To what extent the Session Judge or Magistrate can permit accused to put his defence at pre-cognizance stage as per S 223 of BNSS?

 The transition from the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) ushers in significant procedural shifts. Among the most impactful is the mandatory pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223 BNSS. This provision, a substantive departure from the CrPC's silent pre-cognizance stage, aims to embed natural justice at the very inception of criminal proceedings. However, the efficacy and fairness of this new 'filter' mechanism hinge critically on robust appellate oversight by Session Courts.

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Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant

had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of

the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the

Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said

application and could have refused to direct for the

registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an

application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural

irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given

circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an

order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or

without jurisdiction. {Para 32}

33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain

an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless

the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies

provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate

is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct

the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the

application/complaint discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so

passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction

and would not stand vitiated on this count.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.18084 OF 2024

ANURAG BHATNAGAR & ANR. Vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. 

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 895.

Dated: JULY 25, 2025

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, order of disposal of property during pendency of criminal trial will be final order or interlocutory order?

Three types of orders under Section 457(1) can be passed in various eventualities. Occasion to pass an order for disposal of property can arise in various circumstances. It can be in a situation where the property is subject to decay or may be of such a nature that it cannot be retained in the same form or condition beyond certain time or that the retention thereof is either harmful to the public or the disposal thereof is in the public interest. The second type of orders can be in the circumstances when somebody approaches the concerned Criminal Court claiming to be entitled to possess such property. If the claimant in that regard is able to satisfy the Court about his claim regarding possession to the property, certainly the Court is empowered to pass appropriate order in that regard subject to conditions regarding production thereof in the Court whenever required. The third eventuality can also arise when the property is required to be kept in custody of somebody to enable him to produce it in the course of trial or inventory or whenever required by the Court and at the same time, the person entitled to possess such property cannot be ascertained. In such circumstances also the Court can pass appropriate order for delivery of property to a person ready and willing to produce the same as and when required by the Court and subject to conditions to be specified by the Court. {Para 6}

7. Considering the ingredient of Section 457(1) of the Code, it may appear to be the power invariably to be exercised at the interim stage and, therefore, any order passed in exercise of such power has to be an interlocutory order. Undoubtedly, the term "interlocutory" will have to be understood with reference to the expression used in that regard in Section 397 of the Code. The Sub-section (2) of Section 397 clearly debars the exercise of revisional power in case of any interlocutory order passed by the Criminal Court. Considering the same, can it be said that merely because the power under Section 457(1) can be invoked even before the disposal of inquiry or trial, every such order passed thereunder would be an interlocutory order? Can it be said that because the order to be passed under Section 457(1) would relate to delivery of property in the course of inquiry or trial, it would amount to an interlocutory order? As seen above, the exercise of power under Section 457(1) can be in three different circumstances. Will such exercise of power irrespective of the eventuality in which such power is exercised, would result in an interlocutory order?

8. As seen above, there are three eventualities visualised for exercise of power under Section 457(1), and one eventuality clearly refers to disposal of property, while the other to delivery of the property and the third one for custody. Once the property is disposed of during the pendency of the trial or before the conclusion of the trial, in our considered opinion, any order resulting in disposal of property can hardly be said to be an interlocutory order. Such an order would automatically result in final adjudication in relation to the property ordered to be disposed of. The disposal may also include destruction of the property. In case the property is destroyed, nothing further remains to be considered in relation to the property. Obviously, therefore, any such order can, by no stretch of imagination, be said to be an interlocutory order. Such an order will put an end to all the rights or interest in the property.

9. As regards the delivery of property to any person entitled for possession thereof, it will stand on the same footing as that of disposal of the property. In case of such delivery of property, it would be only after ascertaining the right of the person claiming to be entitled to have possession of such property. Obviously, therefore, the Court will have to decide the issue relating to the right to possess and accordingly deliver the property to the person who is entitled to possess the same. Being so, such an order deciding the issue regarding right to possess the property cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. For that purpose, such an order would be amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code.

10. As regards the third eventuality under Section 457 of the Code, the order in such an eventuality would be only for custody of the property during the trial, subject to condition that the same should be produced at any time required by the Court. Such an order would certainly fall within the category of interlocutory order as one cannot attach any finality to such an order since it does not decide any right to the property nor it implies any adjudication of any issue as such.

11. It is also to be clarified that while passing the order in relation to the second eventuality i.e. to say delivery of property to a person entitled to possess the same, the Court is not forbidden from imposing conditions in respect of production of such property whenever required by the Court during the trial. However, such a condition by itself would not amount to nullify the effect of adjudication in relation to the issue pertaining to right to possess the property. Being so, irrespective of any condition laid down for production of the property while delivering the property to the person entitled to possess, nevertheless the order would be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1531 of 2006 in Case No. 685/N of 2005 in C.R. No. 264 of 2005

Decided On: 15.07.2008

D'damas Jewellery India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M.S. Khandeparkar and V.K. Tahilramani, JJ.

Author: R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Citation: 2008 ALL MR (Cri) 2127, MANU/MH/0611/2008.

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Understanding the Distinction Between Seized Property and Bail Security in Criminal Cases: Legal Implications for Interim Custody Applications

 In criminal proceedings, disputes regarding property custody often arise, leading to applications for interim custody under the criminal procedure laws, primarily Sections 451 and 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). A crucial factor that influences the outcome of such applications is whether the property in question is seized property or property deposited as bail security. This article explores the key distinctions between these two categories of property and their respective treatment under the law.

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Bombay HC: Order passed under sec. 451 and 457 of the Cr.P.C. being an interlocutory order in view of bar under sec. 397(2) revision against it is not maintainable

 Learned single Judge held that the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of interim nature subject to final order and it was interlocutory order which did not decide rights of the parties in any manner. The learned single Judge held that the order passed by the Magistrate did not fall in the category of intermediate order and is covered in the category of interlocutory order and, therefore, not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, Cr.P.C. This case is akin to the case under consideration and I have no reason to take a different view of the matter. In addition, it may be pointed out that in Ghafoor Bhai v. Motiram Bongirwar MANU/MH/0320/1977 while construing Section 457, Cr.P.C. it was held that the provisions of Section 457, Cr.P.C. were sufficiently wide so as to cover the case where the Magistrate is called upon to pass an order about disposal of custody of property even during the investigation stage of the matter. This position was approved in Virendra Kumar v. Dilawar Khan (supra) and for this purpose, reference may be made to paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the said Judgment which read as under :-

10. This Court, in Ghafoor Bhai Nabbu Bhai Tawar v. Motiram Keshaorao Bongirwar MANU/MH/0320/1977 : 1977 Mh LJ 548, while construing the provisions of Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, held that by the words 'and such property is not produced before the Criminal Court during the inquiry or trial' used in the section, all that the Legislature intended to convey is that the property has not been produced before the Magistrate. Such non-production could be on account of (1) the absence of any inquiry or trial, or (2) though the enquiry or trial is pending, the investigation agency had not yet: produced it in the Court. The Court then held that the provisions of Section 457 of the Code were sufficiently wide so as to cover the case where the Magistrate is called upon to pass an order about disposal or custody of a property even during the investigation stage of the matter.

12. In my view, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has merit and has to be accepted. As pointed out by Gadgil, J. in Ghafoor Bhai's case MANU/MH/0320/1977 (supra), an order may be passed under Section 457 of the Code purely at the stage of investigation or even after the charge-sheet had been filed, but before the property was actually produced before the Court during the trial. In the latter case, any order passed by the Magistrate must necessarily be an interlocutory order subject to the final orders to be passed after the trial has concluded.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Crl. Appln. No. 1249 of 1997

Decided On: 10.03.2001

Prakash Tarachand Sakhre Vs. Ashok Pundloikrao Wajge and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Batta, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1293/2001,2001 CRLJ 3024.

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Bombay HC: Order granting anticipatory bail to accused persons - It is interlocutory order and no revision lies against that order

In the case of Amar Nath and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, the Apex Court has clearly held that "passing order for bail" is an interlocutory order and, therefore, there can hardly be any controversy in this regard. The impugned order dated 13-8-1998 is undoubtedly an order of grant of bail and, therefore, falls within the ambit and category of interlocutory order and in view of bar created by Section 397(2) of the Code, the High Court is precluded from exercising its revisional powers in this regard, which ultimately results in rendering revision against such interlocutory order not maintainable. I must, therefore, uphold the preliminary objection raised by Shri Pendsey, learned Counsel for the non-applicants and further hold that all the above referred four revisions filed by the State as well as complainant are not maintainable against the impugned order of grant of bail, dated 13-8-1998. {Para 11}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

D.D. SINHA, J.

The State Of Maharashtra Vs. Sanjay S/O Moreshwar Damle & Ors.,

Cri. Rev. Appln. No. 182 of 1998

4th March, 1999

Citation:  1999 ALL MR (Cri) 1127

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Bombay HC: Revision Petition Not Maintainable Against Order Granting Bail

 From the above referred observations, it is evident that theterm ‘interlocutory order’ used in sub section 2 of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. covers the challenge made to the orders for bail. {Para 17}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.678 OF 2024

Raju Anna Chaughule  V/s. The State Of Maharashtra 

CORAM : ANIL S. KILOR, J.

DATE : 22ND OCTOBER, 2024.

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Calcutta HC: Whether plaintiff must issue legal notice before filing civil suit for recovering damages for defamation?

10. In that view of the matter Mr. Dutt's submission that a letter of demand by the Solicitor was not condition precedent before filing a civil suit for damage for defamation, is irrelevant. Normally and almost universally the practice in a civil suit for defamation is a prior Solicitor's letter demanding damage or apology or both. It is a normal, natural and conventional part of the civil law and procedure of defamation. In strict law the Solicitor's demand is not a condition precedent for a suit for defamation claiming damages, but it is only a natural and appropriate step to take to notify a person that he will be faced with a suit for damage for a particular amount unless he apologizes or unless e does certain things. In the absence of such a notice the question of motive and question of cost in a suit for damage may become important. In some of the Canadian Provinces it is a condition precedent to an action for newspaper libel that the plaintiff shall give the defendant notice in writing specifying the particular statements of which he complains. No doubt, such is not the law here in India. From that point of view it cannot be said in India that the letter of demand is a condition precedent to an action for damages for defamation in a civil suit. Rut the letter of demand in a civil suit for damages for defamation is almost a universal practice in India. In fact, Gatley on Libel and Slander, Fourth Edition at page 432 speaking of English law on the point, which is more like the law in India than Canada on the point, observed:

'No such notice is requisite under our law. It is however, always advisable to give the defendant an opportunity before writ to withdraw and apologise. Such a letter will help to show that the plaintiff's real object is to vindicate his character and not merely to make money out of the attack. Moreover, a refusal to withdraw and express regret for statements that are without foundation is a matter which the jury, may take into consideration in assessing damages. And, if the reply to the demand for an apology be a letter of abuse or reiteration of the charge, such letter will materially strengthen the plaintiffs case if malice is an issue in the action." This is the common sense justification of the universal practice of Solicitor's letter of demand before filing a civil suit for damages for defamation and its essential raison d'etre. Mr. Dutt's submission apparently was that if a notice for a suit for defamation was not necessary then to give a notice of such a character while a criminal proceeding is pending, invariably constitutes contempt of such criminal proceeding. In the view that we have taken we are unable to accept that unqualified submission. {Para 10}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

Criminal Misc. Case Nos. 206 and 214 of 1965

Decided On: 28.02.1966

Asoke Kumar Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Radha Kanto Pandey and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.B. Mukharji and A.K. Das, JJ.

Author: P.B. Mukharji, J.

Citations: AIR1967 CAL178, 1967CRILJ455,  MANU/WB/0054/1967

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Supreme court: Complaint U/S 138 of NI Act can Be Amended Even After Cognizance Is Taken

 The issue, whether a criminal court has power to order

amendment of a complaint filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.,

is no longer res integra. In S.R. Sukumar v. S.Sunaad Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609, this Court held as under:-

“19. What is discernible from U.P. Pollution Control Board

case is that an easily curable legal infirmity could be cured

by means of a formal application for amendment. If the

amendment sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity

which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by

allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to

the other side, notwithstanding the fact that there is no

enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such

amendment, the court may permit such an amendment to be

made. On the contrary, if the amendment sought to be made

in the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity

or the same cannot be corrected by a formal amendment or

if there is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the

court shall not allow such amendment in the complaint.”

Hence, it is fallacious to contend that in no circumstance can

amendments to complaints be allowed after cognizance is taken.

{Para 8}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.15699 OF 2024)

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre  Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd. & Anr. 

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 899

Dated: 25th July, 2025.

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Supreme Court Sets Aside Sentence Under Amended POCSO Provision : Constitutional Bar Against Retrospective Imposition Of Harsher Penalty Is Absolute

 The submission advanced on behalf of the appellant is that

the incident occurred on 20.05.2019. While the conviction is

under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the Protection Of Children

From Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019, which came

into force on 16.08.2019, enhanced the minimum sentence

to 20 years and redefined "imprisonment for life" to mean

imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life. It is the

appellant’s contention that the sentencing court erred in

applying the amended provisions retrospectively, as the

incident in question took place prior to the amendment.{Para 6}

8. Section 6 of the POCSO Act, prior to the 2019 amendment,

read as under:

“6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual

assault – Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual

assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for

a term which shall not be less than ten years but which

may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable

to fine.”

9. This Court, having found no merit in the challenge to

conviction, had confined its notice to the question of

sentencing. However, we find merit in the appellant’s

submission that since the offence was committed on

20.05.2019, the amended provision of Section 6 of the

POCSO Act, which came into force on 16.08.2019, could not

have been applied to his case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…..………….OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 13834 of 2024)

SATAURAM MANDAVI  Vs  THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ANR.

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Dated: July 25, 2025.

Citation: 2025 INSC 892

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Allahabad HC Issues Safeguards Against S. 498A Misuse : No Arrest During 2 Months' Cooling-Off Period After FIR Registration

Thus assesing the totality of the circumstances, object and the allegation of misuse of this piece of legislation in a shape of Section 498A IPC, the Court is proposing the safeguards after taking the guidance from the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (Supra) keeping in view the growing tendency in the masses to nail the husband and all family members by a general and sweeping allegations. {Para 48}

49. Thus, It is directed that:—

(i) No arrest or police action to nab the named accused persons shall be made after lodging of the FIR or complaints without concluding the “Cooling-Period” which is two months from the lodging of the FIR or the complaint. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter would be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committe(hereinafter referred to as FWC) in the each district.

(ii) Only those cases which would be transmitted to FWC in which Section 498-A IPC along with, no injury 307 and other sections of the IPC in which the imprisonment is less than 10 years.

(iii) After lodging of the complaint or the FIR, no action should take place without concluding the “Cooling-Period” of two months. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter may be referred to Family Welfare Committee in each districts.

(iv) Every district shall have at least one or more FWC (depending upon the geographical size and population of that district constituted under the District Legal Aid Services Authority) comprising of at least THREE MEMBERS. Its constitution and function shall be reviewed periodically by the District & Sessions Judge/Principal Judge, Family Court of that District, who shall be the Chairperson or Co-chairperson of that district at Legal Service Authority.

(v) The said FWC shall comprise of the following members:—

(a) a young mediator from the Mediation Centre of the district or young advocate having the practices up to five years or senior most student of Vth year, Government Law College or the State University or N.L.Us. having good academic track record and who is public spirited young man, OR;

(b) well acclaimed and recognized social worker of that district having clean antecedant, OR;

(c) retired judicial officers residing in or nearby district, who can devote time for the object of the proceeding OR;

(d) educated wives of senior judicial or administrative officers of the district.

(vi) The member of the FWC shall never be called as a witness.

(vii) Every complaint or application under Section 498A IPC and other allied sections mentioned above, be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committee by the concerned Magistrate. After receiving the said complaint or FIR, the Committee shall summon the contesting parties along with their four senior elderly persons to have personal interaction and would try to settle down the issue/misgivings between them within a period of two months from its lodging.

The contesting parties are obliged to appear before the Committee with their four elderly persons (maximum) to have a serious deliberation between them with the aid of members of the Committee.

(viii) The Committee after having proper deliberations, would prepare a vivid report and would refer to the concerned Magistrate/police authorties to whom such complaints are being lodged after expiry of two months by inserting all factual aspects and their opinion in the matter.

(ix) Continue deliberation before the Committee, the police officers shall themselves to avoid any arrest or any coercive action pursuant to the applications or complaint against the named accused persons. However, the Investigating Officer shall continue to have a peripheral investigation into the matter namely preparing a medical report, injury report, the statements of witnesses.

(x) The said report given by the Committee shall be under the consideration of I.O. or the Magistrate on its own merit and thereafter suitable action should be taken by them as per the provision of Code of Criminal Procedure after expiry of the “Cooling-Period” of two months.

(xi) Legal Services Aid Committee shall impart such basic training as may be considered necessary to the members of Family Welfare Committee from time to time(not more than one week).

(xii) Since, this is noble work to cure abrasions in the society where tempos of the contesting parties are very high that they would melow down the heat between them and try to resolve the misgivings and misunderstanding between them. Since, this is a job for public at large, social work, they are acting on a pro bono basis or basic minimum honrarium as fixed by the District & Sessions Judge of every district.

(xiii) The investigation of such FIRs or complaint containing Section 498A IPC and other allied sections as mentioned above, shall be investigated by dynamic Investigating Officers whose integrity is certified after specialized training not less than one week to handle and investigate such matrimonal cases with utmost sincerity and transparancy.

(xiv) When settlement is reached between the parties, it would be open for the District & Sessions Judge and other senior judicial officers nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case.

50. At the cost of repetition, it is made clear that after lodging of the F.I.R. or the complaint case without exhausting the “Cooling-Period” of two months, no arrest or any coercive action shall be taken against the husband or his family members in order to derail the proceedings before the Family Welfare Committee.

 In the High Court of Allahabad

(Before Rahul Chaturvedi, J.)

Criminal Revision No. - 1126 of 2022

Mukesh Bansal Vs  State of U.P. and Another 

Decided on June 13, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine All 395 : (2022) 4 All LJ 452 : (2022) 120 ACC 441 : 2022 Cri LJ 2841 : (2022) 3 HLR 399 : ILR (2022) 6 All 1112

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Supreme Court Endorses Allahabad HC Guidelines :No Arrest In 498A FIRs For 2 Months; Refer Cases To Family Welfare Committees

The guidelines framed by the High Court of Allahabad in the impugned judgment dated 13.06.2022 in Criminal Revision No. 1126 of 2022 vide paras 32 to 38, with regard to ‘Constitution of Family Welfare Committees for safeguards regarding misuse of Section 498A, IPC shall remain in effect and be implemented by the appropriate authorities.

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before B.R. Gavai, C.J. and Augustine George Masih, J.)

Transfer Petition (C) No. 2367 of 2023

Shivangi Bansal  Vs  Sahib Bansal 

Decided on July 22, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1494.

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Talengana HC: Whether Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence punishable under Pocso Act?

 As the statutory positions in the Cr.P.C. and the POCSO Act are not mutually exclusive, it shall be construed that the Special Court in the stand of Court of Sessions may receive a case on committal from the Magistrate. Meaning thereby the jurisdictional Magistrate is empowered to receive police report or complaint as set down under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. even in regard to the offences under POCSO Act and after taking cognizance, the same may be committed to the Special Court.{Para 13}

14. Concomitantly, the Special Court is also empowered under Section 33(1) of the POCSO Act to take cognizance of the offence. In that way, the Special Court without any committal procedure can directly receive complaint and while doing so the Special Court sets in the position of Magistrate and would process the complaint by applying relevant procedure.

15. For the aforesaid, it shall be understood that the legislature at its wisdom had provided direct reach to the special Court in addition to the indirect committal procedure to extend the needed relief employing either of the forums. Thus, the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Special Court are correspondingly empowered to take cognizance of an offence under POCSO Act upon the complaint. Consequently, it shall be held that, returning of the private complaint by the Special Court and the Magistrate is improper and against the provisions of law.

19. In this position, it has to be concluded that even for the offence under the POCSO Act the Magistrate is not barred to take cognizance and by the enabling provision, the Special Court is also empowered to take cognizance of the offence under the POCSO Act either upon the police report or on complaint within its territorial jurisdiction. 

Talengana High Court

 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.290 OF 2023

Dated: Date: 18.08.2023.

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AP HC: What action Insurance Company should take if it comes to its knowledge that claimant has put up a false motor accident claim petition in collusion with police?

Admittedly, in this case, the claimants have filed the claim petition on 17.10.2001. The Insurance Company filed counter thereafter. This means, the Insurance Company had knowledge that an allegation is made by the claimant with regard to the involvement of the lorry bearing registration No. ABT 3 in this accident. When the Insurance Company had knowledge that the claimants have alleged involvement of the lorry bearing registration No. ABT 3 in the accident, the Insurance Company should verify the facts. The possibility of falsely involving the vehicle in an accident cannot be ruled out. But as seen from the recitals of the counter, the Insurance Company had not taken any specific stand. At one stage, it doubted the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident and at another stage, the insurance company had pleaded that the deceased himself had contributed to the accident. Thus, the insurance company had no clear view with regard to the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. When the Insurance Company entertains a doubt with regard to the involvement of a vehicle in the accident, it should appoint an investigator to enquire into the allegations as to whether a particular vehicle had plied on the particular route at particular time on a particular day or not. Fact should be verified. If the Insurance Company collects any such evidence to establish that the vehicle was not involved in the accident, then, they must contest the matter and adduce evidence in support of their case. When they come to know that the police investigation is false or that a vehicle is falsely implicated in a case, they must approach the superior police officers and see that necessary action is taken against the erring police officers who have filed a false charge-sheet implicating the vehicle which has no involvement in the accident. They must also challenge the charge-sheet in appropriate proceedings. What happened during the course of investigation and how the police have come to know about the involvement of the vehicle and whether it is due to Finding of the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle at the place of accident or due to the version of the eye witnesses, all those aspects cannot be gone into at this stage. The possibility of police coming to know about the involvement of a vehicle or an accused through some unknown source also cannot be ruled out. The police officers do commit certain mistakes and involve innocent persons in criminal cases. Due to over enthusiastic attitude also, they commit mistakes. What is the fact is to be ascertained. It has to be seen whether police investigation resulted in finding the truth or not. If at all the findings of the police are found to be totally incorrect, it is for the insurance company to adduce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge-sheet are false. It is a fact that P.W. 2 deposed that the offending vehicle was not stopped at the place of accident. If that version is correct, there is no possibility of falling of driving licence at the place of accident. Admittedly, the accident occurred during the night time. Even if P.W. 2 had witnessed the accident and noted the offending vehicle number, admittedly he did not get down from the lorry in which he was travelling. It appears that it being night time, he could not have observed the place of accident and he might not have observed each and every object fallen at the place of accident. It is only during the course of preparation of panchanama at the place of accident that the panchas and the police are expected to observe each and every item and note them in their panchanama. The very purpose of conducting panchanama and the scene of offence is to show the location of the dead body, location of offending vehicle, time, marks or falling of any other objects at the place of accident.

{Para 19}

20. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents/insurance company submitted that the version of P.W. 2 that the offending vehicle was not stopped at the place of accident supports the version of the insurance company that there is no possibility of falling of the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle at the place of accident. As discussed above, since there is no clear evidence to show the distance between the offending lorry and the lorry in which P.W. 2 was travelling, the version of P.W. 2 that the offending vehicle did not stop at the place of accident need not be given much importance. Of course, this circumstance indicates that P.W. 2 also did not see the occurring of the accident. Even if we discard the evidence of P.W. 2, charge-sheet shows that there are two other eye-witnesses. Unless it is shown that police investigation is false, we cannot reach to a definite conclusion. When there is reasonable doubt in a claim petition arising out of the motor accidents, the benefit of doubt should go to the claimants. The possibility of the driver of the offending lorry stopping the offending vehicle at the place of the accident and looking at the scene and fleeing away from the place of accident also cannot be ruled out. Unless there is reliable evidence to show that the contents of the charge-sheet are false, on mere surmise, it cannot be said that the contents of the charge-sheet or the police investigation is false.

21. Learned standing counsel for the insurance company submitted that the insurance company has appointed the investigator, but however, the report of the said investigator is not available in the records of the insurance company. When such an important document is not filed by the insurance company, normally, adverse inference has to be drawn against the insurance company. Admittedly, none were examined on behalf of the insurance company. Mere taking a plea that the offending vehicle was not involved in the accident or that there is contributory negligence would not help the insurance company in the absence of any reliable evidence in support of their contentions, A pleading cannot be taken as proved unless there is evidence to prove the same.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

M.A.C.M.A. No. 2128 of 2005

Decided On: 26.03.2014

K. Rajani Vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B. Chandra Kumar, J.

Citation: 2014 ALT 6 3312015 ANWR AP 1 52015 ACC AP 3 2932015 ACJ 7972014 SCC ONLINE AP 418, MANU/AP/0828/2014

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Under which police papers are not binding on Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for deciding claim petition?

 Thus, it is clear that the claim cases cannot be decided solely only on the basis of documents forming part of police record. The claim cases are to be decided on the basis of material evidence, which is led before the Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, the documents collected during the investigation and the opinion formed by the Investigating Officer is not binding on the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. {Para 6}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 5892 of 2024

Decided On: 25.10.2024

IFFCO Tokyo General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mamta Bai Lodhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J.

Citation: 2024:MPHC-JBP:54034,MANU/MP/3933/2024.

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Digital Forgery in the Courtroom: Lessons from COSCO Shipping Heavy Industry (Dalian) Co Ltd & Anor v Osta Fleet Sdn Bhd

 Introduction

The digital age has revolutionized the way documents are created, shared, and stored. However, it has also introduced new avenues for fraud, particularly through digital manipulation of documents. The recent Malaysian High Court decision in COSCO Shipping Heavy Industry (Dalian) Co Ltd & Anor v Osta Fleet Sdn Bhd offers a compelling case study on how courts can address and analyze digitally forged documents.

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Andhra Pradesh HC: Whether the court can summon discharged or acquitted accused as witness U/S 311 of CRPC in the same case?

A plain reading of Sec. 311 does not place any restrictions on the power of the Court to issue summons to a witness if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the evidence of those witnesses is essential to the just decision of the case. After the complainant compounded the offences with Subbarayan and Kannan the latter two persons were acquitted as a result of the compounding and no longer figure as co-accused in the case to be tried along with the revision petitioner. It can no doubt be said that having figured as co-accused at an earlier point of time, the evidence which those witnesses are likely to give is in the nature of an accomplice evidence but then the court will naturally be on its guard in not acting on such evidence unless their evidence is corroborated in material particulars. The absence of evidence corroborating the evidence of these two persons in material particulars cannot impinge in any manner on the power of the court to summon them as witnesses. Sec. 311, therefore, gives ample power to the court to summon witnesses who are no longer accused before him if the Magistrate felt that their evidence is essential to the just decision of the case. {Para 2}

3. A few cases which have been relied upon can now be noticed. In Banu Singh v. Emperor I.L.R. 33 Cal. 1353 a Division Bench expressed itself:

"The law, however, is well settled, and there can be no controversy on the point that an accomplice, if he is not an accused under trial in the same case is a competent witness and may, as any other witness, be examined on oath.........On such a discharge or acquittal he becomes a competent witness against other persons accused of the same offence. The disability to be examined as a witness on oath against the persons who are brought before the court on the same indictment, may thus cease on the withdrawal of the indictment, against him".

The Supreme Court in Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0063/1967 : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 178, while considering the sweep of Sec. 540. Cr.P.C. (Repealed Code) expressed itself:

"Statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness provided the just decision of the case demands it............If the Court has acted without the requirements of a just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the Court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision, the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the jurisdiction."

The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision referred to Dora Harrig's case 1927-2KB 587. In that case five persons were tried, two for stealing and they pleaded guilty and three others for receiving who pleaded not guilty. The first two remained in the dock and the trial proceeded against the other three. They gave evidence on their own behalf and the prosecution case was not quite strong. The Recorder then asked one of the other two accused to give evidence and allowed the prisoner Dora, against whom the evidence went, to cross-examine him but Dora was not asked to enter the Box again to contradict the new evidence. This was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal to be a wrong exercise of the power of the Court. It was an extreme example of the exercise of the power.

4. The observations made in the aforesaid decisions go to indicate that once the court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision, no exception can be taken if the Magistrate ordered issue of summons to persons who were no longer before him as accused to be tried in the case against the revision petitioner alone. The learned Magistrate has expressed himself that the witnesses appear to be just witnesses and the petition is worth allowing to meet the ends of justice. These expressions can, in the context, be only construed to mean that the Magistrate felt that the examination of these witnesses is essential to the just decision of the case. This objection raised by the revision petitioner is accordingly rejected.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Crl. R.C. No. 803/82

Decided On: 17.12.1983

N. Chennimaliay Vs. The Andhra Pradesh Marketing Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Ramachandra Raju, J.

 Citations

1984 MLJ CRI 1 4651984 ALT 1 3151984 APLJ HC 1 2371983 SCC ONLINE AP 1971984 AP LJ 1 2371984 CRI LJ NOC 139 531984 MLJ CRL 1 4651984 APLJ 1 237, MANU/AP/0245/1983

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Kerala HC: What conditions the court should impose for releasing accused found in possession of intermediate quantity of contraband?

Admittedly, the quantity involved is

'intermediate' as per the relevant notifications. {Para8}

9. Accused Nos. 1 and 3 were ordered to be

released on bail as per order dated 18.07.2022 in B.A.

No.5043/2022 by this Court.

10. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted

that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. It is

submitted that he is accused in Crime Nos.21/2022,

347/2015 and 177/2019.

11. Having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case mentioned above, the

petitioner can be ordered to be released on bail on

stringent conditions.

In the result, this Bail Application is allowed as

follows:

(a) The petitioner shall be released on bail on

his executing bond for Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees One lakh only) with two solvent

sureties each for the like sum to the

satisfaction of the jurisdictional court.

(b) He shall appear before the Investigating

Officer on Mondays and Saturdays between

10 A.M. and 11 A.M. till the final report is

filed.

(c) He shall not attempt to interfere with the

investigation or influence any witnesses.

(d) He shall surrender his Indian Passport

before the Jurisdictional Court. If he does

|not have a passport, he shall file an affidavit

to that effect, within a period of one

week from the date of his release.

(e) He shall not involve in any other cases of

like nature while on bail.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

BAIL APPL. NO. 5531 OF 2022

 AKHIL JOHN  Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

MR.JUSTICE K. BABU

Dated this the 21st day of July, 2022

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Chhatisgarh HC: Whether the court can release accused prosecuted for possessing intermediate quantity of Ganja on bail?

 Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that 1.9 Kg (1900 gm) of contraband(Ganja) was seized from the possession of the applicant. Hence, the offence has been registered. {Para 3}

6. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, particularly considering that there is no criminal past of the applicant and further considering that intermediate quantity of Ganja has been seized from the possession of the applicant, and lastly considering his pre-trial detention, this Court is inclined to release the applicant on bail.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

MCRC No. 3553 of 2023

 Rahul Kumar Vijay Ram, Vs State Of Chhattisgarh 

Dated:15/6/2023

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Kerala HC: Police Cannot Attach Bank Account Under S.107 BNSS Without Magistrate's Approval

 IRAC Analysis of Kerala High Court Judgment (Crl.M.C.No.3740/2025, Order dated 02.06.2025)

With Emphasis on the Concept of "Proceeds of Crime"

Issue

·       Whether the police, during the investigation of a criminal case, can freeze the bank account of a third-party company (Headstar Global Pvt. Ltd.) under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), or whether such freezing requires a specific procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, especially when the funds involved may constitute "proceeds of crime".

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Kerala HC: What conditions the court should impose while releasing accused on Anticipatory bail?

 Considering the dictum laid down in the above decision and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Bail Application is allowed with the following directions:

1. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer within two weeks from today and shall undergo interrogation.

2. After interrogation, if the Investigating Officer propose to arrest the petitioner, he shall be released on bail on executing a bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer concerned.

3. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer for interrogation as and when required. The petitioner shall co-operate with the investigation and shall not, directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade her from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer.

4. Petitioner shall not leave India without permission of the jurisdictional Court.

5. Petitioner shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected.

6. Needless to mention, it would be well within the powers of the investigating officer to investigate the matter and, if necessary, to effect recoveries on the information, if any, given by the petitioner even while the petitioner is on bail as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another [MANU/SC/0100/2020 : 2020:INSC:106 : 2020 (1) KHC 663].

7. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the investigating officer, at the time of surrender. If there is no passport, the petitioner will file an affidavit to that effect. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 3740 of 2025

Decided On: 03.04.2025

K.O. Paul Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

Citation: 2025/KER/29313, MANU/KE/1319/2025

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Kerala HC: Under which circumstances prime facie case for offence under NDPS Act is made out against accused even if no contraband is seized from his possession

 The offences alleged against the petitioner include the offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Section 29 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:

29. Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.

(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.

(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which-

(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or

(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India."

9. A perusal of the same would show that an accused can be prosecuted even if no contraband is seized from him, provided there is evidence to show that there is abetment and criminal conspiracy. In other words, the Section would show that the actual possession of the contraband is not necessary to convict a person for the offences under the NDPS Act. If abetment and criminal conspiracy are proved, the accused can be convicted.

10. In this case, there is a telephonic conversation between the 1st accused and the petitioner. The prosecution alleges that there is a conspiracy between accused Nos. 1 and 2. When such a case is put up by the prosecution, this Court cannot observe that there is no prima facie case against the petitioner, while considering a bail application. It is a matter of evidence. A bail court need not consider the admissibility of the call details produced by the prosecution to prove conspiracy and abetment in all cases.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 2181 of 2025

Decided On: 20.02.2025

Anzar Azeez Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

 Citation: 2025/KER/15357, MANU/KE/0765/2025

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, the court can release accused involved in vehicular accident prosecuted for an offence U/S 304 of IPC on bail?

 The First Information Report is plain about causing the

vehicular accident. The reasons are best known to the

investigating officer how he has applied Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code. Even it is presumed that Ganja was lying in

the car, it was very small quantity. Such quantity does not bar

granting bail and there will be no impediment of Section 37 of

the N.D.P.S. Act. It is an act of rash and negligent driving. The

Court has sympathy towards the persons died but cannot close

the eyes towards the provisions of law in respect of granting bail.

It is not in dispute that villagers have mercilessly beat two

accused persons in the car. They were also hospitalized, not for

the injuries caused in the accident but for the injuries sustained

by assault. The question is whether the applicants would

interfere in the investigation and flee away from the trial. There

is no case as such. {Para 5}

6. After having gone through the documents placed on

record, the Court is satisfied that material investigation has been

completed. Further detention of the applicants is not required.

However, to protect the interest of all, certain conditions are to

be imposed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

938 BAIL APPLICATION NO.957 OF 2024

Akhilesh Sanjay Pawar, Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: S.G. MEHARE, J.

DATE : 20th JUNE, 2024

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances order passed by high court in bail application should not be treated as precedent?

  In so far as the judgment in the case of Manjubhai Rokde and Vinod Ramchandra Gupta (supra) are concerned, it needs to be noted that in both the orders no principle of law arose for consideration and no principle of law was laid down. It is well settled that an order of bail application is summary in nature based on summary facts which can never be relied as a precedent or can be cited as an authority laying down proposition of law by this Court unless and until principle of law arise for consideration and the order lays down principle of law. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. The essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what legally follows from the observations made in the order. A case cannot be an authority on the point of a fact. Each case has to be decided in the light of circumstances existing in it. A precedent is a judicial decision which lays down a principle of law. Generally bail orders in their operative part proceed on peculiar facts of each case. Sometimes facts are not stated in the order considering complexity of facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, generally bail orders without laying down principle of law cannot be regarded as an authority on a point of fact. Therefore, in my opinion, both the judgments cited by the advocate for the applicant in the absence of proposition of law being decided cannot be treated as a precedent laying down principle of law. The orders relied upon by the applicant, therefore, are of no help to the applicant. {Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Anticipatory Bail Application Nos. 189 of 2023 and 616 of 2023

Decided On: 16.06.2023

Eknath Bhalchandra Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/5594/2023.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Whether the court should allow anticipatory bail application in case of seizure of Gutka or Pan Masala?

 I have considered the submissions on behalf of both the sides. I have carefully scrutinized the case diary. Prima facie, the statement of the person from whom prohibited substance was seized named the applicant in ABA/139/2023 as supplier. The applicant in ABA/616/2023 is a seller. Considering the nature of allegations against the applicant, it is necessary that detail investigation as regards existence of any racket operating in prohibited substance need to be investigated. It is also necessary to investigate source of such supply and acquisition. It is also necessary to investigate into the names and identity of purchasers of the prohibited substance from the applicants. {Para 6}

10. Therefore, in my opinion, considering the allegations against the applicant, no case for grant of pre-arrest protection is made out.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Anticipatory Bail Application Nos. 189 of 2023 and 616 of 2023

Decided On: 16.06.2023

Eknath Bhalchandra Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/5594/2023.

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