Saturday, 6 December 2025

Supreme Court: What basic principles the court should follow while deciding application for discharge of accused?

ABSENT A STRONG SUSPICION, AN ACCUSED CAN BE DISCHARGED

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that before proceeding with the matter, it is essential to outline the legal principles to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding an application seeking discharge.

“21. In the decision in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] , this Court held that the word “ground” in Section 227CrPC, did not mean a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial.

22. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , after extracting Section 227CrPC, this Court in paras 10 and 11 held thus: (SCC pp. 401-402)

“10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”

23. In para 13 in P. Vijayan case [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court took note of the principles enunciated earlier by this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] which reads thus: (Prafulla Kumar Samal case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , SCC p. 9, para 10)

“10. … (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to  discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

16. In M.E. Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

Bengaluru, (2020) 2 SCC 768, this Court has held as under:-

“17.This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:

17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.

17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the

grave suspicion.

17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which

can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).” (emphasis supplied)


17. Consequently, at the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5146 OF 2025

TUHIN KUMAR BISWAS @ BUMBA Vs THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 

Author: MANMOHAN, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1373.

Dated: December 02, 2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Taking Photos Or Videos Of Woman When She's Not Engaged In Private Acts Won't Amount To Voyeurism punishable under S 354C of IPC

  FIR AND CHARGESHEET DO NOT DISCLOSE AN OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 354C IPC

19. Section 354C of IPC defines voyeurism as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’ in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed. ‘Private act’ has been defined in Explanation 1 as an act including “an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts

are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public.”

20. Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court is unable to conclude the same disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC since there is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured by the Appellant-accused while she was engaging in a ‘private act’. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, has concluded with respect to the offence under Section 354C as under:-


“11. Allegation made in the written complaint, in my opinion, did not disclose any offence under Section 354C…

12. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clearly intelligible that the allegation of clicking pictures and making video made in the written complaint cannot be said to be an offence within the meaning of Section 354C of IPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. Consequently, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order itself concluded that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of IPC.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5146 OF 2025

TUHIN KUMAR BISWAS @ BUMBA Vs THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 

Author: MANMOHAN, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1373.

Dated: December 02, 2025

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Beyond 50:50: How the Supreme Court Distinguished Gender‑Neutral from Gender‑Equal in Army JAG Recruitment


 The central takeaway of this judgment is that “gender‑neutral” recruitment is not the same as “gender‑equal” recruitment. A 50:50 male–female ratio may look fair on paper, but if it blocks more meritorious women and allows less meritorious men, it is not gender‑neutral and violates the constitutional guarantee of equality.

This article explains that distinction as articulated by the Supreme Court in Arshnoor Kaur & Anr v Union of India & Ors (2025 INSC 954), using the Court’s own definitions and reasoning

1. The Case Setting: JAG Recruitment and the 50:50 Policy

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Friday, 5 December 2025

“e‑Sakshya” Comes to Maharashtra: How Digital Evidence Will Now Be Collected, Stored and Used


The State of Maharashtra has taken a significant step towards a fully digital criminal justice system by notifying the “Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita the State of Maharashtra eSakshya Management Rules, 2025”. These rules operationalise the concepts of digital investigation and electronic evidence envisaged under the new criminal laws, especially the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA).

At the heart of this framework lies the eSakshya Mobile Application, designed to ensure that video, photographs and other electronic records collected during investigation are securely captured, authenticated, transmitted and used in court.

Read Notification here: Click here.

What is “e‑Sakshya”?

The rules define “Sakshya” as any evidence collected or recorded as a document through the eSakshya Mobile Application. This includes:

·       Video recording(s)

·       Photograph(s)

·       Photograph(s) of witnesses

·       Photograph of the investigating/recording officer

Every such act of recording generates an “eSakshya Packet” with the following features:

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Bombay HC: Whether a suit for partition between heads of all the branches of a joint Hindu property is maintainable even though children of those heads are not added as parties to the suit?

As laid down in the Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla in paragraph No. 332, in a suit for partition, the heads of all the branches are the necessary parties. Though not in so many words expressed by the district court, it was clearly observed that both the branches, of Shivram and Totaram, were duly represented in the suit and consequently, in the operative part, the suit property was directed to be divided in two equal parts and possession of one portion each was to be given to both these branches. It was further observed that the intention of the parties to have a particular relief has to be gathered from the pleadings and it was appropriate that the dispute between the two branches was settled once for all. Even if all the sons of Shivram and Totaram were not the parties to the suit, and though strictly speaking the situation was not covered by Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, having found that there was due representation of both the branches and there could not have been any dispute as to equal share of each of these two branches, the interest of justice was met by decreeing the suit partly and by directing the suit property to be divided in two halves only. Pertinently, the district court had not directed a further division amongst the coparceners inter se from each of the branches. {Para 13}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 249 of 1992, X.OBJ/41/2022 in SA/249/1992 and CA/1776/1992 in SA/249/1992

Decided On: 22.04.2022

Gumansing Shivram Patil Vs. Bhika Harsing Patil and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 866 : (2022) 6 Mah LJ 177 : (2022) 4 Bom CR 124 : (2023) 1 HLR 528 : (2023) 242 AIC 295,
 MANU/MH/1409/2022

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Tuesday, 2 December 2025

What is difference between Section 34 of arbitration Act and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act?

Understanding the distinction between Section 34 (application for setting aside an arbitral award) and Section 37 (appealable orders) is crucial to grasping the framework of judicial intervention in arbitration. While they operate together in challenging arbitral outcomes, they function at distinctly different stages with fundamentally different scopes.

Nature and Stage of Intervention

Section 34 represents the primary recourse mechanism against a final arbitral award. It permits a party to directly challenge the award itself on specifically enumerated grounds before the Court. This application targets the substantive output of the arbitral tribunal—the award.

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