Showing posts with label set off. Show all posts
Showing posts with label set off. Show all posts

Tuesday, 28 November 2023

What is the difference between set-off and counter-claim?

 The difference between set-off and counter-claim lies in their nature and purpose in legal proceedings:

O 8 R 6 of CPC provides for set off:

  1. Set-off: Set-off refers to the adjustment or cancellation of mutual debts or claims between parties involved in a legal dispute. It allows a defendant to reduce or eliminate their liability by setting off a claim they have against the plaintiff. In other words, it is a defense mechanism used by the defendant to counterbalance the plaintiff's claim by asserting their own claim against the plaintiff. The purpose of set-off is to achieve a fair and equitable resolution of the dispute by considering the mutual claims between the parties.

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Saturday, 24 December 2022

Supreme Court: Set-Off Under Section 428 CrPC Can't Be Claimed For Detention Undergone For Offence In Foreign Country

Suffice for us to say that the judgment on this issue in Atul Manubhai Parek1 case discusses the earlier two opinions in Raghbir Singh1 case and Najakat Ali Mubarak Ali1 case to opine that the Accused cannot claim a double benefit Under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As already stated, the law would have application within the country and does not have anything to do with extra-territorial application where the trial and conviction has taken place for a local offence, i.e. Portugal in this case.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 679 of 2015 and 180/2018

Decided On: 11.07.2022

Abu Salem Abdul Kayyum Ansari Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0870/2022

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Sunday, 18 September 2022

Important Provisions of CPC(Part 4 ) ( O 6 to O 8 of CPC)

 ORDER VI

Pleadings Generally

1. Pleading.—“Pleading” shall mean plaint or written statement.

344[2. Pleading to state material facts and not evidence

4. Particulars to be given where necessary.—In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary , particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.

6. Condition precedent.—Any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified in his pleading by the plaintiff or defendant, 

7. Departure.—No pleading shall, except by way of amendment raise any new ground of claim or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the previous pleadings of the party pleading the same.

8. Denial of contract.—Where a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the express contract alleged or of the matters of fact from which the same may be implied, and not as a denial of the legality or sufficiency in law of such contract.

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Saturday, 15 August 2020

Questions and answer on law part 10


Q. Whether accused who has undergone imprisonment as undertrial can be granted set off if he is convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment by court?
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Monday, 27 April 2020

Whether the defendant, who admits the validity of the claim of the plaintiff, can plead a set-off?

WHAT IS SET-OFF AND ITS ORIGIN

21. A set-off is defined in the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, to mean "a mode of defence, whereby the defendant acknowledges the justice of the plaintiffs demand on the one hand but on the other, sets up a demand of his own to counterbalance it either in whole or in part". The Courts have repeatedly dealt with the distinction between (i) a set-off (ii) abatement (iii) a counter claim and (iv) adjustment. A set-off, strictly speaking, is not a defence to the action in which it may be filed. The essential nature of a set-off is that it does not defeat a plaintiffs claim by a valid defence, but seeks to project the satisfaction of the plaintiffs claim. Therefore, it is only a defendant, who admits the validity of the claim of the plaintiff, who can plead a set-off. It may also be put differently in that a person pleading set-off indirectly admits the validity of the plaintiffs claim, but contends that the claim is satisfied.

22. A look at the origin of the right to set-off would show that it was the creature of two statutes of the early Eighteenth Century designed to prevent the imprisonment of the debtor of a person not truly indebted because there was a mutual debt. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF STATE OF TELANGANA

C.R.P. No. 6745 of 2018

Decided On: 10.04.2019

M.V. Ramana Rao  Vs.  N. Subash

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V. Ramasubramanian and Dr. Shameem Akther, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2020 Telangana 27
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Tuesday, 16 July 2019

Study material on plea bargaining

[Chapter XXI-A
PLEA BARGAINING
265-A. Application of the chapter.—(1) This chapter shall apply in respect of an accused against whom—
(a) the report has been forwarded by the officer in charge of the police station under Section 173 alleging therein that an offence appears to have been committed by him other than an offence for which the punishment of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years has been provided under the law for the time being in force; or
(b) a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on complaint, other than an offence for which the punishment of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years, has been provided under the law for the time being in force, and after examining complainant and witnesses under Section 200, issued the process under Section 204,
but does not apply where such offence affects the socio-economic condition of the country or has been committed against a woman, or a child below the age of fourteen years.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Central Government shall, by notification, determine the offences under the law for the time being in force which shall be the offences affecting the socio-economic condition of the country.
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Sunday, 7 October 2018

How to grant set off to accused on conviction if he is simultaneously arrested and detained in two or more cases?

Various High Courts have expressed on this question. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court has dissented from a contrary view taken by a Single Judge of that High Court and held in K.C. Das vs. The State (1979 Criminal Law Journal
362) that the statute does not make any distinction between the first case and the second case for application of Section 428 of the Code. A Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati in Lalrinfela vs. State of Mizoram and ors. (1982 Criminal Law Journal 1793) has adopted the same view. Lahiri and Hansaria, JJ, said in the said decision that if the accused is simultaneously arrested and detained in two or more cases and on conviction obtains set off for the period of his detention in the first case he is not ineligible to obtain set off for the period in the subsequent cases; in each case the court is to count the number of days the accused was in such detention separately and the liability to undergo imprisonment on conviction should be restricted to the remainder of the terms of the imprisonment imposed on him in that case.
A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gedala Ramulu Naidu vs. State of A.P. and anr. (1982 Criminal Law Journal 2186) and a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Chinnasamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and ors. (1984 Criminal Law Journal 447) have also adopted the same view in tune with the interpretation given by us. While speaking for the Division Bench of the Madras High Natarajan, J (as he then was) has made a survey of most of the decisions thus far rendered by different High Courts and opted to flow with the view adopted by all the other High Courts almost uniformly.
We have no reason to think that the High Courts mentioned above have gone wrong in taking the view that Section 428 of the Code permits the accused to have the period undergone by him in jail as an under-trial prisoner set off against the period of sentence imposed on him irrespective of whether he was in jail in connection with the same case during that period. We therefore, respectfully dissent from the view expressed by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana(supra).
Supreme Court of India
State Of Maharashtra And Anr vs Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali on 9 May, 2001


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi and S.N. Phukan, JJ.
Citation:AIR 2001 SC 2255
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Sunday, 13 May 2018

Basic concepts of CPC Part 3 definitions


Order S 2(14) of CPC
An order has been defined as the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree.

Difference between decree and order.
Both a decree and an order are adjudication by a civil court and both relate to matters in controversy. However the following are six points of distinction between the two:
1) A decree is an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to any or all matters in controversy;an order on the other hand may or may not finally determine the rights of parties.
2) A decree can only originate from a suit that is proceeding commenced by a plaint. An order may originate from a suit as well as from any other proceeding commenced by an application.
3)Except in certain suits where two decrees(one preliminary and the other final) are passed, in every suit there is only one decree, whereas many orders can be passed in a single suit.
4) A first appeal always lies from a decree. However no appeal lies from an order unless it is appealable order.
5) While appealability is the rule and non-appealability is the exception in the case of a decree,in the case of an order, it is just the reverse.
6) While in the case of a decree, an aggrieved person has the right to second appeal,in an appealable order,he does not have such a right.
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Sunday, 21 January 2018

When court should not set aside entire jail sentence while upholding conviction of accused?

Section 325 of Indian Penal Code

325. Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.-Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.



22. So far as Section 325 Indian Penal Code is concerned, its reading would show that once the Accused is held guilty of commission of offence punishable Under Section 325 Indian Penal Code, then imposition of jail sentence and fine on the Accused is mandatory. In other words, the award of punishment would include both, i.e., jail sentence and fine. So far as jail sentence is concerned, it may extend upto 7 years as per Court's discretion whereas so far as fine amount is concerned, its quantum would also depend upon the Court's discretion.

25. In our considered opinion, the High Court was, therefore, not right in setting aside the entire jail sentence of Respondent No. 1 while upholding his conviction Under Section 325 Indian Penal Code. The High Court, in our view, ought to have either upheld the award of jail sentence of four years awarded by the Sessions Court or reduce the jail sentence to any reasonable term but it had no jurisdiction to fully set aside the jail sentence and substitute it by imposing only fine of Rs. 10,000/-.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2437 of 2010

Decided On: 06.11.2017

The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs.Tribhuwan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 5249,(2018)1 SCC 90
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Saturday, 13 May 2017

How to use statement U/S 164 of CRPC and S 27 of Evidence Act?

The practice of omnibus marking of Section 164 statement of witness deserves to be deprecated. The relevant portion of such prior statements of living persons used for contradiction or corroboration Under Section 145/157 of the Evidence Act deserves to be marked separately and specifically.
 The practice of whole sale marking of confession statement of Accused persons for introduction of the relevant statement admissible Under Section 27 of Evidence Act deserves to be deprecated. Ideally the admissible portion and that portion alone, must be extracted in the recovery memos (Mahazar or Panch-different nomenclature used in different parts of the land) within inverted commas. Otherwise the relevant portion alone written separately must be proved by the Investigating Officer. Back door access to inadmissible evidence by marking the entire confession statement in the attempt to prove the admissible portion Under Section 27 of Evidence Act should be strictly avoided.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No. 1 of 2017
Decided On: 30.03.2017
 In Re: To Issue Certain Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies in Criminal Trials
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.

Citation: 2017 ALLMR(CRI)1747 SC
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Wednesday, 13 July 2016

Whether Judge awarding punishment less than minimum without reason is liable for departmental enquiry?

The Appellant was recruited as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) and
Judicial Magistrate in 1981 in the judicial service of the State of Gujarat.
He was promoted as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) in 1996. The charges
which emanated against him from a chargesheet dated 31 August 2001
related to his work as a judicial officer when he was posted as Chief
Judicial Magistrate at Bhuj from 6 May 1996 to 15 June 1998. Two
criminal cases involving offences punishable under Section 135 of the
Customs Act 1962 and the Imports & Exports (Control) Act 1947 were tried
by him.
4 In Criminal Case 1293 of 1995, the Appellant delivered a judgment
on 22 January 1997 convicting the accused, but awarded a sentence of
imprisonment less than the minimum prescribed by Section 135.
Moreover, the sentence of imprisonment was so structured that after
allowing the benefit of a set-off, the accused was not required to remain in
jail for a further period. In the second criminal case, Criminal Case 675 of
1994, the trial involved offences inter alia under Section 135 of the
Customs Act 1962. Fourteen accused were alleged to be involved in the
smuggling of 275 silver slabs of a value of ₹ 5,86,50,620/-. The trial of
two of the accused who are absconding was separated from the rest. By a
judgment dated 11 March 1997 the Appellant held the twelve accused who
were brought to trial to be guilty of the charges. However, save and
except for five of the accused persons, the Appellant awarded less than the
minimum punishment prescribed under Section 135. All the accused were
granted a set-off. 
 It is not in dispute that the cases in question related to goods to
which Section 123 applied and the market price whereof exceeded rupees
one lakh. The offences were punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years and with fine. The proviso spells out
that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be
recorded in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be for
less than three years. Sub-section 3 of Section 123 provides what would
not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding a sentence
of imprisonment for a term of less than one year. The Appellant was
evaluating, in Criminal Case 675 of 1994, a situation involving the
smuggling of 275 silver slabs worth ₹.5,86,50,620/-. The explanation of
the Appellant that he was recently promoted to the cadre of CJM and was
not aware of the provisions of Section 135 was not accepted by the
Disciplinary Committee (or by the Full Court). As a judicial officer who
was in service for over fourteen years, the Appellant could not have been
unmindful of and was duty bound to have read the governing provisions
of the statute under which the offence was sought to be established. It is
inconceivable that a judicial officer would do so in two successive trials
without apprising himself of the law or the punishment provided by the
legislature. The Appellant awarded sentences ranging from three months
to five years of imprisonment to different accused. No reasons appear
from the record of the judgment, for awarding less than the minimum
sentence prescribed.
18 We have duly perused the judgments rendered by the Appellant and
find merit in the finding of the High Court that the Appellant paid no heed
whatsoever to the provisions of Section 135 under which the sentence of
imprisonment shall not be less than three years, in the absence of special
and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the
Court. Most significant is the fact that the Appellant imposed a sentence
in the case of each accused in such a manner that after the order was
passed no accused would remain in jail any longer. Two of the accused
were handed down sentences of five months and three months in such a
manner that after taking account of the set-off of the period during which
they had remained as under-trial prisoners, they would be released from
jail. The Appellant had absolutely no convincing explanation for this
course of conduct.
19 A disciplinary inquiry, it is well settled, is not governed by the strict
rules of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of misconduct
in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a preponderance of
probabilities. The High Court while exercising its power of judicial
review under Article 226 has to determine as to whether the charge of
misconduct stands established with reference to some legally acceptable
evidence. The High Court would not interfere unless the findings are
found to be perverse. Unless it is a case of no evidence, the High Court
would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there is some
legal evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the
sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or
re-evaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is not
possible to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High
Court on the charge of misconduct. The charge of misconduct was
established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000.
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos 6116-6117 OF 2016
[Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.34674-34675 of 2012]

R R PAREKH V HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
DATED:JULY 12, 2016
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Saturday, 9 April 2016

WHETHER ACCUSED CONVICTED OF AN OFFENCE CAN COUNT THEIR UNDER-TRIAL DETENTION PERIOD IN A SEPARATE CASE FOR SEEKING BAIL?

Those convicted of an offence cannot count their under-trial detention period in a separate case for seeking bail. There can be no concurrence (simultaneous occurrence of events) of under-trial detention in one case with post-conviction sentence in another for the purpose of bail, the Punjab and Haryana high court has ruled while hearing a bunch of bail matters.
Serial offenders used to claim detention in one case as custody for another crime committed, while seeking bail. Due to the longer detention shown, they would often be considered for bail by the courts, and after coming out on bail would again indulge in crime. “Now, habitual criminals will be restrained from getting benefit of same custody in many FIRs, and ultimately, it will result in their staying in jail for longer periods. The order will also instil confidence in society,” said Haryana additional advocate general Surinder Singh Pannu, who was associated with the case.
The high court held that a convict could not serve the sentence in one case and simultaneously show that he was in custody under trial. It should be kept in mind that a crime might have an individual victim, yet it also transcended into an offence against the state and the criminal jurisprudence of every age strove to strike a balance between the rights of the accused and those of society. 
“When a person in under-trial detention in one case is convicted and sentenced in another case, his detention in the first case ceases and the clock stops till such time as he is released in the second case, and his period of under-trial detention in the first case would again start only after he is released (either on bail or on acquittal in appeal) in the second case,” said justice Ajay Tewari in his order.
The high court also made it mandatory for the prosecution to submit custody certificates before the judges in lower courts at the time of consideration of prayer for bail or at the time of sentencing of the accused so that courts could decide cases in “perspective”. So far, it was mandatory to produce custody certificates during the proceedings only in the high court.
The high court also directed Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh to work out an effective custody certificate jointly and forward it to all jails in both the states and the union territory. The high court gave a month’s time to the respondents to comply with the directions. The high court registry has also been directed to circulate a copy of this order to all courts, jails and public prosecutors within a month.
One of the petitions was of Tejinder Singh, a Punjab resident, convicted in 10 cases, all involving physical violence, who had cited under-trial detention and post-conviction sentence period of multiple cases clubbed together to make a case for his bail. During the hearing of the case, the high court had also made Haryana and Chandigarh as parties and appointed an amicus to adjudicate the issue.

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Tejinder Singh @ Teja vs State Of Punjab on 17 March, 2016
CRM-M-21934-2015 (O&M)                                     

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Tuesday, 7 July 2015

Whether counter claim needs to satisfy conditions governing claim in the nature of set off under O 8 R 6 of CPC?

A perusal of the above provisions makes it clear that there is no requirement that the counter claim must be of the. same nature as the claim of the plaintiff or that it must be arising out of the same transaction. In fact the words "any right or claim in respect of the cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff make it very clear that the counter-claim is not subjected to the same restriction as a set off is under O. VIII R. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
i) It is not necessary that the counter claim under O. VIII R. 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure must satisfy the conditions which govern the claim in the nature of a set off under O. VIII R. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
ii) A counter claim can be raised under O. VIII R. 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure even after the written statement is filed.
Bombay High Court
Datta Bandu Sadale And Others vs Sridhar Payagonda Patil And ... on 10 March, 1992
Equivalent citations: AIR 1992 Bom 422, (1992) 94 BOMLR 180, 1992 (1) MhLj 784
Bench: A Savant
Citation; 1992 MHLJ784
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