What is the basic concept of legal right and how this concept is relevant to decide who is “person aggrieved” ?

 In this context, we may refer to a recent
pronouncement in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan
v. The State of Maharashtra & ors.
2012 (11) SCALE 39wherein this
Court has held thus: -
“A “legal right”, means an entitlement
arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be
defined as an advantage, or a benefit
conferred upon a person by the rule of law.
The expression, “person aggrieved” does
not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a
person aggrieved must therefore,
necessarily be one, whose right or interest
has been adversely affected or
jeopardized. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji
v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR
1974 SC 1719; and State of Rajasthan &
Ors. v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1977 SC
1361).”

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35271 of 2011)

Hardevinder Singh Vs  Paramjit Singh 

Dated: January 07, 2013
Dipak Misra, J.
Citation: (2013) 9 SCC 261; 2013 KHC 4017.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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When second suit will not be barred by principle of O 2 R 2 of CPC?

 In this connection, we have also to consider the question as to whether there were two different causes of action in the same proceeding or it is a case of different relief sought under one single cause of action. It is, undoubtedly, true that the order dated 02.12.2011 is claimed by the appellants as a Cabinet decision, which creates certain rights in favour of the appellants and does not, by itself, constitute the cause of action. A cause of action would, indeed, require some act or omission on the part of the respondent, which affects the right of the petitioner resulting in the party approaching the court seeking appropriate relief. The legal right would be the foundation for the cause of action. It would constitute part of the cause of action. There was apparently an omission on the part of the respondents to freehold the properties and this was the complaint of the appellants in the earlier writ petition. The omission on the part of the respondents despite the terms of the order, according to the appellants, indeed, constituted a cause of action. Even assuming for a moment that the actual cause of action was the issuance of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, whereby the right under the Government Order dated 02.12.2011 was infringed or affected, this would be a case, where, from one cause of action, there were different reliefs available and in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 694 of 2014, the petitioners therein sought the full reliefs available; whereas, in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2929 of 2014, the relief of enforcement of the order dated 02.12.2011 was not sought. We have already held that the plea of res judicata or constructive res judicata may not be available having regard to the absence of the decision of the court. Even the bar under Order 23 or, rather, principle of Order 23 may not apply unless the cause of action is the same. The direct authority for this is the judgment of the Apex Court in Vallabh Das vs. Dr. Madan Lal and others, reported in MANU/SC/0367/1970 : (1970) 1 SCC 761, whereby the court held that the expression "subject matter" in Order 23 Rule 1 though is not defined, but that expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. The court, further, took the view that unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit is the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject matter of the second suit is the same as that in the present suit. The court, further, held that mere identity of some of the issues in two suits do not bring about an identity of subject matter in the two suits and, finally, the court held that the subject matter means the bundle of facts, which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. If this principle is employed, it will be noted that, while it is true that there were identity of some issues in the earlier writ petition, namely, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 694 of 2014, but the cause of action meaning the bundle of facts to be established in both the proceedings appear to be different. Therefore, there is no scope for applying the bar of abandonment even if there is such bar by the conduct of the petitioners.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Special Appeal No. 14 of 2015

Decided On: 12.05.2017

 Rajesh Goyal and Ors. Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, C.J. and V.K. Bist, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 UTTAR 119

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Whether right is given preference by court by condoning the delay?

 Individual interest and a right allegedly accrued due to bar of limitation would never result in defeating & destroying rights of community. It is well settled preposition of law which still governs the field in that law of limitation is that the bar may take away the remedy, but shall not extinguish a right. Thus by condoning the delay the right has been given a way in preference to alleged wrong.

Bombay High Court

Shri Suresh S/O Premraj Mutha vs Municipal Corporation Through ... on 29 January, 2008

Bench: A Joshi

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Basic principles for determining who is necessary party to suit

In that case the appellant instituted a case against the third respondent inter alia for a declaration that she was his lawfully married wife. The third respondent filed his written statement admitting the claim but on the same date respondents 1 and 2 made an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC, for being impleaded in the suit as defendants on the grounds that they were respectively the wife and son of the third respondent and that they were interested in denying the appellant's status as wife and the status of children as the legitimate children of the third respondent; that the suit was the result of the collusion between the appellant and the third respondent and that if the appellant was declared to be lawfully wedded to the third respondent, the rights and interests of respondents 1 and 2 in the estate of the third respondent would be affected. The application was contested by both the appellant and the third respondent. The trial court allowed the application and the order was confirmed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The question in the appeal before this Court was whether the lower court did not exceed their powers in directing the addition of respondents 1 and 2 as parties defendants in the action.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority said that a declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status will be binding not only upon parties actually before the Court but also upon persons claiming through them respectively. The Court laid down the law that in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of presence of direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy. In cases covered by the statutory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant. If the Court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission, the result of a declaratory decree on the question of status such as the controversy in that suit affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generation to come and in view of that consideration, the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force. Applying the propositions enunciated to the facts of the case, the Court came to the conclusion that the courts below did not exceed their power in directing the addition of respondents 1 and 2 as parties defendants in the action nor it could be said that the exercise of the discretion was not bound.

13. A clear distinction has been drawn between suits relating to property and those in which the subject-matter of litigation is a declaration as regards status or legal character. In the former category, the rule of present interest as distinguished from the commercial interest is required to be shown before a person may be added as a party.

14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objectives. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some questions involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e. , he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 1 All E.R. 273, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England (1950) 2 All E.R. 611, that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated:

The test is 'May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights.'
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 3570 of 1991

Decided On: 04.03.1992

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal
Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M. Fathima Beevi and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.

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Whether writ of mandamus is maintainable for establishment of legal right?

A full Bench of this Court in the case reported as Rita Mishra
and others Vs. Director, Primary Education, Bihar and others, 1987 PLJR
1090 has discussed as to when writ of mandamus would lie. The Full
Bench relied upon the Supreme Court judgment reported as Lekhraj
Sathramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer,
Bombay, A.I.R. 1966 SC 334 to return the following finding:-
“25A. The primary scope and function of writ of mandamus
has been pithily expressed in the phrase that this writ is issued to
command and execute; and not to inquire and adjudicate. It is not to
establish a legal right but to enforce one. It is only where the legal public
duty is clear, unqualified and specific that a writ of mandamus can be truly
claimed. It is not to be granted where the claim of the petitioner has, in
fact, to be first established and adjudicated upon before it can be enforced. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.60 of 1990

Prahalad Ray Puranmalka

V
 The State of Bihar.

CORAM: THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
And
JUSTICE SMT. ANJANA MISHRA
And
MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH

Date: 17-01-2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 Patna 33

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Whether any rights can be claimed on the basis of internal file notings?

It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have
the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an
expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion
by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of
the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority.
Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure.
Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights
of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in
the department; gets his approval and the final order is communicated to
the person concerned.
15. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395, a
Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the effect
of an order passed by a Minister on a file, which order was not
communicated to the person concerned. Referring to the Article 166(1) of
the Constitution, the Court held that order of the Minister could not
amount to an order by the State Government unless it was expressed in
the name of the Rajpramukh, as required by the said Article and was then
communicated to the party concerned. The court observed that business
of State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through
the agency of a large number of officials and authorities. Before an action
is taken by the authority concerned in the name of the Rajpramukh,
which formality is a constitutional necessity, nothing done would amount
to an order creating rights or casting liabilities to third parties. It is
possible, observed the Court, that after expressing one opinion about a
particular matter at a particular stage a Minister or the Council of
Ministers may express quite a different opinion which may be opposed to
the earlier opinion. In such cases, which of the two opinions can be
regarded as the "order" of the State Government? It was held that opinion
becomes a decision of the Government only when it is communicated to
the person concerned.
16. To the like effect are the observations of this Court
in Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
Anr. 2003 (3) SCR 409, wherein it was said that a right created under an
order of a statutory authority must be communicated to the person
concerned so as to confer an enforceable right.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7607 OF 2005
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA 
V
M/s. PREBON YAMANE (I) LTD.
Dated:November 03, 2015.
Citation:(2015) 16 SCC89

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Whether Persons residing in Premises Gratuitously will Acquire Legal Right On The Property?

Having gone through the record, the submission of the appellants that the grand-mother of the respondent though did not have any right qua the premises was permitted to occupy purely out of love and affection is not without merit. The status of the grand-mother is thus of a gratuitous licensee and that of the respondent is purely of a relative staying with such gratuitous licensee.

Rame Gowda (supra) was a case in which two adjoining owners were claiming independent right of ownership in respect of a strip of land in between their holdings. That piece of land was in possession of the plaintiff and as such while dealing with the controversy, this Court held that a person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession. However, while dealing with the concept of “settled possession” it was observed in paragraph 9 as under:

“The “settled possession” must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and

(iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession.” The matter was further elaborated in subsequent decision of this Court in Maria Margarida (Supra) as under:

“97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallized as under:

(1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand.

(3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. (4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour.

(5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.” Thus, a person holding the premises gratuitously or in the capacity as a caretaker or a servant would not acquire any right or interest in the property and even long possession in that capacity would be of no legal consequences. In the circumstances City Civil Court was right and justified in rejecting the prayer for interim injunction and that decision ought not to have been set aside by the High Court. We therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment under appeal and restore the Order dated 29.04.2013 passed by the Bombay City Civil Court in Notice of Motion No.344 of 2013 in Suit No.408 of 2013.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Behram Tejani & Ors vs Azeem Jagani on 6 January, 2017

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Uday Umesh Lalit
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR 925 SC

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Whether court can give injunction to plaintiff if he fails to prove his legal right?

The judgment of Lower Appellate Court impugned in this second

appeal shows that the lower appellate court has not considered whether the

street in relation to which the plaintiff was claiming right was a public

street or not. It does not consider whether the layout in which the plot

no.20A or plot no.20 are located was sanctioned in accordance with the law

or not. It has also not read sale deed of defendant Exh,.95 and sale deed of

plaintiff Exh.52 in contradistinction. It also lost sight of the fact that sale

deed of defendant was 5 years earlier in point of time than the sale deed of

plaintiff. It has only given importance to the fact that existence of 80 feet

road has been proved by the respondent / plaintiff. The said fact by itself

does not cloth the respondent / plaintiff with any right unless and until it is

established that it was a public street or a street abutting his plot no.20A.

The record shows that on eastern side of his plot there exists another road

of 20 feet width. Ex. 45 on record also shows that plaintiff has encroached

beyond his plot on western side i.e. on land of plot no. 20. However Ex. 45

mentions that on west of plot no. 20 there is 60 feet wide road. The

learned lower appellate court has then considered the judgment of this

court in Appeal No. 27/1978, in which facts reveals that the Nagpur

Improvement Trust had acquired some portion from Khasara no.54 and 55

for the purpose of construction of 80 feet road. Some persons had built

structures on plot no.17 and 18 and High Court only protected those

structures till it became essential for the Nagpur Improvement Trust to

demolish all other structures. The learned lower appellate court has

interpreted this to mean that High Court permitted Nagpur Improvement

Trust to start demolition work when ever it was necessary for construction

of 80 feet wide road. The learned lower appellate court has held that this

judgment of High Court delivered on 24.07.1981 revealed that plot nos.17

and 18 along with other plots were acquired by the Nagpur Improvement

Trust for Sakkardara Street Scheme i.e. 80 feet wide road. As plot nos. 17

to 20 are in one & same row, lower appellate court concluded that plot

no.20 was also acquired and therefeore, nothing remained with owner

Sitabai i.e. the present appellant. It then proceeded to consider the right of

plaintiff to restrain the defendants from carrying out construction over the

disputed area. It found that the plaintiff had legal right to have a road

frontage from western side & it therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed

the suit. It is thus apparent that the provisions of various laws which need

scrutiny to find out such legal right in the plaintiff have not been gone into.

Had plaintiff shown a sanctioned layout plan or a town planning scheme in

force to show 80 feet wide public road on the west of his plot no.20A, the

situation would have been entirely different. Unfortunately the plaintiff

has failed to bring on record any such material. In the circumstances, it is

difficult to sustain the judgment delivered by the lower appellate court and

the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

SECOND APPEAL No. 105 OF 1992.

Dr. Narendra s/o Chirkutrao Balpande.

VERSUS

Atulkumar s/o Pundalikrao Atkar.

CORAM : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J.

Dated : 1st April, 2008.

Citation:2008(3) ALLMR497

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When appeal filed by person who is prejudicially or adversely affected by decree is maintainable?

 This Court has clearly stated
that if a person is prejudicially or adversely affected
by the decree, he can maintain an appeal. In the
present case, as we find, the plaintiff claiming to be a
co-sharer filed the suit and challenged the will. The
defendant No. 5, the brother of the plaintiff,
supported his case. In an appeal at the instance of
the defendant Nos. 1 to 4, the judgment and decree
was overturned. The plaintiff entered into a
settlement with the contesting defendants who had
preferred the appeal. Such a decree, we are
disposed to think, prejudicially affects the defendant
No. 5 and, therefore, he could have preferred an
appeal. It is worthy to note that the grievance
pertained to the nature and character of the property
and the trial court had decreed the suit. He stood
benefited by such a decree. The same having been
unsettled, the benefit accrued in his favour became
extinct. It needs no special emphasis to state that he
had suffered a legal injury by virtue of the over
turning of the decree. His legal right has been
affected. In this context, we may refer to a recent
pronouncement in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan
v. The State of Maharashtra & ors.
2012 (11) SCALE 39wherein this
Court has held thus: -
“A “legal right”, means an entitlement
arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be
defined as an advantage, or a benefit
conferred upon a person by the rule of law.
The expression, “person aggrieved” does
not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a
person aggrieved must therefore,
necessarily be one, whose right or interest
has been adversely affected or
jeopardized. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji
v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR
1974 SC 1719; and State of Rajasthan &
Ors. v. Union of India & ors., AIR 1977 SC
1361).”

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35271 of 2011)

Hardevinder Singh Vs  Paramjit Singh 

Dated:January 07, 2013
Dipak Misra, J.
Citation: (2013) 9 SCC 261: 2013 KHC 4017.

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Whether private body is bound to follow principle of natural justice while deciding legal rights of its members?

In view of the above, the submission that Respondent No. 1/plaintiff, after trial, may get compensation/damages as claimed in the Suit is unacceptable basically at the instance of the Appellant as the abrupt action and its effect and its consequences are far reaching not only as it affects only Respondent No. 1/plaintiff, but also Gymkhana which nominated him apart from Appellant's own reputation itself. It is always legitimate acceptance of every member and basically the member of this type, that the MC though have a power, in view of the rule, still required to follow and/or the basic principle of natural justice, fair play and equity at every stage of the proceedings. The formality of completion of show cause notice itself was not sufficient. The issue even if raised, in my view, need to be tackled to avoid unnecessary publicity and/or affects the name and fame of everybody concern, specially when it is the requirement of the time that if certain issues are raised and/or pointed out, has to be tackled by inbuilt procedures, by giving opportunity to all concerned. Such abrupt punishment as sought in the present case, is not the solution and specially it is not permissible mode to decide the issue. Every body needs to follow the procedure, whether private body and/or public body, when it comes to deciding and/or taking away the legal rights and the obligations of any member/person/representatives. 

Equivalent Citation: 2014(1)BomCR687, 2014(2)MhLj726,2015(7) ALLMR363

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order (Stamp) No. 25497 of 2013 with CAAST/25580/2013

Decided On: 21.09.2013

Appellants: Mumbai Cricket Association
Vs.
Respondent: Mr. Ratnakar Shivram Shetty and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

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Whether father has legal right to perform Kanyadan of his daughter?

As rightly observed by the learned single Judge the bride in this case, namely, defendant No.5 is a major. She has the capacity and every right to decide as to in what form her marriage shall take place; whether ceremonies and rites prevailing in her family shall be adopted or if there are different ceremonies prevailing in the family of the bride-groom they shall be adopted. Even assuming that 'Kanyadana' is an important ceremony in a Hindu Marriage and normally a father considers performing 'Kanyadana' not only as a privilege but as an obligation to redeem himself from 'Pitruruna', the plaintiff cannot ignore himself to perform the ceremony against the will of his daughter-defendant No.5 who is a major. It may be mentioned that defendant No.5 in her written statement and otherwise as seen from the record made it clear that she does not desire the petitioner to participate in any ceremonies pertaining to her marriage. In fact, even while this appeal was pending, defendant No.5 was enquired with by this Court and she emphatically reiterated that she does not desire the participation of the plaintiff in the rites and ceremonies pertaining to her marriage. It is, therefore, obvious that the plaintiff cannot claim any legal right to perform 'Kanyadan' in the facts and circumstances of the case and cannot seek the relief of declaration and injunction sought for by him or any direction to enable him to perform the said 'Kanyadana' in 5th defendant's marriage.

Andhra High Court

Ramlal Agarwal vs Shanta Devi And Others on 2 April, 1999

Equivalent citations: 1999 (3) ALD 19, 1999 (3) ALT 197, I (2000) DMC 640

Bench: B S Reddy, V Rao

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What constitute waiver of right under Securitization Act?

 Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It involves
conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim
or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a
party could have enjoyed. In fact, it is an agreement not to assert a
right. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have
waived, is fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge
about the same, he intentionally abandons them. (Vide Dawsons
Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha, Basheshar Nath v.
CIT, Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, Associated
Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, Jaswantsingh
Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn., Sikkim Subba
Associates v. State of Sikkim and Krishna Bahadur v. Purna

Theatre.)
42. This Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Dr
Hakimwadi Tenants’ Assn.
considered the issue of
waiver/acquiescence by the non-parties to the proceedings and held:
(SCC p. 65, paras 14-15)
“14. In order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary
and intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a
waiver is an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there
is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of
conduct and must necessarily be determined on the facts
of each case. ...

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4679 OF 2014
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (CIVIL) No. 35168 OF 2011]

Vasu P. Shetty V M/s Hotel Vandana Palace & Ors.

Dated;April 22, 2014

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Supreme Court: Admissions made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress cannot bind maker of admission

 The undertaking given by the appellant that he would get the requisite permission of the employer did not put him out of court. It was written because he was anxious to appear in Part II examination and was written in terrorem and in complete ignorance of his legal rights. Any admissions made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress cannot bind the maker of the . admission. 

Supreme Court of India

Shri Krishan vs The Kurukshetra University, ... on 17 November, 1975

Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 376, 1976 SCR (2) 122

Bench: Fazalali, S Murtaza

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Whether Cause of action will accrue to individual if a legal right is for benefit of general public?

A plan sanctioned in favour of the defendant in conformity with municipal rules would not justify defendant's trespass on plaintiff's land or his interference with plaintiff's right of easement or customary right. Plaintiffs can equally challenge any public nuisance committed by the defendant.
Class of persons protected. An individual can sue for a breach of statutory duty only if the statute imposes a duty enforceable by a party aggrieved as well as a public duty. The answer to the question whether the statute imposes a duty so enforceable does not necessarily depend upon whether the statute was intended to protect a limited class of persons or the public as a whole. Nevertheless it is of importance to determine what was the intention of the statute in this respect, because, if the statute on its true construction is intended to protect a particular class, it is some indication that members of that class are intended to have a right of action, as for example in the case of statutes for the protection of factory workers, mine workers, building workers, merchants, seamen, dock labourers, shipyard workers and other employees, or intended for the protection of the public when exposed to certain dangers. On the other hand, if the statute is intended to protect the public as a whole, it will not usually be construed as giving a right of action to individual members of a particular class. In any case in which a class of individuals has a common law right of action in respect of the breach of a duty imposed by a statute, a plaintiff to succeed must show that he is within the class of persons which is intended to be protected and to which the duty is therefore owed."
ORISSA HIGH COURT

Krushna Kishore Bal vs Sankarsan Samal And Ors. on 28 November, 1973

Equivalent citations: AIR 1974 Ori 89

Bench: G Misra, B Patra, S Acharya

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