What is difference between jurisdiction of court to try an offence and territorial jurisdiction of court as per CRPC?

 From the above discussion, it is possible to take a view

that the words “tries an offence” are more appropriate than the

words “tries an offender” in section 461 (l). This is because, lack

of jurisdiction to try an offence cannot be cured by section 462

and hence section 461, logically, could have included the trial

of an offence by a Magistrate, not empowered by law to do so,

as one of the several items which make the proceedings void. In

contrast, the trial of an offender by a court which does not

have territorial jurisdiction, can be saved because of section

462, provided there is no other bar for the court to try the said

offender (such as in section 27). But Section 461 (l) makes the

proceedings of a Magistrate void, if he tried an offender, when

not empowered by law to do.{Para 38}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO.456 OF 2019

KAUSHIK CHATTERJEE  Vs STATE OF HARYANA 

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Whether Section 3 of the Legal Metrology Act bars prosecution of accused for offences under IPC?

In the light of principles laid down, we find that Section 3 of the Act completely overrides the provisions of Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code in respect of the offences and penalties imposable for violations of the provisions of the Act, it being special Act. Therefore, if the offence is disclosed to be made out under the provisions of the Act, an Accused cannot be charged for the same offence under Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code. Reading of Section 51 of the Act makes it clear that the provisions of Indian Penal Code insofar as they relate to offences with regard to weight or measure, shall not apply to any offence which is punishable under the Act. Therefore, the provisions of Indian Penal Code which relate to offences with regard to weight and measure as contained in Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code alone will not apply. No person can be charged for an offence relating to weight or measure falling under Chapter XIII of Indian Penal Code in view of the provisions of the Act.

35. The scheme of the Act is for the offences for use of weights and measures which are non-standard and for tampering with or altering any standards, secondary standards or working standards of any weight or measure. The Act does not foresee any offence relating to cheating as defined in Section 415 of Indian Penal Code or the offences Under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code. Similarly, an act performed in furtherance of a common intention disclosing an offence Under Section 34 is not covered by the provisions of the Act. An offence disclosing a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence which is punishable Under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code is also not an offence under the Act. Since such offences are not punishable under the provisions of the Act, therefore, the prosecution for such offences could be maintained since the trial of such offences is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Similar is the provision in respect of the offences Under Sections 467, 468, 471 Indian Penal Code as such offences are not covered by the provisions of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1328-1329 of 2019 

Decided On: 04.09.2019

 The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Aman Mittal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

Hemant Gupta, J.

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Whether confession of accused recorded under TADA is admissible in trial for offences under other enactments?

 We may hasten to observe that it is now well settled that
the Designated Court, besides trying the case under TADA,
can also try any other offence with which the accused may be
charged at the same trial if the offences are connected with
offences under TADA. For, implicit power has been bestowed
upon the Designated Court to convict the accused for offences
under other enactments if there is legally admissible evidence
to establish those charges. We may usefully refer to the
dictum in paragraph 37 of the Constitution Bench judgment in
Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto (supra), which reads
thus:
“37. The legislative intendment underlying Sections 12(1)
and (2) is clearly discernible, to empower the Designated
Court to try and convict the accused for offences committed
under any other law along with offences committed under
the Act, if the offence is connected with such other offence.
The language “if the offence is connected with such other
offence” employed in Section 12(1) of the Act has great
significance. The necessary corollary is that once the
other offence is connected with the offence under TADA
and if the accused is charged under the Code and tried
together in the same trial, the Designated Court is
empowered to convict the accused for the offence under
any other law, notwithstanding the fact that no offence
under TADA is made out. This could be the only
intendment of the legislature. To hold otherwise, would
amount to rewrite or recast legislation and read something
into it which is not there.”

(emphasis supplied)
This exposition has been applied by a Two Judge Bench in a
recent decision in Ashrafkhan alias Babu Munnekhan
Pathan & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat 10 (2012) 11 SCC 606, as is evident from
paragraph 41, which reads thus:
“41. We have held the conviction of the accused to have
been vitiated on account of noncompliance
with Section
20A( 1) of TADA and thus, it may be permissible in law to
maintain the conviction under the Arms Act and the
Explosive Substances Act but that shall only be possible
when there are legally admissible evidence to establish
those charges. The Designated Court has only relied on the
confessions recorded under TADA to convict the accused for
offences under the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances
Act. In view of our finding that their conviction is
vitiated on account of noncompliance
of the mandatory
requirement of prior approval under Section 20A(
1) of
TADA, the confessions recorded cannot be looked into to
establish the guilt under the aforesaid Acts. Hence, the
conviction of the accused under Sections 7 and 25(1A)
of
the Arms Act and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive
Substances Act cannot also be allowed to stand.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Even in the present case, it is noticed that the
prosecution has essentially relied upon the confessional

statement of the accused recorded under the provisions of
TADA. That will be of no avail and certainly not admissible
against the accused in the trial for offences under other
enactments, especially when the Designated Court could not
have taken cognizance of the offence under TADA for lack of a
valid sanction.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 13591361
OF 2007
The State of Gujarat  Vs Anwar Osman Sumbhaniya 

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Dated:February 27, 2019.

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if offences are committed by unlawful assembly?

 For recording a conclusion, that a person is (i) guilty of any one of the offences Under Sections 143, 146 or 148 or (ii) vicariously liable Under Section 149 for some other offence, it must first be proved that such person is a member of an 'unlawful assembly' consisting of not less than five persons irrespective of the fact whether the identity of each one of the 5 persons is proved or not. If that fact is proved, the next step of inquiry is whether the common object of the unlawful assembly is one of the 5 enumerated objects specified Under Section 141 Indian Penal Code.

30. The common object of assembly is normally to be gathered from the circumstances of each case such as the time and place of the gathering of the assembly, the conduct of the gathering as distinguished from the conduct of the individual members are indicative of the common object of the gathering. Assessing the common object of an assembly only on the basis of the overt acts committed by such individual members of the assembly, in our opinion is impermissible.
32. The identification of the common object essentially requires an assessment of the state of mind of the members of the unlawful assembly. Proof of such mental condition is normally established by inferential logic. If a large number of people gather at a public place at the dead of night armed with deadly weapons like axes and fire arms and attack another person or group of persons, any member of the attacking group would have to be a moron in intelligence if he did not know murder would be a likely consequence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1525 and 1526-1527 of 2009

Decided On: 16.05.2018

 Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel Vs. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel and Ors.

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How to write Judgment if an unlawful assembly commits the offence?

 From the judgment of the Sessions Court, we do not see any clear findings recorded (i) as to the existence of an unlawful assembly, (ii) if it existed, how many (number of the members) were present in the unlawful assembly. It must be remembered that the accusation is that all the 17 Accused were members of the unlawful assembly. There appears to be an accusation of the commission of the offence Under Section 143 Indian Penal Code. There is no finding whether the assembly consisted of 17 members or less (number) and which of the 17 Accused were present (the identity) in the assembly. Nor is there any clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly. Consequentially, there is no finding recorded by the Sessions Court whether an offence of unlawful assembly punishable Under Section 143 was committed by all or some of the Accused. The Trial Court recorded the conviction Under Section 148 Indian Penal Code against 4 Accused. Logically it should follow that the trial court was of the opinion that there was an unlawful assembly. That means more than 5 people participated in the attack. In such a case even assuming for the sake of argument the identity of the Accused (other than the 4 convicts) is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, A-1 and A-5 who were found to have been guilty of the offence Under Section 148 should normally have been found vicariously guilty of the offence of murder along with A-10 and A-12 (provided of course that they are not prejudiced by the improper framing of charges). The record is not very clear whether the Accused were told they were to face a charge of being members of the unlawful assembly, whose common object was to commit murder of the three deceased.

37. Coming to the conviction of A-10 and A-12, the mere statement in the Sessions Court's judgment that two of the Accused were found guilty of offence punishable Under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code falls short of the requirement of law in a case where more than one person died in the transaction. Equally the other two Accused who are convicted of other offences mentioned earlier are entitled to know the details of the offence for which they are convicted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1525 and 1526-1527 of 2009

Decided On: 16.05.2018

 Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel Vs. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel and Ors.

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Whether offence committed at two different places may form part of same criminal conspiracy?

Section 223(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 clearly provides that persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction can be charged and tried together. On the other hand, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my considered view, has no application in the peculiar facts of the present case, because therein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with an issue that goods in the possession of a person who is not lawfully in possession of them, cannot be seized except under authority of law. In the present case, the facts are that a person was held by the police of Police Post Manikaran from whose possession, heroin was recovered and in the course of investigation, he disclosed that he had purchased the same from the present petitioner and further, in the course of investigation, 1 Kgs. and 500 of heroin was recovered from the residence of the petitioner at New Delhi. Therefore, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no assistance.

In the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla

(Before Ajay Mohan Goel, J.)

Okechuku Mathew .v. State of Himachal Pradesh 

Cr. MP(M) No. 1530 of 2017

Decided on December 29, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine HP 1809

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Whether offence U/S 498A of IPC can be proved through dying declaration of deceased wife?

 In Inderpal v. State of M.P. reported in (2001) 10 SCC
736 the Apex Court observes thus:
7. Unless   the   statement   of   a   dead   person
would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act there is no other provision under
which the same can be admitted in evidence. In order to
make the statement of a dead person admissible in law
(written or verbal) the statement must be as to the
cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of
the transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in
which the cause of death comes into question. By no
stretch of imagination can the statements of Damyanti
contained   in   Exhibit   P­7   or   Exhibit   P­8   and   those
quoted   by   the   witnesses   be   connected   with   any
circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her
death. Even that apart, when we are dealing with an
offence under Section 498­A IPC disjuncted from the
offence under Section 306 IPC the question of her death
is not an issue for consideration and on that premise
also Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay
so far as these materials are concerned.
“10. The only evidence to bring home charge under
Section 498A, IPC, is that of PW­4 and PW­5. In their
deposition PW­4 and PW­5 stated that their sister told
them that accused was torturing her as he wanted that
her brothers arrange a job for him or the house at Ganj
Basoda is given to him or a cash of Rs.1 lac is given to
enable him to do some business. They deposed that as
and when their sister come to their house, she would
tell them that accused used to insert cloth in her mouth
and give beatings for dowry. The trial court as well as
the High Court relied on the evidence of PW­4 and
PW­5 and held that charge under Section 498A, IPC,
against   the   accused   was   proved.   Apart   from   the
statement   attributed   to   the   deceased,   none   of   the
witnesses had spoken anything which they had seen
directly insofar as torture and harassment to Ranjana
Rani @ Raj Kumari was concerned”.
“11. The moot question is: whether the statements
attributed to the deceased could be used as evidence for
entering   upon   a   finding   that   the   accused   subjected
Ranjana Rani @ Raj Kumari to cruelty as contemplated
under Section 498A, IPC. In our considered view, the
evidence of PW­4 and PW­5 about what the deceased

Ranjana Rani @ Raj Kumari had told them against the
accused   about   the   torture   and   harassment   is
inadmissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act
and   such   evidence   cannot   be   looked   into   for   any
purpose. Except Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence
Act,   there   is   no   other   provision   under   which   the
statement   of   a   dead   person   can   be   looked   into   in
evidence”.
The statement of a dead person is admissible in law
if the statement is as to the cause of death or as to any
of the circumstance of the transactions which resulted
in her death, in a case in which the cause of death
comes into question. What has been deposed by PW­4
and PW­5 has no connection with any circumstance of
transaction which resulted in her death. The death of
Smt.   Ranjana   Rani   @   Raj   Kumari   was   neither
homicidal nor suicidal; it was accidental. Since for an
offence under Section 498A simpliciter, the question of
death is not and cannot be an issue for consideration,
we are afraid the evidence of PW­4 and PW­5 is hardly
an evidence in law to establish such offence. In that
situation Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act does not get
attracted”.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.451 OF 2004
Suresh s/o Premlal Malviya, V State of Maharashtra,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM: ROHIT B. DEO, J.
DATE:     25th JANUARY 2018.

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Whether Writing of letter to woman intending to insult her modesty can be construed as making gesture U/S 509 IPC?

That is why even a verbal attack on a woman, a gesture and other acts stated in Section 509 I.P.C. were brought under the said Section. It is clear from a reading of Section 509 I.P.C. that by introducing the said provision, legislature intended that any sort of aggression into a woman's modesty whether by any word, deed or act should be deterred, as evident from the title to the Section itself. Thus, the acts which are done intending to insult the modesty of a woman which may not necessarily involve even any physical advances are also brought within the sweep of a separate provision viz., Section 509 I.P.C.

20. In such circumstances, can it be for a moment presumed that the legislature intended that a person who writes a letter to a woman with the intention to insult her modesty should go unpunished? If such a person, instead of uttering the insulting words, puts in writing all what he determines to utter against a woman and sends it to her, intending to insult her modesty, will any court be justified in holding that the legislature expected such person to escape safely? was it the intention of the legislature that such a culprit must go unhurt only because he used his pen and not his tongue, to insult the victim? After suffering all the trauma, when a woman comes before court with the best proof for the assault or violence made on her modesty by producing the letter, can the court refuse to look into the same on the ground that the legislature never intended to bring cases involving writings within the purview of Section 509 I.P.C.?

21. I find it extremely difficult to reach a conclusion which will defeat the very object of Section 509 I.P.C. There can be little doubt that the legislature would not have intended that a person who insults the modesty of a woman by his writings must be kept out of the province of Section 509 I.P.C. In a country like India, legislature would not have ever intended that a person who expresses his attitude or intention to insult modesty of a woman by sending a letter should be absolved from criminal liability. I am of view that the very object of the provision will be defeated if a contrary view is taken. Thus, while interpreting the meaning of the relevant expression in Section 509 I.P.C. in the light of the relevant rules of interpretation, I find that 'writing of letter' to a woman, intending to insult her modesty can be construed as 'making a gesture' under Section 509 I.P.C. I feel quite confident to hold that Indian legislature's intention will not be contrary to what I have already concluded.

22. So, if the court finds that a person writes a letter to woman and that the offender intends that such letter is seen or read by such woman and he also intends thereby to insult her modesty, an offence under Section 509 I.P.C. will be clearly attracted. Charge-sheet in this case itself reveals that the Petitioner allegedly wrote insulting and obscene letters to the victim-woman. It is also clear from the records that such letters were sent to her in the name-address so that the letters will be seen and read by the victim. It further appears from the contents of those letters that prima facie, intention of the author of the letters was to insult the modesty of the woman who receives the letter. Such intention can be discerned from the nature of the language, tone and tenor of the writing.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002

Decided On: 16.02.2005

M.M. Haries Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Hema, J.

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When court should not remand case on ground that relevant offences not included in charge framed?

 Having regard to the number of persons allegedly involved in the offences, as disclosed by the prosecution, the crimes committed are of murder in the course of robbery together with lurking house trespass and house breaking by night in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment with common intention. Though Section 397 IPC deals with robbery or dacoity with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt and prescribes punishment by way of imprisonment of not less than seven years, in our view, the High Court ought to have decided the appeals on merit without remanding the case to the trial court for fresh adjudication after framing charge under Section 397 IPC and recording additional evidence, if deemed necessary.

13. The purpose of framing a charge against an accused person is to acquaint him with the incriminating facts and circumstances proposed to be proved against him in the trial to follow. The principal objective is to afford him an opportunity of preparing his defence against the charge. The possibility of prejudice to the accused arises, if he is not made conversant with the entire gamut of facts constituting the accusations leveled against him, as has been consistently propounded by this Court, amongst others, in V.C. Shukla vs. State through CBI (1980) Supp. SCC 92. Though Section 397 IPC, having regard to the case of the prosecution, may not be wholly irrelevant, the charges framed against the respondents-accused by the trial court, do adequately encompass all essential facts building up the offences imputed against them.

14. In view of the inclusion of Section 34 IPC in the array of offences, for which the respondents-accused had been charged by the trial court, as well as the facts and the evidence sought to be relied upon by the prosecution, in our estimate, the order of remand was not called for and the appeals should have been decided on merits, on the basis of the charges already framed and the materials on record. The deduction of the High Court that the omission to frame charge under Section 397 IPC has resulted in miscarriage of justice is unconvincing in the facts of this case. That meanwhile more than a decade has passed since the date of the incident, cannot also be readily over- looked.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Bharamappa Gogi Vs. Praveen Murthy & Ors. etc.

[Criminal Appeal Nos. 2216-2217 of 2010]

AMITAVA ROY, J.

Dated:9 Feb 2016

Citation:(2016)6 SCC268

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Whether same facts can constitute offence under IPC and Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act?

The contention that the provisions of IPC are ancillary to the
provisions of ITP Act ignores the settled principle that same set of facts may
constitute offences both under the IPC and a special enactment. The
Supreme Court in the decision reported as (1988) 4 SCC 655 State of Bihar 
Vs. Murad Ali Khan & others held –
“31. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute
offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can
amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the
same time constitute an offence under any other law. 
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment Delivered on: June 01, 2016
CRL.A. 723/2014
REKHA .

v
STATE .

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

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How to prove essential ingredients of offence of forgery?

The condition precedent for an offence under sections 467, 468 and 471 is forgery. The condition precedent for forgery is making a false document (or false electronic record or part thereof). This case does not relate to any false electronic record. Therefore, the question is whether the accused (petitioners), in executing and registering the general power of attorney purporting to sell a property, can be said to have made and executed false document. 

An analysis of section 464 IPC shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 

The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 

The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 

The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practiced upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. 

In short, WHEN , if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorized by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 

In Mohd. Ibrahim and others vs. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751 upon examining Section 463, 467 to 471 IPC as noted, herein above, the Court while dealing with sale-deeds executed by the accused held:

"There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorized or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of `false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorized by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code are attracted. 

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 17783 of 2010

Rajesh Gandhi And Others Vs State Of U.P. And Another

Hon'ble Suneet Kumar,J. 

Order Date :- 30.5.2016 

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When offence of defamation is made out?

The news-item, Ex. P-1, contains an impressive heading which is bound to attract the attention of the ordinary person. The heading "Bribery even in Congress Elections, Rs. 5,500 spent" will be read by him to mean that Rs. 5,500 have been spent on bribe in the Congress elections to which the news relates. Then the first sentence of the news will bring to him the information that the news pertains to the election of the President of the District Congress Committee which has recently been held and that the news is authentic. The second sentence will make it plain to him that the successful candidate in the election, the person who has been elected President, has spent Rs. 5,500 (the identical figure referred in the heading has spent on bribe) for obtaining the votes of Mandleshwars (voters who elect the District President). In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the news as a whole as understood by the ordinary person would be that the newly elected District Congress President has got himself elected by paying money to the voters which is a conduct as reprehensible as bribery. This natural and ordinary meaning of the news attributes to the plaintiff, who was the newly elected President referred in it, a disgraceful conduct tending to lower him in the estimation of right thinking members of society. The learned counsel, however, contends that as bribery in Congress elections is not prohibited under any law, the news as published cannot be held to be defamatory. This contention is without any substance. For holding a statement as defamatory it is not necessary that the statement should attribute to the plaintiff some act prohibited by law, but the test, which I have already quoted above, is to see whether the statement tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society. Although there is ''a broad territory common to law and morality", "where law and morality reinforce and supplement each other as part of the fabric of social life", there are many fields of human activity where "the law shrinks, for one reason or another, from pursuing what may nevertheless be recognized as the authentic path of morality.". (See Dennis Llloyd, the Idea of Law, pelican edition, pp. 57 and 59). It cannot, therefore, be said that imputing to a person certain acts, which are not prohibited by the law, is not to attribute to him a disgraceful conduct affecting his moral character. If the conduct attributed to the plaintiff is a disgraceful conduct affecting his moral character tending to lower him in the estimation of right thinking members of society, the test that the statement is defamatory is satisfied notwithstanding that the conduct attributed is not prohibited by the law. I have no doubt in my mind, that a right thinking Indian citizen who after every five years votes in free and fair elections to send his representatives to the Parliament and State Legislatures, would have nothing but feelings of contempt and ridicule for a person who gets elected to an important office of an important political party organisation such as the Indian National Congress by bribing the voters. Rejecting the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, I hold that the news item, Ex. P-1, in its natural and ordinary meaning adversely affected the character of the plaintiff and was per se defamatory.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

S. A. No. 334 of 1964

Decided On: 17.11.1967

 Ramakant Vs. Devilal Sharma and another

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.P. Singh, J.

Citation: 1969JabLJ:1969MPLJ805

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When offence of criminal misappropriation of property U/S 409 of IPC is not made out?

 The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant could be said to have committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the receipt-book. There can be no doubt and that it is amply proved by the oral evidence on record read with the list Ex. PA that the receipt book was entrusted to the appellant in his capacity as Patwari on 6th November, 1967 when he took charge of his post. It must equally be taken to be established that the receipt book was not in the room of the appellant when the lock was broken open and charge was forcibly taken from him on 29th December, 1967. Vide Ex. PF and PG. The receipt book was thus not returned by the appellant though he was bound to do so at the time of handing over of charge to his successor. But from this it does not necessarily follow that the appellant committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the receipt book. Section 409 can be invoked only if it can be shown that the accused being in any manner entrusted with property or with dominion over property in his capacity as public servant committed criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. The offence of criminal breach is defined in Section 405 and an essential ingredient of this offence is that the accused being in any manner entrusted with property or with dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust. Here as we have already pointed out, the appellant was admittedly entrusted with the receipt-book or in any event with dominion over it, but there is no evidence to establish that he dishonestly misappropriated the receipt book or converted it to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of the receipt book. It is quite possible that the appellant might have lost or mislaid the receipt book and hence he might have been unable to return it to the superior authorities. What the section requires is something much more than mere failure or omission to return the receipt book. The prosecution has to go further and show that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated or converted the receipt book to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of it. That, we are afraid, the prosecution has not been able to do in the present case. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant was wrongly convicted under Section 409.

Supreme Court of India

Sardar Singh vs State Of Haryana on 1 November, 1976

Equivalent citations: AIR 1977 SC 1766, 1977 CriLJ 1158, (1977) 1 SCC 463

Bench: A Gupta, P Bhagwati

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When offence of filing of false affidavit is not made out?

 Now the question is whether under the writ jurisdiction both the
orders, the first in point of time dated 24/04/2012 passed by the Deputy
Collector and the second one passed by the Sessions Judge dated
21/04/2014 are required to be interfered under the provisions of Section
482 of Criminal Procedure Code. What is urged before this Court on
behalf of the petitioner is that there is no basis for initiating the
prosecution by the Deputy Collector against the petitioner for the offence
under S.181 of Indian Penal Code inasmuch as even prima facie there is
no finding in the impugned order dated 24/04/2012 that the contents of
the affidavit dated 3/06/2003 were per se false. On this count, counter to
these arguments much is argued by learned Counsel for respondent no.2
by placing reliance on various documents which were annexed to his
complaint dated 25/08/2010 before Deputy Collector. It is argued that in
the year 2002 itself, there were notices issued against the construction
carried out by said Shyam Naik and there are various other letters and
notices issued subsequently. Even directions were given by Panchayat,
Panaji-Goa for demolition of the construction of the house constructed by
said Shyam Naik. By pointing out this it is submitted that the
construction done by Shyam Naik was not authorised and without
sanction and therefore what was mentioned by present petitioner in his
affidavit dated 3/06/2003 was false. However, in the considered opinion
of this Court whether or not the said construction was legal or illegal is
not a question to be determined here, but what is to be seen is whether
there is prima facie finding that the contents of the affidavit dated
3/06/2003 sworn by the present petitioner were false and whether such
false statement was knowingly made by the petitioner before the Deputy
Collector and Sub-Divisional Officer in the proceedings of the year 2002.
On going through the entire order dated 24/04/2012 except reproducing
the arguments of rival parties, Sub-Divisional Officer i.e. Deputy
Collector has not mentioned anything regarding the conclusion that the
contents of the affidavit dated 3/06/2003 were false and which the
petitioner was knowing or believing to be false. In fact, such prima facie
satisfaction is necessary in order to initiate a complaint for offence under
S.181 of Indian Penal Code. On this aspect, though it is tried to argue on
behalf of the petitioner that the said affidavit was filed before then Sub-8
Divisional Officer in the year 2003, the apparent action is initiated by
another Sub-Divisional Officer in the year 2012 and not by the same
Court, there is no much force in the said arguments and if otherwise
requirements of law are complied as to initiate the action under S.181 of
Indian Penal Code then successor in the office can initiate such
proceedings. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.53 OF 2014
Shri Mariano Marques V/s State of Goa,

CORAM : A.R. JOSHI, J.
DATE : 4th AUGUST, 2014
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(CRI)4322

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Whether Magistrate can frame alternative charge U/S 420 of IPC along with charge U/S 409 of IPC?

 The third contention raised on behalf of the revision applicant is that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has ordered to frame a charge under Sections 406, 408 and 409 as well as under Section 420 read with Section 114 of I.P.C. It is vehemently urged before me that the offences punishable under Sections 406 to 409 and offence under Section 420 cannot go together. The applicant has come before this Court before the actual framing of the charge against him and only after the order of framing the charge is passed. It must be mentioned that it is always open for a criminal Court to frame charges alternatively. A person can alternatively be charged under Sections 406 to 409 or under Section 420, I.P.C. It is true that the ingredients of Sections 406 to 409 and the ingredients of Section 420 are required to be considered. The offence under Sections 406, 408 or 409 and the offence under Section 420 could not go together. But if the alternative charge is framed, it could not be said that an alternative charge is illegal or invalid. In the case of Sunil Kumar Paul v. State of West Bengal AIR 1965 SC 706 :1965 (1) Cri LJ 630 the charge-sheet was framed against the accused only under Section 409, but the Appellate Court had found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 420 instead of Section 409 and had convicted the accused under that Section and the said decision has been approved by the Apex Court by observing as under :-

Where a public servant was charged and tried by the Special Court for an offence under Section 409, I.P.C, but a charge under Section 420, I.P.C. could have been framed by the Special Court under Section 236, Cr. P.C. on the basis of the allegations in the charge-sheet, the trial Court or the appellate Court can, in law, convict the accused of that offence instead of an offence under Section 409, I.P.C. if it be of the view that the offence of cheating had been established. This would be in accordance with the provisions of Section 237, Cr.P.C.

Therefore, the learned Judicial Magistrate will have to bear in mind the ingredients of 406 to 409 as well as the ingredients Section 420 and then to consider as to whether the present revision applicant would be alternatively charged under Sections 406 to 409 and Section 420, IPC.

Equivalent Citation: 1998CriLJ216, 1997GLH(2)394

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Criminal Misc. Appln. No. 970 of 1987

Decided On: 25.04.1997

 Ranjitkumar Chakravarti Vs. Co-operative Bank of Baroda Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.D. Pandit, J.

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When offences were committed in the course of one transaction, there will no misjoinder of charges?

Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed referred one more feature of the case and faintly argued that there was a misjoinder of charges since same persons who were not present at the time of the first incident, had been conjointly tried with the appellants. Those who were tried along with the appellants have been acquitted and there has been no prejudice so far as the appellants are concerned. Secondly it cannot be said that there were two isolated incidents. The incident with regard to Girdhar was an off-shoot of the incident with regard to Shyamdutt and being a consequence of the latter incident in which some of the accused were common, it could be legitimately held that the offences had been committed in the course of one transaction. Hence the trial was not vitiated.

Supreme Court of India

Jai Narain Mishra And Ors. vs State Of Bihar on 3 November, 1971

Equivalent citations: AIR 1972 SC 1764, 1973 (0) BLJR 241, 1972 CriLJ 469, (1971) 3 SCC 762, 1972 (4) UJ 183 SC

Bench: A Ray, D Palekar

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Whether offence punishable u/s.185 of M.V. Act can be said to be a 'cognizable' offence?

The   aforesaid   discussion   leads   to   the   following
conclusion.  
(i) Since the power conferred on a police officer to arrest
a person who has committed an offence punishable under
Section 185 of the M.V. Act, is not an unqualified power, and is
conditioned by two requirements: 
(a) That such offence must have been committed in
the presence of such police officers. 
(b) That such police officer, at that time, must be in
uniform. 
The offence punishable u/s.185 of the M.V. Act cannot be said
to be a 'cognizable' offence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1849 OF 2010

Shri Sandeep Indravadan Sagar V State of Maharashtra and others

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Whether offences which affect public health must be dealt with severely?

Whether the court while awarding a sentence would take recourse to the principle of deterrence or reform or invoke the doctrine of proportionality, would no doubt depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case.

While doing so, however, the nature of the offence said to have been committed by the accused plays an important role. The offences which affect public health must be dealt with severely. For the said purpose, the courts must notice the object for enacting Article 47 of the Constitution of India.

Supreme Court of India

State Of Punjab vs Prem Sagar & Ors on 13 May, 2008

Bench: [ Sirpurkar], [ Sinha]

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Whether complaint for offence of bigamy u/s 494 of IPC can be filed by second wife?

This Court finds that the High Court has quashed the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate under Section 498A of IPC on the spacious ground that the marriage of the appellant with the respondent no. 2 is void and as respondent no. 2 is not the wife, she was not entitled to lodge first information report with the police for commission of offence u/s. 498A IPC and on the basis of police report, cognizance of the said offence against the appellant could not have been taken by the learned Magistrate. Such reasoning is quite contrary to the law declared by this Court in Reema Aggarwal Vs. Anupam and others (2004) 3 SCC 199. After examining the scope of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and holding that a person who enters into marital arrangement cannot be allowed to take shelter behind the smoke screen of contention that since there was no valid marriage the question of dowry does not arise, this Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat, has held as under:-

Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting

legalistic approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of

money. The nomenclature dowry does not have any magic charm written over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but also his relations

who are covered by Section 498A. The legislature has taken care of children born from invalid marriages. Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with legitimacy of children

of void and voidable marriages. Can it be said that the legislature which was conscious

of the social stigma attached to children of void and voidable marriages closed its eyes to

the plight of a woman who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences

entered into the marital relationship? If such

restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding

harassment to a woman over demand of

money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been

declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate to construe the expression husband to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the

woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in

any manner or for any of the purposes 

enumerated in the relevant provisions-

Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the

legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The

absence of a definition of "husband" to specifically include such persons who

contract marriages ostensibly and cohabit with such woman, in the purported exercise of their role and status as husband is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions."

17. In view of firm and clear law laid down on the subject, this Court is of the confirmed view that the High Court was not justified at all in quashing the proceedings initiated against the appellant under Section 498A of the Code on the ground that the respondent no. 2 was not wife within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC and was not entitled to maintain complaint under the said provision. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1428 OF 2011

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6349 of 2010)

A.Subash Babu vs State Of A.P.& Anr on 21 July, 2011

Bench: J.M. Panchal, H.L. Gokhale

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