Whether disciplinary authority can dismiss an employee after departmental enquiry even after his acquittal in a criminal case?

In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020

The State of Rajasthan Vs  Heem Singh 

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: October 29, 2020.

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Whether court should refuse to grant anticipatory bail to husband for offence U/S 498A of IPC if he uploads a nude picture of his wife on the internet?

Not only this the husband of the victim had also uploaded

nude photographs of the victim on facebook through fake facebook ID

created by him in the name of victim and had also uploaded nude

photographs of the victim as profile picture of that facebook ID and

after taking screen shots thereof had sent photographs to the victim

and had also uploaded videos and photographs wherein victim was

nude. During investigation, 16 such screen shots have been produced

before the police which were uploaded by the husband of the victim.

16. Relationship of husband and wife is a privileged relation.

Institution of marriage inspires trust and confidence which leads to

complete surrender of spouses to each other. This relation of mutual

trust, faith and confidence creates sense of security and sometimes

even more than parents and children. Sometime spouse feels more

secured in shelter of life partner than mother’s lap. Such feeling

inspires openness between husband and wife.

17. Posting and uploading nude photographs of spouse,

particularly of wife, in public domain amounts to betray the mutual

trust and confidence which marital relations implies. It is stripping off

a woman in public by the husband himself who is not only supposed

but duly bound to protect her, it is not only serious but a heinous

crime. It’s impact on soul, mind and health of the victim is beyond

imagination. It causes suffering to her beyond comprehension,

attracting the provision of Section 498-A IPC. An act amounting to

stripping off a woman in public, in my considered view dis-entitles a

person from anticipatory bail.

18. I am of the considered view that extraordinary provision

of Section 438 Cr.P.C, conferring discretion upon the Court to direct

enlargement of a person on bail before his arrest, in the event of his

arrest, is not framed to benefit such offenders particularly a husband

who is accused of an offence amounting to stripping off his wife in

public. Therefore, considering the given facts and circumstances of

the case, nature and gravity of the accusations and impact thereof on

the soul, mind and body of a woman, affecting her mental and

physical health beyond comprehension, I do not find it fit to enlarge

petitioner Abhishek Mangla on bail, exercising the power under

Section 438 Cr.P.C. Hence, bail petition [Cr.M.P(M) No. 1808 of 2020]

preferred by him is dismissed.

THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MP(M) Nos. 1808 to 1811 of

2020

Decided on: 27.10.2020

Cr.M.P(M) No. 1808 of 2020

Abhishek Mangla Vs State of H.P. 

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.

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Supreme court: Police Presence During Test Identification Makes Statements By Identifiers Fall Within The Ban Of Section 162 CrPC

To establish the presence of Chunthuram at the

place of incident, the Courts relied on the Test

Identification Parade and the testimony of Filim Sai

(PW-3). The Test Identification evidence is not

substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in

corroboration of statements in Court. The ratio in

Musheer Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 

 (2010) 2 SCC 748 will have a

bearing on this issue where Justice A.K. Ganguly,

writing for the Division Bench succinctly summarised

the legal position as follows:

“24. It may be pointed out that

identification test is not substantive

evidence. Such tests are meant for the

purpose of helping the investigating agency

with an assurance that their progress with

the investigation into the offence is

proceeding on right lines.

10. The infirmities in the conduct of the Test

Identification Parade would next bear scrutiny. The

major flaw in the exercise here was the presence of the

police during the exercise. When the identifications

are held in police presence, the resultant

communications tantamount to statements made by the

identifiers to a police officer in course of

investigation and they fall within the ban of section

162 of the Code. (See Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma vs.

The State of Bombay) (1955) 1 SCR 903

 [REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No.1392 of 2011

Chunthuram Vs State of Chhattisgarh 

Dated: OCTOBER 29, 2020

Author: Hrishikesh Roy, J.

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Disciplinary authority should impose punishment of dismissal from service in exceptional circumstances

While dismissing the appeal, we would like to observe that the

government authorities must be quite sensitive while imposing

the severe punishment of dismissal as a consequence to

disciplinary action. 

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

 Chief Justice's Court

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 898 of 2020

 Board Of Basic Education Vs Arvind Prakash Dwivedi And 2 Others

CORAM:

Hon'ble Govind Mathur,Chief Justice

Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma,J.

Order Date :- 21.10.2020

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Whether civil revision is maintainable against the order passed in the application under S 151 of CPC?

 Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard. The revision has to be admitted. I do not find any force in the contention that an order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure being discretionary is not revisable . An order under Section 151, C.P.C. is not appealable hence revision is maintainable against such order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1072 of 1998

Decided On: 31.08.1998

Zakinaben  Vs. Babubhai Alimohmad Kapadia and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.C. Srivastava, J.

Citations: AIR 1999 Guj 118, (1999) 1 GLR 122,MANU/GJ/0235/1998

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Whether court should return court fees to plaintiff if plaint is rejected?

 In a case of return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 invariably the plaint and the court-fee stamps on which also some part of the plaint and/or details thereof are typed and which have even been cancelled as per Section 30 of the Act, 1870 and the Rules are returned for presentation before the competent Court as it is, which on return, are accepted by the subsequent Court with a new registration number of the suit. The case at hand is an exceptional one where it was required to be returned. True, as stated by Shri Sudeep Seth, rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is very different from return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10, especially as, the former is covered in the definition of 'Decree' contained in Section 2(2) C.P.C., but, this would be material and relevant only if return of the original court-fee stamps filed with the plaint, which is rejected, is sought, as, that would be impermissible. Here the return is of additional court-fee stamps offered consequent to amendment of the plaint which were not accepted and the plaint was rejected on the ground of non deposit of additional court-fee. Moreover, the analogy of return of plaint is being referred only to emphasise the return of court-fee stamps along with it and that such return, unless specifically barred, is not impermissible in the peculiar facts of the present case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Misc. Single No. 6585 of 2014

Decided On: 27.04.2017

 Ravindra Kumar Gupta  Vs. Addl. Civil Judge (S.D.) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajan Roy, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/0931/2017

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Whether court must direct payment of court fees in proceeding U/S 154 of Electricity Act before the special court for fixing of civil liability?

 Article 1 of Schedule 1 of Court Fee Act provides for payment of ad valorem court fee on plaint, written statement pleading a set off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal or cross-objections presented to civil or revenue courts except those mentioned in Section 3. Unless the respondent can bring its case within the parameters of Article 1 of Schedule 1, ad valorem court fee would not be payable in respect of the amount claimed by the petitioner as civil liability of the respondents. Therefore, the question which arises is whether the complaint filed by the petitioner can be deemed to be a „plaint‟ within the meaning of Article 1 of Schedule 1 of Court Fee Act and whether the special court can be said to be a civil court for the purpose of this article. Taking into consideration the proposition of law enunciated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Paramjeet Singh Patheja (Supra), special courts cannot be deemed to be civil court, the same having been specially set up u/s 153 of the Special Courts Act primarily for the purpose of trial of offence punishable U/ss 135 to 140 and Section 150 of Electricity Act. These special courts are not regular courts envisaged under Article 136 of the Constitution irrespective of the fact that the person who can be appointed as a Judge of a Special Court needs to be an Additional District & Sessions Judge immediately before his appointment as a Judge of a Special Court. In any case, in the absence of any specific statutory provision to this effect, a court set up primarily for the purpose of trial of the criminal offences cannot be considered to be a civil court within the meaning of Article 1 of Schedule 1 of Court Fee Act.

24. In any case, the complaint filed by the petitioner before the Special Court cannot be construed as a „plaint‟ by any logical construction of the document. A bare perusal of this document, styled as a complaint u/s 135 r/w Section 151 of Electricity Act would show that the main prayer made by the complainant/petitioner was to summon, try and punish the respondents/accused persons on the ground that they had committed theft of electricity and had thereby committed offences punishable u/s 135(1) of Electricity Act, 2003. The complaint also contains an additional prayer to the court to determine the civil liability as provided in Section 154(5) of the Act. In my view, merely because this complaint also contains a prayer for determination of civil liability that by itself does not convert it into a „plaint‟. A document cannot be said to be a criminal complaint as well as a plaint at the same time. A criminal plaint lies before a criminal court whereas the plaint lies before a civil court. The procedure prescribed in Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of a case instituted on a complaint is altogether different from the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, for trial of a suit instituted by filing a plaint. Therefore, this document cannot be termed as a plaint within the meaning of Article 1 of Schedule 1 of Court Fee Act.

25. Section 26(2) of Code of Civil Procedure provides that in every plaint, facts shall be proved by affidavit. On the other hand, Section 154 of Electricity Act, 2003 provides that the special court may try the offences referred to in Section 135 to 140 and Section 150 in a summary way in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Section 263 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall, so far as may be, apply to such trial. It does not prescribe any separate procedure for determination of civil liability. The Electricity Act does not envisage application of two procedures, by special court, one for the purpose of trial of offences referred to in Section 135 to 140 and Section 150 of the Act and the other for determination of civil liability u/s 154(5) of the Act. Had the legislative intent been that for the purpose of determination of civil liability, the special court would adopt the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure for trial of a suit, it would have expressly stated so in the Act. In any case this is not the case of the respondents that the Special Courts, are conducting two independent proceedings, one in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Cr.P.C. for trial of the offences of which the complaint has primarily been filed and the other in accordance with the procedure prescribed in CPC for trial of civil suits, for determining civil liability u/s 154(5) of Electricity Act.

29. The entire procedure for trial of a civil suit instituted by presentation of a plaint as prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure is altogether different from the procedure prescribed for dealing with the complaints in respect of the offences referred to in Section 135 to 140 and Section 150 of Electricity Act. Neither adoption of such a procedure has been prescribed by Section 154 of Electricity Act nor is such a procedure otherwise implicit in that Act.

30. The interpretation given by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Industrial Finance Corpn. (Supra), followed by this court in Prakash Playing Cards Manufacturing Co. (Supra) equally applies to Section 154 (5) of Electricity Act, 2003. The view being taken by me also finds full support from the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in, Paramjit Singh Patheja (Supra), interpreting Section 15 of Arbitration Act of 1899 and Section 36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

31. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, I am of the considered view that ad valorem court fee is not payable on the complaints filed by the petitioner before the Special Courts. The view taken by the learned Judge of the Special Court is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. 

 Delhi High Court

Bses Rajdhani Power Ltd. vs State N.C.T. Of Delhi & Anr. on 25 November, 2008

Author: V. K. Jain

Crl.M.C.3284/2008

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Whether appellate court must suspend the sentence of the convict as a matter of course?

In both the orders impugned, the High Court, apart from the aforesaid error about the length of imprisonment to be served by the Appellant, has also proceeded on entirely irrelevant consideration with reference to the principles related with the prayer for suspension of the operation of the order of conviction that such a suspension could be granted only in rare and exceptional cases and for special reason. With respect, the High Court appears to have missed out the fact that the prayer on behalf of the Appellant had only been for suspension of execution of sentence and not for stay or suspension of the operation of the order of conviction. Hence, reference to the decision in Navjot Singh Siddhu (supra) had been obviously inapt on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. In fact, in the other cited decision in K.C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh: MANU/SC/0409/2001 : (2001) 6 SCC 584, this Court has indicated that ordinarily, the superior Court should suspend the sentence of imprisonment in the matters relating to the offence under the PC Act, unless the appeal could be heard soon after filing. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 751-752 of 2019 

Decided On: 26.04.2019

N. Ramamurthy Vs.   State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0615/2019

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Questions and answers in law part 12

Q.1 What is limitation for filing suit for eviction against tenant on ground of subletting?

Ans:- After hearing both the learned Counsel, and after perusal of the Trial Court judgment and the lower Appellate Court judgment, it is clear that in the instant case, though the tenancy was created in favour of Respondent No. 1, the Respondent No. 1 never stayed in the suit premises, right from inception, i.e. 1st February, 1969. On the contrary, the Respondent No. 1 had illegally sub-let the same to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 from 1st February, 1969. If that be so, the breach of tenancy conditions occurred on 1st February, 1969, and the suit ought to have been filed within 12 years, as per Article 66 of the Limitation Act. Ex-facie the suit is barred by law of limitation. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 684 of 1991

Decided On: 05.12.2006

 Shri Taherbhai Taiyebhai Poonawala, Vs.  Shri G. Hamid Hasan Patel 

Hon'ble Judges: 

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

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Whether the court can refuse to rely on the court commissioner's report if he is not examined as a witness?

According to Sub-rule (2) to Rule 10 of Order XXVI, the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him during the inspection shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. Therefore, there is no controversy with regard to admissibility of the report as evidence during the trial and making the report of the Commissioner part of record. However, before the report is made part of the record and taken as piece of evidence, it is open for the Court to examine the Commissioner on matters referred to him in his report or as to the manner in which he had made the investigation. It is open for the parties also to examine the Commissioner or on the manner in which he had conducted the investigation. This is the only interpretation which can be placed upon Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10. There is no other interpretation possible of this sub-rule. It is a different matter if neither the Court nor any of the parties takes any objection to the report. In such a situation the report becomes final and becomes part of the record and also can be taken as piece of evidence. But once a party objects to it specifically wants that the Commissioner be examined, the Court has no option but to examine the Commissioner. Unless that is done, the Commissioner's report can neither form part of the record nor it can become a piece of evidence which could be relied upon at the stage of disposal of suit.

The legal position cannot be disputed as stated in the rulings cited above that a court commissioner's report can be made a part of the record and exhibited if report is not objected to by the parties to the suit, but when question is regarding correctness of the contents of report, correctness of contents of the report can only be proved by examining writer/author of document as held in Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhidanand Singh reported in MANU/SC/0448/1971 : AIR 1971 SC 1949.

12. In view of the above rulings, mere production of Commissioner's report and it being admitted in evidence by itself does not prove contents of document or as to what investigations were carried out by the court commissioner. Moreover, the trial Court has observed that the commissioner's report is ambiguous and does not give clear picture.

Bearing in mind the settled legal position, it has to be concluded that both the Courts below were justified in ignoring commissioner's report along with its map on the ground of non-examination of the court commissioner as a witness.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 77 of 1999

Decided On: 05.07.2010

 Kirpashankar Mukundlal Sahu Vs.  Tilakraj Khushalchandra Wadhawan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Bhangale, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0720/2010

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What is basic concept of Marshalling and appreciation of evidence?

 The marshaling of evidence is not the repetition of what a witness said but the critical grouping together of the relevant statements of particular witnesses for and against a particular fact. It is the skill of picking up various pieces of evidence on a particular disputed point and putting them together.  A Judge must have clear picture of various disputed points regarding  which the evidence has to be marshalled.

Appreciation of evidence means assessing the worth, value and quality of a particular  piece of evidence.

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Whether court can infer existence of joint family property if two brothers are carrying on business jointly?

 The law is well settled that the burden is on the person who alleges that the property is a joint property of an HUF to prove the same. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi MANU/SC/0374/1961 : AIR 1962 SC 287. Both the parties have placed reliance on the this judgment. In this case this Court held that the general principle is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. It was further held that where one of the coparceners separated himself from other members of the joint family there was no presumption that the rest of coparceners continued to constitute a joint family. However, it was also held that at the same time there is no presumption that because one member of the family has separated, the rest of the family is no longer a joint family. However, it is important to note that this Court in Bhagwati Prasad Sah and Ors. v. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Ors. MANU/SC/0060/1951 : (1951) 2 SCR 603, it held as follows:

.... Except in the case of reunion, the mere fact that separated coparceners chose to live together or act jointly for purposes of business or trade or in their dealings with properties, would not give them the status of coparceners under the Mitakshara law.

The Privy Council in Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurti MANU/PR/0051/1947 : I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 440 held as follows:

The Hindu law upon this aspect of the case is well settled. Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property was joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property

The aforesaid view was accepted by this Court in Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. MANU/SC/0126/1954 : (1955) 1 SCR 1. In D.S. Lakshmaiah and Ors. v. L. Balasubramanyam and Ors. MANU/SC/0639/2003 : (2003) 10 SCC 310 this Court held as follows:

The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available.

Similar view was taken in Mst Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and Ors. MANU/SC/0186/1959 : (1960) 2 SCR 253 and Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade MANU/SC/8597/2006 : (2007) 1 SCC 521. The law is thus well settled that the burden lies upon the person who alleges the existence of the Hindu Undivided Family to prove the same.

11. Normally, an HUF can only comprise of all the family members with the head of the family being karta. Some property has to be the nucleus for this joint family. There is cleavage of opinion as to whether two brothers of a larger group can form a joint family. But assuming that such a joint family could have been formed by Madhav Prashad and Umrao Lal the burden lies heavily on the Plaintiff to prove that the two of them joined together to form an HUF. To prove this, they will have to not only show jointness of the property but also jointness of family and jointness of living together.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6875 and 6876-6877 of 2008

Decided On: 03.04.2020

Bhagwat Sharan (Dead) thr. L.Rs.  Vs. Purushottam and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0354/2020, 2021(1) MHLJ 485

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Whether the court should recognize time-barred payment made by Judgment debtor outside the court?

  Now, the law says further that if money is paid or adjustment of decree of any kind is arrived at outside the Court, it should be promptly got recorded and certified as contemplated by Rule 2. This can be done either by the J. D. or by the decree-holder; but in the very nature of things, a judgment-debtor should be more concerned in having such payment or adjustment recorded and certified by the Court. Article 125 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 30 days for applying to the Court for recording; an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree, from the date of payment or adjustment. There is no provision for extending the said period. Since by virtue of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid (in accordance with Rule 2) shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree", any payment or adjustment not certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XXI is no payment or adjustment in law. Any such payment or adjustment cannot be recognized by the Court executing the decree -- unless of course, the decree-holder himself admits the same. Therefore, when a decree-holder takes out execution, the judgment-debtor will not be entitled to plead -- if by the date of his plea a period of thirty days has expired from the date of payment or adjustment, as the case may be -- that he has paid the money due, or has otherwise adjusted the decree, outside the Court. It is, no doubt, true that the use of the expression 'may' - in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 has given room for controversy and argument; but, in my opinion, the said expression has to be construed and understood in the light of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, and if so read, the expression 'may' is liable to be construed and understood as 'shall'. By placing this construction no inconsistency arises between Order XXI, Rule 2 and Section 47. When Section 47 declares that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree shall be enquired into and determined only by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, it does not mean that the provisions in Order XXI, Rule 2 read with Article 125 of the Limitation Act should be ignored. Indeed, one should read them together harmoniously. As stated hereinbefore, the several Rules in Order XXI supplement, illustrate and elaborate the provisions contained in Part-II of the Code. The object behind Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI is to shut out any plea of payment, or adjustment, which is not promptly got recorded and certified under the said Rule. The idea is to preclude any such pleas and leave no room for them.

20. For the above reasons, I hold, agreeing with Upendralal Waghray, J. that the payment allegedly made by the judgment-debtor on 5-1-1979 not having been recorded and certified in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(2), C.P.C., cannot be recognized by the executing Court in E.P. No. 73/1981, because the application alleging such payment was made, even in the earlier E.P., (E.P. No. 20/1979), beyond 30 days of the payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 2413 of 1983

Decided On: 29.04.1988

P. Narasaiah  Vs. P. Rajoo Reddy

Hon'ble Judges:

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, K. Amareswari and Upendralal Waghray, JJ.

Citation: MANU/AP/0166/1989,AIR 1989 AP 264 (FB)

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Whether the property will remain ancestral property if the husband has given property to wife by executing will?

This Court finds no merit in the aforesaid submission of learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs because bare perusal of copies of Jamabandis for the years 1982-93 and 2010-2011, reveal that part of suit land comprising of Khasra No. 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459 and 460 was owned and possessed by Prema, husband of defendant No. 1 and same subsequently came to be inherited by defendant No. 1, Lajwanti. Perusal of Jamabandis as referred to above, further reveals that land comprised in Khasra Nos. 399 and 400 was jointly owned and possessed by defendant No. 1 alongwith others. As per recital in the Will dated 2.7.1997, placed on record by plaintiffs, late Prema was having one daughter and four sons, besides his wife and he had executed Will since his sons were not serving him and his wife. He bequeathed entire property in favour of his wife, who, after having become absolute owner of the part of suit land, transferred the same to defendants Nos. 3 and 4, for considerations of Rs. 30.00 Lakh and Rs. 10.00 Lakh, respectively. No material worth credence has been placed on record by plaintiffs suggestive of the fact that husband of defendant No. 1, Prema, had inherited suit land from his ancestors but even if it is assumed that suit land was ancestral in the hands of late Prema, it lost character of ancestral property after having been inherited by defendant No. 1 from Prema by way of Will. There is no dispute that plaintiffs have not challenged Will in the present case and as such, they have no right, title or interest over the same.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

CMPMO No. 346 of 2020

Decided On: 28.09.2020

Kishori Lal  Vs.  Lajwanti and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/HP/0897/2020

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Supreme Court: Court Hearing First Appeal In Criminal Matter is Required To Form Its Own Opinion

We would like to say that the First Appeal in

criminal matter requires the court to form his opinion on

the basis of the evidence on record and the opinion of

the Trial Court. A perusal of the impugned order shows

that the facts have been set out followed by what each

witness has deposed. Thereafter, all that is stated is

as under:

“In view of the above, we find that the

prosecution has been successful in proving guilt of

the accused-appellant, by adducing cogent and

reliable evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt.

Hence, from the circumstances brought on record

by the prosecution, the guilt of the accusedappellant

with regard to the commission of crime inquestion

stands duly established.”

The aforesaid is followed by dismissal of the appeal.

We are of the view that this can hardly meet the

requirements of law for considering the First Appeal in

criminal matters and thus, have no option but to set

aside the impugned order and remit the matter back for

consideration by the High Court on merits as a First

Appeal in a Section 302 case of the I.P.C. in accordance

with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.688 OF 2020

CHANDRABHAN SINGH VS. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Dated: October 16, 2020.

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SC Order Extending Limitation Period during Covid19 Does Not Enlarge The Period Upto Which Delay Can Be Condoned In Exercise Of Statutory Discretion

 To get over their failure to file an appeal on or before 18.03.2020, the Appellants rely upon the order of this Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020. It reads as follows:

This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State).

To obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunals across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that a period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws whether condonable or not shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings.

We are exercising this power Under Article 142 read with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and declare that this order is a binding order within the meaning of Article 141 on all Courts/Tribunals and authorities.

This order may be brought to the notice of all High Courts for being communicated to all subordinate Courts/Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction.

Issue notice to all the Registrars General of the High Courts, returnable in four weeks.

19. But we do not think that the Appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3007-3008 of 2020

Decided On: 18.09.2020

 Sagufa Ahmed   Vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., A.S. Bopanna and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0697/2020

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Whether party can deny contents of compromise recorded by court?

The aforesaid statements were recorded in a Court of law by a Judicial

Officer who would have taken all care and caution before recording such

statements. The statements were recorded in the presence of respective

counsel of the parties and who had duly identified them in the Court. Such

statements recorded before a Judicial Officer in a Court of law cannot be

said to have lesser sanctity then an instrument of Compromise drawn

outside the Court attested by some Oath Commissioner/Notary Public or

any other authority. A certain sanctity is attached to a statement made by a

party in the Court and it has to be presumed that the same was recorded

voluntarily. In case a party is permitted to wriggle out of such statements

by conveniently raising some frivolous allegations against his counsel or

against opposing counsel, then it will virtually lead to mockery of the

Court.

21. It is apparent that the very purpose of incorporating that a compromise

should be in writing was to ensure that everything is there in black-andwhite

and that there is no ambiguity in respect of the terms of compromise

so that either of the party does not turn round at a later stage to back out on

some terms or tries to misinterpret some terms and conditions of

settlement, as is seen in the present case. The purpose was to avoid undue

harassment and wastage of precious time of Court lest the parties would

keep on agitating matter time and again. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Pushpa Devi Bhagat's case (supra), went further ahead to hold that

attempts of tenants in such matters to protract the litigation indefinitely by

raising frivolous and vexatious contentions regarding the compromise and

going back on the solemn undertaking given to Court, should be

deprecated.

22. Examining the aforesaid factual position in light of the legal position laid

down on in Jineshwardas's case (supra), Byram Peston j i Gariwa l 's case

(supra), Pushpa Devi Bhagat's case (supra) and Bakshi Dev Raj's case

(supra), as has been discussed above and upon finding that there is nothing

to suggest that there was any collusion between the counsel of the

petitioner and the opposite party, this Court does not find any ground to

interfere with the impugned order. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH.

CR-6310-2019 (O & M)

Date of decision : 06.10.2020

Lachhman Dass Vs Amarjit Singh Sahni 

CORAM : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gurvinder Singh Gill

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Whether relatives of husband can evict wife, who has secured the right of residence in their house under the Domestic Violence Act?

 

The right to reside in shared household as granted

by Section 17 of Domestic violence Act itself 

contemplates an exception in

express words, i.e., “save in accordance with the

procedure established by law”.{Para 109}

116. Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of

the opinion that the expression “save in accordance

with the procedure established by law”, in Section

17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in

court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for

mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or

possession by the owner of the property is maintainable

before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in

sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted

or excluded from the shared household save in

accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus,

the provision itself contemplates adopting of any

procedure established by law by the respondent for

eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the

shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the

competent court can decide the claim in a properly

instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women

need to be excluded or evicted from the shared

household. One most common example for eviction and

exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided

same level of alternate accommodation or payment of

rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f)

itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can

successfully prove before the Competent Court that the

claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is

accepted. We need not ponder for cases and

circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be

allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case

for which no further discussion is necessary in the

facts of the present case. The High Court in the

impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit

filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be nonmaintainable

with which conclusion we are in agreement.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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What are the rights of wife if landlord/lessor/licensor is seeking to evict her from a shared household obtained under Domestic violence Act?

  In case, the shared household of a woman is a

tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/

allotment/license is in the name of husband, father-in

law or any other relative, the Act, 2005 does not

operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in

initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of

the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household.

However, in case the proceedings are due to any

collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in

the shared household has right to resist the

proceedings on all grounds which the

tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the

proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act,

2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in

accordance with the procedure established by law

operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who

is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of

Act, 2005.{Para 117}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether Wife can claim Right Of Residence in immovable property Belonging to relatives Of Husband?

  In paragraph 29 of the judgment, this Court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only

entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared

household and a shared household would only mean the

house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or

the house which belongs to the joint family of which

the husband is a member. The definition of shared

household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate

that a shared household shall be one which belongs to

or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the

definition of “respondent” under the Act. The

respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act

can be any relative of the husband. In event, the

shared household belongs to any relative of the husband

with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has

lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are

satisfied and the said house will become a shared

household. We are of the view that this court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the

definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s)

but did not advert to different parts of the definition

which makes it clear that for a shared household there

is no such requirement that the house may be owned

singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by

the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R.

Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of

shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily

worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible

and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not

commend us. The definition of shared household is

clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The

object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to

aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared

household. The interpretation which is put by this

Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if

accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose

of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the

interpretation of definition of shared household as put

by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is

not correct interpretation and the said judgment does

not lay down the correct law.{Para 64}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated: 15-10-2020

Citation: (2020) AIR(SC) 5397 : (2020) 6 ALT 115 : (2020) 4 CivCC 206 : (2020) 4 GujLH 416 : (2020) 10 JT 244 : (2020)

6 KLT 208 : (2020) 8 MLJ 48 : (2020) 4 RCR(Criminal) 745 : (2020) 11 SCALE 576 : (2021) 1 SCC 414

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Whether all UAPA Offences Investigated By NIA Or State Police Are Exclusively Triable By 'Special Courts?

 It will be seen that the aforesaid notification has been issued under

Section 22(1) of the NIA Act. What is important to note is that under

Section 22(2)(ii), reference to the Central Agency in Section 13(1) is to

be construed as a reference to the investigation agency of the State Government – namely, the State police in this case. Thereafter, what is

important to note is that notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code, the jurisdiction conferred on a Special Court shall, until a

Special Court is designated by the State Government, be exercised

only by the Court of Sessions of the Division in which such offence has

been committed vide sub-section (3) of Section 22; and by sub-section

(4) of Section 22, on and from the date on which the Special Court is

designated by the State Government, the trial of any offence

investigated by the State Government under the provisions of the NIA Act shall stand transferred to that Court on and from the date on which it is designated.

19.Section 13(1) of the NIA Act, which again begins with a non-obstante

clause which is notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, read

with Section 22(2)(ii), states that every scheduled offence that is

investigated by the investigation agency of the State Government is to

be tried exclusively by the Special Court within whose local jurisdiction

it was committed. 

“The Court”,  when read with the extended definition contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the UAPA, now speaks of the Special Court constituted under Section 22 of the NIA Act. What becomes clear, therefore, from a reading of these provisions is that for all offences under the UAPA, the Special Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to try such offences. This becomes even clearer on a reading of Section 16 of the NIA Act which

makes it clear that the Special Court may take cognizance of an

offence without the accused being committed to it for trial upon receipt

of a complaint of facts or upon a police report of such facts. What is

equally clear from a reading of Section 16(2) of the NIA Act is that

even though offences may be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, the Special Court alone is to try such offence –

albeit in a summary way if it thinks it fit to do so. On a conspectus of

the abovementioned provisions, Section 13 read with Section 22(2)(ii)

of the NIA Act, in particular, the argument of the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab based on Section 10 of the

said Act has no legs to stand on since the Special Court has exclusive

jurisdiction over every Scheduled Offence investigated by the

investigating agency of the State.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 667 OF 2020

BIKRAMJIT SINGH  Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB 

Author: R.F. Nariman, J.

Dated: October 12, 2020.

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