Supreme Court Summarises Principles regarding rights of Transferee Pendente Lite To Get Impleaded In Suit As A Matter Of Right

 58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge:

i. First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to come on record, either Under Order I Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure or Under Order XXII Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, as a general principle;

ii. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right;

iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute Rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party;

iv. Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on record;

v. Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit may be improperly conducted by the Plaintiff on record;

vi. Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not being bound by the judgment does not arise and consequently he would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he remains unrepresented;

vii. Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and,

viii. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of interest in the property, as envisaged Under Order XXII Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit.

61. If the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 feel that they have been duped or cheated by the Respondent No. 7/Defendant No. 3, then it shall be open for them to avail appropriate legal remedy before the appropriate forum in accordance with law for the purpose of recovery of the amount towards sale consideration paid at the time of execution of the sale deed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1180-1181 of 2025.

Decided On: 29.01.2025

H. Anjanappa and Ors. Vs. A. Prabhakar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0118/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court Lays Down Principles : When Can Stranger To Suit Seek Leave To Appeal Against Decree?

43. The principles governing the grant of leave to appeal may be summarised as under:

i. Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively;

ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal;

iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person;

iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court;

v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned;

vi. The expression "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury;

vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and

viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1180-1181 of 2025.

Decided On: 29.01.2025

H. Anjanappa and Ors. Vs. A. Prabhakar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0118/2025.

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Whether Protection Under Domestic Violence Act is Available To Husband Or Male Member Of Family?

In the present case, the respondent i.e. the husband of the petitioner has initiated proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act. Prima facie it seems in view of Section 2(a), the protection of the Act is not available to a male member of the family and more particularly the husband. For the aforesaid reasons, the proceedings in complaint case No. 1296/2022 pending before the learned MM, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ CRL.M.C. 6715/2022

 NT v. VT

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

Dated:  23.01.2023

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Bombay HC: Transgender Person Who Underwent Surgery To Change Gender To Female Can File Complaint Under Domestic Violence Act

 On perusal of paragraphs 105 and 129, there is no manner of doubt that transgender persons or either a male or female who has performed a sex change operation are entitled to gender to their choice. The object and purpose of the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act 2005 is to provide more effective protection of the right of the women guaranteed who is victims of violence of any kind that occurs within the family. Domestic violence has been recognized human rights issue and a serious deterrent to development-The Vienna Accord of 1994, the Beijing Declaration, and the Platform for Action (1995). The need to pass legislation like the protection of women from domestic violence Act was found necessary as the existing civil law was inadequate to address a woman who was and is subjected to cruelty by their husband and their family relatives in recognition of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, while interpreting the definition of aggrieved persons in tune with the object and purpose of the Act, such definition needs to be interpreted with the broadest possible terms. The word 'woman' in section 2(a) is no more limited to the binary of women and men and includes the transgender person also who has changed her sex in tune with her gender characteristics. Therefore, in my opinion, the Transgender who has performed surgery to change gender to a female, needs to be termed as an aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is, therefore, held that a person who has exercised his right to decide the self-identified gender of women is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4037 of 2021

Decided On: 16.03.2023

Vithal Manik Khatri Vs. Sagar Sanjay Kamble and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1221/2023.

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Whether a person can be added as party to the lis if no legal right is conferred on him under the statute?

Section 31(1)of the RERA Act uses the expression “any aggrieved person”. The word “person” is defined under Section 2(28) but in Section 31(1) the said word “person” is further qualified by “aggrieved”. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceedings unless he satisfies that he falls within the category of “aggrieved person”. Only a person who has suffered legal injury can challenge the act/action/order in a Court of law. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. The phrase “aggrieved person” used in Section 31(1) of the RERA Act would mean a person who is regulated or governed by the said Act and there is an injury of the right conferred under the said Act. The phrase used in Section 31(1) is “any aggrieved person” and not “any person”. The Appellant is not covered by the RERA Act and therefore he cannot be said to be an “aggrieved person” to take recourse to Section 31(1) of the RERA Act. The Appellant complainant can at the most lead evidence as witness but he cannot claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The Appellant complainant cannot be a party to the lis because no legal right is conferred on him by the RERA Act. Thus from the above analysis it is evident that the Appellant having no concern whatsoever cannot be said to have any locus standi to knock the doors of the RERA Act. The Appellant has knocked wrong door by taking recourse to RERA for redressal of his grievances.

{Para 14}

15. In the instant case, admittedly the Appellant is not an “allottee”in the project being developed by the Respondent No.3. The allegation made by the Appellant are with respect to violation of various laws by the developer in the development of the project. The grievance appears to be made in the nature of private or public interest and not what is governed and regulated by the RERA Act.

16. Therefore, in my view, the Appellant cannot be said to be a“person aggrieved” to make a complaint under Section 31(1) of the Act and take recourse to the provisions of RERA Act for redressal of his grievances.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SECOND APPEAL NO. 432 OF 2023

Dr. Yogesh Keshav Bele. Vs Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory

Authority & Ors. 

CORAM : JITENDRA JAIN, J.

DATE : 25th AUGUST, 2023.

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Supreme Court: Stranger to suit can not file appeal unless he is aggrieved person

Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an

appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid

provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an

appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category

of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects 

person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of

the Appellate Court. Reference be made to the observation of this Court in Smt. Jatan

Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd.1:-

“It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer

an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should

be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment.”

19. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a

psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily

be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized (vide

Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York5 and State of

Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.6).

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2701-2704 OF 2020

SRI V.N.KRISHNA MURTHY  Vs  SRI RAVIKUMAR 

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Dated:21ST AUGUST, 2020

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Calcutta HC: Mother is entitled to claim relief under domestic violence Act against son

In the present case, the petitioner and the opposite party are related

with each other i.e. the relationship of son and mother. They have been in a

relationship with each other where both the parties lived together in a

residence.

The Learned Courts below after considering the evidence adduced by the

parties and the materials placed on record came to the concurrent findings

that the present opposite party was entitled to get a protection order under

Section 18 of the Act of 2005, monetary relief including medical expenses @

rate of Rs.8,000/- per month from the date of the order and also entitled to get

Rs.50,000/- as damages for mental torture and emotional distress.

Both the Learned Courts elaborately analyzed the evidence on record,

the relationship between the parties, their economic condition and the income

of the other two sons of the present opposite party/mother. Thereafter came to

the conclusion that the aggrieved party/mother was entitled to get the reliefs

under the Act of 2005. The conclusion drawn by the Learned Courts below is

based on facts and law.

It is a settled principle of law that in exercise of its power under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court should not, in the

absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and

Appellate Court. Moreso, the High Court in exercise of its inherent power

should not reanalyze and re-assess the materials particularly the evidence on

record.

On perusal of the entire materials on record, it cannot be held that the

Learned Courts below committed an error in holding that the present opposite

party/mother is entitled to get the reliefs under the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction

C.R.R. 2126 of 2015

Goutam Chanda Vs  Gouri Rani Chandan 

Judgment on : 02.12.2019

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Madhumati Mitra

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Whether court can grant relief under domestic violence Act if there is not pleading that there was domestic violence to wife?

 Thus, in order to claim relief under Section-12 of the Act which permits an "aggrieved person" to present an application to the magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act, levelling the allegations of Domestic Violence. Thus, the reliefs contemplated under the Act are thus available to an aggrieved person who alleges that she is or has been in domestic relationship with the respondent and was subjected to any Act of Domestic Violence by the respondent. Allegation about the commission of a Domestic Violence Act is prerequisite for the magistrate or Court of competent jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the Protection from Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and grant of any reliefs contemplated under the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3553 of 2018 and Contempt Petition No. 459 of 2017

Decided On: 04.05.2018

Prakash Kumar Singhee  Vs. Amrapali Singhee

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 665

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Golden rule for interpretation of statute of Limitation

 The Appellants have justly relied on the exposition in the case of Lala Balmukund (supra), (in particular paragraphs 20 and 21), which has answered similar issue regarding the date of obtaining decree and while explicating the term "obtaining a copy", has held that the time will start only after the decree is drawn. It is apposite to reproduce the dictum in paragraph 19, which reads thus:

19. We do not wish to encumber this judgment with a detailed discussion of all the citations and the reasoning advanced therein in support of one or the other view. It will be sufficient to say that upon the language of Section 12(2) both the constructions are possible, but the one adopted by the majority of the courts, appears to be more consistent with justice and good sense. The Limitation Act deprives or restricts the right of an aggrieved person to have recourse to legal remedy, and where its language is ambiguous, that construction should be preferred which preserves such remedy to the one which bars or defeats it. A court ought to avoid an interpretation upon a statute of limitation by implication or inference as may have a penalising effect unless it is driven to do so by the irresistible force of the language employed by the Legislature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10222 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24862 of 2012)

Decided On: 28.03.2018

Mohinder Singh Vs.  Paramjit Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra, C.J.I. and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation:(2018) 5 SCC698.

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What is duty of court while deciding domestic violence proceeding?

 Regard being had to the nature of the legislation, a more sensitive approach is expected from the courts where under the 2005 Act no relief can be granted, it should never be conceived of but, before throwing a petition at the threshold on the ground of maintainability, there has to be an apposite discussion and thorough deliberation on the issues raised. It should be borne in mind that helpless and hapless "aggrieved person" under the 2005 Act approaches the court under the compelling circumstances. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise the facts from all angles whether a plea advanced by the Respondent to nullify the grievance of the aggrieved person is really legally sound and correct. The principle "justice to the cause is equivalent to the salt of ocean" should be kept in mind. The court of law is bound to uphold the truth which sparkles when justice is done. Before throwing a petition at the threshold, it is obligatory to see that the person aggrieved under such a legislation is not faced with a situation of non-adjudication, for the 2005 Act as we have stated is a beneficial as well as assertively affirmative enactment for the realisation of the constitutional rights of women and to ensure that they do not become victims of any kind of domestic violence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10223 of 2014)

Decided On: 20.11.2015

Krishna Bhatacharjee Vs.  Sarathi Choudhury and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

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Study material on domestic violence Act

http://www.lawweb.in/search/label/domestic%20violence

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/542601/

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Whether court should grant maintenance to wife under DV Act if there is no domestic violence to her?

Learned counsel Mrs. Sarnaik is perfectly justified in submitting that the provisions under the said enactment cannot be invoked unless the party alleges an act of domestic violence and approach the Court in the capacity as an "aggrieved person". Though the application filed by the applicant can be entertained in the pending proceedings under the Specific Relief Act, while entertaining an application which is filed Sub-section-1 of Section-12, it is imperative that the person approaching the Court is an "aggrieved person". Though the Family Court in the impugned order has noted the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner-husband that the preliminary requirement of the domestic violence has not been proved by the petitioner and therefore application is not maintainable, the Family Court did not pay any heed to the said submission and rather proceeded to decide the matter on its own merits. The Court has merely noted that as per provision of Section-20 of the D.V. Act aggrieved by had claimed monetary relief for herself and her children however, a whether the applicant is an "aggrieved person" has not at all been considered by the Family Court. Though the Act of Domestic Violence would be established after rendering evidence before the Court, at least the Court prima facie must be satisfied that the person approaching is as an "aggrieved person". It is not every person who can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under the 2005 Act, simply for claiming maintenance, as the purpose of the enactment is to protect rights of women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The Court has refused to consider the said aspect of the matter.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3553 of 2018 and Contempt Petition No. 459 of 2017

Decided On: 04.05.2018

 Prakash Kumar Singhee Vs. Amrapali Singhee

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

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What are powers of high court U/S 482 of CRPC in proceeding under domestic violence Act?

A plain reading of Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which saves inherent power of the High Court, indicates that the power is to be exercised by the High Court not just to quash the proceedings, rather it has to be exercised for specific as well as broader purposes. The exercise of the inherent power has been delimited to such purposes as giving effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This would show that the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked not only to seek quashing of a proceeding, but also to give effect to any order under the Code or to challenge any order of the Court, which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court or generally to secure the ends of justice. This would mean that not only the respondent-man but also the aggrieved person-woman may feel like approaching the High Court to give effect to any order or to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure ends of justice. This would show that this power is capable of being used by either of the parties and not just by the respondent seeking quashing of the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. If this power is removed from Section 28 of the D.V. Act, the affected woman may as well or equally get adversely hit, and this is how, the very object of the D.V. Act may get defeated.

59. Now, one incidental question would arise as to from what stage the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would become applicable and in our view, the answer could be found out from the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the D.V. Act. A combined reading of these provisions shows that the commencement of the proceedings would take place the moment, the Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of the application and passes any judicial order including that of issuance of notice. Once, the proceeding commences, the procedure under Section 28 of the D.V. Act, subject to the exceptions provided in the Act and the rules framed thereunder, would apply. In other words, save as otherwise provided in the D.V. Act and the rules framed thereunder and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 28, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. shall govern the proceedings under Sections 12 to 23 and also those relating to an offence under Section 31 of the D.V. Act on their commencement.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application [APL] No. 578 of 2011

Decided On: 03.05.2018

Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare Vs. Mangala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Dharmadhikari, S.B. Shukre and Swapna Joshi, JJ.

Citation: 2018(3) MHLJ 913

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Whether complaint for offence of bigamy can be filed by second wife?

Having noticed the agony, trauma etc. which would be suffered by the woman with whom second marriage is performed, if the marriage is declared to be void, let us make an attempt to ascertain the purpose of enacting Section 494 IPC. This Section introduces monogamy which is essentially voluntary union of life of one man with one woman to the exclusion of all others. It enacts that neither party must have a spouse living at the time of marriage. Polygamy was practiced in many sections of Hindu society in ancient times. It is not a matter of long past that in India, hyper gamy brought forth wholesale polygamy and along with it misery, plight and ignominy to woman having no parallel in the world. In post vedic India a King could take and generally used to have more than one wife. Section 4, of Hindu Marriage Act nullifies and supersedes such practice all over India among the Hindus. Section 494 is intended to achieve laudable object of monogamy. This object can be achieved only by expanding the meaning of the phrase "aggrieved person". For variety of reasons the first wife may not choose to file complaint against her husband e.g. when she is assured of re-union by her husband, when husband assures to snap the tie of second marriage etc. Non-filing of the complaint under Section 494 IPC by first wife does not mean that the offence is wiped out and monogamy sought to be achieved by means of Section 494 IPC merely remains in statute book. Having regard to the scope, purpose, context and object of enacting Section 494 IPC and also the prevailing practices in the society sought to be curbed by Section 494 IPC, there is no manner of doubt that the complainant should be an aggrieved person. Section 198(1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, amongst other things, provides that where the person aggrieved by an offence under Section 494 or Section 495 IPC is the wife, complaint on her behalf may also be filed by her father, mother, sister, son, daughter etc. or with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption. In Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0109/1979 : (1979) 2 SCC 170 this Court has ruled that in order to attract the provisions of Section 494 IPC both the marriages of the accused must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties must have been duly performed. Though Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any marriage solemnized, if it contravenes the conditions specified in Clause (i) of Section 5 of the said Act, shall be null and void, it also provides that such marriage may on a petition presented by either party thereto, be so declared. Though the law specifically does not cast obligation on either party to seek declaration of nullity of marriage and it may be open to the parties even without recourse to the Court to treat the marriage as a nullity, such a course is neither prudent nor intended and a declaration in terms of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act will have to be asked for, for the purpose of precaution and/or record. Therefore, until the declaration contemplated by Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act is made by a competent Court, the woman with whom second marriage is solemnized continues to be the wife within the meaning of Section 494 IPC and would be entitled to maintain a complaint against her husband.

Even otherwise, as explained earlier, she suffers several legal wrongs and/or legal injuries when second marriage is treated as a nullity by the husband arbitrarily, without recourse to the Court or where declaration sought is granted by a competent Court. The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant. Section 494 does not restrict right of filing complaint to the first wife and there is no reason to read the said Section in a restricted manner as is suggested by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Section 494 does not say that the complaint for commission of offence under the said section can be filed only by wife living and not by the woman with whom subsequent marriage takes place during the life time of the wife living and which marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such wife. The complaint can also be filed by the person with whom second marriage takes place which is void by reason of its taking place during the life of first wife.

A bare reading of the complaint together with statutory provisions makes it abundantly clear that the Appellant having a wife living, married with the Respondent No. 2 herein by concealing from her the fact of former marriage and therefore her complaint against the Appellant for commission of offence punishable under Section 494 and 495 IPC is, maintainable and cannot be quashed on this ground.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1428 of 2011.

Decided On: 21.07.2011

 A. Subash Babu

Vs.

 State of A.P. and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.M. Panchal and H.L. Gokhale, JJ.

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Whether proceeding under domestic violence Act can be conducted by brother of aggrieved woman?

 Under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, an aggrieved person or a
Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person has
been given a right to file an application to the Magistrate seeking various
reliefs permissible under the Act.   The conditions necessary for preferring
such an application are that the application must be filed by an aggrieved
person or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person and that the
aggrieved person must be a woman, who is or who has been in domestic
relationship with the respondent and who is subjected to any act of domestic
violence by the respondent.  In the present case, the application has been filed
on behalf of the respondent by her brother.   The reason being that, at the
time of filing of the application, the respondent was doing her fellowship in
medicine at Bangalore.  The brother of an aggrieved person would certainly
fall within the meaning of the expression “any other person on behalf of the
aggrieved person”, used in Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.656 OF 2015
Dr. Akshay s/o Navalkishor Lakhotiya,

­­ V
   Dr. Arti w/o Akshay Lakhotiya,

  CORAM   :  S. B. SHUKRE, J.

Dated :   15th DECEMBER, 2016.
Citation: 2017(2) MHLJ 235 Bom

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Who is competent to file appeal under domestic violence Act?

Even in a case where the application under Section 12 is not filed by the aggrieved person but is filed by a protection officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person, such protection officer or any other person will be an aggrieved person if an order sought by such protection officer or any other person has not been granted by the Magistrate. Hence, the expression 'aggrieved person' in Section 29 of the Act is wide enough not only to take in the parties to the application but also a protection officer or a person who has moved the Magistrate on behalf of the aggrieved person. Anyhow, such a finer distinction as is attempted by the revision petitioner does not arise in the present revision since the revision petitioner was the respondent to the application filed by his daughter and the revision petitioner is competent to file an appeal against the impugned order in view of Section 29 of the Act. I am not persuaded to accept the distinction drawn by the learned Counsel with regard to Sections 24 and 29 of the Act since both the said provisions are in consonance with the statutory scheme under the Act. The impugned order is clearly appealable under Section 29 of the Act and if so, this revision is incompetent and the remedy of the revision petitioner is to challenge the impugned order by filing an appeal under Section 29 of the Act.

Equivalent Citation : I(2008 )DMC 365

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. R.P. No. 1216 of 2007

Decided On: 04.09.2007

 Chithrangathan Vs. Seema

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V. Ramkumar, J.

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Whether aggrieved person can file petition under DV Act at place of her temporary residence?

Learned counsel for the opposite party on the other
hand contended that in the application itself, in column no.3, it is
mentioned that the opposite party is now residing in the house of
her elder daughter namely, Santoshi Kumari Sahu at Phulbani
and that her present address is at Nadikhanda Sahi, Phulbani
and therefore, the Court of S.D.J.M., Phulbani has got
jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Section 27 of the 2005 Act deals with the jurisdiction
of the competent Court to pass necessary orders under the Act
and also to try the offences under the Act.
Section 27 of 2005 Act reads as follows:-
“27. Jurisdiction.-(1) The Court of Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class or the Metropolitan
Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local
limits of which:-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or
temporarily resides or carries on business
or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on
business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen,
shall be the competent Court to grant a
protection order and other orders under
this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be
enforceable throughout India.”
Thus in view of section 27, if the ‘aggrieved person’
either permanently or temporarily resides at a place, the Court of
Judicial Magistrate of the First Class within the local limits whose
jurisdiction such place situates is competent to entertain an
application under Section 12 of 2005 Act and to grant protection
order and other orders under the Act or try the offences under
the Act.
The legislature in its wisdom has provided that
jurisdiction can be invoked by an ‘aggrieved person’ before the
competent Court on the basis of temporary residence. The word
“temporarily” means lasting, existing, serving for a time only
which is not permanent. A temporary residence is a temporary
dwelling place of the aggrieved person who has for the time 
being decided to make that place as her home. An aggrieved
person who has lost her matrimonial home due to domestic
violence and was not even allowed to stay at her ancestral house
or at her father’s place for some reason or the other and is
compelled to take residence, though temporarily, either with one
of her relatives or with one of her friends at a place where the
domestic violence was not committed can invoke the jurisdiction
of the Magistrate within whose local limits such place of
temporary residence situates. The temporary residence includes
a place where the aggrieved person was compelled to reside in
view of commission of domestic violence. She may not have
decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length
of time but for the time being. A place where the aggrieved
person has gone on a casual visit, a lodge or hostel or a guest
house or an inn where she stays for a short period or a residence
at a place simply for the purpose of filing a case against another
person cannot be a place which would satisfy the term
“temporarily resides” as appears in section 27. The legislature
has provided the aggrieved women who are financially,
economically or physically abused wide options to institute a
case which best suited their convenience, comfort and
accessibility. Section 2(i) of 2005 Act indicates “Magistrate” 6
means the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, or as the case
may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the
area were the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise
or the respondents resides or the domestic violence is alleged to
have taken place. Thus even if for a temporary period of time, an
aggrieved person is residing at a place, she can seek reliefs
under the 2005 Act by filing an appropriate application before
the competent Court within the local limits whose jurisdiction
such place situates.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
TRPCRL NO. 20 of 2016

 Rabindra Nath Sahu V Smt. Susila Sahu 

 P R E S E N T:
MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO

Dated- 14.09.2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4931

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Whether divorced muslim wife is entitled to make application under Domestic violence Act?

Thus a woman having lived in a domestic relationship
with a male, is entitled to claim monetary relief under the
Act irrespective of the fact that the status of the
matrimonial relationship survives or not. That apart, the
assertion made by Shri Jain that the husband Mohd. Rafique
had legally divorced Smt. Rahmat Bano is per se untenable.
The revisionist Mohd. Rafique was put a specific question
during cross-examination that in order to give divorce to his
wife, a Muslim husband is required to pay her the Mehar
and the Iddat amount. He agreed to this suggestion.
However, he did not state that while forwarding the alleged
divorce notice (Ex.NA/11), the wife Rahmat Bano was
offered and paid the Mehar and the Iddat amount. All that is
mentioned in the divorce notice is that the Mehar amount of
Rs.351/- was paid earlier. At what point of time, was the
amount paid is not reflected in the document nor did Shri
Mohd. Rafique during his evidence state anything about the
payment of Mehar and the Iddat money to Rahmat Bano.
Thus, the contention advanced by Shri Jain that Smt.
Rahmat Bano was legally divorced and the matrimonial
relationship stood severed leading to an inference that the
lady ceased to be an aggrieved person is not sustainable on
facts.
Reportable
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR.
(1) S.B. CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No.636/2015
Mohd. Rafique vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Dated: 23/04/2016
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA

Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL468

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Who is person "aggrieved person" in proceeding under bombay regulation Act?

The only contention which was raised by the petitioner before me was that Radhabai was not the owner of the property but that the petitioner was the owner. Grant of an heirship certificate to the petitioner would affect its rights in the property and therefore it was a person aggrieved having a right to challenge the impugned order. In view of clauses 7 and 8 of the Regulation and the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Aloysius D'Souza (supra) the contention cannot be accepted. The grant of an heirship certificate to the respondents would not in any way affect the right, title or interest, if there be any, of the petitioner in any of the properties of the deceased Radhabai. The petitioner does not claim to be an heir of Radhabai. Consequently, the present petitioner would not be a person aggrieved by any order of grant or refusal of grant of the heirship certificate. As such, the petitioner cannot be a person aggrieved by the order allowing the amendment and would have no right to contest the said order and challenge it by a writ petition.

Bombay High Court

Group Grampanchayat vs Sunanda Shamrao Bandishti & Ors on 14 July, 2010

Bench: D.G. Karnik

WRIT PETITION NO.1995 of 2010

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When a person who is not party to suit can file appeal?

 Presently, it is apt to note that Sections 96 and 100
of the Code make provisions for preferring an appeal
from any original appeal or from a decree in an
appeal respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not

enumerate the categories of persons who can file an
appeal. If a judgment and decree prejudicially
affects a person, needless to emphasize, he can
prefer an appeal. In this context, a passage from
Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. M/s. Golcha
Properties Private Ltd. AIR 1971 SC 374
 is worth noting: -
“It is well settled that a person who is not a
party to the suit may prefer an appeal with
the leave of the appellate Court and such
leave should be granted if he would be
prejudicially affected by the judgment.”
14. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh and another
 AIR 1974 SC 994,Sarkaria, J., while dealing with the maintainability of
an appeal by a person who is not a party to a decree
or order, has stated thus: -
“84. Firstly there is a catena of authorities
which, following the doctrine of Lindley,
L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co., (1894) 2
Ch 410 have laid down the rule that a
person who is not a party to a decree or
order may with the leave of the Court,
prefer an appeal from such decree or order
if he is either bound by the order or is
aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected
by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will not be
refused to a person who might have been
made ex nominee a party – see Province of
Bombay v. W.I. Automobile Association,
AIR 1949 Bom 141,

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35271 of 2011)

Hardevinder Singh Vs  Paramjit Singh.

Dated;January 07, 2013
Citation; 2013(1)ALLMR(SC)946, 2014(2)MhLj126, , (2013)9SCC261,

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