Saturday, 31 December 2022

Bombay HC: Husband Can't Be Asked To Explain Wife's Death In his House Unless Prosecution Establishes Prima Facie Case

Per contra, the learned APP has submitted that it is incumbent upon the accused to offer an explanation as contemplated under section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and the very fact that the dead body is found in the house of the accused and he has not put forth any plausible explanation is sufficient to convict the accused for an offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. The learned APP has further submitted that there is an extra-judicial confession before P.W.1 which goes to the root of the matter and points towards the culpability of the accused.

17. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows:

"When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."

18. However, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not discharge the initial burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Unless the prosecution is able to stand on its own legs and give a conclusive proof of the fact that the accused is the author of the injuries sustained by his wife the onus would not shift upon the accused to explain the circumstances in which his wife has died, and her dead body is found in the house occupied by the accused and the deceased. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused has a right to maintain silence and it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the defence has given suggestions that the deceased was addicted to alcohol and that on her way home she had fallen in the nullah and had sustained the said injuries.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 2014

Decided On: 19.04.2022

Suresh Ladak Bhagat  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Milind Narendra Jadhav, JJ.

Author: Sadhana S. Jadhav, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2096/2022

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Can the person who has retained or trespassed on land after land acquisition claim tenancy over acquired land?

In the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and others, reported in MANU/SC/0300/2020 : (2020) 8 SCC 129, Apex Court has observed, as under:

"it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser ensures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. After the land has vested in the State, the total control is of the State. Only the State has a right to deal with the same."

In view of aforestated observations, petitioners could not have claimed tenancy through their landlord to justify their possession. Even otherwise, the Suit No. 5204 of 1996 instituted by Mr. Ambroce Creado, against 'Airport Authority' was withdrawn by him on 29th March, 2013. Having considered the evidence, the eviction orders, passed against the petitioners being unauthorised occupants of 'Airport Premises" calls for no interference, in supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Interim Application Stamp No. 12671 of 2022 in Writ Petition Stamp No. 3715 of 2020, 

Decided On: 06.06.2022

Becharabhai B. Chauhan and Ors.  Vs.  Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2095/2022

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Whether court should set aside exparte decree if summons was received by alleged wife of party summoned?

 It is seen that the learned Appellate Court has not considered the fact that the suit summons was never served on the Petitioner but was accepted by Respondent No. 3 falsely claiming to be his wife. Due to this the Petitioner had no knowledge about the suit proceedings as well as the ex parte decree. This was the cause for the delay. Another important aspect of the service of the summons is that the same was accepted by Respondent No. 3 on behalf of the Petitioner. Hence there was want of knowledge on the part of the Petitioner about the suit proceedings as well as the ex parte decree resulting in the delay. The Petitioner has also relied upon judgment dated 06.07.2019 passed by the court of 7th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli in Regular Civil Suit No. 71 of 2018 in the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction against Respondent No. 2 declaring that the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 3 are not husband and wife and the Respondent No. 3 being permanently restrained from posing as the Petitioner's wife and also not to involve into any illegal transactions concerning the properties of the Petitioner. {Para 8}

9. For all the above reasons and in view of the above discussion and findings, the Writ Petition stands allowed in terms of prayer clauses (A) and (B).

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 4010 of 2022

Decided On: 30.05.2022

Shamrao Piraji Kadam  Vs. Prakash Shivaji Chavan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Milind Narendra Jadhav, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1735/2022

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Would kissing on lips and touching private parts of a minor be an offence under S. 377 Penal Code?

The statement of the victim as well as the First Information report prima facie indicate that the Applicant had touched the private parts of the victim and had kissed his lips. In my considered view, this would not prima facie constitute offence under section 377 of the Indian Penal Code.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Bail Application No. 3731 of 2021 and Interim Application No. 1408 of 2022 in Bail Application No. 3731 of 2021

Decided On: 05.05.2022

Prem Rajendra Prasad Dubey Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anuja Prabhudessai, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1740/2022

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Bombay High Court Directs Assessee To Pay Rs.25,000 to Assessing Officer As The Stay Order Was Not Proactively Communicated

 Mr. Naveen Kumar has explained that, (a) the matters were getting time barred; (b) he was only informed that the stay in terms of prayer clause (b) has been granted but what is prayer (b) has not been explained; and (c) he was informed of the Order only on 30th March, 2022. {Para 2}

3. We totally disapprove the conduct of Petitioner. On an urgent circulation granted, this Court on 14th March, 2022 stood over the matter to 11th April, 2022 and in the meanwhile, granted ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b). Petitioner after obtaining the urgent order from this Court informed the Assessing Officer about the order only after it received a notice dated 29th March, 2022. Petitioner should have been proactive and promptly communicated the stay granted by this Court to the Assessing Officer so that he would have had enough time to make enquiries with his Advocate and also check on the website about orders passed.

4. In the circumstances, we accept the explanation of Mr. Naveen Kumar. Petitioner is also directed to pay within a period of two weeks from today, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to Mr. Naveen Kumar to take care of the expenses incurred by Mr. Naveen Kumar to travel to Mumbai and for staying in Mumbai to attend to this matter. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 4659 of 2022

Decided On: 04.05.2022

Armstrong Pure Water Services Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.R. Shriram and N.R. Borkar, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/1728/2022

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Whether Occupier Of Flat is Entitled To Transit Rent For Period Of Dispossession During Redevelopment?

The fact remains that as respondent no. 3 is in possession of the tenement in question and would now be handing over possession of such tenement to the petitioner/society. Hence considering the consistent view taken by this Court in Heritage Lifestyles and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Amar-Villa Co-Operative Housing Society and others MANU/MH/0380/2011 : 2011 (3) Mh.L.J. 865 and in Saikripa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. V/s. Osho Developers & Ors.1, the party who is dispossessed, would be entitled to the transit rent as it is such party who is put to hardship.{Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L.) No. 4301 of 2022

Decided On: 16.03.2022

Maniar Associates LLP  Vs. Vijay Niwas Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1454/2022
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Bombay HC: 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases

  The Tribunal awarded an interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of application till its realization and I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel to the effect that the interest ought to have awarded @ 9% p.a., which is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in case of compensation to be payable for motor accidents and the Apex Court in case of Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co., MANU/SC/0002/2001 : 2001 (1) SCR 8, has observed that 9% is the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded in motor accident compensation cases. Perusal of the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of Parvinder Singh (supra), the compensation is awarded with interest @ 9%.

{Para 21}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here


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Whether claimant must prove percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability in motor accident case?

 When a claimant suffers a disability as a result of such injuries and on ascertaining that the disability is of permanent nature, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It is expected that the mechanical formulae of calculating the loss of earning capacity depending upon the percentage of permanent disability, is not to be applied as in most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss i.e. the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.


Accepting the aforesaid principle, it can be seen that as far as the respondent claimant is concerned, the disability certificate has certified his disability to be 83% and the Tribunal has accepted his functional disability to be 83% and therefore, the loss of earning capacity to be 83%. However, if the claim of the claimant is that on 83% disability, he has incurred 100% functional disability, then it was imperative for the claimant to bring on record some evidence to that effect. Since the claimant suffer 83% physical disability in the present case, in order to establish that this amounted to 100% functional disability, none of the witnesses are examined by the claimant to prove the said aspect. The claimant has not projected his case before the Tribunal to the effect that on account of the permanent disability incurred by him, his functional disability is also 100%, which has resulted in loss of 100% earning capacity. In absence of any such specific evidence being brought on record, the submission of learned Advocate Ms. Nandini Chittal to that effect, do not deserve any consideration. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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What are Special Damages and General Damages under which compensation is awarded in motor accident cases?

 The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special Damages)

(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.


(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:


(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;


(b) Loss of future earnings on disability. account of permanent


(iii) Future medical expenses.


Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages)


(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.


(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).


(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).


Recording that in routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under Head 1, 2-A and 4, but in serious cases of injury where there is specific medical evidence, corroboration the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi), relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.


20. When a claimant suffers a disability as a result of such injuries and on ascertaining that the disability is of permanent nature, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. It is expected that the mechanical formulae of calculating the loss of earning capacity depending upon the percentage of permanent disability, is not to be applied as in most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss i.e. the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here


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Whether the court can enhance compensation in motor accident case even if claimant has not filed cross-Appeal or cross-objection?

 The counsel for the claimant/respondent Ms. Nandini would submit that though the claimant has not filed any Appeal, against the inadequate amount of compensation awarded to him, though his claim was to the tune of Rs. 1,50,00,000/-, the compensation is awarded in the meager sum of Rs. 52,63,219/- and this require enhancement.

The said claim of the learned counsel is opposed by the counsel for the appellant but in the wake of the settled legal position, I do not have any hesitancy in accepting the submission of the learned counsel for the claimant that the Court on it's motion is also empowered to enhance the compensation, if it is found that the compensation awarded is not 'just' compensation. {Part 14}


15. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and provide for some solace to a victim, who meet with an accident or to the family of the victim who is a sufferer, when the bread-earner is disabled or succumb to the said accident. The duty of the Court in granting compensation to the victim or to his family, for its survival and meet the harness is to ensure 'just' compensation, irrespective of whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant. The parameters of awarding compensation and the various heads under which the claimant is entitled for compensation are well determined by the Constitution Bench and the Apex Court in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi MANU/SC/1366/2017 : 2017(16) SCC 680, and if the compensation is not accorded, in accordance with the legal settled position by the Tribunal, it is the duty of the Court to ensure just and fair compensation.


The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Kunti Binod Pandey & ors., 2020 (1) BCR, 629, where a similar objection was raised in an Appeal filed by the Insurance Company, challenging the judgment and award of compensation by the MACT, holding that it is a statutory obligation of the Tribunal and the Court to do complete justice and award, 'just compensation', it has been held that by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Justice R.D. Dhanuka), that there can be no restriction to enhance compensation in appropriate case even in absence of cross-Appeal or cross-objection.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal ST No. 96999 of 2020, 

Decided On: 07.03.2022

Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nilesh Suresh Bhandari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1455/2022

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Bombay HC: Mere Recovery Of Tainted Currency Not Sufficient For Conviction Under Prevention Of Corruption Act When Substantive Evidence Not Reliable: Bombay HC

The law is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is the sine quo non for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The defence is to be tested on the basis of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the criteria of proof beyond all reasonable doubt

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2012

Decided On: 09.03.2022

 The State of Maharashtra  Vs.   Ajay Ratansingh Parmar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vinay Joshi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0852/2022

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Whether the court quash prosecution against accused for an offence under MCOC Act if he was not present on the spot?

The law on the point of invocation of MCOC is well settled This Act is enacted to prevent and control an organized crime. Organized crime is different from regular crime. If for gaining pecuniary benefits, economic/other advantage unlawful activity is continued it is an organized crime. It must be undertaken on behalf of the organized crime syndicate. It means if there is crime syndicate and they are involved in criminal activity and it has became their source of livelihood, it attracts the provisions of stringent MCOC Act. Normal criminal law is not sufficient to control the activities. {Para 17}

18. It is not necessary that every time same set of criminals will commit that offence. There may be new accused or combination of old and new participants. What is important is all these offences are connected through the web of organized crime syndicate. On this background, if we see the previous offences, we may be find that the gang leader accused Shankar Dashrath Salve is arrested. There is combination of different accused. Accused Shankar Dashrath Salve is involved in present offence. Present Petitioner assisted the arrested accused in committing the offence. Helping them to run, to take shelter attracts invocation of Indian Penal Code. In that manner Petitioner has become member of that crime syndicate.


19. After considering the ratios laid down in above referred judgments, we do not feel that the action of the police in showing the Petitioner as wanted accused does amount to abuse of the process of the Court. It is for the reason that the investigation so far carried out suggest the involvement of the Petitioner. It is not always necessary that every accused must be present on the spot. There are various circumstances in the chain f (sic)circumstances. In that chain, it may happen that set of accused persons may be present at the spot, some of the accused have played a role prior to commission of offence and some of them have participated post commission of offence. Materials shown to us do suggest involvement of the Petitioner in helping the assailants in different manners.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3812 of 2021

Decided On: 28.03.2022

Rajendra Bhau Patole  Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.B. Varale and S.M. Modak, JJ.

Author: S.M. Modak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1201/2022

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Whether family court can permit dissolution of Muslim marriage by mutual consent?

As already mentioned supra, the Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, had categorically held that 'mubaraat' is a form of an extra-judicial divorce based on mutual consent under Islamic law and same is valid, as it remains untouched by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. The court below, in such circumstances, is neither called upon to adjudicate nor called upon to dissolve the marriage by decree of divorce. On the other hand, the Family Court only has to declare the marital status by endorsing the mubaraat invoking jurisdiction under Explanation (b) of Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act. Once a declaration of joint divorce invoking bubaraat is produced before the Family Court, the Family Court has to pass a decree declaring the matrimonial status of the parties. The inquiry in such cases is limited to the extent to find out whether both parties have agreed upon to dissolve such marriage invoking mubaraat. Once the Family Court is satisfied that mubaraat is executed by both the parties, it shall declare the matrimonial status of such parties. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the Family Court is bound to entertain a petition for declaration of the status based on mubaraat. In view of the above, the order passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Alandur in O.S. Sr. No. 744/2020 dated 28.09.2020 is set aside and the parties are at liberty to approach the concerned Family Court with appropriate jurisdiction. Thereafter, the concerned Family Court shall dispose of the matter, if both the parties have filed petition and after making a formal inquiry without any further delay treating it as an uncontested matter in the light of the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Division Bench, High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam in the judgment in O.P.(FC) No. 352/2020 and connected cases dated 23/3/2021 and the present Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs.

5. We have carefully gone through the allegations made in the complaint and also police papers. It appears that the parties have decided to get separated by mutual consent and accordingly approached the Family Court by filing a petition No. F. No. 28 of 2022 under section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 read with section 7 (1)(b) of the Family Courts Act for declaration of status. It appears that the parties have arrived at amicable settlement voluntarily.

7. In the instant case, in terms of provisions of section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, all the questions about the property, marriage, dissolution of marriage including talaq, illa, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be considered as per the provisions of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). It further appears from the bare reading of section 7 of Family Courts Act, 1984, which prescribes jurisdiction, in terms of section 7(1), Explanation (a) and (b), suit for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person can also be a subject matter before the Family Court. 

8. It thus appears that the learned Judge of the Family Court has rightly applied the provisions of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 to the parties before us and accordingly declared the status of marriage as no more in existence by mutual consent.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 166 of 2022

Decided On: 29.03.2022

 Shaikh Taslim Shaikh Hakim  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Jadhav and Sandip Kumar Chandrabhan More, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/1389/2022

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Whether Period Of Suspension Of Govt Servant should Be Treated As 'On Duty' Where Acquittal Based On Benefit Of Doubt?

In this regard we may refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar vs. State of Maharashtra and ors. MANU/SC/0337/1997 : 1997 3 SCC 636. The cause of suspension and initiation of punitive action based on the petitioner's conduct leading to his prosecution were found to be sufficient to hold such suspension to be justified therein. The following observations in paragraph 4 are relevant and the same are reproduced as under:


"4. ... If the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution, though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence, the question emerges whether the government servant prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and fabrication of the records, though culminated into acquittal, is entitled to be reinstated with consequential benefits. In our considered view this grant of consequential benefits with all back wages etc. cannot be as a matter of course. We think that it would be deleterious to the maintenance of the discipline if a person suspended on valid considerations is given full back wages as a matter of course on his acquittal. Two courses are open to the disciplinary authority, viz., it may enquire into the misconduct unless, the selfsame conduct was subject of charge and on trial the acquittal was recorded on a positive finding that the accused did not commit the offence at all; but acquittal is not on benefit of doubt given. Appropriate action may be taken thereon. Even otherwise, the authority may, on reinstatement after following the principle of natural justice, pass appropriate order including treating suspension period as period of not on duty (and on payment of subsistence allowance etc.). Rules 72(3), 72(5) and 72(7) of the Rules give discretion to the disciplinary authority. Rule 72 also applies, as the action was taken after the acquittal by which date the Rule was in force. Therefore, when the suspension period was treated to be a suspension pending the trial and even after acquittal, he was reinstated into service, he would not be entitled to the consequential benefits. ..."


11. The Tribunal while considering the Original Application preferred by the petitioner has rightly held that the acquittal of the petitioner was after grant of benefit of doubt. Since the involvement of the petitioner was in a serious criminal offence and he was acquitted by giving him the benefit of doubt, it was held that the petitioner was not entitled for regularisation of the period of suspension by treating him to be "on duty". All relevant aspects of the matter have been considered by the Tribunal and we do not find any reason to take a different view from the one taken by it. It cannot be said that while passing the impugned order dated 13/04/2016 holding the petitioner not entitled to pay and allowances for the period of suspension, the Competent Authority acted arbitrarily. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1917 of 2021

 Ravindra Prasad Munneshwar Prasad  Vs. Union of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar and G.A. Sanap, JJ.

Author: A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Decided On: 31.03.2022

Citation: MANU/MH/1079/2022

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Bombay HC: Advocates Appointed By Legal Aid Or Court Exempt From Filing Certified Copies Of Judgement In Appeal

 The learned counsel Mr. Pawan Mali has strenuously preparedthe Appeal Memo along with the Application for condonation of delay.It appears that the office has not permitted him to file the Appeal and

Application, mentioning.doc rather has not accepted his papers on the ground that he has not furnished the certified copy of the impugned judgment. In fact the learned counsel was never given a certified copy of the said judgment by the Legal Aid Services Authority. {Para 3}

4. In view of this, the learned counsel Mr. Pawan Mali is exempted

from filing of the certified copy of the judgment and order in Sessions Case No.41 of 2016. Office to accept the papers and register the same as in other proceedings.

5. These directions would be applicable to all Advocates who are

appointed either by the Court or by the Legal Aid Services Authority.

Non-filing of the certified copy of the judgment shall not be an

impediment to accept the papers and register the Appeals by the

office.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

Babi Krushna Pawar  Vs The State of Maharashtra .

CORAM: SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV &

MILIND N. JADHAV,J.

DATE MARCH 30, 2022.

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Whether Magistrate must heard borrower before Allowing Possession Of Assets U/S 14 of SARFAESI Act?

The SARFAESI Act is intended to facilitate quick recovery of secured debts without extending any opportunity of hearing to a borrower and without judicial/quasi-judicial intervention till such time possession of the secured asset is taken by the secured creditor after serving the requisite notices and responding to the objection/representation that may be lodged/preferred by the borrower under section 13(3A). 

8. Pertinently, section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was amended twice, once in 2013 and then again in 2016. If it were the intention of the legislature to extend opportunity of hearing to a borrower before the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, it was free to do so. Advisedly, the legislature did not do so, for, it would have militated against the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and more particularly section 13 thereof. It is implicit in the scheme of the SARFAESI Act that natural justice, only to a limited extent, is available and not beyond what is expressly provided. There seems to be little merit in the argument advanced by Mr. Nedumpara and we hold that the language of section 14 is too clear and unambiguous, and does not admit of any requirement of complying with natural justice by putting the borrower on notice while an application thereunder is under consideration.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 8418 of 2022

Decided On: 23.03.2022

 C.A. Manisha Mehta and Ors. Vs. The Board of Directors and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta, C.J. and M.S. Karnik, J.

Citation:-MANU/MH/1377/2022

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Yearly Digest of Supreme Court for the year 2022

 

Important Judgment of Supreme Court of the year 2022(Part 1)

 https://www.lawweb.in/2022/12/important-judgment-of-supreme-court.html

Important Judgment of Supreme Court the year 2022(Part 2)



Important Judgment of Supreme Court the year 2022(Part 3)

 https://www.lawweb.in/2022/12/important-judgment-of-supreme-court_99.html


Important Judgment of Supreme Court the year 2022(Part 4)



Important Judgment of Supreme Court the year 2022(Part 5)



Important Judgments of Supreme Court for the Year 2022 (Part 6)


 

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Friday, 30 December 2022

Bombay HC: Child Born Out Of POCSO Crime A "Victim" As Defined Under Section 2(wa) CrPC

 

The victim had not only been abandoned by the appellant but also by her real mother(PW 1). They did not stop there but had put the life of the newly born child into jeopardy by sending him in an Orphanage. In view of Section 2(w a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and expression "victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir. The child born to the victim is indeed her legal heir and also a victim in view of the definition of "victim" and therefore, he must be adequately compensated for as it was the appellant who is responsible for bringing him in this world and then abandoning him at the mercy of an Orphanage.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 1430 of 2018

Decided On: 24.02.2022

 Ramesh Tukaram Vavekar  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author: Prithviraj K. Chavan, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0574/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Can the court convict the accused based on the contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses proved through evidence of Investigating officer?

 A daughter may not share everything with the mother but she would definitely share her real feelings and emotions to the sister. The conduct of PW 4 is also not free from doubt as she also did not want to disclose the truth for the reasons best known to her. When she resiled from her statement, learned APP had drawn her attention to the relevant portions of her statement which are marked as 'A', 'B' and 'C' and are proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer, PW 15-Ramchandra Dashrath Jadhav who was a senior Police Inspector attached to Khar police station at the relevant time. Those contradictions are proved at Exhibit 14-A to 14-C.


Portion marked 'A' which is proved as Exhibit 14-A reads thus;


"I found while checking Whatsapp on my mobile that the victim had made a call to Ramesh Vavekar (appellant) on 25.07.2015 and I told this fact to the police officer of Unit no. 9."


Portion marked B which is proved as Exhibit 14-B reads thus;


On 10.10.2015 when discussion was going on in context with my sister (victim) at that time my younger brother PW 2 aged 11 years told that prior to 6 months when there was no one at home he saw the victim talking with Ramesh Vavekar and he had seen him coming to our house for 4 to 5 times to meet the victim, so also prior to one year when PW 2 went to play with his friend in 'X' chawl at that time, the victim came to meet Ramesh in 'X' Chawl, Narli pada, at that time the mother of Ramesh (appellant) asked the victim to not to talk with Ramesh and on that count mother of Ramesh (appellant) had beaten the victim."


Portion marked C which is marked at Exhibit 14-C which reads thus,


Prior to 1 and ½ year, Ramesh was frequently calling me on my phone and expressed his wish to have friendship with me. At that time I replied him that I was not acquainted with him and why should I do friendship with him. At that time I lodged report against him with the police. Then I suspected that the victim was having love affair with Ramesh and he had impregnated her." {Para 32}


33. Cumulative effect of these proved contradictions would definitely indicate and are relevant that the appellant had been conversing with the victim and had also tried to befriend PW 4. In the given circumstances, it appears quite probable and believable that this witness had actually made such statement before the police.

It is a settled proposition of law that the evidence of a hostile witness should not be totally discarded as it can be accepted partially. It is well known that witnesses can not be a branded liars in toto and their testimony rejected outright even if parts of their statements are demonstrably incorrect or doubtful. We do not apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. In view of proved contradictions, evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 can be accepted to the extent of their versions found to be dependable.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 1430 of 2018

Decided On: 24.02.2022

 Ramesh Tukaram Vavekar  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author: Prithviraj K. Chavan, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0574/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether offence Under Pocso Act can be proved by evidence of doctor if relatives of victim have not supported prosecution case?

Turning to the charge under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution has mainly relied upon the evidence of PW 6 to PW 10 who are all doctors and medical experts coupled with the report of DNA examination conclusively establishing paternity of the foetus born to the victim. As already stated PW 1-mother of the victim, PW 2-younger brother of the victim who was then aged about 12 years and PW 4-elder sister of the victim have not supported the prosecution case for the reasons which needs no discussion as it is apparent that they have been won over by the defence. 

{Para 26}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 1430 of 2018

Decided On: 24.02.2022

 Ramesh Tukaram Vavekar  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sadhana S. Jadhav and Prithviraj K. Chavan, JJ.

Author: Prithviraj K. Chavan, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0574/2022

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Whether the Court of Additional Sessions Judge is Empowered To Try Offences Under Insolvency and Bankruptcy code?

 It may also be noted that Section 236(3) of the I.B. Code creates a deeming fiction that the Special Court trying offences under I.B. Code shall be "deemed to be Court of Sessions". If the intention of the legislature was that offences under I.B. Code are to be tried by the Sessions Court, then this subsection would have been unnecessary. According to the Petitioners, this is an indication as to the true and proper interpretation of Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Section 436 of I.B. Code. Thus for all the above reasons, the impugned proceedings have been instituted by the Respondents (Complainant) in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, were not sustainable for want of jurisdiction. As a consequence order, 'issue process' passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the Petitioners, in a complaint by the Respondents/Board was without jurisdiction and therefore not sustainable equally. It is therefore to be held that Special Court "which is to try offences under the I.B. Code is the Special Court established under Section 435(2) (b) of the Companies Act, 2013 which consists of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate First Class. The Petition is therefore allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). {Para 14}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2592 of 2021

Decided On: 14.02.2022

Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu and Ors. Vs. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation:- MANU/MH/0453/2022

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Whether Subsequent Reconstruction Of File Records will Change the Original Filing Date of the Petition?

 In our view, merely because the record in the Office of the Respondent No.2 was not traceable and were allowed to be reconstructed pursuant to the letter dated 30th March 2019 by the Petitioners on 17th June 2019, the date of reconstruction of the papers and proceedings on 17th June 2019 could not be considered as the date of filing such application under Section 18(2)(a) of the said Act. The application was already filed as far back as on 13th September 2004, which was within the time prescribed under Section 18(2)(a) of the said Act and thus the Respondents ought to have considered the date of filing the said application as on 13th September 2004 and not the date of reconstruction of the papers and proceedings in the said application filed under Section 18 of the said Act.

17. In our view, the impugned Order is passed totally without application of mind on the part of the Respondent No.2 in rejecting the application on the ground that the same was filed after 15 years and contrary to Section 18(2)(a) of the said Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 1150 OF 2020

Mahadev Sadhu Ingale.  Vs The State Of Maharashtra 

CORAM : R. D. DHANUKA &

S. M. MODAK, JJ.

DATE : 3rd FEBRUARY 2022.

Author : R.D. Dhanuka, J.

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Important Judgments of Supreme Court for the Year 2022 (Part 6)

 

1) Whether the court can direct police to arrest accused while rejecting anticipatory bail application of accused?


There is no quarrel with the proposition that ordinarily, no

such mandatory order or directions should be issued while rejecting the application for pre-arrest bail that the accused person has to be arrested; and such an aspect is required to be left for the investigating agency to examine, and to take such steps as may be permissible in law and as may be required.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2693/2022

S. SENTHIL KUMAR Vs STATE OF TAMILNADU 

 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE

Date : 24-03-2022

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/07/whether-court-can-direct-police-to.html

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Bombay Inferior village Vatan Abolition Act- Bare Act

https://drive.google.com/file/d/157FKXnBeEZ9LXcpbvIJeSxM6mCHNZEKS/view?usp=sharing 

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Important Judgment of Supreme Court the year 2022(Part 5)

 

1) Whether DM or CMM can appoint an advocate to take possession of property as per the Sarfaesi Act?


 Whereas, applying the "functional subordination" test, we are persuaded to take the view that Sub-section (1A) of Section 14 of the 2002 Act is no impediment for the CMM/DM to engage services of an advocate (an officer of the court) -- only for taking possession of secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor in furtherance of the orders passed by the CMM/DM Under Section 14(1) of the 2002 Act in that regard.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1637 of 2022 

Decided On: 25.02.2022

NKGSB Cooperative Bank Limited Vs. Subir Chakravarty and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

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Under which circumstances the court can accept one personal bond and two surety for several cases against accused?

 This bail application has been filed by the applicant to modify the conditions of bail imposed by learned Court below in Case Crime No. 246 of 2018 (State v. Rizwan alias Atta), Police Station G.R.P., Kanpur Nagar and direct the Court below to accept one personal bond from applicant and two sureties in all for all eleven cases in view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No (s). 8914-8915 of 2015 (Hani Nishad @ Mohammad Imran @ Vikky v. State of Uttar Pradesh). {Para 2}

3. Contention has been raised that in this case, the applicant is involved in as many as 11 criminal cases of the same district i.e. Kanpur Nagar under various case crime numbers and he has been admitted to bail in each of the eleven criminal cases. Now the problem is that the applicant, due to poverty and insufficiency of means, is unable to furnish 22 sureties for all the 11 cases. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in order to secure the ends of justice and to protect the legal rights of the applicant, who is already on bail in all the 11 cases be permitted to furnish one personal bond and two sureties, which may be treated personal bond and surety bonds for all 11 cases against the applicant-accused, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court as mentioned above.


4. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the applicant has engaged attention of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, copy whereof is Annexure No. 12 to the affidavit filed in support of this bail application, wherein, in a number of cases namely - 31 criminal cases against one applicant-accused, the Hon'ble Apex Court had issued direction to execute one personal bond and two sureties which would hold good for all 31 cases.

6. Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as upon perusal of the aforesaid citation relied on by the applicant, it is directed that let the applicant be allowed to execute one personal bond and two sureties to the satisfaction of the Court concerned, which would hold good for all 11 cases concerned against the present applicant.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Cr. Misc. Bail Application No. 11380 of 2019

Decided On: 15.03.2019

 Rizwan  Vs.  State of U.P.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arvind Kumar Mishra-I, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1678/2019

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Supreme Court: The court can accept one common surety for several cases of the accused if he is unable to provide separate sureties due to poverty

 The petitioner was directed to execute personal bond of Rs. 30,000/- in each case.

However, by the impugned order, the High Court has modified the conditions of bail imposed by the Trial Court in the instant cases by directing the Trial Court to accept one common surety for all the cases and one surety each for the 31 cases.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even though the Court has granted bail to the petitioner, the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties.

Considering the submissions, the impugned order is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand only) and the same bond shall hold good for all 31 cases. There shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- which bond shall hold good for all the 31 cases. It is clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Hani Nishad @ Mohammad Imran @ ... vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 29 October, 2018
          
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Thursday, 29 December 2022

Whether directors of a Company can escape liability under The Drugs and Cosmetics Act on the ground that they were not involved in the production of Drugs?

More particularly, the principle laid down in Section 141 of the NI Act (which is pari materia with identical sections in other Acts like the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; the erstwhile Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; etc.) is susceptible to abuse by unscrupulous companies to the detriment of unsuspecting third parties."

17. The interpretation of the expressions used in Section 141 of N.I Act, cannot be applied to Section 34 of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, though if read in isolation look in pari materia. When the offences are not cognate and enabling section to prosecute the Company a juristic body, has to be necessarily read along with the offence charged. Applying the interpretation of Section 141 of N.I Act to the other Acts ignoring the nature of the offence charged will lead to miscarriage of justice.

24. The offences and the offenders in the case of this nature is manufacturing and distribution of sub-standard drugs by a Company which is managed by its Board of Directors. The decision to manufacture the drugs is the collective decision of the Board of Directors. Therefore, the Directors cannot claim that they are not directly involved in the product of the drugs, when the decision to produce the drugs itself is the outcome of their decision. Therefore, the case of Directors signing the cheque on behalf the Company and the case of Directors participating in the decision to produce sub-standard drugs are not one and the same to hold that these petitioners are not involved in day-to-day affairs of the Company.


25. This Court, on considering the facts of the case in the light of the judgments discussed above holds that the contention of the petitioners is wholly unsustainable. If the said preposition is accepted it will go against the object and reasons of the legislations namely Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Crl. O.P. No. 11184 of 2019 and Crl. M.P. No. 5726 of 2019

Decided On: 12.10.2022

Vikas Rambal and Ors.  Vs. The State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. G. Jayachandran, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/7622/2022

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Can the Session court take cognizance of the offence as per S 32(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act even though the said case is not committed to it?

 In 'The Act of 1940', no where expressly or by necessary implication provides that either the Special Court can take cognizance without the case being committed to it by the competent Magistrate, nor any such provisions is there in 'The Act of 1940' that the Magistrate or for that matter, Chief Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and to pass a committal order. {Para 10}


11. Section 193 of 'The Code', which deals with cognizance of offence by Court of Sessions and is relevant for the present discussions runs as under:


193. Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session.--Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code."

12. Section 193 (Supra) provides, in no uncertain terms, that a Court of Sessions will not take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction, unless the case has been committed to it, except otherwise expressly provided in that regard.


13. Hon'ble the Apex Court, while considering Section 14 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as it stood prior to amendment of 2015), in the context of taking cognizance by the Special Court constituted under that Act had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Section 193 of 'The Code' Relevant observations made in this regard, which are apposite here and cover the controversy at hand, run as under:


"Section 14 of the Act says that "for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Sessions to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act". So it is for trial of the offences under the Act that a particular Court of Session in each district is sought to be specified as a Special Court. Though the word "trial" is not defined either in the Code or in the Act it is clearly distinguishable from inquiry. The word "inquiry" is defined in Section 2(g) of the Code as. "every inquiry, other than trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court". So the trial is distinct from inquiry and inquiry must always be a forerunner to the trial. The Act contemplates only the trial to be conducted by the Special Court. The added reason for specifying a Court of Session as Special Court is to ensure speed for such trial. "Special Court" is defined in the Act as "a Court of Session specified as a Special Court in Section 14", [vide S. 2(1)(d)] Thus the Court of Session is specified to conduct a trial and no other court can conduct the trial of offences under the Act. Why the Parliament provided that only a Court of Session can be specified as a Special Court? Evidently the legislature wanted the Special Court to be Court of Session. Hence the particular Court of Session, even after being specified as a Special Court, would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and designation of it as a Special Court would not denude it of its character or even powers as a Court of Session. The trial in such a court can be conducted only in the manner provided in Chapter XVIII of the Code which contains a fasciculus of provisions for 'Trial before a Court of Session'."


"Section 193 of the Code has to be understood in the aforesaid backdrop. The section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if "the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate", as provided in the Code, Two segments have been indicated in Section 193 as exceptions to the aforesaid interdict. One is, when the Code itself has provided differently in express language regarding taking of cognizance, and the second is when any other law has provided differently in express language regarding taking cognizance of offences under such law. The word "expressly" which is employed in Section 193 denoting to those exceptions is indicative of the legislative mandate that a Court of Session can depart from the interdict contained in the section only if it is provided differently in clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless it is positively and specifically provided differently no Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence directly, without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate."


14. Here it is noticeable that Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 specifically provides that special Judge under the Act can take cognizance of offence(s) without the accused being committed to him for trial.


15. Likewise, under the SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989 (prior to amendment by Amending Act of 2015), a case triable by Special Court constituted under Section 14 of this Act was required to be committed to the Special Court as held by the Apex Court in Gangula Ashok's case (MANU/SC/0047/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 740) (supra). After the amendment of 2015, a provision has been added in Section 14 of SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989, conferring power on the Special Court to take cognizance of the case without the same being committed to it for trial. A provision identical to one in Sec. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or Sec. 14 of the SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989 is not there in 'The Act of 1940', therefore, Special Court, constituted under this Act, which is a Sessions Court, cannot take cognizance without the accused being committed to it for trial.


16. In view of Section 193 of 'The Code' as interpreted by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Gangula Ashok's case (MANU/SC/0047/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 740) (supra), the cases (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no application in the present case. The special Court constituted under 'The Act of 1940' cannot take direct cognizance, because no enabling provision is there in 'The Act of 1940' in that regard, hence, no fault can be found with the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, committing the case to the special Court. Therefore, the impugned order of for that matter the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate does not suffer from any illegality. In view of the aforesaid, this petition having no force deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

M. Cri. C. No. 11940 of 2016

Decided On: 10.01.2017

 Kalptaru Medicose  Vs.  Food and Drug Administration

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ved Prakash Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/MP/0133/2017,2017(1)Drugs cases (DC)204

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Wednesday, 28 December 2022

Whether Magistrate must record evidence of complainant if complaint is filed by public servant in session triable offence?

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 202 (2), Proviso and 465-Complaint-Enquiry by Magistrate under Section 202 (2)-Scope of proviso to Section 202 (2) when offence complained of exclusively triable by Court of Session-Duty of Magistrate to examine complainant's witnesses-Omission to do so not by itself to vitiate proceedings.

Held :

Per Thomas, J.

(1) The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is not merely to confer a discretion on the Magistrate, but a compelling duty on him to perform in any such cases. However, the Magistrate in such a situation is not obliged to examine witnesses who could not be produced by the complainant when asked to produce such witnesses. Of course, if the complainant requires the help of the Court to summon such witnesses, it is open to the Magistrate to issue such summons, for, there is nothing in the Code which prevents the Magistrate from issuing such summons to the witnesses.


(2) However, if the Magistrate omits to comply with the above requirement that would not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings. If no objection is taken at the earlier stage regarding such omission, the Court can consider how far such omission would have led to miscarriage of justice, when such objection is taken at a later stage. A decision on such belated objection can be taken by bearing in mind the principles adumbrated in Section 465 of the Code.


(3) When the accused have chosen not to raise objection on the premise of omission to examine witnesses of the complainant under the proviso to Section 202 (2) of the Code before process was issued by the Magistrate, it must be taken that they had no grievance that such omission had occasioned failure of justice. Even if they had taken such objection after committal of the case to the Sessions Court, there was no need to turn the switch board backwards as there is no scope for believing that such omission had occasioned failure of justice. This is because no evidence of any witness would be used in the trial court unless such witness was examined in the trial court and the accused is afforded reasonable opportunity to cross-examine him.


Per Shah, J.


(1) Inquiry under Section 202 (2) of the Code is itself discretionary one-giving option to examine or not to examine witnesses on oath. Hence, proviso to the said sub-section is required to be read accordingly though couched in mandatory term by using the word 'shall'. Normally, the procedure prescribed therein should be followed, but non-observance of the said procedure may not vitiate further proceedings in all cases. In a case where a complaint is filed, not by the public servant, and where the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate should follow the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202 and call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. This would be in consonance with the provision of Section 208 which, inter alia, provides for supply of copy of statements and documents to accused. This would also facilitate the Sessions Court in framing the charge or discharging the accused. In the sessions triable case, under Section 226 the prosecution has to open its case by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence it proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. On such submission, the Sessions Court is required to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the submissions of the accused and prosecution in this behalf, to decide whether there is sufficient ground or not for proceeding against the accused. Upon such consideration, if the Court finds that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall be discharged as provided under Section 227. In case, where there is sufficient ground, Court is required to frame the charge as provided under Section 228. Hence, for the purpose of framing the charge also, the recording of such evidence is necessary. It also facilitates the accused to know allegation made against him as well as evidence in support thereof. However, in a case where complaint is filed by a public servant after holding inquiry and recording the statements, question of recording of such evidence may not arise. Hence, compliance of proviso by the Magistrate in all sessions triable cases is not a must and would not vitiate the further trial unless prejudice caused to the accused is established.


(2) Section 465, Cr. P.C. specifically provides that irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, order or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry shall not be a ground for reversing order passed by the competent Court, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) further provides that in determining whether any irregularity in proceeding has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Hence, the statute does not expressly provide for nullification of the order as a consequence of non-compliance of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 202, but provides that unless prejudice is caused, the order is not to be set aside. This would mean that during inquiry under Section 202 when Magistrate examines the witnesses on oath, as far as possible proviso is to be complied with but the mandate is not absolute.


(3) Where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the direction of investigation by the police officer is not permissible and he is required to hold inquiry by himself. During that inquiry, he may decide to examine the witnesses on oath. At that stage, proviso further gives mandatory directions that he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. The reason obviously is that in a private complaint, which is required to be committed to the Sessions Court for trial, it would safeguard the interest of the accused and he would not be taken by surprise at the time of trial and it would reveal the version of the witnesses whose list is required to be filed by complainant under Section 204 (2) before issuance of the process. The irregularity or non-compliance thereof would not vitiate the further proceeding in all cases. A person complaining of such irregularity should raise objection at the earliest stage and he should point out how prejudice is caused or is likely to be caused by not following the proviso. If he fails to raise such objection at the earliest stage, he is precluded from raising such objection later. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Crl. A. Nos. 18-19 of 2000 

Decided On: 10.01.2000

 Rosy and Ors.  Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah, JJ.

Authored By : K.T. Thomas, M.B. Shah

Citation: AIR 2000 SC 637,( 2000 ) 2 SCC 230,MANU/SC/0018/2000

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