Bombay HC: Unmarried daughters, widows or destitute daughters have absolute right of residence in the immovable property of joint family as per S 14 of Hindu Succession Act

 Thus, the legal principles applicable to the facts of the present case, on the daughter's rights under the Hindu law in the father's property can be summarised as follows:

(a) The uncodified Hindu law provided that a Hindu father is bound to maintain his unmarried daughters, and on the death of the father, they are entitled to be maintained out of his estate and if the married daughter is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband, or, after his death, from his family, her father, if he has got separate property of his own, is under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain her. A moral obligation, even though not enforceable under the law, would, by acknowledgement, bring it to the level of a legal obligation, for it would be perfectly legitimate for the father to treat himself obliged out of love and affection to maintain his destitute daughter. This obligation would also apply to the heirs of the father who inherited the father's property.

(b) Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 has improved the right of a Hindu woman, which was acquired before or after the 1956 Act.

(c) In view of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as the full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

(d) The words "any property" in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act would include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, and also in lieu of maintenance.

(e) After the 1956 Act, in the property of a male Hindu dying intestate, the daughter classified as a Class I heir has a share.

(f) Under Section 23 of the 1956 Act, a female heir had no right to claim partition in a dwelling house till the male heirs chose to divide the respective shares, but it gave the right of residence to a female heir in the dwelling house. Section 23 is omitted with effect from 9th September 2005. {Para 17}

18. Thus, it is a well-established legal principle that, pre-1956, unmarried daughters, widows or destitute daughters were entitled to be maintained by their father and reside in the father's property. Hence, in the present case, the right of the defendants to residence prior to 1956 would become an absolute right after the Act of 1956 came into force. So far as defendant nos. 1 and 3 are concerned, even if it is held that they came to reside in the suit property after Rama's death, they would be entitled to the right to residence in view of the moral obligation to be maintained by the heirs of the father who inherited the property.

19. Thus, irrespective of whether Rama died before or after 1956, the appellants, being daughters of Rama, had a right to his property. Before 1956, Rama or his heirs who inherited his property were bound to maintain the appellants, and on the death of Rama, they were entitled to be maintained out of his estate under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain them. After the 1956 Act, Section 14 has improved their right of maintenance acquired before the 1956 Act, which has culminated in an absolute right. In view of Section 23 of the 1956 Act, the appellants had the right of residence in the dwelling house. If Rama died after 1956, the appellants, being Class I heirs, were entitled to a share in Rama's property. Hence, under any contingency, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek possession from the appellants on the ground that they were gratuitous licensees and she terminated it. Hence, all the questions of law are answered accordingly in favour of the appellants.

20. Considering the well-established legal principles as discussed above, the appellants' right of residence needs to be protected. Thus, in view of the well-settled legal position as discussed in the above paragraphs, the impugned decrees would not be sustainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 296 of 1993

Decided On: 13.08.2025

Anusaya Baburao Kale and Ors. Vs. Babai Laxman Chorge

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Gauri Godse, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:35026, MANU/MH/5038/2025.

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Can a wife claim the right of residence in the shared household even if she was not residing in said house?

 Further, the expression 'the right to reside in a shared household' cannot be restricted to actual residence. In other words, even in the absence of actual residence in the shared household, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside therein. The aforesaid interpretation can be explained by way of an illustration. If a woman gets married then she acquires the right to reside in the household of her husband which then becomes a shared household within the meaning of the D.V. Act. In India, it is a societal norm for a woman, on her marriage to reside with her husband, unless due to professional, occupational or job commitments, or for other genuine reasons, the husband and wife decide to reside at different locations. Even in a case where the woman in a domestic relationship is residing elsewhere on account of a reasonable cause, she has the right to reside in a shared household. Also a woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship has the right to reside not only in the house of her husband, if it is located in another place which is also a shared household but also in the shared household which may be in a different location in which the family of her husband resides. {Para 31}

32. If a woman in a domestic relationship seeks to enforce her right to reside in a shared household, irrespective of whether she has resided therein at all or not, then the said right can be enforced Under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the D.V. Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs.  Kamlesh Devi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Decided On: 12.05.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/0631/2022

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Whether daughter-in-law can seek an order to restrain parents-in-law from selling their house property?

 While relying upon the principles annunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the learned Appellate Court in the impugned judgment observed that the daughter-in-law (petitioner herein) was not residing at the house in question on the day of presentation of the complaint nor any time soon before. Further observed that she was occupying a staff quarter allotted to her husband and lived in the house in

question only for short duration and occasionally visited parents-in-law, to say only thrice. The Appellate Court accordingly held that these short durational visits or stay of daughter-in-law at the house of the parents-inlaw would not get the house a colour of being a shared house hold and having hold so, the restraint order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside, it being without any finding as regards the nature of premises being a shared house hold. Further held that the parents-in-law shall be well within their rights to sell off the house in question.{Para 14}

20. But the pertinent question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the old aged parents-in-laws, who at the fag-end of their life, wish to sell off their property to relocate themselves in a better place of their choice, be restrained to sell of the house or permitted to do it? In this regard, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish

Chandra Ahuja (Supra) are as under:-

“90. Before we close our discussion on Section 2(s),

we need to observe that the right to residence under Section

19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared

household especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted

against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The senior

citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live

peacefully not haunted by marital discord between their son

and daughter-in-law. While granting relief both in

application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act or in any civil

proceedings, the Court has to balance the rights of both the

parties. The directions issued by the High Court [Ambika

Jain v. Ram Prakash Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del

11886] in para 56 adequately balance the rights of both the

parties.”

21. Applying the afore-noted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the case in hand, this Court finds that the impugned judgment dated 03.05.2021 suffers from no illegality or infirmity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 CRL.M.C. 1327/2021 & CRL.M.A.7314/2021

VIBHUTI WADHWA SHARMA Vs KRISHNA SHARMA AND ANR. 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

Pronounced on: 17.05.2021

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Supreme Court: Summary Eviction Procedure Under Senior Citizens Act Cannot Be Invoked To Defeat Right Of Residence Of Woman In A Shared Household As Per DV Act

This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted Under Section 7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, Under Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred Under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 Under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged Under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2625 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a 'shared household' Under Section 17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the "aggrieved woman" obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.

23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the Appellant's simple plea is that the suit premises constitute her 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2 of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series of transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of the Appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the marriage but subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered sale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of the Appellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the Appellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourth Respondent. Parallel to this, the Appellant had instituted proceedings of dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse; and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The Appellant had also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth Respondent and the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events, that the Second and Third Respondents instituted an application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the Appellant in respect of a shared household. A shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the Appellant had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth Respondent) is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the Appellant of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005

F Summation

24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant that the premises constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the Appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020 

Decided On: 15.12.2020

 S. Vanitha  Vs.  The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0943/2020

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Whether relatives of husband can evict wife, who has secured the right of residence in their house under the Domestic Violence Act?

 

The right to reside in shared household as granted

by Section 17 of Domestic violence Act itself 

contemplates an exception in

express words, i.e., “save in accordance with the

procedure established by law”.{Para 109}

116. Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of

the opinion that the expression “save in accordance

with the procedure established by law”, in Section

17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in

court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for

mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or

possession by the owner of the property is maintainable

before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in

sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted

or excluded from the shared household save in

accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus,

the provision itself contemplates adopting of any

procedure established by law by the respondent for

eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the

shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the

competent court can decide the claim in a properly

instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women

need to be excluded or evicted from the shared

household. One most common example for eviction and

exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided

same level of alternate accommodation or payment of

rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f)

itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can

successfully prove before the Competent Court that the

claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is

accepted. We need not ponder for cases and

circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be

allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case

for which no further discussion is necessary in the

facts of the present case. The High Court in the

impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit

filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be nonmaintainable

with which conclusion we are in agreement.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether Wife can claim Right Of Residence in immovable property Belonging to relatives Of Husband?

  In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only

entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared

household and a shared household would only mean the

house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or

the house which belongs to the joint family of which

the husband is a member. The definition of shared

household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate

that a shared household shall be one which belongs to

or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the

definition of “respondent” under the Act. The

respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act

can be any relative of the husband. In event, the

shared household belongs to any relative of the husband

with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has

lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are

satisfied and the said house will become a shared

household. We are of the view that this court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the

definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s)

but did not advert to different parts of the definition

which makes it clear that for a shared household there

is no such requirement that the house may be owned

singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by

the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of

shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily

worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible

and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not

commend us. The definition of shared household is

clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The

object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to

aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared

household. The interpretation which is put by this

Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if

accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose

of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the

interpretation of definition of shared household as put

by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is

not correct interpretation and the said judgment does

not lay down the correct law.{Para 64}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated: 15-10-2020

Citation: (2020) AIR(SC) 5397 : (2020) 6 ALT 115 : (2020) 4 CivCC 206 : (2020) 4 GujLH 416 : (2020) 10 JT 244 : (2020)

6 KLT 208 : (2020) 8 MLJ 48 : (2020) 4 RCR(Criminal) 745 : (2020) 11 SCALE 576 : (2021) 1 SCC 414

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Whether in suit U/S 6 of Specific relief Act wife can claim right to residence in shared household as per DV Act?

Plaintiff was examined as PW1. He deposed in tune with the plaint averments and stated that he purchased the vacant site under Ex. A1 in the name of his son. Since he was retired and it was difficult to get loan in his name, hence, the loan was obtained in his name and in the name of his son. Plaintiffs claim is that he paid the loan instalments out of his own money. His case is that inasmuch as the suit property belongs to him, his son executed two gift deeds under Exs. A2 and A3 in his favour and thereby, the plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit property. This is the evidence of plaintiff with regard to the origin of the suit property. It must be noted that plaintiffs son Maddimsetti Vasudeva Nrusimha Satyanarayana is not a party to the suit but his wife i.e., D1 is the party. Be that it may, D1 also did not dispute about the factum of execution of the gift deeds. Her case is that the suit property belongs to her husband and in view of the matrimonial disputes between herself and her husband, he colluded with his parents and executed sham and nominal gift deeds in favour of plaintiff obviously to smother her right of residence in the suit property. So from the pleadings and evidence, it is clear that plaintiffs son executed two gift deeds in favour of plaintiff in respect of the suit property and though D1 claims the same as sham transaction, she has not so far filed any independent suit questioning the validity of the gift deeds. It is already discussed supra that in a suit of this nature filed under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, title of the parties is rot germane for consideration except possession. In that view, for the sake of this suit, the contentions of defendant with regard to the validity of the gift deeds cannot be taken into consideration. On the other hand, having regard to the fact that Exs. A2 and A3 are registered gift deeds, the title of the plaintiff for the sake of this suit can be accepted though the same is the subject-matter in a comprehensive suit based on title.

15. The next crucial aspect for consideration is whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property and he was dispossessed by D1 to D3 on the evening of 10.5.2015.

15A. A perusal of Exs. A4, A6 to A15 and A20 to A22 would show that plaintiff has been paying the house tax, electricity bills and water tax to the authorities in respect of the suit property which implies that he has been in occupation of the suit property. Apart from the documentary evidence, the oral, evidence of PWs. 1 and 3 would also confirm the same. Though D1 contended that the plaintiff was never in possession but she has been in possession of the suit property, the same is not borne out by any record except her parole evidence. 

The plaintiff and his wife are aged persons and the record shows that they have been in possession of the suit house and therefore, it is highly unbelievable that seeing the defendants, they would leave the house. So the evidence on record clearly establishes the fact that the defendants have highhandedly dispossessed plaintiff and his wife. The suit was filed on 2.11.2015 seeking recovery of possession and it is clear that the suit was filed within six months from the date of dispossession and the ingredients of Section 6 are complied with.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

CRP No. 619 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2019

 Maddimsetty Ramana Kumari Vs.  Maddimsetty Narasimha Rao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U. Durga Prasad Rao, J.

Citation: AIR 2020 AP 2

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Whether wife can claim right of residence in property in the name of her father in law?

Against the above backdrop, the contentions raised by the
petitioner that she has a right to continue to live in a portion of the
above-mentioned property cannot survive. The claim of her husband
through whom she claims the right of residence in his property has
already been repelled by the civil court twice, once in the partition suit
and second time in the suit for partition brought by the first respondent
himself. The claim brought through her son has already been rejected,
the suit for partition having already been dismissed.
12. It is clear from the averments of the petitioner herself, she has
been permitted to use a portion of the property by the second
respondent. This averment may be assumed to be correct. But, then it
is clear from the averment itself that what was allowed was only a
permissive user. The petitioner cannot force herself on the owner of

the property, particularly when she has no vested or legal right to claim residence in his property.
13. The judgments reported as Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur & Ors. in FAO (OS 196/2014, decided by a division bench of this Court on 10.09.2014, and Smt. Preeti Satija vs. Smt. Raj Kumari & Anr. in RFA (OS) 24/2012, decided by another division bench of this Court on 15.01.2014, do not assist the petitioner in the present case in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169, particularly, the observations in para 29 of which read as under:-
“As regards Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 30th August, 2018
 Crl.M.C. 2082/2016 & Crl.M.A. 8823-24/2016

MANJU GUPTA  Vs  PANKAJ GUPTA 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA

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Whether wife can reside in her matrimonial house even if her husband is not owner of said house?

 In this case, admittedly, till the dispute started between the
Petitioner and Respondent, both of them were very much residing in
the flat at Mulund and, therefore, as they have lived together in the
said flat as a 'couple', as a 'husband and wife', in a domestic
relationship, it becomes her 'shared household', as stated in the
definition of Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In such a situation,
whether the said flat belongs to or owned by the Respondenthusband,
is totally irrelevant. As stated above, Section 19(a) of the
D.V. Act makes it clear that, whether or not the Respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared household, the Court can
pass a residence order, restraining the Respondent from
dispossessing, or, in any other manner, disturbing the possession of
the aggrieved person – Petitioner-wife herein. Therefore, much
emphasis laid by the Family Court on the fact that the flat at Mulund
belongs to the Respondent's father and not to the Respondent, is
totally misplaced. The question of title or proprietary right in the
property is not at all of relevance, when the provisions of the D.V.
Act; especially Section 19 thereof, are to be considered. As a matter
of fact, it needs to be emphasized that, as the wife's right to reside in
the matrimonial home was being defeated on this very ground that
the house does not belong to the husband or does not stand in his
name, this D.V. Act was brought in the Statute Book with the specific
and clear language and the unequivocal Clause that the 'title of the
husband or that of the family members to the said flat', is totally
irrelevant. It is also irrelevant whether the Respondent has a legal
or equitable interest in the shared household. The moment it is
proved that it was a shared household, as both of them had, in their
matrimonial relationship, i.e. domestic relationship, resided
together there and in this case, upto the disputes arose, it follows
that the Petitioner-wife gets right to reside therein and, therefore, to
get the order of interim injunction, restraining Respondent-husband
from dispossessing her, or, in any other manner, disturbing her
possession from the said flat.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10696 OF 2017
Roma Rajesh Tiwari V Rajesh Dinanath Tiwari 
 CORAM : DR. SHALINI PHANSALKAR-JOSHI, J.
 DATE : 12TH OCTOBER 2017.

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Whether daughter in law can file counter claim under domestic violence Act before small cause court?

The Appellant got married with son of the Respondent. The Appellant started residing in the suit flat alongwith her husband. The flat was allotted to the Respondent by the Society. A daughter was born from their wedlock. The husband of Appellant left her at the suit flat and shifted to live with his parent. The Respondent along with his wife had been residing in another flat nearby. The Appellant was treated with cruelty by her husband and other members of the family. A suit for divorce on the basis of cruelty was filed by the Appellant against her husband. A notice was sent on behalf of the Respondent to the Appellant revoking the gratuitous licence and asking the Appellant to stop the use and occupation of the suit flat. The Appellant replied the notice. The Respondent filed suit in the Small Causes Court. The Appellant filed a written statement in the suit pleading that she was residing in the suit flat along with her husband and daughter. Her husband who was also residing along with her left her to live with the Respondent. It was pleaded that suit flat was intended to be used by the joint family as a joint family property and although the agreement of purchase of the suit flat bore the name of the Respondent, the suit flat was used as joint family property. The allegation that Respondent was the sole owner of the flat was denied. The Respondent/Plaintiff filed an application Under Section 9A (Maharashtra Amendment) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the application, the Respondent claimed that declaration sought by the Appellant in the suit was not maintainable, hence, a preliminary issue Under Section 9A of Code of Civil Procedure be framed. The application was objected by the Appellant. The Appellant claimed that since she had been subjected to domestic violence she was entitled for the reliefs sought by way of counter claim as provided in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act, 2005). It was contended that the reliefs sought by way of counter claim were not barred as per Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (Act, 1887). The Trial Court framed preliminary issue "as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the counter claim". Judge Small Causes Court held that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the counter claim. Revision was filed against the order passed by the Small Causes Court before the District Judge. The District Judge rejected the revision which order was challenged by the Appellant by means of writ petition which was dismissed by judgment. The High Court held that in view of the express language in Section 15 as also the Second Schedule of Act, 1887, the Small Causes Court constituted under Act, 1887 cannot entertain and try the counter claim. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the Appellant filed the present appeal. 

(i) The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to Courts of Small Causes established beyond the Presidency-towns. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has been enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Act, 2005 was enacted by the Parliament to give effect to various international conventions. There cannot be any dispute that proceeding before the Judge, Small Causes Court is a legal proceeding and the Judge, Small Causes Court is a civil court. On the strength of Section 26 any relief available Under Section 18 to 22 of Act, 2005, thus, can also be sought by the aggrieved person. [13],[17] and[20]

(ii) "Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act" as used in Section 26(1) of Act, 1887 are words of expression of the widest amplitude engulfing the contrary provisions contained in the Act. The suit in question was filed by the Plaintiff for enforcement of his right as a licensor after allegedly terminating the gratuitous licence of the Appellant. On a plain reading Item No. 11 of Schedule II covers determination or enforcement of any such right or interest in immovable property. But by virtue of Section 26 Sub-section (1) as applicable in State of Maharashtra, Item No. 11 of Schedule 2 has to give way to Section 26(1) and a suit between licensor and licensee which is virtually a suit for recovery of immovable property is fully maintainable in Judge, Small Causes Court that is why the suit was instituted by the Plaintiff in the Judge, Small Causes Court claiming the right and interest in the immovable property. [29]

(iii) When the suit filed by the Plaintiff for determination or enforcement of his right as a licensor can be taken cognizance by Judge, Small Causes Court the relief claimed by the Appellant in the Court of Small Causes within the meaning of Section 26 of Act. 2005 can be considered by the Judge, Small Causes Court. In facts of the present case, the bar and embargo under Item No. 11 of Schedule II read with Section 15 of Act, 1887 stand whittled down and engulfed by virtue of Section 26 Sub-section (1) as applicable in the State. [30]

(iv) Section 26 of the Act, 2005 has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Unless the determination of claim by an aggrieved person seeking any order as contemplated by Act, 2005 is expressly barred from consideration by a civil court, this Court shall be loath to read in bar in consideration of any such claim in any legal proceeding before the civil court. When the proceeding initiated by Plaintiff in the Judge, Small Causes Court alleged termination of gratuitous licence of the Appellant and prays for restraining the Appellant from using the suit flat and permit the Plaintiff to enter and use the flat, the right of residence as claimed by the Appellant is inter-connected with such determination and refusal of consideration of claim of the Appellant as raised in her counter claim shall be nothing but denying consideration of claim as contemplated by Section 26 of the Act, 2005 which shall lead to multiplicity of proceeding, which can not be the object and purpose of Act, 2005. The counter claim filed by the Appellant before Judge, Small Causes Court was fully entertainable and courts below committed error in refusing to consider such claim. The judgment of the High Court and order of Small Causes Court as well as judgment of the District Judge were set aside. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6448 of 2017 

Decided On: 09.05.2017

Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi Vs. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2017) 14 SCC 373.

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Whether Married Daughter who Has Legal Right Of Residence In Building Can Seek Tenant’s Eviction?

 Coming to the second question first, in our
opinion, its answer depends upon the proper

interpretation of the definition of the word "family" as
defined in Section 3(g) of the Act. It reads as under:
“3(g) “Family”, in relation to a landlord or
tenant of a building, means, his or her-
(i) spouse;
(ii) male lineal descendants;
(iii) such parents, grandparents and any
unmarried or widowed or divorced or
judicially separated daughter or
daughter of a male lineal descendant, as
may have been normally residing with
him or her,
and includes, in relation to a landlord, any
female having a legal right of residence in
that building;”
25) Perusal of the afore-quoted definition would go to
show that family in relation to landlord or tenant of a
building would include (1) spouse (2) male lineal
descendants (3) such parents, grandparents,
unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially
separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal
descendant as may have been residing with the
landlord. The definition further says, "Family”
includes in relation to landlord, any female having a

legal right of residence in that building.
26) The inclusive part of the definition, which is
enacted only for the benefit of “female” in relation to
the landlord, adds one more category of person in
addition to those specified in clauses (i) to (iii), namely,
“any female having a legal right of residence in that
building”.
27) A fortiori, any female, if she is having a legal right
of residence in the building, is also included in the
definition of “family” in relation to landlord regardless
of the fact whether she is married or not. In other
words, in order to claim the benefit of expression
"family", a female must have a "legal right of residence"
in the building. Such female would then be entitled to
seek eviction of the tenant from such building for her
need.
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No. 9727 OF 2016
 
Gulshera Khanam  Vs Aftab Ahmad 
Dated:September 27, 2016
Citation: 2016 SCCONLINESC1001,(2016) 9 SCC414

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Whether husband is liable to pay maintenance to wife and children even if wife is residing in house of husband?

On considering the above submissions I find that

the sole consideration before this Court is whether the

Appellate had erred in passing the order of

maintenance against the petitioner/husband in the

light of the fact that the petitioner/husband was living

elsewhere and the respondent/wife was residing with

the in-laws in the house which was in the name of the

husband. I find that there is no infirmity in the order

passed by the Trial Court primarily because it is not a

case, where the wife has left the house of the husband,

but under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the

case, it is the husband who has left the shared

household, but that would not relieve him from

paying maintenance to his wife and children.

Apparently children are aged 16 and 14 years and in

these days of inflation, schooling is expensive and the

aged father-in-law has also supported the daughter-inlaw,

whereas the husband has lost the suit of divorce

then, under the circumstances, I have no hesitation in

holding that wife is entitled to the maintenance as

alleged by the Courts below, besides what has been

ordered is also reasonable under the circumstances

and on that score also the impugned orders does not

call for any interference. The judicial conscience of

the Court cannot shut itself from the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case. Moreover, this being a

criminal revision, the findings of fact by the lower

courts are unassailable, as the Court cannot reappreciate

the entire evidence and the jurisdiction

being limited to question of law and errors apparent

on the face of record, I do not find any infirmity in the

order passed by the lower Court.

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH: BENCH AT INDORE

 Hon'ble Mrs. Justice S.R. Waghmare

Criminal Revision No. 949 / 2015

 Naresh Sharma  Vs. Jyoti Sharma

Citation: 2016 CRLJ3113 MP

(Passed on 10/02/2016)

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Whether wife is entitled to reside in house jointly owned by her husband and mother in law?

There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid exposition of law. But, then the petitioner has failed to prove on record that the house belongs exclusively to his mother. Rather, it has come on record that he alongwith his mother had taken a loan for building the house and he was repaying the loan amount in monthly installment of ` 7,000/-. He also admitted that his salary was ` 25,000/- per month, whereas, his mother had retired from a government job in the year 2010 and his father was handicapped. The petitioner himself has admitted that there are 9-10 rooms in the old and new houses and once this is the position, the petitioner cannot back out from his legal obligation of providing residence to the respondent in the shared household.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

Cr.M.M.O. No. 248 of 2014

Decided On: 21.05.2015

Sandeep Gupta  Vs.  Indu Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.

Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL225

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Whether wife of government servant has right to reside in official residence when her husband is not entitled to reside in it?

 Undoubtedly, the writ petitioner and his wife used to reside in the official accommodation/quarter allotted to the writ petitioner by the Haldia Dock Complex/Port Trust Authorities. The official accommodation/quarter, during the period of allotment, therefore, was the couple's home. However, the wife cannot claim possession of the official accommodation/quarter, once the writ petitioner became disentitled to occupy the same. A spouse's right to enjoy occupation of an official accommodation/quarter and even calling it his/her matrimonial home co-exists with the right of the allottee spouse to enjoy occupation of such accommodation/quarter, but cannot travel beyond the allottee spouse's entitlement or right to enjoy occupation of the official accommodation/quarter. In other words, the spouse's right or entitlement vis-a-vis the allottee spouse's right or entitlement is inalienable in nature.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

W.P. 16492 (W) of 2014

Decided On: 18.06.2015

 Abdul Matleb
Vs.
Haldia Dock Complex and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Biswanath Somadder, J.

Citation: AIR2015Cal205

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Whether wife can claim right of residence in house of mother in law as per domestic violence Act?

Perusal of both the impugned judgments and orders
shows that the house at Mahsul colony, Nanded is in the name
of Kevalabai w/o Madhavrao Mahurkar, who is the mother of
present respondent. Both the courts below, on the basis of
available evidence have recorded a finding concurrently that the
said house, at no point of time, was the matrimonial house.
Further said house was not shared by the present applicants
with the respondent. Therefore, merely because the
respondent has any right of succession in the said house, that
will not entitle the present applicants to claim the right of
residence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
AURANGABAD BENCH, AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 235 OF 2013
Sandhya w/o Sanjay Mahurkar,

VERSUS
Sanjay s/o Madhav Mahurkar,

CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, J.
DATED : 13 th January, 2015
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)1393

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When woman should not be denied right of residence in house owned by her mother-in-law?

  If, as a matter of fact, a girl is brought to the house

by the bridegroom on his own without the junction of his

parents, of course, the girl cannot forward a claim on such a

house belonging to the father-in-law or the mother-in-law as

the shared household. In this particular case, the husband

of the woman is no where in the picture. He has virtually

abandoned the girl and has gone abroad. It seems that his

parents are hand in gloves with him and they want to see


that the girl is thrown to the street. The marriage of the girl

was an arranged marriage, and she was brought not to the

street after marriage, whereas she was brought to the house

in question. Party respondents have no case that her

husband has another house of his own wherein they were

living together. Had she been made aware before the

marriage that she would not be permitted to reside in that

house and she would not be permitted to treat that house as

shared household, she would not have agreed for such a

marriage. In such a case, no sensible parents of a girl will

give their daughter in marriage to such a person. Therefore,

having accepted the girl as their daughter-in-law and

permitted to be taken to that house for her stay there, they

cannot be permitted to show the doors to her, on a mere

claim that the house belongs to the mother-in-law.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                          PRESENT:

                    MR. JUSTICE B.KEMAL PASHA

               TUESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2015
                                 OP(Crl.).No. 23 of 2015 (Q)
                                  

        SHIMA, V   NAVAS
           

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