Madras HC: Under which circumstances the court can direct forwarding of complaint to police under S 151 of CPC?

 In the case on hand, since, as I have already pointed out, the offence of forgery of Exs. A2 and A3 was committed outside the Court, even before they were produced before the Court, there can be no impediment for the police to register a case. When it was pointed out by this Court to the learned counsel on either side that this Court has power to issue a direction to the Tahsildar, Tambaram to forward a complaint to the police in respect of the above offence of forgery, for registration of a criminal case so as to investigate the same thoroughly to find out the real culprits, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that such power is not available for this Court in a civil proceedings. Of course, it is true that there is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code specifically empowering a Civil Court to issue a direction either to a party or to a witness to make a complaint to the police. But at the same time, it needs to be noted that there is no prohibition, either express or implied, thereby prohibiting a Civil Court from issuing any direction to a party or a witness to forward a complaint to the police when a serious offence of forgery is alleged. {Para 59}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Second Appeal No. 479 of 2012 and M.P. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2012

Decided On: 30.03.2015

N. Natarajan Vs. The Executive Officer

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Nagamuthu, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/0811/2015

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Fraud at the Courthouse Door: When Can Civil Courts Use Section 151 CPC to Set the Criminal Law in Motion?

 Why this question matters

Civil judges increasingly encounter forged documents, fabricated seals, and engineered “fraud on the court” designed to siphon public money or manipulate rights. The immediate civil response is clear: refuse or recall relief obtained by fraud. But a connected and difficult question is: can the civil court itself trigger criminal prosecution, and if so, when and how, under Section 151 CPC?

Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence now fairly clearly recognises that inherent powers under Section 151 can be used to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings—including by undoing orders obtained by fraud and, in appropriate cases, by directing that serious independent forgeries be reported to the police. This operates alongside, and not in derogation of, the special mechanism for “offences against public justice” under Section 195/340 CrPC, now Section 215/379 BNSS.

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Bombay HC: Whether the court can keep infructuous suit pending in the hope that a new cause of action may later be introduced by amendment?

 Amendment plea rejected

One of the respondent’s key arguments was that he had moved, or intended to move, for amendment of the plaint to incorporate a prayer for renewal of lease. The High Court rejected this line of defence​

The court noted that as on the date of the impugned order, namely 11 November 2022, no amendment application was before the trial court. It further recorded that the chamber summons for amendment was filed only on 30 June 2025, almost three years later, and till date the plaint did not contain any prayer for renewal.​

The court held that whether a suit has become infructuous must be decided on the basis of the cause of action actually pleaded, not on the basis of a party’s future plans. A dead suit, the court said in substance, cannot be kept alive indefinitely in the hope that a new cause of action may later be introduced by amendment.

Read full article here: Click here.

Ratio of the judgment

The ratio of the decision is that a civil suit whose pleaded cause of action has disappeared because of a supervening event may be dismissed as infructuous under Section 151 CPC, provided no specific provision of the Code covers the situation. A court cannot retain such a suit merely because dismissal would bring an interim order to an end.​

The decision also reinforces that future or proposed amendments cannot justify retaining an otherwise infructuous suit on the file. The court must examine the reliefs actually claimed and the cause of action actually pleaded as on the relevant date.

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Civil Court Can Use Section 151 CPC To Dismiss Suit As Infructuous If Cause Of Action Ceases: Bombay High Court

Union of India & Ors. v. Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia, Civil Revision Application (ST.) No. 23914 of 2023, decided on 17 March 2026​

The Bombay High Court has reaffirmed a basic but often ignored procedural principle: when the very cause of action in a suit disappears because of subsequent events, the court should not keep the suit alive merely because an interim order is operating. In Union of India & Ors. v. Maheshkumar Gordhandas Garodia, Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a lease suit seeking declaration of subsistence of a 99-year lease became infructuous once the lease itself expired on 14 October 2016, and therefore the suit deserved dismissal under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Read full judgment here: Click here.​

Case details

The case was decided by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application (ST.) No. 23914 of 2023. The judgment was reserved on 5 March 2026 and pronounced on 17 March 2026.

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Whether family court can pass divorce decree on admission without trial if both parties have not withdrawn allegations against each other?

 A perusal of decree passed by the Family Court clearly indicates that though the Family Court has taken cognizance of Section 151 of CPC which provides for inherent jurisdiction of the Court, when there is no specific provision for passing such an order, the Family Court has passed the decree of divorce contrary to Section 151 of CPC by assuming that the Appellant and the Respondent are intending to separate as marriage has been dissolved in their mind and heart. None of the parties have led any evidence. Allegations and counter allegations are made against each other. The learned Family Court could not have done guess work and could not have come to the conclusion that the marriage was dissolved in their mind and heart while passing the decree of divorce. It is a common ground when parties agree for divorce and do not make any allegations against each other or withdraw allegations made against each other, the parties could have filed a Petition for mutual divorce. No such Petition for mutual divorce was filed. {Para 19}

20. In view of the fact that, there is a specific provision for passing decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC on satisfaction of conditions provided under the said provision, the Family Court could not have invoked Section 151 of CPC. The impugned order shows non application of mind on the part of the Family Court while passing decree of divorce by doing a guess work and without there being any evidence on record. As per Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC, the party who is alleged to have made an admission is entitled to be granted an opportunity to explain the so called admission made in the affidavit at the stage of trial. Such allegations made by the parties against each other could not have been brushed aside in such a summary manner as it is done by the Family Court.

21. We have perused the Application filed by the Respondent for passing decree on admission without admitting the allegations of cruelty made on part of the Appellant in the affidavit-in-reply, and also based on its own admission in the Application, praying for passing of decree of divorce on admission and submitting to the decree in terms of prayer clause (a) of the Petition. There is no admission on the part of the Appellant for decree of divorce. The decree of divorce on admission could have been passed if both parties would have agreed before the Family Court. The situation would have been different in such case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022 and Interim Application No. 1854 of 2022 in Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022

Decided On: 24.03.2023

Mansi Bhavin Dharani Vs. Bhavin Jagdish Dharani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka and Gauri Godse, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1269/2023.

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Whether the court can exercise powers U/S 151 of CPC if other remedy is available to applicant under CPC?

The subsequent judgment of this Court in Ram Prakash Agarwal v. Gopi Krishan, (2013) 11 SCC 296 further clarifies the law on the use of the power under Section 151 of the CPC by the Court in cases of fraud and holds as follows:

“13. Section 151 CPC is not a substantive provision that confers the right to get any relief of any kind. It is a mere procedural provision which enables a party to have the proceedings of a pending suit conducted in a manner that is consistent with justice and equity. The court can do justice between the parties before it. Similarly, inherent powers cannot be used to reopen settled matters. The inherent powers of the Court must, to that extent, be regarded as abrogated by the legislature. A provision barring the exercise of inherent power need not be express, it may even be implied. Inherent power cannot be used to restrain the execution of a decree at the instance of one who was not a party to suit. Such power is absolutely essential for securing the ends of justice, and to overcome the failure of justice. The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any procedure to do justice, unless the same is expressly prohibited. {Para 33}

xxx

19. In view of the above, the law on this issue stands crystallised to the effect that the inherent powers enshrined under Section 151 CPC can be exercised only where no remedy has been provided for in any other provision of CPC. In the event that a party has obtained a decree or order by playing a fraud upon the court, or where an order has been passed by a mistake of the court, the court may be justified in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the said order, or by passing any other appropriate order. However, inherent powers cannot be used in conflict of any other existing provision, or in case a remedy has been provided for by any other provision of CPC. Moreover, in the event that a fraud has been played upon a party, the same may not be a case where inherent powers can be exercised.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. The High Court, relying upon the above judgments of this Court which recognizes the power to recall, seems to have lost sight of the restrictions imposed while exercising jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC, which were elaborately discussed by this Court in the above referred judgment about exercising of the power under Section 151 of the CPC being only in circumstances where alternate remedies do not exist.

35. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that recalling a final decree in such circumstances cannot be countenanced under Section 151 of the CPC. The High Court erred in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC, to hear and pass a detailed judgment recalling its earlier final decree dated 19.09.2013, rather than directing the respondents to pursue the effective alternate remedies under law. Having said the above, we must clarify that we are not, in any way, doubting the proposition of law that fraud nullifies all proceedings, or that the Court has power to recall an order which was passed due to a fraud played on the Court. However, while exercising the power under Section 151 CPC for setting aside the final judgment and decree, the Division Bench should have taken into consideration the restriction which was observed by this Court in the captioned judgment. Once we have come to the irresistible conclusion that exercising power under Section 151 CPC in the facts and circumstances of the case is bad, we are not inclined to go into further issues that were extensively argued.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5784 OF 2022 (@ S.L.P (CIVIL) NO. 7015/2022) 

MY PALACE MUTUALLY AIDED COOPERATIVE SOCIETY Vs B. MAHESH & ORS.

Coram: N.V. RAMANA; CJI., KRISHNA MURARI; J., HIMA KOHLI; J. 

Author: N.V. Ramana, CJI

Dated: AUGUST 23, 2022

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Whether the court can restore insolvency petition dismissed in default on the application of one of the creditors?

 The learned Assistant Judge considered that the petitioning creditor sues on behalf of the general body of creditors and, therefore, in a sense every creditor is a party to the proceedings and that under Order IX, Rule 9, any party to the proceeding can ask for a petition dismissed for default being restored to file. But Order IX, Rule 9, refers specifically to the plaintiff who has to satisfy the Court that he has sufficient cause for non-appearance, and it is doubtful whether it was competent to the shop of Laxminarayan Sitaram to apply under Order IX, Rule 9, for a revival of the petition.

7. But the question still remains whether the Court did not have inherent jurisdiction to restore the application to file at the instance of one of the creditors. Under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In my opinion the ends of justice do require in the peculiar circumstances of this case that the application should be restored to file, and that, therefore, the two lower Courts were right in passing the order that they did.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 87 of 1944

Decided On: 17.11.1944

 Keshav Appa Bhagat  Vs.  Sitaram Hanumandas

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Rajadhyaksha, J.

Citation:1944 SCCONLINE 79: AIR 1946 Bom 20:MANU/MH/0133/1944

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Whether civil revision is maintainable against the order passed in the application under S 151 of CPC?

 Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard. The revision has to be admitted. I do not find any force in the contention that an order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure being discretionary is not revisable . An order under Section 151, C.P.C. is not appealable hence revision is maintainable against such order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1072 of 1998

Decided On: 31.08.1998

Zakinaben  Vs. Babubhai Alimohmad Kapadia and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.C. Srivastava, J.

Citations: AIR 1999 Guj 118, (1999) 1 GLR 122,MANU/GJ/0235/1998

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Whether the Appellate court can permit conversion of the civil appeal into cross-objection?

The Appellate Bench of the Court appears to have also considered various judgments cited at the Bar on the applicability of Section 151 of the Code. The court held that the provisions of Section 151 could be invoked, only when there was no specific provision to deal with the issue. Though the relevance of this principle has not been fully stated by the court in the context of the issue at hand, the emphasis appears to be on the fact that there is a specific provision, namely, Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code, whereunder the respondent to an appeal could file a cross objection; that provision did not provide for conversion of an appeal into a cross-objection; and therefore, there was no scope to allow conversion of the present appeal into a cross-objection. No doubt there is no specific provision to permit this, but there is equally no specific provision barring the court from ordering such conversion. Since a cross-objection was anyway maintainable and there was no specific provision barring conversion of an appeal into cross-objection, there was a legitimate case for invoking the provisions of Section 151 of the Code and ordering such conversion. The provisions exist for enabling civil courts to do complete justice, when a particular course seems to be advisable or just, but there is no specific provision to allow such course. The provision cannot be resorted to, however, when a specific provision of law bars such a course, either expressly or by implication.

9. Accordingly, the impugned order of the Appellate Court cannot be sustained. Rule is made absolute and the writ petition is allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order and allowing the Petitioners' application, being Exhibit '10'. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 93 of 2017

Decided On: 06.09.2019

 Nelufer Behram Irani  Vs. Asha R. Kotian and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.C. Gupte, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2612/2019,2020(2) MHLJ703

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Whether court directing wife to undergo gender detection test amounts to a violation of her right to privacy?

This petition has been filed by the petitioner/wife under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the orders dated 16.8.2018 as also order dated 25.9.2018 passed in Case No. 112-A/2017 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Jabalpur, whereby the learned Judge, by accepting an application filed by the respondent husband under Section 151 of CPC has directed that the gender of the petitioner be verified by a Government lady doctor and vide order dated 25.9.2018, the petitioner is directed to keep herself available for medical examination on 10.10.2018 before the Dean, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, Medical College, Jabalpur.

This Court is of the considered opinion that if any evidence having a nexus with the lis between the parties, should be allowed to be produced. In a matrimonial dispute, if gender of one of the parties is questioned by the other party, it assumes importance and the party raising such issue also has a right to adduce the evidence in this behalf and the other party, to rebut the same. This Court is conscious of the fact that one's sex/gender is one's own business, but when it comes to marriage, the other partner's rights are also closely attached with the same, as it assumes importance to maintain a healthy and peaceful married life, and since he or she also has a fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the rights of both the parties are evened out. In such circumstances, the plea of violation of privacy or any fundamental right is not tenable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 4820 of 2018

Decided On: 04.10.2019

 Surbhi Trivedi  Vs.  Gaurav Trivedi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Subodh Abhyankar, J.

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Whether court can condone delay in execution of decree as per S 5 of limitation Act?

It is also trite that the civil court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court cannot invoke its inherent power.

It is well-settled that when a power is to be exercised by a civil court under an express provision, the inherent power cannot be taken recourse to.

An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable in a proceeding arising under Order XXI of the Code. Application of the said provision has, thus, expressly been excluded in a proceeding under Order XXI of the Code. In that view of the mater, even an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not maintainable. A fortiori for the said purpose, inherent power of the court cannot be invoked.

Supreme Court of India

Damodaran Pillai & Others vs South Indian Bank Ltd on 8 September, 2005

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Whether court can entertain temporary injunction application in pauper suit?

In those cases, it was held that a plaint filed by a pauper with an application to sue in forma pauperis cannot be treated as a suit. In those cases the question whether temporary injunction can be granted in exercise of inherent powers in a plaint with an application for permission to sue as pauper, was not even remotely involved. Dharmeshwar Nath Tewari's case (supra) though accepts the position that no suit comes into existence till the application to sue in forma pauperis is allowed, it was held that an injunction to protect the rights of the indigent person can be passed in exercise of the inherent Jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code. In my view, the law laid down in Dharmeshar Nath Tewari's case is a good law and it was for this reason that it was followed by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court as well as subsequently by this Court in Pankaj Kumar's case (supra). The legal position which admits of no doubt boils down to this : that an order of temporary injunction can be passed in exercise of Inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code on the plaint which has been presented by an indigent person with an application for leave to sue as such.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

C.M.W.P. No. 19466 of 1999

Decided On: 24.05.1999

 Bal Kishan Agarwal  Vs.  Pulin Garg and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Om Prakash Garg, J.

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Whether the court can restore suit dismissed in default in the exercise of inherent powers?

Overruling the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court and answering the reference by declaring that Section 151 of the Code could be invoked to seek restoration of a Suit dismissed under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order IX of the Code, we lodge the caveat. The caveat would be that the Plaintiff would have to show a sufficient cause. The previous conduct of the Plaintiff would also require to be considered. The inconvenience and the prejudice caused to the served defendants or the defendant who was not served as a consequence of restoration of the Suit would also have to be kept in mind.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 896 of 2007, 7552 of 2009 and Civil Application Stamp No. 901 of 2019

Decided On: 16.10.2019

Hariba Tatyaba More  Vs.  Dada Ekhatnath More and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pradeep Nandrajog, C.J., M.S. Karnik and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Citation: 2019(6) MHLJ 511(FB)

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Whether De novo proceeding is to be initiated after return of plaint?

The provisions of Section 151 would come to the aid of the Court, as no Code can possibly make provisions so as to meet every situation which may arise during the pendency of the suit. It is a situation where inherent jurisdiction of this Court would come to the aid and supply the vacuum. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court would normally be exercised in the interest of justice and for attainment of object of expeditious disposal of suits. May be it is the creation of the applicants themselves that the Court has lost pecuniary jurisdiction and the applications under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10(A) are pending or that the order has been passed for return of plaint but the plaint as a matter of fact has not been returned to the plaintiffs as of today. Thereafter interim orders in the present petitions were passed in favor of the petitioners. In these circumstances, it is difficult for this Court to hold that there is no suit or proceedings in the suit, pending before the trial Court. The Legislature in its wisdom has worded the language of Section 24 in wide terms by empowering the High Court to transfer any suit or appeal or other proceedings pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it. In other words, the meaning of the word "such or other proceedings pending in any court" cannot be restricted or construed so as to exclude the proceedings as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 10, 10(A) of the Act.

17. The present are the cases which have been filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of Competent jurisdiction. However, earlier they were transferred to the District Courts in view of the notification and now the district courts have lost pecuniary jurisdiction as a result of the order of the Court at the behest of the parties. The interim orders, undertakings have continued for years together. In some cases evidence has been recorded. It will be travesty of justice if the proceedings have to commence de novo right from the stage of filing a written statement as the plaintiff would be returned only plaint, to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction there is nothing in the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 which on its plain reading or by necessary implication be construed as a bar to maintainability of a petition under Section 24 of the Code....

27. It is held, on the basis of the above reasoning, and the line of decisions following Joginder Tuli (supra) and Aviat Chemicals (supra), the proceedings in the present case do not have to commence de novo, but from the stage they were in the court of the Additional District Judge.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

FAO(OS) 64/2013 and C.M. APPL. 1784/2013

Decided On: 28.11.2013

 Narendar Singh Vs. The Indian Institute of Architects

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Ravindra Bhat and Najmi Waziri, JJ.

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Whether court can stay suit proceeding as per S 151 of CPC?

Thus, section 10 of the Code bars the court from proceeding with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. The object of the section is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. Thus, section 10 of the Code specifically provides for the contingencies under which a subsequent suit can be stayed, viz., (i) where the issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit; (ii) such suit is between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title; (iii) where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. There is no other provision in the Code which provides for stay of the suit by the court where the suit is instituted. Section 10 of the Code clearly exhausts the contingencies in which such power can be exercised. Therefore, if powers under section 151 of the Code are exercised, the same would clearly be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in section 10 of the Code and against the intentions of the legislature. Considering the scheme of the Code, it is apparent that the legislature intended the provisions of section 10 to be exhaustive insofar as the prohibition against proceeding with the subsequent suit is concerned. Therefore, the exercise of inherent powers under section 151 of the Code to stay the proceedings in contingencies not contemplated under section 10 of the Code would be against the legislative intention and against the interests of justice. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to relief claimed in the application either under section 10 or section 151 of the Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/Special Civil Application No. 20580 of 2018

Decided On: 21.01.2019

HDFC Bank Limited Vs.  Ashima Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Harsha Devani and Dr. A.P. Thaker, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Guj 64

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When court can restore execution application as per S 151 of CPC?

Under Order XXI Rule 105 of CPC, the Court is empowered to fix a date for hearing of the execution application. It further provides that if on the date fixed or on any date the hearing is adjourned, the applicant does not appear when the case is called for hearing, the Court may make an order that the application be dismissed. Order XXI Rule 106 of CPC provides that when an order is made under sub-rule 2 of Rule 105 Order XXI or sub-rule 3 of that Rule, such party against whom such order is passed may apply to such Court to set aside such an order and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance, the Court shall set aside the order on such terms it thinks fit and shall place the matter on the day for further hearing of the application. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 106 of Order XXI further provides that an application under sub-rule 1 of Rule 106 of Order XXI shall be made within 30 days from the date of the order or in case an ex-parte order, if a notice was not duly served, within 30 days from the date when the applicant had knowledge of the order.

13. In my view, since the record clearly indicates that on the date of the said execution application, the Executing Court had not fixed the execution application for hearing under Order XXI Rule 105 of CPC, the said execution application has been dismissed on the ground that no steps were taken by the petitioner. In my view, the time of 30 days prescribed in sub-rule 3 of Rule 106 of Order XXI of CPC for making an application for setting aside the ex-parte order would not be attracted in such a situation. There would be thus no limitation prescribed for making an application for setting aside the order dismissing the execution application dismissed due to the steps not having been taken by the decree holder in the execution application. Such application shall be filed within reasonable period.

17. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Executing Court indicates that the learned Judge has rejected the said application for condonation of delay on the ground that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the restoration proceedings under Order XXI Ruled 106 of CPC. In my view, since the provisions of Order XXI Rule 106 of CPC, were not attracted in this case, in view of the execution application itself not having been placed on board for hearing, reference to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the impugned order shows perversity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 5896 and 5897 of 2015

Decided On: 15.10.2018

Botanium Limited  Vs. Babu Raghu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka, J.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 287

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Whether application for extension of time to pay deficit court fees is maintainable after rejection of plaint?

As against the order rejecting the Plaint for failure to deposit the Court fees within the prescribed period, no doubt remedy of Appeal is available. However, as has been held in the case of Niranjan Alloys (supra), when there is no controversy as regards the liability to pay the demanded Court fees, the quantum of Court fees an application simplicitor seeking extension of time to pay such Court fees can always be taken out under section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure as was taken out in the present case.

15. In the above regard, reference can be made to the observations made in paragraph 11 and 18 of the Niranjan Alloys (supra) which read as follows:

11. There cannot be any duality of opinion that an order rejecting a plaint Under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C., for nonpayment of the additional courtfees demanded is appealable as a decree. The Apex Court held in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and Ors. (supra) that it is appealable as a decree and even a second appeal would lie Under Section 100 of C.P.C. on the ground that the decision of the first appellate Court on the interpretation of Section 7(iv)(c) is a question of law. It cannot be, however, overlooked that such rejection of plaint would be appealable when there is a controversy raised regarding correctness of the demand for courtfees under any particular provisions of the law. Where, there is controversy  regarding interpretation of the provisions of the Court fees Act or Suits Valuation Act then the plaintiff is required to prefer an appeal against adverse finding which entailed dismissal of the suit. In the present case, however, there was no controversy raised by the plaintiff regarding liability to pay the demanded court fees. Nay, he had applied for payment of such court fees and was permitted to pay the same. He had deposited the cheque with the Court, although, it could not be encashed. He immediately filed next application, explaining that his bank account was having sufficient funds but due to fault of the Bank, the cheque was returned. This fact was not controverted by the petitioner before the trial Court. It appears, therefore, that there was sufficient substratum before the trial court to reach conclusion that the demand for courtfees was acceptable to the plaintiff/respondent herein.

18. I am inclined to hold that the time could be extended by the trial Court irrespective of the fact that the remedy of appeal was also available. For, it was just a formality to prefer an appeal inasmuch as the plaintiff had not raised any question related to interpretation of the Bombay Court fees Act or the Suits Valuation Act. Secondly, the plaintiff submitted the application immediately after he came to know about bouncing of the cheque. There was no substratum available to say that the cheque was returned only because cash amount was not at his credit. His statement on affidavit was not controverted in this context and moreover, the plaintiff had expressed willingness to deposit the deficit courtfees immediately without demur. The impugned order has not caused any prejudice to the rights of the petitioner. The rejection of the application would have, on the other hand, caused grave injustice to the plaintiff as he would have been put to excessive financial burden without a very serious lapse on his part. Normally, when there is express provision in the C.P.C. then the powers Under Section 151 C.P.C. may not be invoked. Still, however, such remedy must be of exhaustive character and the relevant provision should be such that there is express or implied prohibition on the exercise of powers Under Section 151 of C.P.C. The intention of the legislature can be gathered from proviso appended to Rule 11 of Order 7. Considering the purport of the proviso and peculiar facts of the instant case, there appears no serious error committed by the trial Court while exercising the inherent powers Under Section 151 of the C.P.C. There is no perversity committed by the trial Court in this behalf. It follows, therefore, that interference by this Court in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not called for.

Bombay High Court

Sou. Bhavana Kirit Vora And Ors vs Kushal Surendra Shah And Ors on 11 March, 2019

WRIT PETITION NO.6141 OF 2017 WITH WRIT PETITION NO.11511 OF 2015 (NOB)

Bench: M.S. Sonak

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When it is not permissible for court to extend time U/S 151 of CPC?

 The question is whether a trial court after it has ordered specific performance of a contract, on a sum of money being put in within a specified time and also ordered that if the money is not put in within that date, the suit would stand dismissed, has jurisdiction thereafter to extend the time.

 4. The question whether section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the court jurisdiction to extend the time is more difficult. In the first place we have to remember that if the Court has lost seisin of the case altogether there is no scope for the application of section 151 C.P.C. It is only 


if the court has retained jurisdiction in the litigation that the question of making any order in inherent jurisdiction arises. If jurisdiction had already ceased to exist the scope of making order in the inherent jurisdiction of the court totally disappears. The real question, therefore, is whether in a case like where an order has been made for the payment of certain money within a certain time for the purpose of getting specific performance and at the same time an order has also been made that if the money is not paid the suit will stand dismissed, the court retains jurisdiction. Though not without hesitation, I have reached the conclusion that in such a case it will be unrealistic and unjust to say that the court retains jurisdiction. Whether the court has retained jurisdiction or not will, in my view, depend very much on the substance of the directions given. If in granting a decree for a specific performance the court makes it conditional on the payment being made within a certain time and it appears that the time specified was intended by the Court to be the essence of the order, it would be unreasonable, in my opinion, to hold that the court has still retained jurisdiction. Where a decree for specific performance is made and at the same time a direction is given to the plaintiff to put in the money within a certain time and there is no indication that time is the essence of the order, it might be possible and ordinarily reasonable to say that though a time has been specified for the performance of the act, the court has not finally dealt with the matter and retains jurisdiction to pass such other orders as may appear to it to be reasonable. 

 5. In our own Court it was decided in Kshetra Mohan Ghose v. Gour Mohan Kapali (2) (37 C.W.N. 878) that where a certain time is fixed by a deed of the court for taking some steps and it directs that on failure of doing so within the time limited the case should stand dismissed, the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree. That it is true was not in a case of specific performance.

Calcutta High Court

[Civil Revisional Jurisdiction]

(Before K.C. Das Gupta and Debabrata Mookerjee, JJ.)

Bhutnath Das and Ors. 

V

Sahodeb Chandra Panja 

Civil Revn. Case No. 2526 of 1957

Decided on September 16, 1958

Citation:1958 SCC OnLine Cal 77 : (1961-62) 66 CWN 645 : AIR 1962 Cal 485

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Whether it is permissible for defendant to claim injunction?

 In any event of the matter, it is now settled law that injunctions can even be sought by the defendants and granted against the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 read with Section 151 or Section 94(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in exercise of inherent powers of courts when circumstances warrant such exercise. Being an equitable relief, the grant or refusal of an injunction will ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the courts, to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also now settled that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive, because, the legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible circumstances which may arise in future and there is no expression in Section 94 of the CPC which prohibits the issue of temporary injunction in circumstances which are not even covered by Order XXXIX Rule 1. Further, Section 151 provides that nothing in the Code shall deem to limit or otherwise effect the inherent power of the Court to make necessary orders for ends of justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

F.A.O. Nos. 53 and 55 of 2017

Decided On: 29.06.2017

 K.P. Shibu  Vs. P. Rajammal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.N. Ravindran and Devan Ramachandran, JJ.

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Whether court can direct tenant to deposit rent amount in court under inherent powers U/S 151 of CPC?

 The attempt was made on the part of the learned counsel to contend that if the landlord-plaintiff is not getting any amount and the defendant is enjoying the property, it would cause great injustice pending the proceedings and the suit may take long time for its decision and therefore, the power could be exercised under Section 151 of CPC.

9. In my view, the process of law in the normal circumstance as is applicable to any property under the Transfer of Property Act should be the same either eviction or recovery of the rent or for recovery of possession. It is true, if the decree is to remain as the paper decree, there are express provisions made under CPC to protect the interest of the plaintiff but, such is not the situation in the present case nor such power of the Court was invoked.

10. The power under Section 151 as observed earlier, cannot be exercised in absence of substantive statutory provision available under Transfer of Property Act or in absence of express provision made authorizing Court or the mechanism to direct the lessee to deposit the amount.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Writ Petition No. 44943/2016 (GM-CPC)

Decided On: 20.10.2016

B.V. Nagakannika

Vs.

 Dastagir S. Haroon

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jayant M. Patel, J.

Citation:AIR 2017 Karnat 48

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