Supreme Court : If an accused obtains anticipatory bail by suppressing material facts (e.g., prior rejections or hidden criminal antecedents), the Court will not hesitate to cancel it.

 In the present case, the allegations against the Accused Respondents, including Accused-Vishwajeet, are grave in nature. There is a clear observation by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the bail rejection order dated 7th September 2023 that the Accused Respondents tried to mislead the Court by concealing the fact that the ex parte injunction order dated 27th June, 2023 had been set aside in appeal. The High Court seems to have glossed over this important aspect of the case and granted indulgence of pre-arrest bail to the Accused Respondents without considering the nature and gravity of allegations attributed to them and the fact that there was an imminent need for custodial investigation of the Accused Respondents. {Para 19}

20. Additionally, the High Court failed to notice the criminal antecedents of the Accused persons, which are highlighted in the counter affidavit filed by the State. Apparently, the incident recorded in the FIR was a clear-cut attempt by the estranged husband (Accused-Vishwajeet) to dispossess his own wife (Appellant-complainant) from her lawfully inherited property i.e., the subject-hotel, by use of force and by employing henchmen to do the dirty work. Hence, considering the gravity of allegations, it is not a case warranting indulgence of pre-arrest bail to the Accused. In our view, the High Court clearly erred in granting such liberty to the Accused Respondents. Furthermore, by threatening the witnesses, the Accused-Vishwajeet has flouted the conditions of anticipatory bail order. For this reason, also he cannot be allowed to continue on anticipatory bail.

Ratio: Anticipatory bail is an "extraordinary remedy." If an accused obtains it by suppressing material facts (e.g., prior rejections or hidden criminal antecedents), the Court will not hesitate to cancel it.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3088 of 2025 

Decided On: 21.07.2025

Nikita Jagganath Shetty Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Author: Sandeep Mehta, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 878, MANU/SC/0957/2025

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Supreme court: Whether bail granted on medical grounds can be sustained when the medical necessity is vague and non urgent?

Whether bail granted on medical grounds can be sustained when the medical necessity is vague and non urgent -- Held, bail granted on medical grounds must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions, and if it is shown that a party obtained bail by misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing material facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled on that ground alone.

 Grant of bail on medical grounds -- Held, bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and necessary facilities are not available in jail

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, this Court cautioned that “bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and necessary facilities are not available in jail”. The burden to prove such necessity lies on the accused.

This Court has consistently held that bail granted on medical grounds must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions. The discharge summary dated 28.11.2024 issued by the hospital, mentions that A2 is a patient with a history of diabetes, hypertension, and prior cardiac issues, and that he may require a CABG surgery in the future. However, the report does not indicate: any current emergency or need for immediate medical intervention; any life-threatening condition warranting urgent release; and any inability of the prison medical system to manage his current state. Thus, there is no compelling medical necessity for grant of bail. In Puran v. Rambilas, this Court held that "if it is shown that a party obtained bail by misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing material facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled on that ground alone".

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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What amounts to suppression of material facts in litigation?

 Suppression of Facts:

66. The tenants have contended that two of the owners' children got employment, perhaps, pending the appeal. It was not brought to the Appellate Court's notice. It is suppression. At least, the tenants assert so.

67. S.P. Chengalraya Naidu is the oft-quoted judgment on fraud and its ramification in the judicial arena. It invokes Chief Justice Edward Coke's aphoristic assertion that "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal". It reiterates that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of the law.

68. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant, according to the Supreme Court1, disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have affected the merits of the case. It must be a matter material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the Court may have taken.

69. The owners have a counter allegation: the tenants have business at another place, too. But they suppressed that fact.

70. At any rate, I see no plea taken in the CA about the suppression of a material fact: two of the children getting employment. But it was argued. I reckon among the many children of the owners, two getting employment in thirty years hardly affects their case prospects. Nor does it amount to a material suppression.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 497 of 2016

Decided On: 06.09.2019

Rukminibai Motiram Kshirsagar  Vs.  Manoramabai Mallikarjun Bagale

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Whether non disclosure of sale of property prior to institution of eviction suit amounts to suppression of material facts by landlord

 So far as the question of sale of property by the landlord on 03.07.2001 is concerned, it was before institution of proceedings for eviction. On the date of institution of proceedings, this accommodation which was already sold and the same was not available with the landlord. The requirement of Section 16(1)(g) r/w Section 16(2), is in respect of the disclosure of the premises/area in occupation/use of the landlord, on the date of institution of the proceedings. Hence, non-disclosure of such sale on 03.07.2001, by the landlord in his application, in my opinion, does not amount to suppression of any material facts. Apart from this, there is no pleading by tenant in written statement in respect of such sale. It is for the tenant to specifically plead such fact and bring on record the evidence to establish the animus possidendi or oblique motive, on the part of the landlord. Even the sale was prior to institution of proceedings, the tenant had a full opportunity to raise appropriate plea in respect thereof and to avail full opportunity, to place evidence on record. The tenant has, in the instant case, failed to plead this fact and has further failed to avail an opportunity provided to him by the Trial Court. The enquiry in to such questions involve resolution of disputed questions of facts. If this plea had been raised by the tenants, the landlord would have got sufficient opportunity to defend it. Hence, such a plea can not, for the first time, be entertained by this Court, in revisional jurisdiction.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 244 of 2007

Decided On: 14.12.2009

 Bismilla Bee  Vs. Anwar

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Whether possession of tenant who has not paid rent for fifteen years is lawful entitling him to get injunction?

 The conclusion of the trial court that the first Respondent-Plaintiff vacated the suit property since the year 1991 is fortified by yet another circumstance viz., nonpayment of rent by the Respondent-Plaintiff. Admittedly, ever since withdrawal of earlier suit RCS No. 1004/1988, the first Respondent-Plaintiff has not paid any rent from the year 1991. Be it noted, that the Appellant-Defendant had also not initiated any proceedings claiming rent or arrears of rent from the first Respondent-Plaintiff. After fling of the suit in 2004, the first Respondent-Plaintiff has sent a cheque dated 14.05.2005 for Rs. 10,395/- towards payment of rent for 189 months thereby admitting that he has not paid the rent for more than fifteen years. The trial court also observed that the first Respondent-Plaintiff has suppressed the material fact that he has not paid the rent from 1991. The trial court observed that the first Respondent-Plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands and that he cannot sustain his claim for the equitable relief of permanent injunction.

15. The First Appellate Court did not keep in view that the first Respondent-Plaintiff has not shown that he has paid any rent after 1991 and that without paying rent, he cannot have any legitimate right to be in possession of the suit premises. The party seeking injunction based on the averment that he is in possession of the property and seeking assistance of the Court while praying for permanent injunction restraining other party who is alleged to be disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff, must show his lawful possession of the property. Having not paid rent for more than fifteen years, it cannot be said that possession of the first Respondent-Plaintiff can be said to lawful possession entitling him to grant of permanent injunction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1509 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 29417 of 2016)

Decided On: 06.02.2019

 Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande Vs. Balkrishna Rambharose Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 933

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Whether suppression of material facts by Advocate amounts to his unbecoming conduct?

When the matter was listed before us today, we
repeatedly asked Shri Nedumpara, why he did not disclose to
us the order dated 22nd October, 2018 when the matter was
mentioned before us on 14th November, 2018. To this, there
was no answer. We then warned Shri Nedumpara that as a
counsel appearing before the Court, his primary duty is to
disclose all material facts to the Court before obtaining any
order from the Court. We have warned him that such
unbecoming conduct of an advocate who appears before this
Court, will be sternly dealt with should any future incident of a
like nature arise before this Court. We were inclined to impose
heavy costs but have not done so only because the appellant,
for whom Shri Nedumpara appears, already appears to be in
dire straits financially.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 26424 OF 2018

SHASHIKANT GANPAT JOGAL RABIN MAJUMDER 
Vs
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
Dated:November 19, 2018.

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Whether suit for specific performance of contract can be dismissed if defendant has suppressed that property was encumbered?

The assurance given by the Appellant at the time when the agreement dated 30.06.2000 (Ex. A1) was executed that there was no encumbrance over the suit property was not a correct statement of fact. The further recital that the "Original Parent Document" was in the Bank again was not a fair and complete disclosure. It is true that these averments were copied in the subsequent suit agreement dated 20.09.2000. However the communication dated 22.09.2001 (Ex. A6) emanating from Respondent No. 1 records that by the time the suit agreement was entered into the existence of the encumbrance was a well known fact. For the purposes of the present matter what is important is the common understanding with which the parties had entered into the transaction. If Respondent No. 1 was well aware about the existence of encumbrance over the suit property at the time when suit agreement was entered into, he cannot thereafter submit to the contrary. In the face of such clear understanding under which the suit agreement was entered into, the High Court was completely in error in observing that the entire case put forth on the part of the Appellant was required to be summarily thrown out. Further, reliance on the decision in S.P. Chengalveraya Naidu (supra) was also misplaced. That case did not arise from a suit for specific performance and more over the Plaintiff in that case was found to have withheld relevant documents and as such the judgment rendered by the trial Court dismissing his claim was restored by this Court. The principle laid down therein cannot apply either on facts or in law to the present case.

8. As regards suit for specific performance, the law is very clear that the Plaintiff must plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract all through i.e., right from the date of the contract till the date of hearing of the suit. If Respondent No. 1 was well aware about the encumbrance and the parties had chosen that the balance consideration be paid to the Appellant before 20.03.2001 so that the sale deed could be registered without any encumbrance, it was for Respondent No. 1 to have taken appropriate steps in that behalf for completion of transaction. The facts on record disclose that the first step taken by Respondent No. 1 after the suit agreement was well after four months, when further amount of Rs. 2 lakhs was paid on 21.01.2001. Thereafter nothing was done till 20.03.2001 by which the transaction had to be completed. The record is completely silent about any communication sent around 20.03.2001 towards completion of transaction. As a matter of fact the first step thereafter was six months after the deadline namely on 22.09.2001 when the communication (Ex. A6) was sent along with amount of Rs. 10 lakhs. The written submissions filed on behalf of Respondent No. 1 also do not indicate any steps till this time so as to say that he was all the while ready and willing to complete the transaction.

9. The assertion made by Respondent No. 1 in paragraph 7 of the plaint is a mere assertion without any relevant details as to what exactly he had done towards fulfillment of his obligations and completion of the transaction. The factual aspects as detailed above are quite clear that Respondent No. 1 had completely failed in his obligations and was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Even going by the case set up by Respondent No. 1, that around 29.07.2002 an arrangement was arrived at, under which out of the balance amount Rs. 19.5 lakhs, Rs. 13.5 lakhs were to be made over by Respondent No. 1 to the Bank directly and rest of the sum of Rs. 6 lakhs was to be paid to the Appellant in cash, the facts do not indicate any observance of these conditions. Beyond filing an application for impleadment which came to be dismissed, Respondent No. 1 did not take any step. The amount of Rs. 13.5 lakhs was independently deposited and discharge was obtained by the Appellant.

10. If Respondent No. 1 was put in possession of the suit property pursuant to the arrangement as suggested by him, his corresponding obligation under such arrangement was also twofold namely to pay off the dues to the Bank directly and pay rest of the sum to the Appellant. There is nothing on record which could be consistent with discharge of such obligation on the part of Respondent No. 1.

11. The case put up by Respondent No. 1 that he was put in possession pursuant to an arrangement arrived at on or around 29.07.2002 is not free from doubt. In a matter where Rs. 19.5 lakhs were still outstanding, it is not possible to accept that the vendor may put the purchaser in possession when the original agreement did not contemplate handing over of the possession even before execution of the sale deed. The contemporaneous facts including the aspects that the Appellant had initiated criminal proceedings and made complaints to various authorities about forcible possession having been taken by Respondent No. 1, also indicate falsity in the claim of Respondent No. 1. Be that as it may the basic issue is whether Respondent No. 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract which in our considered view has to be answered against him. We are conscious that two Courts have arrived at a finding of fact but in our view such finding is completely opposed to and contrary to the facts on record and is completely unsustainable.

12. We, therefore, reject the claim of Respondent No. 1 and hold that the suit for specific performance preferred by Respondent No. 1 is required to be dismissed. At the same time we accept the counter claim made by the Appellant and hold that he is entitled to recovery of possession. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3353-3354 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 22018-22019 of 2014)

Decided On: 28.03.2018

P. Meenakshisundaram Vs. P. Vijayakumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

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Whether application for condonation of delay can be rejected if applicant has suppressed material facts from court?

In this context, it would be apposite to consider the judgment of the Apex Court in Balwant Singh Case (Supra). In the said case also, as can be seen, the Apex Court found that since the application for condonation of delay was suffering from suppression of facts, no indulgence would be shown to the appellants who were guilty of the said suppression of facts. The relevant paragraphs 9, 10, 27 and 39 of the said judgment are reproduced herein :

9. It is clear from a bare reading of the above paragraph that the applicants were totally callous about pursuing their appeal. They have acted irresponsibly and even with negligence. Besides this, they have not approached the Court with clean hands. The applicant, who seeks aid of the Court for exercising its discretionary power for condoning the delay, is expected to state correct facts and not state lies before the Court. Approaching the Court with unclean hands itself is a ground for rejection of such application.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3773 of 2012

Decided On: 18.09.2012

 Hemant Ganeshprasad Jaiswal Vs. Murlidhar Govind Khade

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Savant, J.

Citation: 2013(1) MHLJ71,

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Whether suit can be dismissed for want of cause of action?

Now the question arises as to what appropriate orders should be passed in a case like this where the plaintiff has suppressed true facts from the Court to make out a flimsy cause of action. The plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC because for this purpose the Court will have to see only the allegation contained in the plaint. Does it mean the Court is power less to deal with the litigants who file frivolous and vexatious suit concealing material facts from the Court? The answer to this question is provided by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. reported in MANU/SC/0034/1977 : [1978]1SCR742 . Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if clever drafting has created illusion of a cause of action the evil should be nipped in the bud by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. it was held that such bogus litigation should be struck down at the earliest. As already noticed, the plaintiff concealed all the material facts in the original plaint and also in the amended plaint. He filed suit as the original owner of the property which has been found to be untrue from his own admission contained in the reply referred to above. If true facts were pleaded he would not have been entitled to maintain the suit for possession nor he could maintain the suit for declaration that the sale deed dated 9th June 1995 executed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favor of the defendant No. 3 in respect of one half portion of the property No. IX/6075, Kashyap Marg, New Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi is illegal because at the time of execution of the said sale deed, the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in favor of defendant No. 1 and 2 was admittedly in force. The said power of attorney was cancelled subsequently vide cancellation deed dated 26th July, 1995. The true facts which are admitted in his own reply indicate that he had no cause of action to file the suit. Material facts were suppressed from the Court only to make out a sham, flimsy cause of action. Therefore, on the authority of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T. Arivandandam (supra), I think the suit is liable to be dismissed not under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, but for want of cause of action.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

IA No. 7494/1999 and S. No. 70/1998

Decided On: 12.09.2001

 Madan Lal Vaid Vs. Nand Kumar Walia and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Om Prakash Dwivedi, J.

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Whether plaint can be rejected if there is suppression of material facts?

I find no force in the submission raised on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite parties. No doubt, as per the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purposes of determining the question of rejection of plaint on the other grounds mentioned therein, it is the plaint that has to be looked into, but the question is that if the plaintiffs have deliberately suppressed the material facts, the disclosure of which is required by law to be made in terms of Order VI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether it was open for the court concerned to proceed with the trial and decide the suit after framing issues. The order dated 20.11.2006 was challenged by the plaintiffs-judgment debtors themselves before this Court and the civil revision was dismissed by a reasoned order dated 1.5.2008. Thus, this fact was well known to the plaintiffs and they were duty bound in law to disclose the same which they have not done. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly stipulates that the pleadings should contain the material facts. It has been observed by the Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others [MANU/SC/0071/2004 : (2004) 3 SCC 137] that omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement or plaint becomes bad. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits and in case Court is prima facie persuaded of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court, in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised.

10. Law is well settled that dexterity of the draftsman whereby the material facts are camouflaged in a cleverly drafted plaint and illusionary cause of action is set out, cannot defeat the right of the defendant to get the plaint rejected. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

C.R. No. 2143 of 2009

Decided On: 24.06.2010

Bhagirath Prasad Sigh @ Bachcha Babu Vs. Ram Narayan Rai @ Ram Narayan Singh and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Ravi Ranjan, J.

Citation: AIR 2010 Patna 189

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Whether plaintiff has legal duty to come to court with true case and prove it by true evidence?

Inspite of the courts repeatedly stating and reaffirming the principle that it is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring to the notice of the Court all facts material and relevant to the issue, the litigants continue in their efforts to obtain favourable orders from the Court, ex parte, without disclosing all material facts to the Court. 

Thereafter again the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, observed as follows :

"KULDIP SINGH, J.:---"Fraud- avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or a Decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/Decree- by first Court or by the highest Court-has to be treated as a nullity by every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court even in collateral proceedings."

"7. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that There is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of the law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation."

The passages quoted above leave no manner of doubt that a dishonest litigant loses his remedy, when discretionary relief is obtained by misrepresentation. The affidavit in support must make a candid and fair statement of facts. Facts must not be stated in a manner to mislead the Court as to the true facts. There must be no concealment of material facts. It is no excuse for the party to say that he/she was not aware of the importance of any facts which he/she has omitted to bring forward.

Bombay High Court

Agarwal Industries Ltd. vs Golden Oil Industries (P) Ltd. on 8 April, 1999

Equivalent citations: AIR 1999 Bom 362, 1999 (3) BomCR 390, (1999) 2 BOMLR 476, 2001 106 CompCas 78 Bom, 1999 (3) MhLj 684

Bench: S Nijjar

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Whether auction sale can be set aside for suppression of material facts?

 Admittedly, the facts noticed hereinabove were not
disclosed to the intending bidders in the E-auction notice
dated 01.03.2016. A bidder would not intend to buy litigation with the
property, which may ensue between the Bank and the Housing Board.
The petitioner has specifically pleaded that on 24.04.2016 he filed an
application for providing a copy of NOC/permission, if any, granted by
the Housing Board for sale of the property in question. The averments
in paragraph no. 18 of the writ petition has been reiterated in
paragraph no. 5(o) of the memorandum of the instant appeal, however,
this assertion has not been controverted by the respondent-Bank. The
Bank has taken a position that there was no pleading in the writ
petition to the effect that while preparing for deposit of the balance bid
amount the petitioner came to know about the aforesaid illegality,
however, in view of the pleadings in the writ petition, particularly in
paragraph no. 18, the defects in the sale notice cannot be ignored.
There is no warrant of the proposition that illegality which would go to
the root of the auction sale must have been discovered by an auction
purchaser during the auction sale and a fact which would vitiate the
auction sale, if discovered subsequently, cannot be taken note of.
Knowledge to the petitioner about nature of the property put on auction
sale, even after the concluded sale, can be looked into to examine the
legality of the sale notice and the auction sale. The fact that the sale
notice was issued on “as is where is basis”, “as it is where it is
basis” and “whatever there is basis”, would not attach legality to the
auction sale inasmuch as, knowledge of the defect in property cannot
be imputed to an intending purchaser. Such covenants cannot
overcome the fatal defect in auction notice and the auction conducted
by suppressing vital informations must be held illegal.
16. The Bank was under a duty to disclose all relevant
facts including, the fact that the property put on auction sale was a
lease-hold property and it belongs to the Housing Board. This is a
basic requirement of fair play in action and more so, in case of a Public
Sector Bank. The auction sale which proceeded on a
misrepresentation to the intending bidders is definitely illegal and is
liable to be quashed. The terms and conditions of an illegal auction
sale cannot be enforced by the respondent-Bank, and accordingly
Clause-13 of E-auction notice which provides forfeiture of the amount
deposited by successful bidder in the event of failure to deposit the bid
amount within the stipulated time cannot be resorted to by the
respondent-Bank to forfeit EMD and 25% of the bid amount deposited
by the appellant. Dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the
appellant-writ petitioner himself invoked jurisdiction of this Court
seeking a direction upon the Bank to confirm the sale and issue Sale
Certificate, is not justified. The writ petition was decided without
affording an opportunity to the Housing Board to file its response, as is
apparent from the proceeding in W.P.(C) No.2181 of 2016, which was10.
disposed of on the very first day of hearing. In view of the objection
raised by the Housing Board to the auction sale of its property, the
direction issued by the Writ Court to the respondent Bank to take steps
for execution of lease in the name of the appellant is also rendered
erroneous. Considering the aforesaid facts, we are of the opinion that
the impugned order dated 26.04.2016 passed in W.P.(C) No.2181 of
2016 suffers from serious error in law.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
 L.P.A. No. 220 of 2016

Kumar Rohit, 
 V
Allahabad Bank, 
CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE VIRENDER SINGH, CHIEF JUSTICE
  MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

 Dated:26th July, 2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 Jharkh 65

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When insurance company has failed to prove that policy holder has fraudulently suppressed material facts?

 The opposite party-Corporation has taken a plea that the
answer given by the deceased policy-holder was not correct and he has
fraudulently suppressed the material facts because while he was treated
as an indoor patient before his death, there was an endorsement of the
doctor to the effect that he was suffering from “Seizure Disorder” since
1995 and stopped medication since 2001. It is not brought out by the
learned counsel for the Corporation as to who has made such statement
to the doctor of the Corporation and the said endorsement does not
disclose that for such disease, he was ever hospitalized. Moreover, such
endorsement does not disclose that he has undergone any test for such
disease. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Corporation
has not examined any doctor to prove such endorsement. It may not be
also out of place to mention here that the deceased policy-holder died
on 26.9.2004 after remaining for five days as an indoor patient. The
deceased policy-holder took the policies in the year 2002 and 2004.
Even if assuming that his medication continued up to 2001, obviously on
the date of policy undertaken, he was not suffering from any serious
illness and Annexure-7, which is the opinion of the treating doctor of
SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack shows that the deceased
policy-holder died due to “Septicaemia” as primary cause and “Drug
Rash” is a secondary cause. The doctor has not been examined to prove
the basic source of information about “Seizure Disorder” the deceased
policy-holder was suffering from 1995 till 2001 and thereafter on the
date of taking the policies also, the policy-holder was suffering from
such disease.
HIGH COURT OF ORISSA,CUTTACK
W.P. (C) No.5265 of 2009

Mrs. Mamata Satpathy 
Versus
The Zonal Manager,
LIC of India and others 
PRESENT :
THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE D.P.CHOUDHURY
Date of judgment:16.01.2017
Citation: AIR 2017 Orissa 54

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Whether claim of first wife can be rejected if her husband has suppressed marriage with her from court?

In   the   present   case,     Indubai   had   filed   criminal   case   for
maintenance under section 125 of Cr. P.C.  In the written statement,

Jaydeo has admitted his marriage with Indubai and he did not state
anything about his marriage with Draupada.  On the basis of evidence
tendered in the said case, the learned Magistrate held that fact of
marriage between Draupada and Jaydeo is proved and held that she
was entitled to maintenance and awarded the same.  Thus, under that
order, Jaydeo was paying maintenance to her during his life time.
The learned Judge of the trial Court has erred in accepting the finding
of the learned Magistrate as a final word while  determining the issue
of valid marriage of Indubai and Draupada with Jaydeo.  Draupada
has four children out of this wedlock.  The trial under section 125 of
Cr. P.C. conducted before the learned Magistrate was in absence of
Draupada.   The suppression of the fact of first marriage by Jaydeo
was obvious because he was in Government service and if he would
have   stated   about   the   first   marriage,   then   he   would   have   been
charged   for   misconduct   under   Rule   26   of   the   Maharashtra   Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules and that might have been affected adversely
on his service.  Thus, silence of Jaydeo about his first marriage with
Draupada in the written statement cannot be given any weightageand a circumstance against Draupada.  His efforts to hide the fact of
first marriage from Court was successful and therefore, Indubai was

declared to be entitled to receive maintenance and which she was
receiving during his lifetime.   The learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class in that maintenance application gave the correct finding on the
basis of the evidence available to him.   Draupada was never before
him to plead her case.  Under such circumstances, if one wife does not
come before the Court to plead her case and the fact of two marriages
are   never   brought   before   the   Court,   then   the   finding   given   and
judgment passed in respect of validity of one marriage is always a
subject of challenge before the Civil Court and in that event, the Civil
Court has to consider the evidence independently of both the parties

and is required to give its verdict. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO.577 OF 2015

Draupada @ Draupadi Jaydeo Pawar vs. Indubai d/o. Kashinath Shivram Chavan

CORAM : MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.

 Dated  : 10th FEBRUARY, 2016
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR197

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Whether an employee can be removed from service on ground of registration of offence against him when he was juvenile?

 In the present case, we have to examine whether merely because the
petitioner was called before the Juvenile Justice Board in connection
with some accusation made against the petitioner when, admittedly,
he was a minor of 14 years would itself justify or create any
impediment in his appointment in Government service. In this
connection, we will take note of the provisions of Section 19 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Section
19 reads thus :
“19. Removal of disqualification attaching to
conviction.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has
been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall
not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a
conviction of an offence under such law.
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the
relevant records of such conviction shall be removed
after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable
period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may
be.”
7. Taking note of the said provision and the admitted facts in
the present case, we find that mere non-disclosure of the alleged
accusation during the period when the petitioner was a minor would
not, be a disqualification of being appointed to Government service.
8. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of
Commissioner of Police and others (supra), has observed at paras 8,
10, 11 and 12, thus :  
“ 8. We respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court
that the cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but
we wish to give our own opinion in the matter. When
the incident happened the respondent must have been
about 20 years of age. At that age young people often
commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often
be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are
not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older
people. Hence, our approach should be to condone
minor indiscretions made by young people rather than
to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 171/2014
Pravin Arjun Shetkar

 V
State of Goa,
 CORAM :- F.M. REIS &
 K.L. WADANE, JJ.
 Date : - 16 OCTOBER 2015.
Citation: 2016 (5)ALLMR356

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Whether suppression of material facts in notice and complaint for dishonour of cheque is fatal to case?

  Before she filed the complaint the second respondent sent

Ext P4 statutory notice to the revision petitioner informing him about the

dishonour of the cheque and demanding payment of the amount

covered by      it.  Neither the nature, nor the date of the transaction

between the parties nor the date of issuance of the cheque was

disclosed in it. There was only a bald statement          that the revision

petitioner issued a cheque bearing the date 11.1.1999 for Rs.2,55,000/-

in discharge of a debt. There is no explanation why these material facts

were not disclosed in the statutory notice. Suppression of material facts

relating to the alleged transaction in the notice issued before filing the

suit or the complaint is an artifice used by certain litigants, the intention

of which is very clear. They want to develop a story after knowing the

defence that may be set up by the opposite party. The doors of the

court should be closed to such fortune seekers.

       19.   In the complaint also neither the nature, nor the date of the

transaction between the parties is mentioned. The only addition made

in the complaint is that the date of issuance of cheque is 14.9.1998. For

the first time it was in her evidence the 2nd respondent (PW1) disclosed

that the transaction between the parties was a loan of Rs.1,95,000/-. In

answer to a leading question put in the examination in chief she stated

that the transaction was after the marriage between her daughter

Sulatha and the revision petitioner's son Pradeep, which was

solemnised on 23.1.1998.        She testified that the revision petitioner

requested for a loan of Rs. 3 lakh one week after the marriage of

Sulatha and Pradeep and she paid him Rs.1 = lakh on 9.4.1998 and

Rs.45,000/- on 8.5.1998.      The amount mentioned in the cheque is

Rs.2,55,000/- though the loan amount was only Rs.1,95,000/-

Rs.60,000/- is said to be interest. How the interest was calculated will

be considered later.     Her story is that in August 1998 she made a

demand for repayment of the amount and then the revision petitioner

undertook to pay the amount in January 1999;           the 2nd respondent

insisted on getting a cheque and a document from the revision

petitioner;    on 14.9.1998 at her residence at Pampadi the revision

petitioner executed Ext P1 cheque and Ext P8 undertaking.

       20.   In a criminal case the accused should be informed before

the trial not only of the nature of the offence but also the particulars of

the transaction which are necessary for him to effectively meet the case

against him. But unscrupulous complainants refuse to do so with the

object of denying the accused a fair trial, which is a right guaranteed

under Article 21 of the Constitution. An accused in a complaint case

filed under Section 142 of the Act also is entitled to know before the trial

the particulars of the accusation against him. Suppression of these

particulars in the complaint alone is sufficient to order his acquittal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                           PRESENT:

         MR. JUSTICE K.ABRAHAM MATHEW

   9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2016

               Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 1689 of 2009 ( )

              

          K.K.DIVAKARAN, 

   V

          STATE OF KERALA 

                        

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Whether wife is entitled to get maintenance who suppresses fact of getting scholarship from court?

Having considered the rival contentions of either side, what is an
admitted position is that the fact that the wife was getting scholarship from
the National Institute of Technology, Durgapur that too of an amount of
Rs.30,000/- per month, the same cannot be said to be a temporary source
of income as long as it is an income of the wife. Rs.30,000/- is not a small
amount and is definitely a good amount for any normal human being to
maintain a decent standard of life. Even if it is a development which had
taken place subsequent to the filing of the application under Section 125
CrPC even then the said fact ought to have been disclosed the Court while
the evidence of the wife was being recorded, and suppressing this fact
from the Court at that relevant point of time is not appreciable on the part
of the wife. The fact that she got a scholarship of Rs.30,000/- also gives an
indication of her capabilities and her competence and for drawing a safe
inference of the wife being qualified, able and a competent lady capable
enough of sustaining herself well.
In the given factual background of the case as narrated in the
preceding paragraphs, this Court is of the opinion that for want of these
material facts from the Court below, the conclusion arrived at by the Court
below cannot be said to be based on proper facts. Definitely if the fact of
the wife getting a scholarship of Rs.30,000/- per month would had been
established before the Court below then the possibility of either rejection of
the claim application or the quantum of maintenance amount also being
reduced substantially, cannot be ruled out. Thus, in the opinion of this
Court, the matter needs to be remitted back to the Court below so that
either party can lead sufficient evidence to establish their respective source
of income, particularly the wife so far as her source of income is
concerned.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 157 OF 2016

Dipak Verma, Vs  Smt. Rashmi Verma, 

Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy
Dated:01/07/2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)282 Chh

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When court will not grant injunction in favour of plaintiff?

A perusal of record further indicates that after obtaining
ad-interim order of status-quo from this Court, the appellant has
extended the temporary structure in the suit premises. A perusal of
the photographs produced on record by the Municipal Corporation as
well as by the intervenor clearly indicates such further extension
carried out by the appellant. In my view, the reliefs under the
provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
equitable reliefs and are discretionary and such discretion can be
exercised by the Court only when the person has come to the Court
with clean hands and has not suppressed and/or material facts and
makes out a prima-facie case. In my view if a person violates the
order of status-quo granted by this Court, cannot be granted anyrelief by exercising discretionary power by Court. A perusal of the
order passed by the learned trial Judge clearly indicates that the
appellant was given an opportunity to produce all the documents. The
learned trial Judge considered each and every document produced
by the appellant before him and has rightly rejected the ad-interim
relief. Though this Court has granted sufficient opportunity to the
appellant to convince this Court that the suit structure was a pacca
structure and that the appellant was carrying on business in the suit
premises since 1961-1962. In my view, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant could not demonstrate any of these

crucial facts to seek any interim relief from this Court.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.75 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.89 OF 2015
Mohd. Ismail Gulam Shaikh 
V/s.
Municipal Corporation of Gr.Mumbai & Anr.
 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 DATE : 1ST FEBRUARY, 2016.
Citation;2016(3) MHLJ247

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Supreme Court: Suppression of material information amounts to moral turpitude in service law

Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2013) 9 SCC 363

Service Law

Termination of Service

Fraud/Misrepresentation/Suppression of information sought by employer or furnishing false information while seeking

appointment - Appellant while obtaining appointment suppressing material information sought by employer about his

criminal antecedents i.e. involvement in criminal case - Fact that final report was submitted by prosecution and accepted

by Judicial Magistrate concerned in criminal case against appellant - Effect of - Held, suppression of such material

information itself amounts to moral turpitude and is a separate and distinct matter than what is involved in criminal case -

In such a case, service of appointee concerned is liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or person

concerned stood acquitted/discharged - Thus, termination of service of appellant on ground of aforesaid suppression of

material information by him, held, proper - Not liable to be interfered with, 

Fraud/Forgery/Mala Fides

Order/Appointment obtained by fraud/misrepresentation - Effect and value of - Duty and approach of court while

entertaining petitions of persons committing such act, 

Supreme Court of India

Devendra Kumar vs State Of Uttaranchal & Ors. on 29 July, 2013

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Whether Suppression of material fact will be sufficient to declare Marriage as null and void?

Fraud must mean representing as existing what is not and concealing what is material. The misrepresentation or  concealment necessarily presupposes that the respondent was aware of the facts and circumstances which were misrepresented or concealed.Every fact and circumstance cannot be materials. Therefore,concealment of misrepresentation of every fact and circumstances cannot be said to be fraud sufficient for annulment. It is difficult to define with any certainty what can be said to be material fact or circumstance but it may be safely said that the fact or circumstance which is of such nature as would materially interfere with the marital life and pleasure including sexual pleasure will be a material fact or circumstance. The only limitation is that the material fact, or circumstance must be concerning the respondent, meaning thereby that it must be in respect of the person or character of the respondent. It is immaterial whether such fact or circumstance is curable or remediable. If a party to a marriage is suffering from some abhorrent disease such as leprosy or venereal disease and this is not disclosed it will be definitely concealment and consequently fraud as to material fact and circumstance. Similar would be the case with suppression of the fact of immoral life prior to the marriage. Without going into the detail or definition as to what may or may not constitute material fact or circumstance..If can be said that existence of a condition in the respondent which materially interferes with the sexual intercourse or its pleasure of which makes its indulgence in a normal way difficult or is such as is likely to cause dislike or abhorrence in the mind of the other spouse to have sexual fact or circumstance even though it may or may not amount to impotency. In the present case as I have already held the sexual intercourse was not possible without manipulation of the protruding uterus by hand, which obviously is likely to cause dislike abhorrence or disgust to a newly wed husband; concealment of such a fact will be fraud as to material fact of circumstance concerning the respondent as new contemplated by Section 12(1)(c), In the circumstance, the marriage solemnised between the petitioner and the respondent is avoidable and is liable is be annulled.

Bombay High Court

P. vs K. on 15 July, 1981

Equivalent citations: AIR 1982 Bom 400, 1982 (1) BomCR 454

Bench: Mody

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