Showing posts with label S 92 of Evidence Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 92 of Evidence Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 3 October 2021

Whether court can permit a party to adduce oral evidence regarding written agreement?

This Court in Gangabai v. Chhabubai [(1982) 1 SCC 4 :

AIR 1982 SC 20] and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1

SCC 434 : AIR 2000 SC 426] with reference to Section 92(1)

held that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend

that the deed was not intended to be acted upon, but was

only a sham document. The bar arises only when the

document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be

varied and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to

show that document executed was never intended to

operate as an agreement but that some other agreement

altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into

between the parties.” (Emphasis Supplied) {Para 22}

27. A perusal of the above judgment would show that the oral evidence of a written agreement is excluded except when it is

 sought to be alleged the document as a sham transaction.

28. It is beyond dispute that a sale deed is required to be registered i.e. a document required by law to be reduced to the form of a document. Therefore, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from its terms. The proviso (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act on which reliance was placed is a proof of such fact which would invalidate any document such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“92. Exclusion of evidence or oral agreement. - When the

terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of

property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to

the form of a document, have been proved according to the

last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or

statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any

such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the

purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting

from, its terms:

Proviso (1).—Any fact may be proved which would

invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person

to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud,

intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of

capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of

consideration, or mistake in fact or law.”

29. The respondents were free to prove fraud in execution of the sale deed. However, factually, the respondents have not alleged any  fraud in their suit or in the written statement in the suit filed by appellant No. 1. The feigned ignorance about the nature of document cannot be said to be an instance of fraud. In the

absence of any plea or proof of fraud, respondent No.1 is bound by the written document on which he admitted his signatures and of his wife. There is no oral evidence which could prove fraud, intimidation, illegality or failure of consideration to permit the respondents to lead oral evidence to dispute the sale deed dated 14.9.1970. Therefore, the judgments referred to by Mr. Mehta are of no help to support his arguments. Thus, the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court are clearly erroneous in law and are, thus, set aside.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1491 OF 2007

PLACIDO FRANCISCO PINTO (D) by LRs  Vs JOSE FRANCISCO PINTO

Author: HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2021.

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Tuesday, 10 December 2019

Whether a party can adduce evidence as per S 92 of Evidence Act that registered lease deed was never intended to be acted upon?

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners heavily relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Raval and Co. vs. K.G. Ramachandran reported in MANU/SC/0416/1973 : (1974) 1 Supreme Court Cases 424, to contend that the Courts below could not have gone into the question of validity of the registered lease deed dated 17.07.1995 (Exh. 184) on the basis of unregistered document like the letter dated 27.07.1995 (Exh. 178), because the terms of a registered document executed between the parties ought to prevail and the parties could not be permitted to lead evidence to disprove such terms of registered document. In this context, the position of law pertaining to the exact nature of bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act has been considered by this Court in the case of Vijay Laxmipati Dasari vs. Laxmibai Ramayya Bolabattin reported in MANU/MH/1832/2016 : 2017(3) ALL Mr. 567, wherein it has been laid down that the power under Section 92 of the Evidence Act would not apply when a party seeks to disprove the contract itself or to prove that the document was not intended to be acted upon and that the intention was totally different. It has been held that the bar applies only when oral evidence is sought to be led to disprove the terms of a contract. While laying down the said position of law, this Court has relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Janakiraman vs. State reported in MANU/SC/0001/2006 : AIR 2006 S.C. 1106. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-

"11.6. We may cull out the principles relating to section 92 of the Evidence Act, thus:-

i) Section 92 is supplementary to section 91 and corollary to the rule contained in section 91.

ii) The rule contained in section 92 will apply only to the parties to the instrument or their successors-in-interest. Strangers to the contract (which would include the prosecution in a criminal proceeding) are not barred from establishing a contemporaneous oral agreement contradicting or varying the terms of the instrument. On the other hand, section 91 may apply to strangers also.

iii) The bar under section 92 would apply when a party to the instrument, relying on the instrument, seeks to prove that the terms of the transaction covered by the instrument are different from what is contained in the instrument. It will not apply where anyone, including a party to the instrument, seeks to establish that the transaction itself is different from what it purports to be. To put it differently, the bar is to oral evidence to disprove the terms of a contract, and not to disprove the contract itself, or to prove that the document was not intended to be acted upon and that intention was totally different."

14. Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that merely because Exh. 184 in the present case was a registered lease deed, it could not be said that the respondents were prohibited under Section 92 of the Evidence Act, to lead evidence to show that the said lease deed was never intended to be acted upon. Therefore, it becomes clear that the petitioners cannot contend that once the document at Exh. 184 was a registered document, the Court could not examine the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents at all.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 4777 of 2014

Decided On: 30.04.2019

Orbit Super Market Private Limited  Vs. Mukta Arvind Bobde and Ors.
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Wednesday, 5 June 2019

When plea of defendant that agreement of sale was mortgage by conditional sale is not tenable?

The finding of the Court below that since the defendant had pleaded that it was a loan, therefore, the burden would be shifted on the plaintiff that it was not a sale agreement appears to be not according to the law as Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act covers such transaction. For sake of brevity, Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act is reproduced as under.

58(c) Mortgage by conditional sale. - Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property-

on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or

on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or

on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller,

the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale:

[Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale].

9. Reading of the aforesaid provision would show the defendant though had raised the defence that it was a loan but the transaction is not been embodied in the document Ex. P-1, therefore, as per the proviso clause the transaction cannot be deemed to be a mortgage as condition do not have been incorporated in the document Ex. P-1 except the defence and the oral evidence. Consequently, the finding of the trial Court cannot be sustained on this issue.

11. Further more, the defendant stated that the husband of the defendant has demanded a loan of Rs. 40,000/- which was arranged by the plaintiff and thereafter a fiduciary agreement of sale was executed which is Ex. P-1, thereby the defendant admitted the existence of agreement (Ex. P-1) but stated that it was for a mortgage. No such averments have been contained in the document. Therefore, it would be difficult to accept such defence in view of proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the document was of a mortgage.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

First Appeal No. 72 of 2004

Decided On: 03.01.2019

Santosh Mahobiya  Vs.  Mahendra Tamboli

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Chhat 92
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Sunday, 6 January 2019

Whether it is necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove terms of lease deed?

 Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to the form of documents. The lease deed is a document within the meaning of Section 91 and, therefore, no amount of oral evidence is required for elucidation of the terms and conditions stipulated under the said lease deed. The document speaks for itself. So also Section 92 is relevant in the present case which relates to exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. When the document itself is admitted, no oral agreement can improve the defendant's case.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

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Sunday, 23 April 2017

Whether burden of proof will be on defendant if he takes plea of loan transaction?

Submissions of Mr. Thorat that when there is a registered document, then the sale is to be considered as a genuine, would have been accepted if the defendant would not have challenged the truth-fullness of the contents of the sale-deed and not contended that it is a sham document given as a security. The case of the defendant squarely falls under proviso Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Obviously, the burden lies on the defendant to prove that the document executed was intended for something else than what is mentioned in the document.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Second Appeal No. 22 of 1990
Decided On: 31.10.2012
Shripati Ramchandra Choudhari

Vs.
Rajaram Bhau Shinde

Coram:

Mrs. Mridula Bhatkar, J.

Citation: 2013(1) MHLJ 304
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When court can grant permission to lead oral evidence contrary to terms of written agreement?

 The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that Sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars the respondent from contending that there was no sale and, it is submitted, the respondent should not have been permitted to lead parol evidence in support of the contention. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the norm of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself. Sub-section (1) of Section 92 declares that when the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms And the first proviso to Section 92 says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contradicting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. It is clear to us that the bar imposed by Sub-section (1) of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and Anr. v. Vedathanni. MANU/PR/0014/1935. The Trial Court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parol evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parol evidence is admissible, the finding of the court below in favour of the respondent must be accepted. The second contention on behalf of the appellant must also fail.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 1537 of 1970
Decided On: 06.11.1981
Smt. Gangabai Rambilas Gilda
Vs.
Smt. Chhabubai Pukharajji Gandhi

Coram:
D.A. Desai and R.S. Pathak, JJ.



Citation:AIR 1982 SC 20
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Sunday, 16 April 2017

Whether defendant can adduce evidence contrary to contents of agreement of sale?

 In so far as the submission of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff that the defendant no.1 could not have been permitted to lead
evidence contrary to the contents of the agreement to sale dated 17th
October 1995 is concerned, the first appellate Court has held that the
defendants were entitled to adduce oral evidence to show that the real
intention of the parties behind the agreement for sale dated 17th October
1995 was to secure the loan. The first appellate Court has considered the
several judgments including the judgments of the Supreme Court in the
cases of Udai Chand Dutt Vs.Saibal Sen, reported in AIR 1988 SC
367, M/s.Hindustan Fasteners Vs. Nashik Workers Union, reported in
2007 11 SCC 660, Krishna Bai Vs. Appasahen, reported in AIR 1979
SC 1880 and Tyagaraja Mudaliar Vs.Vedathani, reported in AIR 1936
PC 70 and has followed the principles of law laid down in that judgments
and held that there was no hurdle to adduce other evidence to show that
the document executed by the party was sham and was not to be acted
upon.
22. In so far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff that the defendant no.1 could not have been permitted to lead
evidence to contradict the contents of the agreement to sale dated 17th
October 1995 in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 is concerned, in my view, the defendant no.1 had not led evidence
to contradict the contents of the said agreement for sale dated 17th
October 1995. The case of the defendants before the trial Court was that
the said transaction entered into between the parties was not to be acted

upon as the same was to be kept as a security in favour of the plaintiff
and was not to be acted upon as an agreement to sale. The defendant no.1
had disputed the entire transaction and thus could lead evidence in that
regard in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The first
appellate Court, in my view, has rightly adverted to the judgments of the
Supreme Court referred to aforesaid and has rightly rejected the
contention raised by the plaintiff. In my view, there is no substance in
this submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.144 OF 2016

Manohar Pamandas Jani 
 V
 Madhukar Trimbak Waychal 
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 DATE :  25th October 2016
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR102
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Monday, 13 March 2017

Whether the court can permit defendant to plead contrary to registered Sale deed ?

Order 7 Rule 11, Order 12 Rule 6 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 91, 92 - Possession - Sale deed - Title - Rejection of counter-claim - Decree on admission - By way of a registered sale deed defendant transferred the suit property to the plaintiffs - Total consideration of Rs. 1,65,00,000 was paid - Sale deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar - Right of possession of plaintiffs was recognized in the sale deed - Despite the receipt of the entire consideration and execution of the sale deed, the defendant has failed to handover the physical vacant possession of the suit property - Defendant claimed that the amounts received by him were towards loan, and not towards sale consideration - Defendant has not produced any document to show that amounts were received by way of loan - Defense set up by the defendant is barred under section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act - Since the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property stands established, suit of the plaintiff for possession has to succeed - Defendant has failed to establish any right or title in the suit Property - Defendant may have occupied the suit property as a licensee - License stands terminated - Cause of action pleaded by the defendant in the counter claim is the so-called oral agreement that the plaintiffs shall re-transfer - No cause of action has arisen to seek the cancellation of the sale deed - Counter claim of the defendant is rejected - Possession was never delivered to the plaintiff would not deprive the plaintiff to claim ownership on the basis of their title derived from the sale deed, and to claim possession of the suit property - Applications of the plaintiffs are allowed - Suit is decreed in respect of the relief of possession.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CS (OS) 1633/2012, CC 18/2013 and I.A. Nos. 10623 and 16134/2012
Decided On: 26.03.2014
 Karan Madaan and Others
Vs.
 Nageshwar Pandey
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Vipin Sanghi, J.

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Sunday, 12 March 2017

Whether court can permit defendant to lead oral evidence to find out nature of transaction?

In so far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff that the defendant no.1 could not have been permitted to lead
evidence to contradict the contents of the agreement to sale dated 17th
October 1995 in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 is concerned, in my view, the defendant no.1 had not led evidence
to contradict the contents of the said agreement for sale dated 17th
October 1995. The case of the defendants before the trial Court was that
the said transaction entered into between the parties was not to be acted

upon as the same was to be kept as a security in favour of the plaintiff
and was not to be acted upon as an agreement to sale. The defendant no.1
had disputed the entire transaction and thus could lead evidence in that
regard in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The first
appellate Court, in my view, has rightly adverted to the judgments of the
Supreme Court referred to aforesaid and has rightly rejected the
contention raised by the plaintiff. In my view, there is no substance in
this submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.144 OF 2016
along with
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.228 OF 2016

Manohar Pamandas Jani
 V
 Madhukar Trimbak Waychal
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 DATE :  25th October 2016
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR 102
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Saturday, 14 January 2017

Whether Bar of S 92 Evidence Act will operate when document is sham and was not to be acted upon?

Relying upon the aforesaid judgements, the learned counsel would submit that the Trial Court erred in accepting the plea of the defendant that agreements are not intended to be acted upon but were executed only as security for a loan transaction and not otherwise. Per contra, Mr. N. Suresh, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that what is prohibited under Section 92 of the Evidence Act, is only the attempt to vary the terms of the contract and the defendant can always establish any invalidating circumstance, that would establish that the contract itself was a sham transaction. In support of his contention, the learned counsel rely upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal reported in MANU/SC/0747/1999 : AIR 2000 SC 426. The learned counsel draws my attention to para 16 of the judgement where the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring the earlier decision in Gangabai v. Chhabubai reported in MANU/SC/0385/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 20 observed that it is permissible for a party to contend that the deed was not intended to be acted upon but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. He also invites my attention to the observations of the Division Bench in Kamireddi Sattiaraju v. Kandamurai Boolaeswari reported in MANU/TN/7611/2006 : 2007 1 MLJ 499. It was also a suit for specific performance with similar plea to the effect that agreement was not intended to be acted upon but was executed only as security for a loan transaction. After reviewing the entire case law, the Division Bench has held as follows:
"15. In the judgment, in paragraph 22, the Supreme Court has stated the legal position as regards the substantive part of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act in the following words:
22. This Court in Gangabai v. Chhabubai and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal with reference to Section 92(1) held that it is permissible to a party to a deed to contend that the deed was not intended to be acted upon but was only a sham document. The bar arises only when the document is relied upon and its terms are sought to be varied and contradicted. Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties.
16. In the decision, the Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph 9:
An enquiry into reality of transaction is not excluded merely by availability of writing reciting the transaction. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar v. Vedathanni MANU/PR/0014/1935 : AIR 1936 PC 70 : 64 IA 126 is an authority for the proposition that the oral evidence in departure from the terms of a written deed is admissible to show that what is mentioned in the deed was not the real transaction between the parties but it was something different.
17. From the above ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, when we analyse the stand of the parties, according to the appellants, irrespective of the fact that Ex. A-1 came into being, it was contended that the deed was never intended to be acted upon and that it was a sham document. When the said stand is probed into further, as held by the Supreme Court, the bar under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act vis-à-vis Ex. A-1 would operate if only the appellants attempt to rely upon Ex. A-1 agreement and simultaneously sought to vary and contradict its terms. Such is not the case of the appellants. The appellants are not attempting to contend that the terms contained therein are to be varied or that the evidence let in on their side was to contradict the terms contained therein. According to the appellants, the entire evidence let in both oral and documentary, was only to demonstrate that inspite of existence of Ex. A-1, it will have to be held that the parties had a different contract altogether and Ex. A-1 was never intended to be acted upon. At the risk of repetition, we state that applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, such a stand of the appellants was certainly not prohibited under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act."
12. The learned counsel would also draw my attention to the judgement of this Court in Pappammal @ T. Pappa v. P. Ramasamy reported in MANU/TN/1411/2012 : 2012 4 CTC 100 wherein also, the Hon'ble single judge had followed the Division Bench judgement referred to above and held that it is open to the defendant in the suit for specific performance to plead that the contract was not intended to be an agreement of sale. Recently in the judgement in Rajammal and another v. M. Senbagam reported in MANU/TN/2873/2016 : 2016 (6) CTC 225, this Court held that the plea to the effect that the agreement was not intended to be acted upon can be entertained by the Courts. I have examined the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the law laid down by the precedents referred to at the Bar. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the defendant cannot be precluded from taking the plea that the agreement was not intended to be acted upon as an agreement of sale, but it was executed for some other purposes namely, as security for loan transaction. Such plea would fall within the exceptions under Section 92 of the Evidence Act because, it is actually a invalidating circumstance which is pleaded before the Court of law and by pleading so, the defendant is not attempting to vary the terms of the contract. The actual attempt is to show that the contract is not one, which was intended to be acted upon. Therefore, in my considered opinion the argument that Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act prevents the defendant from contending that the agreement was not intended to be acted upon cannot be countenanced, in view of the categorical judicial pronouncements referred to above.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
A.S. No. 34 of 2010
Decided On: 02.01.2017

P. Vaidyanathan Vs.  K. Sundaram

Coram:R. Subramanian, J.
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Wednesday, 27 April 2016

When court can permit oral evidence in respect of contents of document?

 Before starting appreciation of evidence, the defence
which is available to present defendants need to be discussed in
brief. It is because the Trial Court had held that the aforesaid
defence taken in the written statement is not available to the
defendants in view of the provision of section 92 of the Evidence
Act. The relevant portion, proviso (2) of section 92 is as under :-
"92. Exclusion of evidence of oral
agreement.- When the terms of any such
contract, grant or other disposition of property, or
any matter required by law to be reduced to the
form of a document, have been proved according
to the last section, no evidence of any oral
agreement or statement shall be admitted, as
between the parties to any such instrument or
their representatives in interest, for the purpose of
contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting
from, its terms:

Proviso (1).-----------
Proviso (2).- The existence of any separate
oral agreement as to any matter on which a
document is silent, and which is not inconsistent
with its terms, may be proved. In considering
whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall
have regard to the degree of formality of the
document.
Proviso (3).- ............"
20) On the aforesaid point, the learned counsel for
respnodents/defendants placed reliance on the case reported as
AIR 1982 SUPREME COURT 20 [Smt. Gangabai Vs. Smt.
Chhabubai]. The relevant observations are as under :-
"(B) Evidence Act (1 of 1872),S.92(1)-Bar of,
as to adducing of oral evidence –
Applicability.
The bar imposed by sub-sec.(1) of Section 92
applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the
document embodying the terms of the transaction.
In that event, the law declares that the nature and
intent of the transaction must be gathered from
the terms of the document itself and no evidence
of any oral agreement or statement can be
admitted as between the parties to such document
for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its
terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the
case of a party is that the transaction recorded in
the document was never intended to be acted

upon at all between the parties and that the
document is a sham. Such a question arises when
the party asserts that there was a different
transaction altogether and what is recorded in the
document was intended to be of no consequence
whatever. For the purpose, oral evidence is
admissible to show that the document executed
was never intended to operate as an agreement
but that some other agreement altogether, not
recorded in the document, was entered into
between the parties. AIR 1936 PC 70, Foll."
21) In view of nature of defence taken by the defendants
which is already quoted and the aforesaid position of law, this
Court has no hesitation to hold that the defendants cannot be
prevented from taking such defence. On this point, the learned
counsel for appellant placed reliance on the case reported as
2010 (6) Mh.L.J. 653 BOMBAY HIGH COURT [Shriram s/o.
Tukaram Avatade Vs. Ramrao Udaji Khadase]. In this
reported case, this Court held in view of the facts of that case
that there was no evidence to override the legal effect of the suit
agreement. This proposition is not disputed and on facts it was
held that the defence taken was not proved.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
SECOND APPEAL NO. 188 OF 2010
Kashinath S/o Yadeo Hiwarde,

Versus
 Osman Baig Sandu Baig @ Amir Baig,




CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATED : 10th December, 2015.
Citation; AIR2016(NOC)266 Bom
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Tuesday, 3 February 2015

Whether hospital records fall within Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act?



 Mr. Tulsi argued that the best evidence available was in the form of the contemporaneous medical records and record of examination of the plaintiff by various doctors. The best evidence being a written record was the most trustworthy and conclusive as to its contents. These documents undermined the plaintiff's claim altogether, as they established that she had dived headlong into the pool and sustained the injuries, which could not be attributed to ITDC's actions or alleged omissions. No evidence to the contrary, especially oral evidence, could be given preference, in view of Section 91 of the Evidence Act.


Since hospital records are neither conclusive of rights nor are instruments as between parties, this Court is of the opinion that the argument that PW 19's oral evidence contradicts hospital records, thus violating Section 92 is untenable.
 Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the question of whether the plaintiff dived or jumped cannot be gone into in this appeal, since it was not pleaded in the written statement. The question of whether the oral evidence contradicts hospital records, regarding Susan having allegedly "dived", and thus violating Section 92 of the Evidence Act consequently need not be answered. In any event, it is found that hospital records, not being documents that are dispositive of any rights, do not fall within Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
Delhi High Court
India Tourism Development ... vs Miss Susan Leigh Beer on 30 May, 2014
Author: S.Ravindra Bhat
Citation;AIR2015(NOC)56 Delhi
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Sunday, 6 January 2013

Whether any variation of rent reserved by registered lease deed should be made by another registered instrument?

Any variation of rent reserved by registered lease deed must be made by another registered instrument. The agreement between the landlord and the tenant by which the rent was increased being in variation of a written contract,evidence of that was barred under section 92 of the Evidence Act.

Supreme Court of India
Raval & Co vs K. C. Ramachandran & Ors on 11 December, 1973
Citations: 1974 AIR 818, 1974 SCR (2) 629
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Tuesday, 3 April 2012

The Word "Terms" as used in section 91 and 92 of evidence act

The expression "terms" in sec 91 and 92 of evidence act must relate to statements assertions or representations contained in written contract which relates to subject matter of contract and something to be done or not to be done under the contract and has no application to a provision in the nature of condition precedent to a very existence or formation of a contract.
Bombay High Court

P.B. Bhatt And Ors. vs V.R. Thakkar And Ors. on 27 July, 1971

Equivalent citations: AIR 1972 Bom 365, (1972) 74 BOMLR 509
Bench: Vimadalal

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Friday, 23 March 2012

Whether Sale deed signed by only vendor is valid?



Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 and 92 – It is not open to a party to a document to prove by oral evidence a variation in the terms of the document or as to the amount of consideration shown in the document. 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 and 92 – Parole evidence given for the purpose of proving variation in the amount of consideration shown in the document would be inadmissible under S.92 of the Evidence Act. 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 and 92 – The bar under S.91 and S.92 of the Evidence Act will not apply for proving want of consideration or failure of consideration. 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 5 and 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 10 - Sale deeds only contain the signature of the vendors thereunder and not the respective vendees - That will not render those sale deeds invalid as contracts for want of mutuality on the ground that they are only unilateral instruments. All that is necessary is to ensure that the essential parts of a modern conveyance namely, the “parties, the recitals, testatum, operative words, parcels, habendum and testimonium” are present in the instrument. 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 5 and 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 10 - There is no scope any more for anybody to contend that an agreement for sale or a sale deed (deed of conveyance) executed by the prospective vendor or the vendor, as the case may be, is a unilateral document or instrument and is not a contract which can be enforced in law. 
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sections 5 and 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 10 - An agreement of sale signed by the vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser, and accepted by the purchaser, has always been considered to be a valid contract. In the event of breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. There is, however, no practice of purchaser alone signing an agreement of sale.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

A.F.A. No. 59 of 1994

Decided On: 13.01.2012

 Vasu @ Bhaskaran Vs.  Parukutty Amma & Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V. Ramkumar and K. Harilal, JJ.


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