Showing posts with label S 96 of CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 96 of CPC. Show all posts

Sunday, 7 February 2021

Does Section 96 of CPC restrict the scope of cross-objections only to questions of merit excluding any aspect of procedural lapses?

 The first appellate Court has heavily relied on the case holding

of Bhanu Kumar Jain v Archana Kumar. (2005) 1 SCC 787 Then, it has held that the judicial dictum of Bhanu Kumar Jain is unmistakable and that an appeal under Section 96 of CPC cannot accommodate the grounds available for the appellants under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. Therefore, it has concluded

that instead of filing the cross-objections, the contesting defendants could have invoked Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

12. In this context, we may straight away refer to para 24 of Bhanu Kumar Jain. It declares that an appeal under Section 96(2) of CPC against an ex parte decree could be filed on two grounds: (i) that the materials brought on record [the merits] in the ex parte suit proceedings by the plaintiff would not entail a decree in his favour, and (ii) that the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing. Thus, the procedural lapse that

has led to the ex parte decree can be very much a ground of appeal under Section 96. It is under the rubric “that the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.”


21. Though the Appellate Court has acknowledged the contesting

defendants’ right to file cross-objections, it has concluded that under Section 96 of the Code, no plea about procedural lapses such as nonservice of suit summons can be taken; it ought to be purely on the merits.

22. We have already examined Bhanu Kumar Jain but have found no such judicial dictum as suggested by the First Appellate Court. Even Section 96 of the Code imposes no such restriction. Section 96, in fact, allows the first appeal against “every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction.” Under sub-section (2), it explicitly mentions that “an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.”


25. The First Appellate Court has rejected those cross-objections on the premise Section 96 of the Code allows a challenge only on the merits, but not on procedural lapses. As we have already discussed, Bhanu Kumar Jain’s dictum does not endorse this interpretation of Section 96, as the First Appellate Court has erroneously believed.

26. So, I am constrained to hold that the First Appellate Court has

misread the case holding of Bhanu Kumar Jain and misapplied its judicial dictum. Pithily put, an appeal under Section 96 can contain pleas not only on the merits but also on questions like non-service of suit summons and the illegality of the order setting the defendant ex parte – procedural lapses.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

SECOND APPEAL NO.61 OF 2019

 Mr. Carlton Gilbert Fortes V/s Smt. Sonhia Lobo,


Coram: - DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.

Date: - 3rd March 2020

Citation: 2020(6) MHLJ 703

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Sunday, 23 August 2020

Supreme Court: First appellate court must give reasons on all issues and contentions


It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing on law as well as on fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right of the Appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for re-consideration. Therefore, the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1485 of 2020 
Decided On: 12.02.2020

 Malluru Mallappa  Vs.   Kuruvathappa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Abdul Nazeer and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.


Author:S. Abdul Nazeer, J.
Citation: (2020) 4 SCC 313,MANU/SC/0166/2020
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Saturday, 22 August 2020

Supreme Court: Stranger to suit can not file appeal unless he is aggrieved person

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an
appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid
provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an
appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category
of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects 
person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of
the Appellate Court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Smt. Jatan
Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd.1:-
“It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer
an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should
be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment.”


19. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a
psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily
be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized (vide
Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York5 and State of
Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.6).

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2701-2704 OF 2020

SRI V.N.KRISHNA MURTHY  Vs  SRI RAVIKUMAR 

KRISHNA MURARI, J.
Dated:21ST AUGUST, 2020
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Tuesday, 21 April 2020

Whether the court can look into the merits of the case while deciding the application for condonation of delay in civil appeal?

This appeal by the first defendant in a suit for partition is filed along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 30 days in filing the appeal. She says that she was suffering from back pain and was, therefore, prevented by sufficient cause from filing this appeal within the time prescribed. We would have been inclined to issue notice on that ground for condonation of delay. But we thought it appropriate to look into the merits of the appeal as well since nothing forbids a look into the merits in terms of Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure even while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in connection with a first appeal under Section 96 CPC. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

R.F.A. No. 268 of 2011

Decided On: 21.06.2011

Aliyamma Isow  Vs.  P.J. Joseph and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.B. Radhakrishnan and S.S. Satheesachandran, JJ.

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When should appellate court suspend the operation of the order of lower court during pendency of appeal?

The petitioner alleges that the decree of the trial court entails serious civil consequences and that pursuant to the decree, the plaintiffs are purchasing the stamp papers with the intention of selling the property and consequently the defendant has approached the Court seeking protection of his rights.

2. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner-defendant and having perused the record, this Court finds that where a statutory remedy of an appeal is available and where serious civil consequences follow from an order, it is imperative for the appellate court to suspend the operation of the order.

3. In Mool Chand Yadav and Anr. v. Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur and Ors. 1983 AWC 121, the Supreme Court held that where orders are challenged in appeal which orders have serious civil consequences, the judicial approach required that during the pendency of the appeal, the operation of the order should be suspended more so when the appeal had been admitted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Decided On: 19.12.2008

 Bhagwan Shankar Bajpayee  Vs. District Judge and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Tarun Agarwala, J.

Citation: 2009(3) Civil court cases 429 ALL
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Sunday, 24 November 2019

Difference between scope of first appeal and application for setting aside exparte decree

We have, however, no doubt in our mind that when an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code is dismissed, the defendant can only avail a remedy available there against, viz, to prefer an appeal in terms of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. Once such an appeal is dismissed, the Appellant cannot raise the same contention in the First Appeal. If it be held that such a contention can be raised both in the First Appeal as also in the proceedings arising from an application under Order 9, Rule 13, it may lead to conflict of decisions which is not contemplated in law.

37. The dichotomy, in our opinion, can be resolved by holding that whereas the defendant would not be permitted to raise a contention as regards the correctness or otherwise of the order posting the suit for ex-parte hearing by the Trial Court and/ or existence of a sufficient case for non-appearance of the defendant before it, it would be open to him to argue in the First Appeal filed by him against Section 96(2) of the Code on the merit of the suit so as to enable him to contend that the materials brought on record by the plaintiffs were not sufficient for passing a decree in his favour or the suit was otherwise not maintainable. Lack of jurisdiction of the court can also be a possible plea in such an appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8246 of 2004 
Decided On: 17.12.2004

Bhanu Kumar Jain  Vs. Archana Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N. Santosh Hegde, B.P. Singh and S.B. Sinha, JJ.


S.B. Sinha, J.
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Supreme Court: Party can not be denied right to file first appeal after dismissal of application for setting aside exparte decree

 An appeal Under Section 96(2) Code of Civil Procedure is a statutory right, the Defendant cannot be deprived of the statutory right merely on the ground that earlier, the application filed Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed. Whether the Defendant has adopted dilatory tactics or where there is a lack of bona fide in pursuing the remedy of appeal Under Section 96(2) of the Code, has to be considered depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In case the court is satisfied that the Defendant has adopted dilatory tactics or where there is lack of bona fide, the court may decline to condone the delay in filing the first appeal Under Section 96(2) Code of Civil Procedure. But where the Defendant has been pursuing the remedy bona fide Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, if the court refuses to condone the delay in the time spent in pursuing the remedy Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, the Defendant would be deprived of the statutory right of appeal. Whether the Defendant has adopted dilatory tactics or where there is lack of bona fide in pursuing the remedy of appeal Under Section 96(2) of the code after the dismissal of the application Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, is a question of fact and the same has to be considered depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8898 of 2019
Decided On: 21.11.2019

 N. Mohan  Vs.  R. Madhu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2020 SC 41
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Sunday, 15 September 2019

Whether Bar On Appeal Against Compromise Decree is Applicable Where Court Declines To Record Some Part Of Compromise?

Again, in Kishun alias Ram Kishun (supra) it was held that
where the compromise is contested, the bar under Section 96 (3) will
not come into play. The order passed by the court on such contest
and the resultant decree would be subject to appeal and second
appeal. It has been observed that “when there is a contest on the

question whether there was a compromise or not, a decree accepting
the compromise on resolution of that controversy, cannot be said to
be a decree passed with the consent of the parties. Therefore, the bar
under Section 96(3) of the Code could not have application. An
appeal and a second appeal with its limitations would be available
to the party feeling aggrieved by the decree based on such a disputed
compromise or on a rejection of the compromise set up.”
The law laid down in Ram Kishun has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in a more recent judgement in Daljit Kaur and
another Vs. Muktar Steels Private Limited and others (2013) 16 SCC 607 holding
that bar under Section 96 (3) CPC will not get attracted where the
compromise is disputed. In my considered opinion, the same would
also be the position where the court refuses to record compromise or
part of it on the ground that it is not lawful, as in the instant case.
The legal position which thus emerges after amendment of
Civil Procedure Code by Act No.104 of 1976 is that the appellant in
an appeal against a decree passed in suit after recording a
compromise or refusing to record a compromise is entitled to contest
the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not,
have been recorded (Order 43 Rule1-A). The same principle would
apply where the court records some part of the compromise while

declines to record the remaining part. In such cases, the bar
contained under Section 96 (3) CPC would not get attracted. 

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3147 of 2019

 Sri Ram Krishna Vivekanand Shishu Niketan Vs
Sri Onkarnath And 19 Others

Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Gupta,J.
Dated:Order Date :- 3.9.2019
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Wednesday, 28 August 2019

Whether suit dismissed on ground of res judicata will be decree even if it was passed without framing of issue?

 In terms of Section 2(2) of the Code, in case, the court adjudicating the case, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to any one or more or all of the matters in controversy in the suit, the requirement of decree is satisfied. Such determination can be preliminary or final. Rejection of a plaint is deemed to be a decree Under Section 2(2) of the Code. Only two orders are excluded-(i) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order and (ii) any order of dismissal for default. Order XLIII of the Code has provided for appeals from orders. The impugned order does not come under Order XLIII. The order has conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to one of the matters in controversy in the suit, viz., Res Judicata. True, it is not an order passed on framing an issue. But at the same time, there is adjudication on the controversy as to whether the suit is barred by Res Judicata in the sense there is a judicial determination of the controversy after referring to the materials on record and after hearing both sides.

15. The impugned order dismissing the suit on the ground of Res Judicata does not cease to be a decree on account of a procedural irregularity of non-framing an issue. The court ought to treat the decree as if the same has been passed after framing the issue and on adjudication thereof, in such circumstances. What is to be seen is the effect and not the process. Even if there is a procedural irregularity in the process of passing such order, if the order passed is a decree under law, no revision lies Under Section 115 of the Code in view of the specific bar under Sub-section (2) thereof. It is only appealable Under Section 96 read with Order XLI of the Code.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4543 of 2016 

Decided On: 13.04.2016

 Rishabh Chand Jain  Vs.  Ginesh Chandra Jain

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kurian Joseph and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation: 2017(1) MHLJ 16 SC
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Friday, 23 August 2019

Principles regarding mode of disposal of first appeal

 In this context, we may usefully refer to Order 41 Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

ORDER 41

APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES

***

31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.--The judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state--

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.

13. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. It is necessary to make it clear that the approach of the first appellate court while affirming the judgment of the trial court and reversing the same is founded on different parameters as per the judgments of this Court. In Girijanandini Devi MANU/SC/0287/1966 : AIR 1967 SC 1124, the Court ruled that while agreeing with the view of the trial court on the evidence, it is not necessary to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given in the trial court judgment which is under appeal should ordinarily suffice. The same has been accepted by another three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari MANU/SC/0091/2001 : (2001) 3 SCC 179. However, while stating the law, the Court has opined that expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage to be adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. We are disposed to think, the expression of the said opinion has to be understood in proper perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the first appellate court can quote passages from the trial court judgment and thereafter pen few lines and express the view that there is no reason to differ with the trial court judgment. That is not the statement of law expressed by the Court. The statement of law made in Santosh Hazari has to be borne in mind.

14. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao MANU/SC/0019/1974 : (1974) 2 SCC 492 is worthy of noticing, although the context was different. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power of the Division Bench hearing a letters patent appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that the letters patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law. The purpose of referring to the said decision is only to show that when the letters patent appeal did lie, it was not restricted to the questions of law. The Appellant could raise issues pertaining to facts and appreciation of evidence. This is indicative of the fact that the first appellate court has a defined role and its judgment should show application of mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of which it agrees with the trial court. There has to be an "expression of opinion" in the proper sense of the said phrase. It cannot be said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of law. Needless to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is without any substance and it is another thing to elucidate, analyse and arrive at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7418 of 2009

Decided On: 01.07.2019

R.S. Anjayya Gupta Vs.   Thippaiah Setty and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Citation:( 2019)7 SCC 300
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Saturday, 3 August 2019

Whether Validity of decree passed on compromise can be challenged by a separate suit?

Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second Defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other Defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second Defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second Defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.
12. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi MANU/SC/0152/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 581 where also this Court had observed:

As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII, or an appeal Under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 13 of the Code.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 10416-10417 of 2014 
Decided On: 20.11.2014

 R. Rajanna Vs.  S.R. Venkataswamy

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur and R. Banumathi, JJ.

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Sunday, 16 June 2019

Whether Time spent to set aside ex-parte decree is “sufficient cause” to condone delay in filing Appeal?

A conjoint reading of Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section
96(2) CPC indicates that the defendant who suffered an ex-parte
decree has two remedies:- (i) either to file an application under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree to satisfy
the court that summons were not duly served or those served, he
was prevented by “sufficient cause” from appearing in the court
when the suit was called for hearing; (ii) to file a regular appeal
from the original decree to the first appellate court and challenge
the ex-parte decree on merits.
11. It is to be pointed out that the scope of Order IX Rule 13
CPC and Section 96(2) CPC are entirely different. In an
application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the Court has to

see whether the summons were duly served or not or whether
the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
appearing when the suit was called for hearing. If the Court is
satisfied that the defendant was not duly served or that he was
prevented for “sufficient cause”, the court may set aside the exparte
decree and restore the suit to its original position. In terms
of Section 96(2) CPC, the appeal lies from an original decree
passed ex-parte. In the regular appeal filed under Section 96(2)
CPC, the appellate court has wide jurisdiction to go into the
merits of the decree. The scope of enquiry under two provisions
is entirely different. Merely because the defendant pursued the
remedy under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, it does not prohibit the
defendant from filing the appeal if his application under Order IX
Rule 13 CPC is dismissed.
12. The right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory
right and the defendant cannot be deprived of the statutory right
of appeal merely on the ground that the application filed by him
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC has been dismissed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4669 OF 2019


BHIVCHANDRA SHANKAR MORE  Vs  BALU GANGARAM MORE 

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:May 07, 2019.
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Sunday, 9 September 2018

Whether compromise decree passed by appellate court can be challenged on ground of fraud?

 In this case, we prefer to follow this course
keeping in view the bar contained in Order 23 Rule
3A
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short
‘the CPC’) for filing the suit in a case of this nature
and also another bar created under Section 96 (3) of
the CPC, which prohibits filing of any appeal,
though in this case it does not apply because the
dispute arose in second appeal filed under Section
100 of the CPC.
8) The purpose in making reference to these two
provisions is to show the legislative intent which
does not allow the parties to take recourse to these
legal remedies to challenge the compromise once it
is arrived at in the suit/appeal. The only exception

being if the challenge is founded on the ground of
fraud committed by the parties in obtaining any
judicial orders, the suit, in appropriate case, may
lie.
9) In this case, we find that the High Court did
not examine the plea of the appellants properly
keeping in view the facts alleged in the application
and while negativing the attack observed that the
appellants are free to take recourse to any other
legal remedies. Since the second appeal was
disposed of affecting the rights of the parties in the
light of compromise, the proper Forum to reexamine
the issue, in our opinion, is the High
Court, which disposed of the second appeal rather
than any other Forum to examine the issue at this
stage. It is more so when we find that the High
Court did not go into the details in the proceedings
filed by the appellants in its correct perspective.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.8353 OF 2014

Ved Pal (D) V Prem Devi (D) through LRs

Dated:August 10, 2018
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Print Page

Saturday, 12 May 2018

Notes on Civil appeal

APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREE: S 96-99A .Order 41 of CPC.

The word appeal has not been defined in the code. The term refers to the removal of cause from an inferior to a superior court for the purpose of testing the soundness of the decision of the inferior court. It is thus a remedy provided by law for getting the decree of lower court nullified, and is in fact,a complaint made to a higher court that the decree of lower court is unsound and wrong. An appeal must be preferred against
the whole decree and not any item or items in it. An appeal is only a continuation of original proceedings and it is a stage in the suit itself.

S 96 of CPC lays down four primary rules regarding appeals from original decree as follows:
1) Unless otherwise provided, an appeal lies from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorised to hear appeals from decisions of such a court.
2) An appeal can be even from an exparte decree.
3) However,no appeal lies from a consent decree.
4) Except on a question of law,no appeal lies from a decree in any suit cognizable by a small causes court,if value of subject matter of original suit does not exceed Rs. Ten Thousand.
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Sunday, 8 April 2018

Whether high court can decide appeal on merit if it was preferred against order of remand?

The High Court failed to see that when the first Appellate Court itself did not decide the appeal on merits and considered it proper to remand the case to the Trial Court, a fortiori, the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits. Moreover, Order 43 Rule 1(u) confers limited power on the High Court to examine only the legality and correctness of the remand order of the first Appellate Court but not beyond that. In other words, the High Court should have seen that Order 43 Rule 1(u) gives a limited power to examine the issue relating to legality of remand order, as is clear from Order 43 Rule 1(u) which reads thus:- “1(u) an order under rule 23 or rule 23A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court”
25) It is well settled law that the jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits can be exercised by the Appellate Court only when the appeal is filed under Section 96 or 100 of the Code against the decree. Such was not the case here.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
J. Balaji Singh vs Diwakar Cole & Ors on 24 April, 2017
Bench: R.K. Agrawal, Abhay Manohar Sapre
                  
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Friday, 17 March 2017

Whether high court should decide appeal only on preliminary issue of limitation?

 The second question that requires consideration is
whether the High Court was right in merely deciding the issue
of limitation in a first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code
of Civil Procedure without going into the merits of the case.
Quite recently, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391
this Court had
occasion to consider the issue whether, under Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate court ought to decide
all the issues before it or not. Reference was made to a very
large number of decisions rendered by this Court and it was
concluded, particularly relying upon Madhukar v. Sangram 
(2001) 4 SCC 756
decided by a Bench of three learned judges of this Court that
sitting as a court of first appeal it is the duty of the High Court
to deal with all the issues and evidence led by the parties before
recording its findings.
25. In so far as the present appeal is concerned, the High
Court only considered the issue of limitation and did not
consider the other issues in the appeal. This was
impermissible. The result is that since we do not agree with the
view taken by the High Court on the issue of limitation, there is
no option but to set aside the view expressed by the High Court
and following the decisions of this Court, remand the matter to
the High Court to decide the remaining issues in the first
appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6687 OF 2016
Madina Begum & Anr.
 v
Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors. 
Dated:August 1, 2016
Print Page

Saturday, 22 October 2016

Whether high court can decide issue of limitation in first appeal without going into merits of case?

The second question that requires consideration is
whether the High Court was right in merely deciding the issue
of limitation in a first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code
of Civil Procedure without going into the merits of the case.
Quite recently, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar(2015) 1 SCC 391
this Court had
occasion to consider the issue whether, under Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate court ought to decide
all the issues before it or not. Reference was made to a very
large number of decisions rendered by this Court and it was
concluded, particularly relying upon Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756
decided by a Bench of three learned judges of this Court that
sitting as a court of first appeal it is the duty of the High Court
to deal with all the issues and evidence led by the parties before
recording its findings.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6687 OF 2016
Madina Begum & Anr. 
 versus
Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey & Ors
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINESC751
Print Page

Sunday, 28 August 2016

When court should not direct return of plaint if it has no jurisdiction to try civil suit?

Since the trial Court has directed the plaint to be returned
for   presentation   before   the  proper   forum,   reference   to  provisions   of
Order VII Rule 10(1) would be necessary.  Said provisions reads thus:
10. Return of plaint.­­­ (1) [Subject to the provisions
of Rule 10­A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the suit
be returned to be presented to the Court in which the
suit should have been instituted.
(Emphasis supplied on underlined portion)
The aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the plaint can be returned
to the plaintiff for being presented to the Court in which the suit should
have been instituted. It is only when the Civil Court in which the suit has
been filed comes to the conclusion that the plaint ought to be returned

for   presentation   to   another   Court   either   on   account   of   lack   of   its
pecuniary and/or territorial jurisdiction that such direction can be given.
This position is further clear from a reading of provisions of Order VII
Rule 10A and Rule 10B of the Code.
12. The scheme of Rule 10 of Order VII of the Code is thus
clear that the plaint can be directed to be returned  only after the Court
comes to the conclusion that the suit ought to have been instituted in
another Court.  If, however, the Civil Court comes to the conclusion that
the suit as filed is barred by law due to which its cognizance cannot be
taken by the Civil Court, the question of returning the plaint for its
presentation   to   another   Court   in   which   the   suit   should   have   been
instituted would not arise. It would then be a case of the jurisdiction of
the civil Court being barred thereby precluding any contest on merits.
If   any   statutory   remedy   under   a   statute   is   available   to   the   plaintiff
thereby resulting in a bar to the maintainability of the civil suit, the
question of returning  the plaint for being  presented before the such
forum  would not arise. The expression “suit” as employed in Rule 10(1)
of Order VII of the Code has a definite connotation and a statutory
appeal under Section 406 of the said Act can hardly be equated with a
suit under the Code.  The finding that the civil court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the subject matter of the suit has the force of a decree under
Section2(2)   of   the   Code   and,   therefore,   a   remedy   of   appeal   under
Section 96 of the Code would be available.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.80 OF 2015
       
Shri   Akola   Gujrati   Samaj           Vs  Akola   Municipal   Corporation,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
  CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

  DATED:  23­-09-­2015.

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Saturday, 14 May 2016

When first appellate court is last court of facts?

 ‘Perversity’ has been the subject matter of umpteen
number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by

several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court,
under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last
court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are
perverse.
10. In Krishnan v. Backiam and another 
(2007) 12 SCC 190
, it has been held
at paragraph-11 that:
“11.It may be mentioned that the first appellate
court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of
facts. The High Court in second appeal under
Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate
court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the
findings of fact of the first appellate court can be
challenged in second appeal on the ground that
the said findings are based on no evidence or are
perverse, but even in that case a question of law
has to be formulated and framed by the High
Court to that effect. …”
11. In Gurvachan Kaur and others v. Salikram (Dead)
Through Lrs.(2010) 15 SCC 530, at paragraph-10, 
this principle has been
reiterated:
“10.It is settled law that in exercise of power
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of
fact recorded by the first appellate court which is
the final court of fact, unless the same is found to
be perverse. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 231 OF 2015
DAMODAR LAL ... APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
SOHAN DEVI AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENT (S)
Dated;January 5, 2016
KURIAN, J.:
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC 78
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When appellate court should not interfere with finding of trial court?

 The Appellate Court may not interfere with the finding of the trial court unless the finding recorded by the trial court is erroneous or the trial court ignored the evidence on record. The High Court reversed the decree passed by the trial court without discussing oral and documentary evidence and several grounds raised before the trial court. The High Court veered away from the main issue and went on to elaborate on the law of arbitration and the mode of setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, which in our view, was not warranted. Without considering the oral and documentary evidence, the High Court erred in interfering with the factual findings recorded by the trial court and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
Supreme Court of India
Venkatesh Constrn.Co vs Karnataka Vidyut Karkhane ... on 20 January, 2016

Bench: T.S. Thakur, A.K. Sikri, R. Banumathi
REPORTABLE
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.       461-462  OF  2016
 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.29680-29681 of 2010)

Citation;(2016)4 SCC119
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