publication of the proclamation and the provisions in this respect are mandatory.
It must be emphasized here that the nature of the satisfaction mentioned in the proviso is objective and not merely subjective. The attachment of property incurs civil consequences and is deprivation of the valuable right to property of the person whose property is so attached. The satisfaction cannot be arrived at arbitrarily or on fanciful grounds. There has to be evidence by way of reliable evidence or other tangible material on which alone such satisfaction can be founded.
Allahabad High Court
Guman Ahmad @ Manna And Arman Ahmad ... vs State Of Uttar Pradesh on 11 July, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005 CriLJ 4191

Bench: P Srivastava
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